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It is my purpose in this thesis to draw out and discuss certain
relationships between modes and levels of theorizing, and social
practice. My intention is to explicate certain immanent connections
between epistemology and methodology, and social life -practice.
I propose to discuss these claimed connections in four different
schools of social science: Max Weber (and certain related neo-
Kantians), Hermeneutics, Positivism, and Critical theory.
I am especially concerned with the relationship between theory
and practice in theory- -specifically, with internal relations in theory
between:
1. epistemological positions (e. g., on fact/value, descrip-
tion and evaluation, subject and object, science and criticism)
and social, political, and moral issues and positions;
2. . epistemological and methodological positions and capacities
to conceptualize social and historical action;
3. levels of theory and modes of verification, i. e., the
relationship between a·theory's conjectures Ihypotheses truth
claims and the nature of evidence it regards as necessary
and/ or sufficient for its verification or fatsification;
4. the structures of knowledge and the interest structure
(generalized motives) of the species (i. e., can certain modes
of knowing be explained, as Habermas contends, by the struc-
ture of human action?); and
5. the theory of the relationship between theory and politlcal
and moral life.
The relationship between theory and practice in practice essen-
tially concerns the relationship between theory as the expression of
a specific mode of practice and labor, and the practice and labor of
individuals, groups, classes, and epochs. This latter area is the
traditional area of the sociology of knowledge which seeks to expli-
cate the social situatedness of all human knowledge. It is an area
of enormous complexity and my least concern in the thesis. It is
left mainly to suggestion and references (of those who have systema-
tically addressed these questions).
I proceed by examining key texts in each tradition. It need
hardly be said that I make no claims to deal exhaustively with each
-school (or author). Rather, I endeavor to demonstrate the central
assumptions and implications of each school through these key texts
recognizing full well that any claims that are made are specific to
these authors and do not represent all possible positions available
within each tradition.
I do not intend to discuss each school simply within the dimen-
sions above, but hope to develop the discussion, pointing out simi-
larities and differences, etc., across schools. Particularly, I
would like to show how critical theory and science highlight many
of the self-misunderstandings and inadequacies of the other three
schools. Finally, I intend to argue that the Critical school itself
is extremely vulnerable to a number of important and fundamental
criticisms which leave open a further series of questions and issues
which have yet to receive the attention they require.
Thesis Supervisor: Miles Morgan
Title: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
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INTRODUCTION
It is tny purpose in writing this thesis to draw out and discuss
certain relationships between m.odes and levels of theorizing and
social practice. My intention is to explicate certain im.m.anent
connections between epistem.ology and m.ethodology and social life-
practice. I propose to discuss these claim.ed connections in four
different schools of social thought and science: Max Weber (and
some related neo-Kantians), HerlTIeneutics, Positivism., and Critical
The terms "theory" and "practice" have a long and complex
history that dates back, at least, to the Gr~ek~"c~nceptsof "_th~~!_~~~.-'
Cl:nd "Eraxi~.~" The historicity of these terms need not concern us
here at any length, although an initial orientation to these term.s
is importa~t. 1 As Nicholas Lobkowicz points out in his history
of the concept of theory and practice from. Aristotle to Marx:
When today we oppose "practice" to "theory" we
usually have in m.ind lived life as,Jopposed to abstract
ideas, or else m.an's acting as opposed to his flm.ere tr
thinking and reflecting. 2
The terlTI Ilpractice lt or "practicall' in contem.porary English
usage frequently ilTIplies a denotation to "technically skilledfl
activities, activities which have specified uses and perhaps exchange
7
8value. The Greek term.s "praxis," however, in its ordinary usage,
had a broader sense and reference, i. e., to "doing" and llacting"
in general. As Lobkowicz writes:
The verb" ...,.p.c.,.. ....".)11 [pras s'$l has a}lumber ofclose~y
related m.eanings such as "I accom.plish (e. g., a
journey),11 III manage (e. g., a state of affairs), It
III do or fare (e. g., well or ill), II and, in general,
"I act, I perform. som.e activity. 113
(-\
"theoria." Although I1theoria l1 is som.etim.es rendered as I1contem.-
plation,11 "contem.plation, II as Richard Bernstein has noted, too
often tends to suggest "a receptive and passive state of mind. ,,4
In Greek usage, and in particular in Aristotle, II·ltheoria,l_ is a form.
of life that involves strenuous desciplined activity. 11 5 For the
Greeks the connotations of theoria and praxis were often intertwined
with a question that was frequently posed in their culture and tradi-
tion, namely, "which is the best and :most desirable of lives? ,,6
Within Greek philosophy systelTIatic reflection on the nature 'of
theoria and praxis was argued to reveal an ilTIlTIanent connection
between knowledge and a IIparticularly sublim.e way of life, II
7 - ~..: .:~ ~" _ ;,~- t~ D n \\7a ~ _'. - :. -I ('.:.:~ r1:11 ~ ~-: j.:. ,,1 Cr ~ , '., ,_ ...~
lIa truly free life. 11 This ·c'onnection -was· founded on the clai:med
ihsightfh~i-fhet~rithgf ~faf~in~nts is iink~aiiifiiri~teif Ilfg tli~:
In this thesis I will be concerned to explore the theory of
the relationship between theory and practice and, particularly, as
9first suggested by the Greek philosophic tradition, certain clai:med
i:m:manent connections between theory and practice. My initial
conceptions of theory and practice are cornm.onsensical and conven-
tional. On this account theory is a sche:ma or syste:m of statenlents
or ideas held to understand and/ or explain and/ or account for social
or natural phenotTIena. It is a hUlTIan creation, a product of social
activity. Practice refers potentially to the totality of hutTIan activity,
to the world~constitutive, self-fortTIative and self-generative activities
of the hu:man species or to sotTIe sp~cial sector of these activities
(where specified).
The essential guiding principle of this thesis is the study and
exalTIination of how Max Weber and certain neo-Kantians, Positivists,
Her:meneuticians, and Critical theorists conceive, characterize,
analyze, understand, and explain the relationship between theory
and practice. I will be concerned specifically with the relationship
between theory and practice in theory. I will also be concern"ed,
but to a :much lesser extent, with the relationship between theory
and practice in practice.
In exalTIining the theory of the relationship between theory and
practice in theory, I seek to analyze and understand the internal
relations between:
1. episte:mological positions (on fact/value, description
10
and evaluation, science and criticisln, subject and object):.
and social, political, and lnoral issues and positions. For
exam.ple, does holding certain epistelnological positions
entail commitments to particular :moral positions?
2. eptstemological and lTIethodological positions~and.
capacities to conceptualize social and historical action.
For exam.ple, do certain epistemological and Inethodological
presuppositions ilTIply specific characterizations of social
action? If so, what kinds of questions can and does a given
school ask about social action? Are any areas of potential
concerns and questions about social action closed off as a
result of a school l s initial presuppositions?
3. levels of theory .and lJ::l<?cl¢~-of>verifi:¢ation~. For exam.ple,
what is the relationship between a theory's conjectures/
hypotheses/truth claitns and the nature of evidence it regards
as necessary and/ or sufficient for its verification or falsifi-
cation?
4. the structures of knowledge ~andf·actiQn;" For exam.ple,
can the logical structure of scientific knowledge, certain
m.odes of knowing, be explained, as Habermas contends, by
the basic interests, or basic orientations, of the species?
5. the theory of the relationship between theory and
11
political and moral life. For exa:mple, how do different
schools and writers conceptualize the way theory should
inform. and guide social, political, and moral life? How do
different schools characterize the relationship between
theory and the social and political practice of individuals,
groups, classes, and epochs?
The relationship between theory and practice in practice essentially
concerns. the relationship between
1. theory as the ~xpressiori?£'~>spe¢i~i~!,rrio~eof practice
and labor and the practice and labor of individuals, groups,
classes, and epochs.
This latter area is the traditional arena of the sociology of know-
ledge which seeks to explicate the social situatedness of all hUInan
knowledge. The topics .::invoke~. by the sociology of knowledge are of
enormous co:mplexity and are my least concern in this thesis. This
whole area of inquiry is mainly left to suggestion and to reference
(of those who have systematically addressed these questions).
In concentrating attention on the relationship between theory
and practice in theory, it is my purpose and hope to shed light on
the status and character of certain aspects of social theorizing and
of the self-understanding and self-co:mprehension of theorists. A
discussion of these issues is claimed to be of significance to social
r,
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science, theory, and social scientific practice. It is, furthermore,
contended that they are by no Ineans only "abstract philosophicalll
questions of lilTIited acadelTIic ilTIport. They also have iInlTIanent
im.plications and consequences for the practice of political and
social life.
The work begins with an exam.ination of the writings, especially
the m.ethodological works, of Max Weber. 9 My intention is to
reconstruct Bom.e of the central concerns of Weber's sociology,
epistemology, and Inethodology. I will, in particular, be con-
cerned with the presence in Weber's work of certain claimed
dualisIns: the often perceived cleavages between fact and value,
description and evaluation, subject and bbject,~;;sc~enceand criticis:m,
and the claim.ed separation of theory and practice that follows in
their wake. It is :my hope in discussing Weber's work to critically
explicate its specifically Kantian and neo-Kantian underpinnings.
I chose to begin this thesis with a discussion of Weber for
three reasons: First, because his writings have been and continue
to be of central i:mportance to the shaping of conte:mporary social
science; second, because in his work we find detailed and irnpor-
tartt stateInents that explicitly place the dualis:ms we lTIentioned
above at the heart of sociology, episte:mology, and Inethodology;
and third, because we find hiITl often atte:mpting to integrate a
13
positivist and a herrn.eneutic conception of social science. The
latter two features of his work rn.ake it an enormously fruitful basis
on which to raise many of t~~~themes;-o'~this study.
The tensions and problems that are highlighted in Weber's
work sometilTIes find their source and origin in his attern.pt to
locate in social science a role for a nomothetic (generalizing) and
ideographic (individualizing) science. These respective dirn.ensions
o~ 1hi~" thought raise irn.portant questions and issues as to the
nature of a generalizing or individualizing (social) science. These
questions and issues are systematically addresse-d- ifi(-:Par.t 2.
In Part 2 I will discuss central aspects of the positivist and
hermeneutic prograrn.s for science. The former is a philosophical
expression of a generalizing science, while the latter is a theory
"that inforlTIs a conception of an individualizing science. In an
analysis of these schools a central thern.e of this thesis is developed;
narn.ely, that in positivist thought there is a tendency to reduce
practice to theory, and in hermeneutic thought there is a tendency
to reduce theory to practice. We will see that positiv~sm is u~Ja"1:)l~
to com.prehend science, where the latter is conceived, not as a
formal, self-enclosed system, but as hurn.an activity, as the prac-
tice of the cOlTIm.unity of investigators~. In the positivist program.,
theory was direm.pted from practice and the forIner becalTIe
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unable to co:mprehend and the:matize the latter. As a consequence,
positivist theory is unable to account for itself and so is unable to
justify itself. The her:meneutic tradition, on the other hand, places
at its center the concern to interpret and understand social practice.
However, within the herll1eneutic tradition we find a strong tendency
to reduce the role of theory to that of explicating practice. The
tradition tends not only to grant authenticity, but also authority, to
the categories and concepts of its subject/ object of investigation.
As such, within herll1eneutic episte:mology and ll1ethodology, it is
contended that theory falls into a relativisll1 and descriptivis:m, and
into a position whereby it is unable to justify its (soll1etill1es expressed)
clai:m to be advancing an understanding of an event in the world
which is som.ething more than just another everyday account.
In Part 3 I will try and show how the Critical tradition attem.pts
to overco:me the problelTIs associated with the previous three schools·
theories of objectivity and truth. The Critical tradition has
developed, with various degrees of rigour, positions which attelTIpt
to ground (ulti:mately justify) ·its choice of theoretical principles
and :methodological procedure. This tradition atte:mpts to :maintain
standards of objectivity and truth that are both of social practice
and independent of its imlTIediacies and contingencies. Unlike the
pJ;evio\ls ~three~ sclioolsj. the~ critical. school seeks to distinguish·
between:
(',
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- - -ideology and truth.
---false consciousness and true consciousness.
---understanding and critical understanding.
Within '1his rc ontext-:-~\wil1 (:e.xaniine (ce rtain..'6f~tllie ~·-w?rkS'of:~Ge6r,g
Lukacs, Max HorkheilTIer,:and Herbert Marcuse.
In Part 4 I expound and analyze the work of Jurgen Haberm.as.
Haberm.as directly confronts the central concerns and thelTIes of
this thesis. His work is a sweeping attem.pt to develop a system.a-
tic theory of the relationship between theory and practice, and to
ground a conception of a critical science. Throughout this thesis I
both use and refer to his work as a resource and topic. It should
be noted that Haberm.as' thought and writing have been extrem.ely
influential on (and to so:me extent inform.ed by) the thinking and
writing of a nu:mber of associates, notably Karl-Otto Apel, Albrecht
Welltner, Gerard Radnitzky, Thom.as McCarthy, and Trent Schroyer.
Their work often contains both very helpful elucidations and clarifi-
cations of Haberm.as' positions, as well as additions to (and develop-
:ments of his conception of a critical science. In this context
reference will be :made to their writings.
Throughout this thesis I will proceed by exa:mining key texts
in each tradition of social thought and science. It need hardly be
said that I :make no clciim.s to deal exhaustively with each school
16
(or author). Rather, I will endeavor to demonstrate the central
assumptions and implications of each school through these key
texts recognizing full well that a~y clailTIs that are lTIade are specific
to these authors and do not represent all possible positions available
within each tradition.
The discussion of each of the four schools of social science
is organized around a continuous concern with the theory of theory
and practice. I also approach each school with a direct concern to
investigate its central foci. In each part I hope to give an exegesis
of respective positions as well as a critique. I do not intend, how-
ever, to discuss each school sirnply within the dirnensions above,
but hope to develop the discussion:'i:·.pbinj.;ingtotitlsirnilarities and
differences, etc., across schools. Particularly, I would like to
show how critical theory and science highlight rnany of the self-
rnisunder~tandingsa.nd inadequacies of the other three schools.
It is very irnportant to note that throughout this thesis there
is a continually expressed interest in the capacity of social science
to be able tq~·generate a critical theory of society. By critical
theory (or critical science, or critique of ideology), I understand,
unless otherwise stated, a social theoretic position that is able to:
1. give an account of the concept of ideology.
2. support its pretensions to a critical perspective by
17
grounding its vision of ideology-free intersubjectivity, i. e. ,
clarify and justify in the notion of ideology, a neces sarily
i:mplied conception of a "self-conscious ll and "self-trans-
parent ll actor. In short, it :must be able to elucidate the
difference betw.eenfalse-consciousness and true-consciousness.
3. give a reconstruction of the natural-historical develop-
·m.ent of ideological structures of intersubjectivity.
In the analysis of Max Weber and the neo-Kantians, positivism,
and hermeneutics I atte:mpt to uncover how a critical perspective
is closed off as a result of episte:mological and m.ethodological pre-
suppositions. As a consequence we see how each school is unable
to conceptualize the proble:mati.c of ideology, the possibility of
syste:matic distortion in the self-understanding of co:m:munities,
societies, and tr.aditions. In this context of the:mes, certain
criticis:ms are m.ade of these three schools. In m.aking these criti-
cis:ms I often draw on the writings of the authors I discuss directly
in Parts 3 and 4. It is crucial, however, to reme:mber that in
m.aking these criticisms we not only raise a series of questions
which uncover issues and problem.s which the three schools do not
satisfactorily address, but also note that certain of these criticism.s
themselves depend for their viability on the capacity of the critical
tradition to II make .good" on them. In other words, the force of
,."
f'1
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the criticislTI, for exalTIple, that these three schools close off a
critical theoretic approach, rests on an assessment of the validity
of such a project. If the validity of such a project can be syste-
matically doubted, the previously expressed "criticism" loses
its status qua criticism. In criticizing the three schools r accounts
of objectivity and truth we lTIust be careful to explicate, clarify,
and justify presupposed standards.
In a discussion of the Critical school we see that SOlTIe of our
presupposed standards have, at best, an ambiguous status. I
intend to argue that the Oritical school itself is extremely vulnerable
to a nUlTIber of important and fundamental criticisIns. The Critical
school has not (as yet?) been able to develop a defensible theory of
objectivity and truth. Here I will argue that to the extent that this
school searches for ultimate fouridations, absolute standards, it
raises a multiplicity of problems. These problems are not simply
problelTIs internal to the critical tradition. They are also not
problems that can be solved within its terms of reference. In my
concluding remarks I suggest that the quest for ultimate foundations
implies a task which is theoretically and practically implausible.
The Critical enterprise cannot be grounded. However, this does
not mean that a critique of ideology is necessarily an unfounded
imposition on social life. It is my contention that the ·~piste:m.ol.ogical.
(""'1
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questions and issues could be refornlulated in a lTIanner COlTIInen-
surate with a conception of a critical progralTI in social science.
Such a progra:m, it is suggested, would be dependent for its validity
on an appreciation of the ilTIportant role a nOITlological and herlTIe-
neutic science can have. Needless to say, we are left, at the end,
with a further series of questions and problem.s which have yet to
receive the attention they require.
r.'
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PART I
MAX WEBER AND NEO-KANTIANISM:
THE ISSUES RAISED
·0
CHAPTER I
THE EXPANSION·-OF ·RATioNALIZATION: ~TH'E EMPIRICAL-
BASIS OF WEBER' S'1 (E-PISTEMOLO-GIGAL::PRBS lJPPOSITIONS
Introduction
In the following three chapters I will examine certain immanent
connections between Weber1s general interpretation of the social
tendencies of his times and his epistemological and methodological
work. Of particular concern will be the relationship between Weber's
recognized and unrecognized commitments to theory and practice as
developed in his theoreticalcw,r.itings-~cW·eberl'sadh~l:"·ence:-to certain
object, desGript~on and evaluation, will be discussed. I would also
like to suggest a relationship between that which his work subsumes
and the social life of an epoch and practice of a particular clas s.
The latter task is, unfortunately, mainly left to suggestion. It is here
a secondary task. To fulfill it, would require a massive study that
obviously cannot be carried through within the boundaries of this
thesis. In one of the best studies of Weber's life in Germany at the
turn of the century, Arthur Mitzman has attempted such a:study. In
The Iron Cage, Mitzman p.ersuasively argues that:
22
a.
b.
c.
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. . . generational conflict, aggravated both by the
special tensions of his falTIi~y and the suffocating
character of bourgeois society in IlTIperial Germany
did, indeed, underlie Weber's scholarly and politi-
cal perceptions;
that his formulation of liberal-imperialist ideology
reflects a stage both in his personal evolution and
in the psycho-social development of the German
bourgeois; and
that the "heroic pessimism" of the late Weber was
in large measure a result of his shattering conflict
with his father. . . which. . . reveals in contours
the underlying conflict. . . in .fin de siecle Germany
and that a similar hopelessness as to any conceivable
alteration of the merciless course of rationalization
and bureaucratization [was] the source of a great deal
of the estrangement and voluntarist irrationalism of
the age. 1
However, Mitzman's work, as a whole, has certain fundamental·
weaknesses, the most important of which is his option for the
methodology of Psycho -History. 2
In this study we hope to take up a number of the issues suggested
by our second task. But we will only have time to note a few critical
points and establish a direction for further investigation.
We b~gin this study with an exploration of the empirical basis
of Weber's epistemological presuppositions.
0.
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It will be seen that we cannot separate an interpretation 6f
Weber 1s methodology from his general interpretation of the social
tendencies in development during his life and times. 3 As Karl
Lliwith has emphasized, Weber 1s methodological standpoint can only
be comprehended adequately in close analysis and appreciation of his
other works, and more particularly, his general interpretation of
the rise of modern capitalism. 4 In fact, the perceived hopelessness
of the course of rationalization, with its resulting "disenchantment,"
may be conceived, as Jean Cohen has argued, to be "the foundation
for his epistemological presuppositions. 11 5 It is worth, for a
moment, exploring the concept of rationalization.
In Economy and Society Weber attempts to recount the history
of rationalization in the formal theory of rationality and domination,
the two central themes. Through them the concept of industrial
capitalism becomes concretized. Economy and Society is in large
measure an effort to determine the connections between rationality,
domination, and capitalism. Herbert Marcuse has summarized the
connection in its most general form:
the specifically Western idea of reason realizes
itself in a system of material and intellectual culture
(economy, technology, ll conduct of life, 11 science,
art) that develops to the full in industrial capitalism,
and this system tends toward a specific type of domi-
nation which becomes the fate of the contemporary
period: total bureaucracy. 6
The essential concept is Western Rationality.
~,
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In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber
sets out to discuss and account for the emergent instrumentalism
(the Spirit) of capitalism and to exa~ine the part which religious
ideas of ascetic Protestantism played in accounting for an ethos,
he believed, to be peculiar to the West. Weber points to the existence
of capitalist economic and commercial organizations before the
Reformation in order to refute any theory that attempted to hold that
the political-economic institutions of capitalism "were a result of
the Reformation. II He dismisses such a view as a I1foolish and
doctrinaire thesis. 11 7 He argues instead that he regards lithe
influence of economic development on the fate of religious ideas to
be very irnportant ll8 and declares that any further study of the
Protestant ~ethic would demonstrate "how Protestant asceticism was
in turn influenced in its development and character by the totality of
social conditions, especially economic. 119 The thesis has to be seen
in context of his other works.
Weber discusses a number of areas of social and economic
life in which elements of rationalization had advanced prior to the
outgrowth of modern capitalism. These early developments (e. g. ,
the emergence and formation of "rational jurisprudence l1 in Roman
law) are seen as having created an increasing capacity for, and
having a facilitating role in, the rise of capitalism. "The
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importance of Calvinism and other branches of ascetic Protestantism,
as Weber makes clear in The Protestant Ethic," is, as Anthony
Giddens has pointed out, "not that it was a 'cause t of the rise of
modern capitalism, but that it provided an irrational impetus to the
disciplined pursuit of monetary gain in a specified t calling I - -and
thereby laid the way open to the further spread of distinctive types
of rationalization of activity stimulated by the vicarious expansion
f · 1- ,,10,11o capIta Ism. The ascetic religious ethic sanctioned hard
work, resignation to one's "lot in life"; the division of labor, etc.;
integral components of liberal and organized capitalism. What were
the elements of rationalization?
The term is a complex one and is used to refer to a number of
sets of related phenomena. (1) There is a growth in mathematization,
as Marcuse pointed out, of "experience and knowledge"; the shaping
of all scientific practice according to the model of the natural sciences
and the extension of (scientific) rationality to "the conduct of life
itself." This in turn must be seen as part of a specific feature of
the secularization of the modern world which Weber often terms
the intellectualization (i. e., demystification and demagicification)
and/ or thei'disehoharitmentcof thetworld-.~ (T4el~_es.pe~tiye·-",charac..,; - -
terizations reflect Weber IS ambivalence to the program of the
Western, modern "spirit. II) (2) There is "the growth of rationality
(i
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in the sense of 'the methodological attainment of a definitely given
and practical end by the use of an increasingly precise calculation
of adequate means'. ,,12 The expansion of capitalism presides over
the final transformation of social relationships to the form which
approximates the'·~ide·all·~typ~,of 'Zw.eckratiohalitat·/ ~n which a ":-'
person rationally calculates the consequences that follow from the
h - (f ) f 1- h - d 13c Olce rom a range 0 means to accomp 1S a glven en .
(3) There is "the growth of rationality in the sense of the forma-
tion of tethics that are systematically and unambiguously oriented
to fixed goals I. ,,14
The rationalization of mythical, religious, or metaphysical
interpretations of reality takes numerous different forms. Weber
shows in his studies of China and India that the rationalization of
ancient and medieval world views may follow one or a combination
of the three elements above and 'may extend to a varying degree
through modes of social relation~hips and the orientation of social
conduct; modes of legitimacy, domination, and authority; classes
and status groups and the respective institutionalized universes of
symbolic meaning. Weber, furthermore, sought to demonstrate
that each of these three aspects of rationalization was promoted
much further by capitalism. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
discuss and trace the history of rationalization in all these forms. 15
('I
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It is, however, an important task of this work to show how this com-
plex concept provides an empirical basis and justification for his
epistemological presuppositions. But before we can discuss this
relationship and indeed explicate what these epistemological pre-
suppositions are, a number of additional points need to be noted.
In Parsons' highly influential discussion of Weber the suggestion
is made that the process of rationalization can best be described as
a law and, in fact, Parsons goes on to compare the process with the
second Law of Thermodynamics. 16 The process is not best under-
stood in this light. For Weber, rationalization, as the extension of
formal rationality, is not a unilinear law of all-embracing proportion.
Rather, the extension of formal rationality is seen to be dependent on
the outcome of conflicts with substantive rationality (which "cannot
be measured in terms of formal calculation alone, but also involves
a relation to the absolute values or to the content of the particular
ends to which it is oriented. . . . In principle, there is an indefinite
number of possible standards of value which are 'rational' in this
17
sense Jl ). Often an advance of formal rationality is itself an
unintended consequence of action oriented to substantive values. The
extension of formal rationality results also, it is argued, in the
generation of unintended irrationalities of a formal and substantive
kind. "In short, 11 as Cohen put it, "the process of rationalization
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can be seen as a dynamic between formal and substantive rationality.1I18
Formal rationality is the organization and orientation of action
to formal laws, rules, and norms; it was the expression of contem-
porary reason, both the result ,ofarid-rinipetus to anj~mpers'onal, bureau-
cractic order, an order of precise calculation, of objective scientific
rationality. But with the increasingly impartial, tria-ir; It and modern
worlddwe:;conti'nuaUw risk the "dialectic of the enlightenment. ,,19
The extension of formal rationality to tithe conduct of life" becomes
a concern for Weber also as a "form of domination"; means becoming
ends, social rules becoming reified objectifications commanding
directions, the market becoming a key mechanism in the orientation
of conduct and planning. Rationalization expressed as formal
rationality spins off its own dynamic and depersonalizes both history
.and social structure. The very products of human activity are seen
as having a strong tendency to be apprehended lias if they were some-
thing other than human products - -such as facts of nature, results of
cosmic law. . . 11 20 Impersonal forces threaten the role of sub-
jectivity. "It is precisely here, II Cohen has suggested, "that sub-
stantive rationality or action oriented to the particular, qualitative
needs of man as the ultimate value, intervenes and presents tensions
f · 1· · ,,21and limits to the process 0 ratlona lzatlon. In Cohen's view,
"as formal rationality advances, it evokes counterforces all along
·30
22the way. If This, indeed, seems to a large extent to be Weber's
position. But there is an important point that has not yet been made
that should be stressed. Weber was increasingly pessimistic and
doubtful that action oriented to substantive issues could limit the
process of formal rationalization in the modern era. 23 If such sub-
stantively oriented action was absent or of insufficient strength to
provide such a limit, Weber thought this should not be the case and
a limit to formal rationality ~~igorously defended (as the theme of
J1Politics'as"a:VVoca'tiQnn![sugg'est~'>:24 How he sought to protect a
realm of values we take up later.
Weber's ambivalence to this process and the historical exten-
sion of formal rationality ~as-:already>been-briefly. m'entioned;- It is
"'-r..
crucial, nonetheless, according to him, to realize that the resultant
"disenchantment'l acts as a critique of traditional world views (e. g. ,
Christianity). This means:
. . . principally [thad there are no mysterious
incalculable:fo~c·es;that come into play, but rather
that one can, in principle, master all things by
calculation;. This means that the world is dis-
enchanted. One need no longer have recourse to
magical means in order to master or implore the
spirits, as did the savage for whom such mysterious
powers existed. Technical means and calculations
perform the service. This is above all what intellec-
tualization means. 25
The basis for the attribution of ultimate meaning and value-univer-
salism by world views is undermined. In the modern, rational,
r31
disenchanted world there is no simple reconciliation for "ultimately
possible attitudes towards life ... their 'struggle' can never be
brought to a final conclusion. 1126
The rationale of action under capitalism, given the pervasive-
ness of Zweckrationalit~t, can only be based on value -Juc;lgments and
preferences, on individual~y chose!). values, based in turn on an
lJethic of responsibility. II The only account that we can give of our
ultimate values is through a description of the processes whereby
we choose them; the only justification of our values lies in the coher-
ence and clarity of our choice. The coherence of our substantive
rationality; our values and upheld goals was open, in Weber's view,
to critical tests in discourse. An ethic of responsibility was based
on the rational, scientific consideration and calculation of possible
consequences of claimed necessary means, in the pursuit of an end,
1 t - 27goa, or ac lone But, the choice between'values, in the last
("'-I
instance, was the unique prerogative of the individual. "It is the
responsibility of each person to judge and decide." There is no
ultimate justification, but the calculated choice of an individual to
"which of the warring gods we should serve. ,,28 The struggle to
choose am.ongst gods is, ultimately, an irrational one.
Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible
attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and
hence their struggle can never be brought to
a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to
make a decisive choice. 29
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Our decisioonois, in the last analysis, based on faith: "only on the
assum.ption of belief in the validity of our values is the atteInpt to
espouse value -judgeInents meaningful. However, to judge the
validity of such values is a matter of faith. ,,30 This is, as Weber
put it, "the fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of know-
ledge.
"
An account of ultimate meaning can no longer be
,0
\0
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grounded. There are no longer world-views which can have any
ultimate basis to command intersubjective agreement.
Weber never IIdistanced tl himself froIn this position. It is a
position commensurate with the unfolding of Western Rationality.
It is a position, as we shall see, that also subsumed and sanctioned
this rationality and an individualistic, atomistic ontology.
I
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CHAPTER II
SCIENCE IN THE LIGHT OF DISENCHANTMENT:
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE; WEBER'S
DOCTRINE OF VALUE-FREEDOM, OBJECTIVITY,
AND THE ROLE OF METHOD
The process of rationalization is then, an agent 'in the demysti-
fication of the social world. With and because of disenchantment,
the undermining of the legitimatizing efficacy of cultural traditions;
the central questions of men's collective existence and .ofindividual
life history no longer found or could find an all-embracing' world-
view with systematic answers, providing a coherent and cohesive
social identity. "Now," and as a result, Weber argued, lias soon
as w.e:attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in
immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity
of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events,
both 'within' and 'outside' ourselves. ,,1 'rPi)those who have eaten of
the tree of knowledge, reality no longer appears with the cohesion of
one constituted by myth, religion, and metaphysical world-views,
but as a totality "in bewegung"- -a "heterogeneous flux. "
For Weber, the consequences of disenchantment were, as we
shall see, multifarious. Of these and of primary importance, was
36
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that historical reality became conceived in identical terms to those
which Kant had conceptualized natural reality. For Weber, history
was, then, a cultural manifold of infinite richness; for Kant, natural
reality was a sensous manifold. 2 The "absolute infinitude" of this
reality, this multiplicity, "is to remain undiminshed, 11 for Weber,
~~evenwhen our attention is focused on a single 'object, ' for instance,
a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attetnpt an exhaus-
tive description of all the individual components of this 'individual
phenomenon 1 to say nothing of explaining it causally. 11 3 Causal
analysis evinces the same character; "an exhaustive causal investiga-
tion of any concrete phenomenon in its full reality is not only prac-
4
tically impossible--it is s~mply nonsense. " How then can social
science embrace reality?
Since reality is unknowable in its infinity, the' "object" of
investigation is delineated and constituted 'by the scientific investi-
gator. For Weber, all knowledge is a result of constitution; all
cognition and rationality are to be located on the side of the knower.
The scientific investigator proceeds according to his or her own
individual "values" and cognitive interests. The knowledge generated
by scientific practice is in consequence seen to be partial and one-
sided. But having said this, Weber, nevertheless, claims "objectivity"
for the social sciences and scientific "truths" / "proofs II as value-
:(1
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free. What is the nature of his argument? How can we conceptua-
lize Weber's position?
The core of Weber's discussion of the nature of "objectivityll
consists in the attempt to clarify the Illogical relationships '1 between
scientific and value judgments. The discussion revolves around
their incompatibility and differences. For Weber, this most definitely
does not imply an attitude of "moral indifference"; such an attitude
"has no connections with scientific 'objectivity'. ,,5 (The authority
of science, in Weber's view, as we shall see, rests on an explicit
commitment.) It does, howeyer, imply a complex attitude that
pivots on what he calls "value -orientations" and rational method
(that guarantees the Ifobjectivityrr of scientific results). The under-
pinning assumptions of this view, and the view itself, need careful
explication and analysis.
According to Weber, "The type of social science in which we
are interested is an empirical science of conc~etei~·!reali.ty.-[Wi-rk1:Lch-
keitswissenschaft] ,,6 and our aim is to:
a. ... understand the characteristic uniqueness of
social reality, the relationships and the cultural
significance of individual events [and phenomena; and
b. ... to understand the causes of these events] being
historically so and not otherwise. 7
Since social and cultural reality is infinite, the question arises:
how can we know and conceptualize a part of this reality?
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The number and type of causes which have influenced
any given e:vent are always infinite and there is
nothing in the things themselves to set some of
them apa;rt as alone meriting attention. A chaos
of "existential judgements" about countless indi-
vidual events would be the only result of a serious
. attempt to analyze reality "without presuppositions. 11
And even this result is only seemingly possible,
since every single perception discloses on closer
exatnination an infinite nutnber of constituent per-
ceptions which can never be exhaustively expressed
in a judgement. Order is brought into this chaos
only on the condition that in every case only a part
of concrete reality is interesting and significant to
us, because only it is related to the cultural values
with which we approach reality. Only certain sides
of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon,
namely those to which which we attribute a general
cultural significance - -are therefore worthwhile
knowing. 8~:~ [Emphasis added in last sentence. ]
~:~Weberls discussion of the "cultural significance 11 criterion
for problem selection (cf. M. S. S., pp. 74-77.) '~s :::ambig\J:Ous; ,-
Parsons argues that Weber insisted on the very great importance
of the cultural significance of a problem for the values of the time
in determining the directions of the interest of the investigator.
Miles Morgan, on the other hand, has pointed out that a careful
reading of the texts reveals several inconsistencies in Weber IS usage
of the terms. It is unclear by whose estimation a problem is to be
regarded as "culturally significant l1 : the investigator 1s, or the
society ls begin studied, or people 1s in different groups in a given
society or which culture 1s lI s ignificance" is to be used (even given
that all I1 cultures 1J take the phenomenon to be ll s ignificant 1t in some
w9-Y or another)? Broadly, Weber IS remarks on the interest of the
investigator indicate the social scientists 1 sense of lI s ignificance"
is central, and his remarks on Verstehen, which we discuss at
length in the following chapter, indicate the subject's sense of
"significance 1J is the most important.
{',
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Given the nature of reality we cannot, Weber argues, give an exhaus-
tive description or causal explanation. Weber assumed that a true
picture of concrete reality was impossible and that no individual or
collective scientific enterprise could furnish an lIa bsolutely 'objec-
tive" ,,9 or authentic "copy of reality." Saloman, reflecting on
such statements, has correctly observed that for Weber "the utmost
that can be accomplished by such sciences, either in the historical
or the social disciplines, is, through reasoned thought, to bring
order into the world of reality, which is in a state of ceaseless flux.
The principles of classification by which this order is to be achieved,
must be imposed by the scientist himself. ,,10
Weber\'!s:i:nethodological standpoint consequentially hinges upon
the establishment of certain di~hotomies; between reality as infinite
and science as finite; between subjectivity in science and objec~ivity
in science; and between "rationality" and "irrationality. II
The objective validity of all empirical knowledge
rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given
reality according to categories which are subjec-
tive in a specific sense, namely, in that they pre-
sent the presuppositions of our knowledge and are
based on the .P!~.~~py~~it~?n'~of:the2,valuec6fLthose
truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to
give us.... But these data can never become the
foundation for the empirically impossible proof of
the validity of the evaluative ideas. The belief
which we all have in some form or other, in the
meta-empirical validity of ultimate and final values,
in which the meaning of our existence is rooted, is
not incompatible with the incessant changefulness
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of the concrete viewpoints, from which empirical
reality gets its significance. Both these views are,
on the contrary, in harmony with each other. Life
with its irrational reality and its store of possible
meanings is inexhaustible. nIl
We need to ask more about how these dichotomies were established.
Central to any attempt to explore the polarities Weber estab-
lished is an understanding of the distinction between value -judgments
and value-orientations. ~:<. It is important to emphasize that Weber's
notion of value -freedom was concerned explicitly with the relation-
ship of science to value-judgments. As distinct from a value-
orientation, a value -judgment is used to evaluate an object, to express
prefer~rice, approval, or dislike, etc. Such judgments are not in
any ~aypart of science.
IIBy 'value -judgements 1 are to be understood, where nothing
else is implied or expressly stated, practical evaluations of the
unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to
our influence. 11 12 And, as Weber states: "The social sciences,
which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to presume
to save the individual the difficulty of lTIaking a choice, and they
~It should be noted that Weber rarely, if ever, made (detailed)
arguments for the positions we are attempting to sUInlTIarize in his
name. Rather, for example, The Methodology 'of the Social Sciences
reads like a series of position statetnents.
(-
·n
(';
I
I
I
•
42
should not create the impression that they can do so. ,,13 In fact,
the position that he seeks to sustain in "The Meaning of 'Ethical
14
Neutrality'" and elsewhere, is that if scientific methodologies,
theories, and validity claims neither entail nor imply value-judg-
ments, they are then value-free.
15Weber's position on value-freedom, it can be argued, arose
as a response to two factors. Firstly, he sought to protect science
from. lithe present political situation. II ~!Everyone knows..... ;:<that
. . . vital questions which are of decisive political significance are
permanently banned from university discussion, II and in view of
that fact It. • • it seems to me to be only in accord with the dignity
of a representative of science to be silent as well about such value-
problems as he is allowed to treat. 1f16 Secondly, he sought to pro-
teet lithe Jrea:lin of values If from the increasing encroachment of
· 1- · H h·· h 17 h· · · frat10na 1zatlon. ence 1S Vlews on testate, 1S cr1tlque 0
those that viewed the state as a value in itself! :l8aand his famous
stres son charismatic leadership and "politics as a vocation. If 19
With such distinctions Weber attempted to establish an enclave for
science and an enclave for value-judgments. Such an attempt
reflects Weber's. anxiety to provide a limit to the rationalization of
everyday life and yet to preserve the benefits of "the fruit of the
tree of knowledge. 11
f;'
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The discussion of value-freedom, Weber makes clear, pre-
supposes the crucial questions about the nature of "objectivity"
itself.
,When we distinguished in principle between "value-
judgem.ents" and "empirical knowledge, II we pre-
supposed the existence of an unconditionally valid
type of knowledge in the social sciences, i. e., the
analytical ordering of empirical social reality.
This presuppostion now becomes our problem in
the sense that we must discuss the meaning of
objectively "valid" truth in the social sciences.
The genuineness of the problem is apparent to
anyone who is aware of the conflict about methods,
1ffundamental concepts" and presuppositions, the
incessant shift of "viewpoints, 'I and the continuous
redefinition of "concepts" and who sees that the
theoretical and historical modes of analysis are
still separated by an apparently unbridgeable
gap...20
Weber's famous claim that social scientific knowledge is constituted
with reference to value has already been noted. 21 At a preliminary
level the influence of val":les or presuppositions ("value -orientations")
is not only not denied but seen as the very principle that makes
"objectivity" possible in the first place (and prevents Iia chaos.
of judgements ll ). 'As with the Heidelberg school of .neo-Kantians,
the "theoretical relation to values rather than interfering with the
acquisition of objective knowledge, becomes the active subjective
precondition which allows us to acquire objective historical know-
ledge. It allows us to detach froIn, historical reality. . . (an infinite
richness) ... , a definite object. 11 22 This is a key part of Weber's
:~
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position. If historical and social reality is best characterized as
"nothing more" than an infinitely detailed manifold there can be
(a) not only no objective analysis of it but also (b) no most profitable
starting point from which we might best begin an examination and
investigation of social phenomena.
There is no absolutely "objective'!-.sci~ntific'analy-
~sis.of(culturec'; fe .0 'of ~bci~l,ph.enom-e1?-a.iridependent
of special and "one -sided
"
viewpoints according
to which--expressly or tacitly, consciously or
unconsciously--they are selected, analyzed and
organized for expository purposes. 23
As Cohen observed, "Rationalization and disenchantment result in
th~ fragmentation of the knower into a one-sided specialist and in
the fragmentation of knowledge into separate partial systems con-
stituted according to one -sided viewpoints. 1124
. Thus the ~tudy of social phenomena presupposes value-
orientations and the work of the social and/ or historical investigator
cannot be conceived independent of them.' Indeed, the very naming
of a phenomenal object as a cultural or socia-economic object or
event, reveals the interplay of values which cannot be taken as a
given. liThe quality of an event as a 'socia-economic' event is not
something which it possesses 'objectively'.: It is rather conditioned
by the orientation of our cognitive interest, as it arises from the
specific cultural significance which we attribute to the particular
event in a given case. ,,25 The concept of culture is then, for exaIllple,
45
a "value -concept. ,,26 Therefore, the facts we select for study
depend also on "a small portion of existing concrete reality. . .
coloured by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant
27
to us. " Likewise,"... the extent or depth to which. . . the
. . . investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal
web. . . is . . . determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate
the investigator and his age. ,,28 For Weber, the explication of
value-orientations serves to locate--individually, socially, and
historically--the human sciences. It is a thesis that attempts to
take seriously the relativity of the investigatorl's "presuppositions"I/;
the recognition that detachment of an "object" for investigation (from
the Itcultural manifold") speaks of the investigator, not of the object
lri~1ts-e1~f;; the recognition that "the stream of immeasurable events"
that "flows unendingly toward eternity ll29 "freezes" science in its
30youth; the recognition that ·'every science, every single descrip-
I
I
I()
tive history, operates with the conceptual stock in trade of its
times. ,,31 For Weber, there was a potentially inexhaustible num-
ber of alternative ways to describe, analyze, and account for social
'-
reality. The result is an expectation and tolerance of a relativism
in regard to theory (which is grounded in his relativism in regard to
value - -th~ ltresult" (of a rationalized and disenchanted world).
...'--.......'--......
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Weber's view of value-relativism, it should be noted, does not
imply that '·social phenomena" or "cultural objects" are appraised
according to some schema of values. The history of art, he states,
must be distinguished from an aesthetically evaluative approach. 32
Rather, it can be argued, the thesis of value-relativism attempts to
distinguish the appraisal of objects by value schema (which would con-
elude that 11 some envisaged or actual state of affairs is worthy of
approval or disapproval l1 ) from their characterization (which affirms
that "a given characteristic is in some degree present (or absent)
in a given instance,,);~33 according to their "significance ll or IImean- '
ing" within the structure of cultural values of the investigator himself.
This view is not without its tensions. For, firstly, "while
reference to value makes possible objective knowledge of a cultural
or historical object, tr as Goddard put it, Weber also want to hold,
as we have seen, that "knowledge is condemned to remain incomplete.
The criterion of the real ultimately renders the real unknowable as
to its intrinsic or true nature or structure, or its objective mean-
34
ing. II Secondly, the implicit distinction between appraising and
characterizing establishes a false dichotomy. Weber1s attempt to
simply characterize an object implies or takes for granted a further
schema of values that restricts social scientific practice, "by a
meta-theoretical assertion, If to the trproductionll of knowledge which.
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"must have an exclusively descriptive [i. e., a nonevaluative, non-
judgmental] -coritent. 1I~~r.-However, this assertion hides an evaluation,
a commitment to a particular form of rationality and, as we shall
see, a certain type of practice. These points need further careful
explication.
Weber's position is clarified and better understood in light of
the previous discussion of the empirical basis of Weber's epistemo-
logical presuppositions. With rationalization came "disenchantment fl
and the Ifintellectualization" of the world, the perception of the world
as infinitely complex. This process Weber saw as undermining the
possibility of attaining value -consensus in the constitution of the
world and, consequently, destroying the foundation for a collectively
attained consciousness. The end result of this process, for the
context of our discussion, was a multitude of competing value-
claims, v~lue-relativism, no value of which could 'have a privileged
status. There was, in Weber's view, no ultimate justification for
any value. As a result, which we previously noted, Weber sought
to keep value-judgments outside the realm of science.
Weber's view of the human sciences rests"~on:·'a~~·i~teJ;pretation
of developments in the whole of society, on interpretations which"
if it is to have validity, as Haberrnas has pointed out, "presupposes
a m.ore pretentious concept of sociology, ,,36 i. e., a sociology that
48
is able to grasp the totality of a given social formation, the dominant
trends in it and make fundamental claims about them. 37 Indeed, as
we shall see, Weber's conception of social science is, to a signifi-
cant degree, constituted by his conception of the essence of the
modern era, his pessimism and resignation to what he considered
the "fate of our time"--rationalization, etc. (lithe inescapable con-
dition of our historical situation tr ).
Weber claims scientific practice to be free of the value-
judgments of the social and historical scientist. But this claim.
hinges on a belief in the value of scientific truth and its:~having
synonymity with "objectivity. tI A value -judgment is concealed:
"The capitulation to, and acceptance of, the rationalized world--as it
appears. The method of formal rationality (use of nonevaluative
concepts) is an expression of Weber's evaluation of the meaning of
the rationalized, meaningless world, of his acceptance and resigna-
- h- - 1· · 11 38tlon to t 1S ratlona lzatlon. In arguing for scientific truth as
objectivity, he presupposes the rationality of this society. The fate
of the modern world is the unalterable foundation of "science." Let
us examine this claim further.
The rigid demarcation Weber draws between value -judgments
and scientific practice has parallels to one of the central tenets of
positivism: that facts and values are separable and that value-
judgments have no cognitive bases'. In the positivistically oriented
social sciences, this presupposition has consequences not only on
the lepi~temological level of self-misunderstanding of science.but,:
also, on the level of social theory and social practice, e. g., social
policy planning. To believe in the dichotomy of "objective" know-
ledge (facts) and values is in effect to attempt to divorce theory
from practice. Despite Weber's concern with the interplay of value'"
orientations and, as we shall see, his views about the role of
scientific practice, he, nevertheless, ultimately reestablished this
. dichotomy as a fundamental tenet of his view of the sciences. Weber's
position amounts, in effect, to separating theoretical reason from.
practical reason and restricting claims to objective, true knowledge
to the sphere of the former. This dichotomy, as we emphasize
because their very claimed status is an inadequate conceptualization
later, supports a technocratic consciousness and leads into a
of contemporary capitalism. (These factors are held to be ideological
'n~
r
;
i
j
I
i
!('1
I
d - .... · t· th· 39ee·1SlonlS lC e lCS; ideological factors central to the organization
of the nature of their own status. )
Under the guise of a value -free science, Habermas has
attempted to demonstrate that positivist social science masks its
true nature af? a proponent of ~. quite specific form of rationality and
practice. 40 This much, we contend, Weber has in common with
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positivism. 41 N. B. There are strong parallels between our claims
about Weber's own self-Il1isunderstanding and miscomprehension of
the status of his own claims, and those of the positivists. The
details of Habermas' argument against positivism cannot be made
here but the points of immediate relevance to our discussion of
. 42Weber should be drawn out.
In the name of his own view of science and rationality, Weber
felt that he was able to launch a critique of ideology aimed at rooting
out competing theories which a~e supposedly value-laden and, there-
fore, illegitimately claiming scientific status. 43 But, as we have
j1.lst pointed out, this critique is -laden with a schema of values, an
evaluation which Weber overlooks. Although not recognized as such,
an "interest. in technically useful knowledge (i. e., knowledge which
can ~id decisions on substantive questions by providing, for example,
knowledge of the choice and effectiveness of means, regularities,
etc. )44 and the rationality which embodies it, are values assumed
by this (and the positivist) conception of science. They are nof
recognized as values because of a persuasive definition qf (scientific)
rationality which makes such rationality coincide with purposive,
rational, scientific procedures. Thus the rationality concept under-
lying Weberian.science is that of a formal rationality, c.a means-ends
rationality:
r .
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... simply, efficiency of means to given ends.
These values are accorded a privileged status since
they are implied in .Irational" procedure itself. . . 45
In the name of value -freedom this criticism of ideologies dictates
the value-system for all other modes of scientific practice. Theo-
retical objective knowledge is made coextensive with a particular
form of method, rationality, and scientific practice. Questions of
practical reason are ruled out of the range of science and b~yond
rational inves.tigation (although, as we shall see, Weber IS views of
the role of science do specify that science can be critical of the
coherence and "practicality·' of ends). Not being open to rational
solution, practical questions become the province of the private
individual and, in the final instance, can be justified only by refer-
ence to a decision; ethics becomes decisionism and not open to cog-
nitive mediation.
Thus the belief in the fact-value, theory-practice dichotomies
leads to contradictory results. In the name of value -freedom (i. e. ,
freedom from "value-judgments II), a certain schema of values is
championed to the exclusion of all others. (On this conception,
Weber's understanding of the role of values [value-orientations]
is singularly inadequate. For his conception of the interplay of science
and value-orientations implies orientations with more extensive
commitments.) Furthermore, despite;;Weber's tacit-'claim that theory
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~nd practice a-re es sentially two distinct realms, a particular form of
practic~·.. is sanctione_d~ .Weber:ts-:see-min·gly passive. conte~plative sci-
entific:'reason:masks.an1underlying level of committed reason.
In the name of value -freedom, Weber smuggles in a value-
laden concept of' rationality and implicitly sanctions that which he
most feared: the spread of formal rationality. Substantive rationality
is suppressed in the "innocent partisanship for formal rationality.,,46
The effect on social theory of this hidden value-orientation is a con-
ceptualization'of Itscience,1I "scientific problems, 11 "social prob-
lems" and "alternative solutions" which encourages the spread of
formal rationality. Substantive rationality, i. e., the rationality of
ultimate ends, was held to be independent of science. But because
of the fact-value dichotomy, substantive rationality could not itself
be rationally justified and could not be used to ultimately ground
value choices. Thus there was no way to rationally combat the
spread of formal, means ~end rationality as a value, i. e., the pro-
cess of rationalization which enthroned science and the technical
values of economy and efficiency as ultimate values. Weber saw no
historical alte rnative to the "fate of our time" although he s ought to
protect an enclave for values and justify a limit to the process of
rationalization. But while not endorsing ZweckrationalitUt and its
threat to monopolize reason, Weber, nevertheless, succumbed in
:0
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the end to its logic- -by grounding science in it. As Habermas wrote,
It is ironical, however, that, as we have seen, this
recommendation of a restrictive concept of science
rests on an interpretation of developments in the
whole of society: ... In his own work Max Weber
did not keep within the limits set by positivism: he
was, however, in agreement with the Neo-Kantians,
positivistic enough not to allow himself to reflect
upon the connection between his methodological
perspective and rules, and the results of his social
analysis. 47
These connections need further explication. They will be discussed
and developed throughout the remainder of this thesis. They also
will be further illustrated in our discussion of how Weber approached
t'~usal~ty 'and methoq. and what he himself thought science could tell
us. These topics must be temporarily put aside, but will be taken
up later. It is necessary, first, to explore in greater detail Weber IS
relationship to Kant and the neo -Kantians.
The theoretical positions Weber adopts overlap in many impor-
tant respects with those of Kant and the neo-Kantians of his day.
The elaboration of this theme provides further insight into his dis-
cussion of "objectivity" and the claim that there exists "an uncon-
ditionally valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i. e., the
analytical ordering of empirical social reality, " the full nature of
,-",
\ .'
which we have yet to elaborate. The discussion serves further to
highlight the tension between value -relativism and "objectivity" and
the tension between Weber's methodological position and what we
have hitherto referred to as his subsumed and more "pretentious
concept of sociology. 11
In the C.ritique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that "nature" is
scientifically known to the hum~n consciousness through the opera-
tions of the Understanding. We cannot know IIthings-in-themselves fl
(the noumenal character of phenomena are inaccessible to the under-
standing). We can claim to know on~y what is mediated by the trans-
cendental principles, rules, and representations of human conscious-
ness (the phenomenal world). 48 N. B. It is precisely with this con-
text in mind that D. Goddard has noted that:
Weber follows Kant fully here, since he argues that
the IIm.eaning ll of history [i. e., o1?jec~ive-meaning,
in the sense, for example, of history embodying' an
objective teleology] is inaccessible and that the
actual, empirical objectivity of phenomena is only
possible through the synthetic operations of
consciousness. 49
Goddard further argues that a formal analogy with Kant's
critique of reason may be advanced. First, it may be noted that
Kant. . . took as given that the perceptual world
was atom.istic in character. Perceptions are dis-
tinct and separate from each other.... The
sensuous m.anifold presents itself as . . . a mosaic
of im.pressions which ... could only be unified
through the spontaneous operation of the understa:nding.
Sense data are given as subject to unification.
Here is the first parallel with Weber.
For Weber reality is
\-
. . . "an infinitude of details," "an infinite rich-
ness," "a finite segment of the meaningless
infinity of the world process." It has no meaning
or significance, nor any internal bond or connec-
tion, except that which is conferred on it by the
operations of a meaning-endowing consciousness.
In other words, the historical process also pre-
sents itself as a mosaic of confused events and
actions, the total investigation of the detail of
which must always lead to an infinite regress
resulting in::a "chaos of existential judgements. 1150
'().
Secondly, noting the influence of the neo-Kantians (and particularly
Rickert), we saw that
. . segments of that manifold only become cultural
constellations or objects, having a certain unity of
meaning, by reference to value or meaning, or, as
it might be put, under the form of meaning. In the
same way we find in Kant that temporality and
spatiality are the conditions under which sense -data
are received. Sense-data present themselves as
stable objectivities (phenomena) under these forms
alone. Nothing in the external world can 'be con-
sidered phenomenal, that is, be anything more than
a vague and confused impression, unless it satisfies
these conditions.
However , thirdly,
. . . phenomena remain distinct and separate unless
connection is imposed on them by the pure under-
standing. They are subject to ratification. Thus a
temporal sequence A-B-C-D may have no connection
unles s the temporal relationship is ratified under the
law of causality, the principal category of the under-
standing in which Kant was interested. 51
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There is, of course, an extraordinary conjunction andcomple-
mentarity between Weber's Kantianism and his sociological investi-
gations. Whereas the theme of rationalization can be seen as the
empirical basis (or concretization) of ihis epistemological pre-
suppositions, it is clear that his epistemological presuppositions
themselves were in part Kantian. But in discussing~the category of
causality (which was crucial for Weber), we will see that he develops
the Kantian epistemological viewpoint as he both extends the cate-
gory's significance for the human sciences and locates its role within
a complex methodology.
For Weber, the parti~ular concepts we deve~op cannot repre-
sent reality. The elaboration of concepts serves to "clarify a singu-
lar event or phenomenon. and facilitates the construction of a syste-
matic or rational picture of a segment of culture in order to establish
its internal meaning and to discover its adequate causation. ,,52 Yet
the concepts themselves accentuate already selected aspects of
reality; for instance, an ideal-type "is formed by the one-sided
accentuation of one or more points of view. . . which are arranged
according to Jthose )one -sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified
analytical construct (Gedankenbild). ,,53 An ideal-type is constructed
by the abstraction and combination of a number of elements which,
although given in reality, are stressed and constituted from the point
57
of view we are interested in. ~:~ As Goddard has correctly observed,
1tthe ideal-type endows features of cultural experience, which other-
wise would remain indistinct, with a clear and precise meaning.,,54
The result is that the concepts generated permit us to make a pre-
cise analysis of it from the value -orientation we took toward it.
The question remains, however, what is the status of this
analysis, given Weber's claim that it can be "objective," if our
topic of investigation is constituted by value and if our concepts are
both value and empirically relative?
The answer lies ~Jith Weber's emphasis on rational method.
On this claim rests Weber's attempt to have separated "science
from faith. "
In 1tSc ience as a Vocationll and '10bjectivity in the Social
Sciences," Weber- states that all scientific work presupposes two
things: (1) " ... that the rules of logic and method are valid, II
i. e., a "rational method, 11 55 and (2) that "what is yielded by scien-
tHie work is important in the sense that it is "worth being known.,,56
The former presupposition is crucial for the claims to objectivity,
~:~Ideal~types are not formed purely through theor-etical ;'~
r~flectibn~:'-;-' R~the.r, .-they ar~e~:lTI~di~~ed~and.-_sharpene'd~through ~ -! ..
empirical analysis and in turn further aid the' exactness of that
analysis. (Cf. Weber, M. S. S., pp. 32-47 and 90-98.) The role
of ideal-types will be discussed further in the next chapter.
put it,
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for it is argued that "rational method" in the social sciences "
if it is to achieve its purpose. . ." must generate "systematically
correct scientific proofs ll that must be "acknowledged as correct
even by a Chinese--or--more precisely stated--it must constantly
strive to attain this goal, which perhaps may not be completely
attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore, the successful logical
analysis of the content of an ideal and ultimate axiom and the dis-
covery of the consequences which arise from pursuing it, logically
and practically, must also be valid for the Chinese. ,,57 That is to
say, despite the interplay of values, rational method is claimed to
be the ·basis on which truths/proofs are produced having cross-
cultural inter -subjective validity~
This does not imply that validity claims generated by "rational
methods 11 (or the "ideal" mentioned above) will be accepted or
rejected across cultures. In the second presupposition, as Weber
"are contained all our problems" ;58
, .. for this presupposition cannot be proved by
scientific means. It can only be interpreted with
reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must
reject or accept according to our ultimate posi-
tion towards life. 59
In fact, Weber states that our evaluation of the importance and status
of science and / or scientific proofs is its elf historical (a product of
the Ilrationalization" of everyday life). What, then, does Weber
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mean by Ilvalid proofs, II etc.q It appears that Weber might have
two views on this issue.
It seems, first, that Weber wants to argue that "the Chinese 1f
would accept the validity (despite supposedly distanced cultural
norms) of rational methods (e. g., rules for logical inference,
rational thought, i. e., an appropriate methodology), but might well
reject the interpretive framework, the explanation, the explanans
of a Western advanced, industrial, and scientific culture. liThe
Chinese" might prefer and, argue instead for accounts and explana-
tions of the (social) world underpinned by, for example, moral or
. religious standpoints. In other words, '''the, Chinese" might accept
the validity claims generated by an established and intersubjectively
recognized procedure but not necessarily the explanation. (We will
call this "pas ition one. ")'
But a q~estion arises: why would the Chinese accept the ~
methods of inquiry? Why are such methods exempted, in Weber's
view, in their acceptance or rejection from the process of rationali-
zation? They clearly are not trans -historical and inter -subjectively
recognized across cultures. 60 Weber offers no elaboration of this
paint,and, as with so many of his positions, they are simply stated
and 'assumed. Elsewhere he states that:
The m.eans available to our science offer nothing
to those persons to whom. this truth is of no value.
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It should be remembered that the belief in the value
of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures
and is not a product of man I s original nature .. 61
If by "means" he implies rational methods of inquiry, the poisition
we have just established, viz .. , the Chinese, is contradicted, making
the acceptance of scientific procedures itself also historically and
culturally relative. (We call this "position two. II)
Both views, it should be noted, also suggest that given at least
some cultural heterogeneity within a supposedly, predominantly,
scientific culture, there is no ultimate justification for (a) in posi-
tion one, scientific explanations qua explanations, and (b) in position
two, for scientific methods and explanations.
Each position has its difficulties and its tensions. In the first
recognized as valid and in use, productive of truths and proofs that
are" said to be valid cross -culturally. Yet, it is also suggested that
the explanations of these "proofs, II etc., need not entail inter-
subjective agreement. What then is the status of the proofs? What
can they be s"aid to be proofs of? Furthermore, in what sense can
Weber now maintain that science is a rational and systematic means
to acquire truths about empirical reality? On this conception of
science we risk a relativism, a science that is capable of producing
a multitude of competing explanations, all generated by rational
r-
I-
I
·,0
('\
61
methods and all at s orne level claiming the status of truths. The
tensions and issues that are raised here need further explication.
But before doing so, let us look briefly at position two.
In the second position Weber argues more generally that one
cannot justify the "strange intoxication" with science and scientific
practice within its own terms of reference. There is a form of
Ilirrationality, II the motivation base, behind those that utilize the
"rational method." In this context we can see why Weber quotes
Tolstoi with appreciation and approval:
Science is meaningless because it giv~s: no answer.
to our question, the only que stion important to us:
"What shall we do and how shall we live? ,,62
Thus here, acceptance of the authority of science to establish truth
claims is dependent on_prescientific value choices and dependent for
acceptance or rejection on, ultimately, individually chosen values.
Science, then, rests its authority on individual decision and, like
all value choices, such a decision is, in the last analysis, based on
faith. This position, it might be noted, is very close to that of the
thoroughly anarchistic views of the philosopher of science, Paul
63Feyerabend.
Yet Weber also wants to say (if we take him to be holding
position two·land given we accept the role of science) that science is
uniquely constituted by a rational method productive of valid,
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objective claims! Such a view would not be accepted by Feyerabend,
who would note that the logic of position two cannot generate a single
justification for science. Science, on this account can have no more
claims to be offering an Itobjective" analysis of the social (or natural)
world than other methods and accounting schema that subsume alter-
native rationalities.
So the authority of science is (in position one), on the one hand,
legitimated by rational method, its products are independent of
value-judgments, but on the other hand, explanations are culturally
and historically relative and might well differ. In position two,
sc1ence's authority rests on a decision and is dependent (wholly) on
values. But given a decisionistic commitment to science, valid and
objective claims are (said to be) generated. Scientific claims are
partial and one-sided because in position one, different explanations
are l~gitimate for a given and established social phenomenon, and in
position two, because both scientific practice and explanatory claims
have no privileged status unless accepted individually and thereby
legitimated.
Of th~ positions, position one finds stronger support through-
out the texts and appears to be Weber's essential argument for
demarcating science froIn faith. This view is (very importantly)
consistent with Weber's arguments, viz., the dichotomy between
in
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value -judgments and objective knowledge (facts). It is also consis-
tent with our ·arguments that Weber subsumes a particular form of
rationality and practice in his view of science. In fact, His very
emphasis on and taking-for-granted of the centrality of method
Inight well be explained by his implicit evaluation and subsumption
of formal rationality in science. If he held to position two, he would
be risking a view of complete and utter relativism and would not be
able to defend science, as he clearly did, as a special area of
human endeavor productive of lt objective 1f knowledge (i. e., knowledge
free of value-judgments). ~< The issues raised by position-two (which
can be used as a basis for a critique of position one) will be taken up
again later in the text.
As we previously suggested, textual readings provide evidence
that Weber most wanted to hold to position one. It is this position
that we will assume and further explore for the remainder of this
chapter. As Weber put it inltObjectivity in the Social Sciences, rr
~:~It should be noted that position two does not necessarily
imply a general critique of the notion of objectivity. Rather, that
several methods, e. g., of a scientific, moral, critical, or religious
kind might be defended as equally productive of objective knowledge
(e. g., each subsuming a different form of rationality).
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The objective validity of all empirical knowledge
rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given
reality according to categories which are subjec-
tive in a specific sense, namely, in that they
present the presuppositions of our knowledge and
are based on the presupposition of the value of
those truths which empirical knowledge alone is
able to give us. 64
"The criterion of scientifi~ knowledge, 11 Weber declares, "is to be
found in the 'objective I validity of its results. ,,65 A delicate balance
is struck? Weber deliberately opposes the minitnizing of the role of
"subjectivity, II and deliberately attempts to take into account and
emphasize that which is scientifically undemonstrable. Here Weber
is IIfundatnentally attacking. . . the belief of science in objective
norms in general and their scientific demonstrability in particular. ,,66
The argument (developed above as positioncone~·anCl:~s1:1ggeste·d:.in·r:the
quote above), however, seeks to balance "subjectivitytr with a value
which no longer refers to "value -orientation" but to the universal
value of scientific method. The argument for Ifobjectivity" rests,
in the last analysis, on the capacity of ce,rtain procedures to generate
" valid11 proofs, i. e., on Method.
The position is a logically necessary one for Weber. For
once it is admitted that subjective value -orientations constitute the
"object of investigation1f and the social facts explored; and that there
exists n~ alternative grounding for our· knowledge, then, if the con-
elusion that social science can only produce competitive explanations
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of the social world to those of the laymen and holders of other pro-
cedures and rationalities, is to be avoided--the argument necessarily
tends to a strong emphasis in epistemology on methodology. 67
Weber's position in respect to method can also be clarified
· h f h -d 1 - f·· 68, 69Wlt re erence to t e Hel e berg neo-Kantlans 0 hlS tlme.
In his highly influential rectoral address, Gesichte und Naturwissen-
schaft,70 Wilhelm,.Windelband rejected the distinction between
Natur /Geisteswissenschaften as a distinction that can be made on
the basis of two different objects of inquiry. 71 Rather, he argued,
that any such division must be based on a purely formal or logical
statement. 72 The address, in part, centers on a discussion of the
status of psychology and in the ensuing analysis and comparison of
psychology and the natural sciences, he concludes that a "recon-
struction of their logical similarity. . . must rest on a formal or
methodological distinction with the historical sciences. II
The principle of division is the formal character
of their ends of knowledge (Erkenntnis ziele). The
one seeks general laws, the other particular his-
torical facts: expressing this in language of formal
logic, the end of one is general, apodictic judge-
ments (the end) of the other is singular assertoric
sentences. 73
The distinction is between nomothetic and ideographic sciences, a
distinction that classifies only the "methodological treatment
not the content of the knowledge itself. ,,74
()
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In the closing sections of the speech Windelband calls for
logicians to recognize that there are other logics than that of the
natural sciences and asks them to begin an inquiry into ideographic
analyses, specifically the work of historians, to uncover all that is
involved. "Of no less importance, " Windelband says (bearing the
natural sciences in mind) "is an understanding of historical evolu-
tion. II His argument about logics and methods rests finally on the
granting of equal status to the different ends, interests, and goals
that guide the two (potential) major scientific enterprises. He saw
both of these as necessary for the bildung (cultivation, education)',
of man and German society.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to show how Heinrich
Rickertls position (in his important Kulturwissenschaften und
Naturwissenschaften)75 developed from and differed with Windel-
band IS, but one or two points - -which offer insight into Weber IS own
work--may be noted. Rather than speaking of nomothetic and ideo-
graphic sc~ences,FRickert·: stres s~d -ther"ifatt~thatthere~are, generalizi?-!-g
and individualizing tendencies within all sciences, and saw these
tendencies as determined by the goals toward which the sciences
aim. 76 Maintaining Windelband's stre s s on the nature of the dis-
tinction, he argued that it was purely logical and Ifin no way con-
cerned. . . the content peculiar to the various branches of the
I'
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natural or cultural sciences. 1177 The theme can be illustrated well
by his discussion of the concerns of the Kulturwis senschaften; 78
which he argued were and should be concerned with lithe interpreta-
tion and transmission of an historical acquisi~ion," i.e., with :Kultur,
and thus are compelled to employ the historical or individualizing
method because of the ends they seek. The distinction between the
natural and social sciences is not, however, for Rickert, an abso-
lute one.
It is in this light that we can further understand Weberts stress
on method- -a stress typical in certain philosophical circles of his
time. It was unnecessary for him to locate his early methodological
essays: the discussion of method per see The location was, of
course, taken for granted. His methodological writings can be seen
as an excursion into histiography and the social sciences; a response
to the call for an investigation made by the neo-Kantians.
Weberts methodological preoccupations follow, then, from
Kantian and neo-Kantian and epistemological presuppositions. They
provide the framework in which his work is to be understood. Our
discussion of Weber ts epistemology and methodology can now also
be seen to be a discussion that extends into this framework.
However, in many respects, Weberts claims about the role of
the human sciences went beyond that envisaged by Windelband and
.~
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Rickert. Weber's claims about what social science could tell us
extended the logic of a discipline offering an account of Kultur, an
interpretation of past traditions, an historical hermeneutics. In
order to explicate these claims we must first make one further set
of distinctions: namely those that, in Weber IS view, separate the
natural from the human sciences. It is only by reference to Windel-
band and Rickert's positions that we can gain insight into Weber's
own.
As it was unnecessary for him to "locate" his stress on
method, he likewise essentiallylpresupposed the neo-Kantian position
here as well. But there were certain differences and one major
change. The. neo-Kantian account of the natural sciences was sub-
sutned, but he both extended and altered the neo-Kantian view of the
human sciences.
At the turn of the century in German universities there were
extensive debates about the status and differences between the
natural and cultural sciences --the fatnous Methodenstreit. 79 Many
joined the debate, including economists (SchmtJller, Menger),
psychologists (e. g., Wundt), historians (E. Meyer, Lamprecht),
philosophers (Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert), and several others. 80
The center of controversy was the cultural sciences. Shouldtthey,
as the positivists agreed, be assimilated into the natural sciences,
II II
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employing the same methodologies? This position was rejected
completely by the neo-Kantians. Dilthey held that there was an
ontological disjunction between the natural and social sciences.
There was a fundamental difference in the respective objects of each
scien~e~~--Ita! classIfication .. 1)€be~_ngrdrawh:-betweeill~he-·.kingdom·of
nature and that of the human mind. 1181 Windelband and Rickert, as
we have seen, rejected this ontological claim. For Rickert, the
infinite flux of reality could be broken down according to the different
goals of the respective sciences, which forced on those sciences
particular methodologies.
Rickert (also) argued that the distinction between the natural
'and social sciences was not an absolute one. For Weber, following
Rickert, - the distinction was also not a IIdistinction in principle. II
I
But Weber IS remarks on the differences between the natural and
cultural sciences were, as we shall see, all too brief.
In his critique of Roscher an~ Kneis, the first of his metho-
dological essays, he suggests that lithe supposed distinction between
natural and social sciences may be used to support a II spurio,,!s
· ... ,,82,83 Th · · f R h W b h Idlntultlonlsrn. e wrltlngs 0 osc er, e er argues, 0
the view that the universe of human action is not one in which natural
scientific m.ethods apply/ According to Weber, the Roscher distin~-
tion of natural and social sciences "introduce an overriding component
IIII
r'
I
70
of semi-mystic idealism into the.
... ,inexact intuitive procedures.
analysis. . . and consequently
. The human world is thus an
'(1
In
'irrational' one, which is epitomised by the Volksgeist or Volksselle .
. . . It is impossible, Weber points out, to reconcile the use,
of such notions as this with the claim, which is advanced by this
same author, that vigorous historical research is an end which
should be striven for. 11 84 Weber argues that the social sciences
are necessarily concerned with "spiritual" or "ideal ll phenomena
and that there is a qualitative difference between the subject matter
of the natural and social sciences, but argues--in this paper--that
this does not imply or involve the sacrifice of objectivity nor the
b - - f 1- bIll · b' · - - 8 5su stltutlon 0 rep lca e causa ana YS1S y lntultlonlsm.
In "Objectivity in the Social Sciences," Weber maintains that
IIwhereas in astronomy, the heavenly bodies are of interest to us
only in their quantative and exact aspects, the qualitative aspect of
phenomena concerns us in the social sciences."
To this should be added that in the social sciences
we are concerned with psychologicalcand intellectual
(geistig) phenomena the empathic understanding of
which is naturally a problem of a specifically
different type from those which the schemes of the
exact natural sciences in general can or seek to
solve. D'espite that, this distinction in itself is
not a distinction in principle, as it see:ms at first
glance. Aside from pure mechanics, even the
exact natural sciences do not proceed without
qualitative categories. 86 [Emphasis added.]
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If it is not a distinction in pJ;inciple, one may well ask what kind of
qualitative distinction is being made? A precise answer is not
easily found in Weber1s writings.
Weber recognizes, of course, as the remarks and quotations
above suggest, that there is a qualitative difference between the
subject matter of the natural and social sciences. There are two
points that can be noted here. First, there is a sense in which
Weber differentiates the natural from the social sciences which
refers"lback·to ~ur pr~vious comments on Weberl~.conception of
value -oriep.tations. Thecobject domain of all sciences was seen to
be the result, for Weber, of a process of constitution. In the case.
of the social sciences he felt that there was a multiplicity of possible
value -orientations that could determine the objects of investigation.
(This was because of, amongst other reasons, (a) the different
interests of historians, economists, and psychologists, etc., in the
social world; and (b) because the objects these people would regard
as culturally significant and consequently worthy of study, changes
over time with historical developments and as a result of enhanced
knowledge~) The complex and changing nature of the social scientist1s
value-orientations is held to be in marked contrast to much less
varied value -orientations found aInongst investigators of the natural
world. In a very strong statement of this }point, Weber wrote:
iIi'
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T;his way of being conditioned by "subjective
values" is, however, entirely alien in any case
to those natural sciences which·;~takemechanics
as a model, and it constitutes, indeed, the
contrast between the historical and natural
sciences. 87
It appears to be Weber's view that there is (complete?) consensus
in the natural sciences informing theLnatural scientist's value-
orientations. (This point, as Weber has developediit is not very
substantial. For it can be. argued that the differences between, e. g. ,
the physicist and the chemist create fundamentally different interests
in the natural.world, with the same status as in point (a) above. It
can a~so be argued that the history of these sciences changes and
complicates the scientist'syvalue-orientations in the same way as in
. 88 89point (b) above.)-· ,
The second point Weber makes, which is much stronger and
more fundamental, is that whereas -riatura~.i 's"C:-ientists ~a-nd:',cliltural :
of their,::value ~orien~ations!,·:.theJculttiral~~scientist:ha':s'in~addition to be
concerned with "objects" that have a self-understanding. In other
words, the cultural scientist has to be able to understand his object
domain, whichi:consists ~:of soc~al,and~hist-or.icalsubjects~who themselves
constitute the world in varying contexts. He cannot offer a scientifi-
cally a~equate account of this world without taking into consideration
these acts 'of constitution. (~.his)point and its consequences will be
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further developed in the next chapter.) This is a dimension of
scientific investigation which rarely, if ever, exists for the natural
· · 90SClentlst.
However, Weber offers no argument that dwells on the differ-
ence between the natural and social sciences being essentially one of
subject matter .. It seems that he saw in this distinction primarily
methodological considerations.
With ~ickert he rejects the attempt to rigidly classify the
sciences. 'He accepts and recognizes the distinction between gener-
alizing and individualizing methods, the 11 l a bstract' -theoretical
methodll and llempirica1 historical" techniques of research. 91 The
natural sciences are seen to be characterized by the former, but not
restricted to this methodological stance (e. g., some natural sciences
might use "different methods to explain unique occurences). With the
social sciences it was significantly different:-.-for tWeberJestablishes -
a major "generalizing and individualizing" tendency within the human
sciences. Sociology and even history are seen to employ and utilize
causal explanations and generalizing laws. There is a complex inter-
play, between the respective methods, that develops in Weber IS
writings. How he establishes this position we explicate at length in
the following chapter. All that need be noted here is that in making
these fundamental changes in the neo-Kantian position he takes the
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cultural (or human) sciences beyond the logic or goals of those
envisaged for thes~ sciences by Windelband and Rickert. For
Rickert, for example, the study of history through culture was
thoroughly hermeneutic in intent: it was to be an analysis and inter-
pretation of tradition that would yield and enhance our understanding
of the socio-cultural life -world. Weber's position was and is not
simply hermeneutic in implication. As the human sciences embodied
a generalizing and individualizing tendency, so they also embodied
more complex goals. As we have previously noted and as we shall
see in more detail, Weber's extended conception of the human
sciences and their roles implies an alternative conception of their
logic that both extends and changes the neo-Kantian position we have
discussed here.
Weber was much more explicit in his views about what the
sciences could te~l us, than about the nature of the distinction between
lz.them. However, as we point out below, there is more to his view
than he, in fact, even here makes explicit.
trIn the natural sciences, the practical evaluative attitude, "
Weber thought, "toward what was immediately and technically use-
ful was closely associated from the very first with the hope ... of
attaining a purely 'objective I • • • lTIonistic knowledge of the totality
of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity and
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mathematical form. ,,92 Those natural sciences which became
closely bound to evaluative attitudes (Weber names clinical medicine
and "what is conventionally called 'technology' II) lose, for him,
their scientific status - -becoming "purely practical 'arts 1."93
Natural science cannot tell us whether we ought to m.aster life
technically or whether such a pursuit is Ilmeaningful." Natural
science can only gather knowledge of reality ,and tell us how to master
life technically. It cannot tell us whether to "master life technically"
norv what ends to pursue to achieve technical mastery.
The social sciences, Weber points out, "first arose in con-
nection with practical considerations. 1194 Tracing its origins to
state economic policy, he goes on to say that as such:
. . . It was a "technique" in the same sense as, for
instance, the clinical disciplines in the medical
sciences are. It has now become known how ifhis
situation was g,radually modified. This modification
was not, however, accompanied by a formulation of
the logical (pr'inzipiel1e) distinction between "exis-
tential knowledge," i. e., knowledge of what "is, "
and "normative knowledge," i. e., knowledge of
what "should be. ,,95
Such a distinction is lIa bsolutelyll necessary for, as we have already
seen, despite the partiality, one -sidedness of knowledge, knowledge
is "objective" and, Weber states countlessly, it is logically impos-
sible for an empirical discipline to establish, scientifically, ideals
which define what "ought to be, II i. e., which (and to what purpose)
:1 11 '._ I.
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an end should be pursued. What then can social sciences tell US?
Weber argues that while value-judgments concerning what
"ought to be" cannot be validated by science, "the question of the
appropriateness of means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly
accessible to scientific analysis. 1196 Scientific analysis can allow
us to determ.ine the applicability and suitability of a given range of
means, by examining the chances attached to each "means 11 for the
realization of an end. Furthermore, the social scientist can
examine the full range of consequences, advantages, "costs,"
entailed by the selection of a particular m.eans to a given end. 97 The
costs analyzed can be of two sorts: (1) the partial rather than the
complete realization of a chosen end, or (2) the bringing; about of
additional consequences which might have negative effects on other
ends held by the individual. In this way it is also possible, Weber
claims, .that we can lIindirectly criticize the setting of the end itself
as practically "meaningful (on the basis of the existing historical
situation) or as meaningless with reference to existing conditions. ,,98,99
"The contribution 6f science does not reach its limits with
. 100
this . .. if we are competent in our pursuit (which must be
presupposed here), we can force the individual or at least we can
help him., to give an account of the ultimate meaning of his own con-
d t ,,101uc . Science is also, therefore, able to assess the internal
.JI.! .
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and external consistency of conduct, to make frequently presupposed
ideals explicit and, in other words, to be "in the service of self-
clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. 11 102 Weber sees
scientific activity as an important agent in the demystification of
the world, not an end itself. Yet again, it can be said, his views
are not without difficulties and tensions.
Science, .on Weber's account, can be critical of the. suitability,
coherence, completeness, etc., of an end or :ideaQ. Science can
evaluate means, suggest which are most appropriate to a given end,
and also ("indirectly") assess the "practicality ll of ends with refer-
ence to existing historical conditions. In fact, on Weber's view,
science is able to establish "means" in a hierachy of "costs, If
practicality, etc., and, therefore, specify accomplishable ends.
Science on this account, despite Weber's claims, is evaluative and
judgmental. The practical consequences of Weber's view of science
become more explicit here and bring many of our previous themes
to a head. These points are worthy of further consideration.
The assessment of means etc., according to the criteria of
practicality, is to appraise these empirical possibilities with a value
that is, in Weber's works, atnbiguous and much in need of absent
elaboration. For the question arises: From whose standpoint do we
judge practicality? The businessman's, the revolutionary's, the
:0
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social scientist's? Weber's view also establishes a dichotomy that
is, at best, weak. The relationship between means and ends is not
a rigid and distinct relation. Mte r all, what are means? They can
easily be regarded as short-run ends. And ends? Are they not
long-run means? The relationship, as Hegel would argue, is an
identity of identity and difference, i. e., a dialectical unity, a differen-
· d. · · 103tlate lnteractlng unlty. To evaluate ends even "indirectly"
according to the "practicality" etc. of means (albeit in an historical
context), is to beg the question as to whether or not means are ends
and vice -versa and for whom our criteria of assessment are valid.
Given Weber's views on value-orientations, he might well have
responded to thes,e questions by saying that since the disenchanted
world can find no ultimate justifications for deciding between com-
peting irreducible ideals, then, what we mean by practicality or,
for example, an end, will of course differ. And this is how it should
be. So long as the adherents to different conceptions of practicality
etc. utilize the rational method, then we have no means available,
in the last analysis, to choose between them other than personal
decision. Just as science has the capacity to produce "objective"
competing explanations of the social world, so the role of science
can produce a plethora of different accounts of the practicality of
ends, each having equal claim to validity.
I
I
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The tensions entailed in this view were pointed to in our earlier
of position one). They can be further elaborated. Weber1s account
of science and "objectivity" admits, we have suggested, of the pos-
sibility of a multitude of competing explanations of the social world
all claiming validity. Given different value -orientations and adher-
ence to the norms of rational method, it would seem possible for
there to be mutually incompatible, perhaps contradictory, knowledge
·claims. If this is the case, then science is open, incomplete, and
necessarily relative to the point of being potentially constitutive of
incompatible validity claims that find no possible resolution within
scientific practice. Weber1s conception of science embodies incom-
pleteness and openness in the sense that:
o a.
b.
c .
true statements about !reality. ;.ar_e said.=tc;> beiwithout limit,-
all knowledge is held to be potentially falsifiable, and
· ·f · k 1 d .' t . b .- 1 t' 1[104SClentl lC J no)" e gellls~seen 0:· e -:cumu a -lve.
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But .although it adm.its of incompatible knowledge claims, it does not
lead to contradiction. Larry Simon has pointed out that it does not
lead to contradiction because there
. . . is a form of incommensurability inherent in
Weber IS position. All scientific truths are partial
and relative to their value -orientations. Truths
have to be understood in terms of this relativity.
Seemingly incompatible claims cannot be juxtaposed
to produce a contradiction because, in the final
n··0
· 80.
analysis, they are not talking about the same identi-
cal objects or events. Each is true of a particular
portion of the flux of reality as illuminated or
abstracted according to a particular criterion of
significance. Since they are not strictly talking
about the same identical thing, they are not tech-
nically contradictory. 105
Instead, they are best conceived as truths of reality which are illumi-
nating of it, but inherently partial and never, by definition, in strict
correspondence ~o ,it. The Chinese or Western social scientist can
claim objectivity and validity for an analysis of Z, even though the
former m~ght explain it by A and the latter by B. If Q is constituted
from different value -orientations, there is no contradiction between
the respective accounts. In Weberls conception one can only have
contradictory claims if a given analysis of Q is constituted from the
same value -orientations, uses the same intersubjectively recognized
methods of inquirYi( .and lthe~lproduces incompatible statements.
Scientific practice, therefore, can result in a m.ultitude of competing
explanations of the social world, all illuminating reality, all adding
to our stoc~ of knowledge. There may not be contradiction but there
is an inherent relativism. For, in the last analysis, there are no
criteria to judge between competing explanations other than those
based on individual value-orientations. This same argument obviously
applies to Weber IS conception of science's capacity to address
tfmeans," trends, II and "ideals. It
For although we have competing explanations
11
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Having said this', however, it is crucially important to realize
that in Weberfs account of the role of science, the tolerance of rela-
tivism as regards to value and consequently theory and validity,
might be thought of--to use Marcusets famous phrase--as a "repres-
· I 11 106Slve to erance.
all justly claiming validity, they are in competition within a fixed
framework, a specific form of rationality, a specific schema of
values that consequently sanction a particular form of practice.
They are differentiated views, but differentiated within the same
fundamental framework. As our previous discussion of these issues
pointed out, it is a fralTIework delineated by formal, means -ends
rationality, a decisionistic ethics and practice. It is in this frame-
work that Weber grounded his science. Although not recognized as
such, an int.erest in technically useful knowledge and the rationality
which embodies it are values assumed by this conception of science,
for science, on this account, has an inherent potential and subsumed
interest in providing technically useful information. Science lends
itself to technical recommendations and has an in-built potential for
becoming little more than a technical critique. As we noted earlier,
in the name of value -freedom (i. e., freedom from value-judgments),
Weber smuggles in a value-laden, evaluative~9onceptof rationality
and as such sanctions what he hoped to challenge: the spread of
:0
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formal rationality. Weber takes for granted that which he most sought
to limit.
The "logic" and "goals 11 of the human sciences are no longer,
as they were for Windelband and Rickert, "simply" hermeneutic in
intent. Weber's concept of science is deeply embedded in a technical,
instrumental interest. This is not to say that Weber's exposition of
the human sciences does not embody a hermeneutic dimension. As
we shall see in the following chapter, his conception of history approxi-
mates the intentions of Rick~rt, but his conception of the human sciences
extends the "goals" of both historical hermeneutics and, as we have
just seen, a partiality for the goals of technically useful knowledge.
Interestingly enough, it might be noted, that what we called
Weber's second position107 (i. e., the view that the authority of
science's explanations and rational procedures rests on individual
decision) is the basis of a potentially strong argument to undermine
the first position, which we have taken in this thesis to be the position
Weber attempted to uphold. As we know, Weber takes for granted
formal rationality as the foundation of science. His claims are
essentially unmotivated, they are without (elaborate) justification:
they are, for the best part, assumed. But given his own view that
value -judgments, evaluations, practical recommendations, etc., are
all, ultimately based on faith, there can, within his own terms of
L·
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reference, be no justification for the formal rat~.onality of science as
a privileged, unevaluative, absolute ground for lIobjective" know-
ledge. The commitment to formal rationality involves a substantive
choice, i~e., a value-judgment. The option for formal rationality
requires a justified practical reason. Since Weber has closed off
value -judgments from cognitive resolution, and rules out of consi-
deration the possibility that practical questions admit of truth, he
cannot rationally justify his own position. It too, within Weber's
own terms of reference, rests on a decision which is, Ifin the end, "
based on faith. For there is, in Weber's view, no ultimate justifica-
tion on which science can be grounded. We are, firmly, in the
established relativism of position two. But the question now is:
can we avoid this position? Is it the only option and direction we
have? In asking these questions we discover another position that
Weber implicitly shuts off.
It is often held by the Critical tradition that although Weber,
of course, allows (in position one) for the possibility of describing
the genesis of our values (e. g., the: Rr.otestant ethic», -hee.does: not
comprehend the possibility of a critically reflexive understanding of
this genesis. Such an understanding of the interconnectedness of
values to t4eir social situatedness, e. g., class structuration, 108
might reveal that certain value -orientations and judgments blind ~
1...L ..
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those who hold them to an adequate conceptualization of the social
world, i. e., might be ideological. It would be ideological in the
sense that and insofar as the values project onto the social world a
view which is limited, one -sided, distorted, and false, and prevents
an adequate confrontation with the nature of its own limited, one-
sided, distorted, and false status.
Weber can (attempt to) justify his view with reference to the
empirical basis of his epistemological presuppositions. There can
be no ultimate arbitration between value -judgments and value -claims;
they only admit of individual choice in a Itd~senchantedlt world. But
in holding this position, Weber must also uncritically accept a multi-
tude of possible competing .explanations and accounts about the world
as long as they adhere to the canons of rational scientific method.
As such, it could be argued, he closes off the possibility of a critical
theory that. jm·~ght i~~~plic~tel the ideological basis of certain accounts
of the social world.
Weber 1s views, as we shall see, are in sharp contradistinction
to certain members of the Critical and Marxist traditions, whose
writings we explore in the third part of this thesis. It is with the
possibility of a critical reflexive understanding, they contend, that
we can avoid the inevitable relativism of Weber 1s second position.
In order to establish such a critical understanding, the task, which
or',ij'
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Weber cannot conceive within his terms of reference, is to explicate
the possibility of a Critical science which is grounded and which
recognizes ,that'practical 'q1.!estiops:adrriit,Jof truth. This possibility
we will begin to examine at the close of the following chapter and in
Parts III and IV. However, at this point it should be noted that the
criticism of Weber that he closes off the possibility of a Critical
theory of society depends for its force on the capacity of the Critical
tradition to make goodlon its claim that a Critical theory is a viable
epistemological and methodological project. If such an alternative
cannot be sustained we either become once more vulnerable to
Weber 1s position two or we have to rethink possible approaches and
structures of questions to the problematics raised.
The issues and critique we have .developed so far can be
further illustrated in Weber's account of the human sciences, in his
approaches to sociology and histiography in particular and in his
treatment of their respective methods and approaches to causality.
This we attempt to do in the following chapter. But before turning
to these further questions, an additional note tnight be added.
(:1
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The neo -Kantians did not foresee that in the mid-twentieth
century the interest in certainty, prediction, and control, the logic
they associated with the natural sciences, would become the general
logic and program for most of the social sciences. Weber might be
thought of as having anticipated this development in his preoccupation
with the process of rationalization and the spreading of instrumental
reason. It is paradoxical, however, that given his enormous insights
into economy and society that when compared to Rickert's conception
of the human sciences, Weber's own contribution can be seen to have
added to and confirmed the very social processes he wanted to limit.
The "fate of the modern world" did indeed show a cunning that he
himself was blind to. Weber's conception of science, given all his
· · h · I ·d I · 1 1091nslg ts, 1S a so 1 eo oglca . The question must be asked why
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Weber remained satisfied with the view of science he expounded.
Any attempt to provide an adequate answer to this question
would require an analysis of the stature of Lucierl.(B~ldinan's·;~tudy
~ -: (110
o·f>.Karit: 1 If. ,It)w:ould require a study in the sociology of knowledge
that was not just concerned with Weber's life and work, but the epoch
from whence he emerged. It is obviously an unthinkable task in the
bounds of this thesis. We can only note a few brief points.
It is clear that Weber took for granted the philosophical con-
text of his methodological writings and, consequently, epistemology
1..
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did not directly preoccupy hilTI as it did others of this time. Other
clues can be found in Mitzman's work that we earlier referred to: III
~till others, in his acquiescence and capitulation to the rationalized
world as it appeared. For ultimately this was a world in which
formal rationality also made possible a development of social
institutions strongly tending toward law and justice that would free
the arbitration of civil society from collective and individual sub-
stantive interests. A world of universal, technically trained officials
and organizations that becomes the "absolutely inescapable condi-
t,ion of our existence. If It is in this context that we may note the
force of Marcuse's comment that:
Weber's concept of fate ... generalizes the blind-
ness of a society which reproduces itself behind the
back of individuals, of a society in which the law of
domination appears as objective technological law. 112
The very concept of rationalization is also ideological. For it glosses
social processes, reifies social life, and consequently depersonalizes
and depoliticizes history. But for Weber, we lTIust remember, this
process also brings in its wake an intellectualization of the social
world, a new freedom for thought and inquiry. Its institutions offered
a new impartiality and individuals enhancedC'choice~:.Itswas a:world,
in which each person was, in the end, best able to be the master or
the mistress of his or her life. The empha_sis, as we have seen, in
Weber's discussion of values is on individual freedom and choice and
L.,
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on the capacity of individuals to choose. In a disenchanted 'world man
finds a new freedom from dependence on unreflected Weltanschaung,
and a new freedom to will his life his own.
For Weber, the modern democracy is a means to an end. 113
His political writings are deeply intertwined with the values of Euro-
pean liberalism. 114 and its ultimate value: the individual's autonomy.
The classical tenets of bourgeois, liberal individualism, and its
vision of freedom are constantly upheld. These values, Weber
argued, could only be defended and furthered by the development of
the German nation-state. But the State is always a means for
Weber, for he saw modern bourgeois democracies as the Ifonly
modes, If as Giddens put it, "of partially releasing modern tnan
from the 'iron cage' of the bureaucratized division of labour. ,,115
Weber also saw the need and the possibility to supplement the
new democratic order with the value-'c,reafive properties of charis-
matic political leadership. Weber sought decisionistic self-assertion
in the' midst of a rationalized world. In politics he favored, as Haber-
tnas wrote, "scope for a leader, strong-willed and with an instinct
for power, ,,116 who could accommodate and use the expert civil
servant. Weber's political vision was thoroughly intertwined with
the bourgeois vision of the freedoms of possessive individualism. 1 I?
There are further consequences which should not and cannot
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be overlooked. If we may quote Habermas once again:
At the time of the First World War he [Weber] out-
lined a sketch of Caesar-like leader-democracy on
the contemporary basis of a national-state imperialism.
This militant latter -day liberalism had consequences
in the Weimar period which we, and not Weber, must
answer for. If we are to judge Weber here and now,
we cannot overlook the fact that Carl Schmitt was a
"legitimate pupil" of Weber's. Viewed in the light
of the history of influences, the decisionist element
in Weber's sociology did not break the spell of
ideology, but strengthened it. 118
The same can be said of Weber's conception of science. It subsumes
and reflects the bourgeois vision of Rationality, Freedom, and
Democracy. There is little self-consciousness of this in Weber's
methodological writings.
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CHAPTER III
WEBER IS APPROACH TO METHOD IN
HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY
Having located the roles of value and method in Weberls work,
we are brought to Weber's analysis of causation and lTIethod. In
attetT!pting to unravel these often misunderstood areas, we can pur-
sue the themes of the last pages to the inner mechanisms of Weber's
conception of the human sciences.
We have seen that it was Weber's view that the analysis of
tfinfinite realit.ytf which the tffinite mind tf can conduct rests on the'
as~umption that only a finite portion of this reality can be constituted
as the object of .scientific investigation, and on~y it, once delineated
by the soc~al sc"ientist 1s value-orientations and considerations of
cultural significance, can be "objectively" known. Weber did not
believe, however, that this segment of "reality" should be selected
without aid and consideration of existing empirical studies and a
variety of empirical sources. In "Objectivity in the Social Sciences tf
and Economy and Society, he points to criteria for selection. These
include the results of functional analysis, th~ usage of laws, psycho-
logical insights, and statistical facts .
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The specific reference to organicist sociology- -a "classical
example 1f Weber cites as ItSchtlffle IS brilliant work Bau und Leben
des Socialen Ktlrpers"l_-reveals that he considered it as a means of
IIpractical illustration and for provisional orientation, . . . not only
useful but indispensable. ,,2 "But," and in contradistinction to one
of his most well-known interpreters, 3 Weber immediately adds:
. . . at the same time if its cognitive value is over-
estimated and it,s concept illegitimately t'reified lt
it can be highly dangerous .. , '. '. -;'. Ini~the-tcase- of' sO'c'ial
collectivities p~ecisely as distinguished from organisms
we are. in a position to go beyond merely demonstrating
functional relationships and uniformities. We can
accomplish something which is never attainable in the
natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding
of the action of component individuals .... We do
not "understandlt the behaviour of Ic'ells, but can
only observe the relevant functional relationships
and generalize on the basis of these observations.
This additional achievement of explanation by inter-
pretive understanding, as distinguished from external
observation, is of course obtained only at a price --
the more hypothetical and fragmentary character of
its results. Nevertheless, subjective understanding
is the specific characterization of sociological
knowledge. 4
Weber differs strongly with Sch!iffle in his estimation of the logical
status of functional/holistic concepts. These, he argued, could
easily engulf sociologists into the hypostatization of concepts. It
was ~ IIspectre of collective conceptions It which he sought lito
exorcise. ,,5 None of this, of course, implies that Weber thought
it unnecessary and undesirable to use collective concepts ,(·e. g., the
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"State, If but he always reminds one, in his methodological treatise,
that it must not be forgotten that these collectives are "solely the
resultants and modes of organization of the specific acts of individual·
men, since these alone are for us the agents who carry out subjec-
tively understandable action. ,,6~:~
For Parsons it is given in the possibility of analytic science
(natural or social), the capacity to generate laws (statements that
formulate constant and empirically regular relationships between
the values of at least two variables). Parsons also believes, there-
fore, that "Weber should have gone all the way to the view that in a
purely logical aspect there is no difference whatsoever [between -"--. ~
sociaLand-natutal sciences], ,,7 and adds critically that "Weber does
not even consider the possibility of formulating .laws of the latter
type, essentially because he does not develop socialt~~h~oJ;~Yexplicitly
in the direction of setting up a system of independent variables, but
8
confines it to the ideal type l~v:·el.1f
Weber did not, indeed, consider the possibility of formulating
laws for the social world which were logically akin to those of the
~1~The point is !nade by Weber with considerable .force. It !night
also be noted in this context with some irony given the "implicit"
status of such concepts as "formal rationality, 11 the "fate" of the
~odernworld, etc.
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critical of all such enterprises:
It has often been thought that the decisivie criterion
in the cultural sciences, too, was in the last analysis,
the "regular" recur·rence of certain casual relation-
ships. The "laws ll which we are able to perceive in
the infinitely manifold stream of events must--
according to this conception- -contain the scientifically
lIessentialll aspect of reality. . . . Accordingly, even
among the followers of the Historical School we con-
tinually find the attitude which declares that the ideal
which all the sciences, including the cultural sciences,
serve and towards which they should strive even in
the remote future is a system of propositions from
which reality can be "deduced. 119
The goal of these cultural scientists was, Weber argued, fl ••• how-
ever far it might be from realization. . . to construct a closed sys-
tern of concepts, in which reality is synthesized in some sort of
permanently and universally valid classification and from which it
can again be deduced. ,,10 Weber rejected such a goal and frequently
attacked this view. Jo~~_Eldl7:.tdge.has assessedl'succintly~Weberts··view
on this issue: "This position identified by Weber as the naturalistic
viewpoint (or prejudice!) is rejected by hitn .fundamentally because
he does not accept that the cultural scientists can have a direct
awareness of the structure of human actions in all their reality. ,,11
The point is well illustrated by Weber IS consistent critique of those
w;h6 made the "fantastic claimll for "economic theories - -e. g. ,
abstract theories of price, interest, rent, etc. - -that they can, by
ostensibly following the analogy of the physical science propositions,
.1-.' .' ..
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be validly applied to the derivation of quantatively stated conclusions
from given real prelTIises, since given the ends, economic behaviour
with respect to means in unambiguously 'de.termined t." 12
This does not mean, Weber asserts, that nomothetic proposi-
tions are inapplicable or impos sible in the human sciences: "a valid
imputation of any individual effect without the application of 'nomo-
logical knowledge, '- -i. e., the knowledge of recurrent causal
sequences--would in general be impossible. ,,13 In fact, Weber
maintains:
Wherever the causal explanation of a "cultural phenone-
non- -an "historical individual tf is under consideration,
the knowledge of causal laws' is not the end of the investi-
gation but only a means .Itfacilitates and renders
possible the causal imputation to their concrete causes
of those components of a phenomenon the individuality
of which is culturally significant. So far and only so
far as it achieves this, is it valuable for our knowledge
of concrete relationships. And the more "general,"
i. e., the more abstract the laws, the less they can
contribute to the causal imputation of individual phenomena
and, more indirectly, to the understanding of the signifi-
cance of cultural events. 14
The extent to which a cultural scientist can reach a valid causal impu-
tation with either the aid of "concretely established generalisations"
and/ or "with his imagination sharpened by personal experience and
trained in analytic methods" always depends for Weber, as Giddens
has written, "upon the particular case in question. But it is always
true that the more precise and certain our knowledge of relevant
(}
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general principles, the more certain the causal imputation we can
15
make. II
At the opposite pole, Weber also maintains, that the practioners
of psychology may offer the social scientist insights. 16 He deals
swiftly, however, with those who propagate a simpl~ psychological
reductionism. As an analytic tool, the analysis of psychological
factors would, he suggests, I'be as useful as a textbook of organic
chemical combinations would be for our knowledge of the biogenetic
aspect of the animal and plant world CGoncrete'real~ty=cannot
be deduced from Isuch' factors. tll7 Weber's view of the role of
psychology is worth quoting at length, especially in light of the
growing status and popularity of psychology and the stress some
schools of social science have placed on micro-sociology, etc.
the part~y brilliant attempts which have been
made hitherto to interpret economic phenomen~.psy-
chologically, show iil'-Jany case that the procedure does
not begin with the analysis of psychological qualities,
moving then to the analysis of social institutions, but
that, on the contrary, insight into the psychological
preconditions and consequences of institutions pre-
supposes a precise knowledge of the latter and the
scientific analysis of their structure. In concrete
cases, psychological analysis can contribute then an
extremely valuable deepening of the knowledge of the
historical cultural conditioning and cultural signifi-
cance of institutions. The interesting aspect of the
psychic attitude of a person in a social situation is
specifically particularized in each case, according
to the special cultural significance of the situation in
question. It is a question of an extremely heterogeneous
and highly concrete structure of psychic motives and
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influences. Social-psychological research involves
the study of various very disparate individual types of
cultural elements with reference to their interpretability
by our empathic understanding. Through social-
psychological research, with the knowledge of indivi-
dual institutions as a point of departure, we will learn
increasingly how to understand institutions in a psy-
chological way. We will not however deduce the insti-
tutions from psychological laws or eX:Rlain them by
elementary psychological phenomena. 18
The social scientist can also glean a great deal from "statistics, II
II s tatistical uniformities, II "facts, II e. g" death rates, suicide rates,
immigration patterns, life chances, etc. 19 These are data to be
"taken into account." But however important, Weber clearly dis-
tinguishes the techniques of data collection from the construction of
analytic sociological typ~s (which we have hitherto referred to as
ideal:types). The collection of statistics are "treated by a different
method from the other; they become conditions, stimuli, furthering
or hindering circumstances of action. 1120 John Rex has made a
similar point when he observed, "research into what Weber called
the 'life chances I of human beings strictly speaking forms no part of
sociology. True it poses a problem for the sociologist who asks
whether the differential distribution of life chances is indicative of
a particular power system or whether it means the emergence of
segregated ways of life. But by itself it is simply a part of the study
of human biology in which exact descriptive and mathematical techo-·
niques have been developed to a high level. 1121
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Having pointed to guidelines for investigation, to signposts for
the social scientific enterprise, we have, of course, as yet said
nothing of how, concretely, Weber suggests we establish the existence
of a causal relationship and how one might employ his guidelines,
concepts, and methods. It is to these issues that we must now turn.
In his critique of Edward Meyer's methodological writings, 22
Weber makes both a crucial and central distinction. Meyer, he
points out, is in "danger of confusing two fundamentally different
but often identified ~ategories: the ratio essendi and the ratio cog-
noscendi. ,,23 The distinction is between two forms of analysis and
it is explicated, albeit in embryonic form, three pages later. Weber
talks of
. . . this division of the logical use of data given by
cultural reality into (1) conceptualization with the
illustrative use of "particular fact" as "typical"
instances of an abstract "concept, II i.e., as an heuris-
tic instrument on the one hand- -and (2) integration of
the "pa~ticular.f'fact''';as ;~ jlirik, if~e., as a real causal
factor into a real, hence concrete context with the use
among other things of the products of conceptuali~~tion
on the one hand as exemplificatory and on the other as
heuristic devices - -entails the distinction between what
Rickert called the "natural scientific" and Windelband
the "nomothetic" (ad 1) and the logical goal of the
"historical cultural" sciences (ad 2). It also implies
the only justified sense in which history can be called
a science of reality: (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). For
the meaning of history as a science of reality can only
be that it treats particular elements of reality not
m.erely as heuristic instruments but as the objects of
knowledge, and particular causal connections not as
premises of knowledge but as real causal factors. 24
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The methods of analysis of the form of ratio cognoscendi are said to
have a different logical structure from that of ratio essendi. The
former represents the scientist IS attempt to construct type concepts
(of man, of organizations, of authority, of culture, of socio-economic
structures) which are developed and elaborated as heuristic devices.
The latter form represents the attempt to establish causal linkages
in exp~aining historical events. Both moments of the neo-Kantian
present but in a form that would have surprised Rickert. For as we
have seen, he associated the <Kiilturwissenschaften with the predomi-
nant use of the historical or individualizing method, whereas Weber
has located .within the human sciences the apP,licability of both forms
of analysis. Furthermore, it is our contention that by the time of
.. Economy and Society, Weber IS fully developed work embodies these
two modes of a1l:alysis as two distinct types of causal analysis. That
is to s~y that ratio cognoscendi no longer can be understood (as in
the Methodology essays) as being only concerned with the construction
of (ideal) type concepts for heuristic purposes. The distinction'
between the two modes of analysis, their development, and their
consequences need careful attention.
The treatment of these two forms of analysis differs in the
methodological works over time. In 1I0bjectivity in the Social
J!.;.
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Sciences,,26 both are present; the major discussion evolves around
concept formation but, when Weber talks of causality, he is talking
about the method of ratio essendi.
To the extent that our science imputes particular
causes - -be they economic or non-economic --to
economic cultural phenomena, it seeks "historical"
knowledge. 27
In "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, ,,28 the
distinctions. between modes of analysis are again present, but here
the primary concern revolves around causal analysis and the exten-
sion and elaboration of the techniques of ratio .essendi. In Economy
and Society there is a significant shift in emphases. He moves the
focus of attention toward the establishment of uniformities of social
and economic organization, to the problems underpinning the formu-
lation of general principles, generic types, ideal-types; toward
sociology. Let us proceed more slowly and examine each position
in turn.
The determination of (hypothetical) "laws" and (psychological)
factors is only the first of many operations which lead us to the
desired type of knowledge; it is a preliminary tas.k. The essential
stages of analysis include:
The analysis of the historically given individual con-
figuration of those "factors" and their significant
concrete interaction, conditioned by their historical.
context and especially the rendering intel~igible of
the basis and type' of this significance would be the hext
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task to be achieved. This task must be achieved, it
is true, by the utilization of the preliminary analysis
but it is nonetheless an entirely new and distinct,task.
The tracing as far into the past as possible of the
individual features of these historically evolved con-
figurations which are contemporaneously significant,
and their historical explanation by antecedent and
equally individual configurations would be the third
task. Finally the prediction of possible future con-
stellations would be a conceivable fourth task. 29
In "Objectivity in the Social Sciences" this "entirely new and distinct
taski' and the "third task" are early expressions of the two modes of
analysis. Weber offers an example in a discussion of exchange and
the market. Here he clearly distinguishes between the analysis of
general aspects of exchanges (a "highly important task") and the
application of the concepts which we are provided by the investiga-
tion. The application entails their us e as heuristic device s for
h e • 1 1 1· 30lstorlca, causa ana YS1S. The constituent elements of causal
C"
analysis are given in the techniques of ratio essendi.
Although both moments of the investigatory procedure are
inadequately developed and little discussed in this es say (ratio
essendi receiving fuller theoretical treatment in the critique of
Edward Meyer), one topic does attract Weber's attention: the
specification and usage of ideal-types. Weber does not consider
his discussion of ideal-type concepts original, a new form of con-
ceptual method. Rather he feels he is making explicit what was
1 · 1··· ddt· 31a ways lmp lClt ln past proce ure an prac lce. Since the status
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of these concepts has already been discussed, it is sufficient here to
sharpen the context of their usage. 32
The interpretation and explanation of an historical configura-
tion requires the construction and elaboration of concepts which are
specifically delineated for that purpose and which, as we have seen,
cannot and do not reflect "universally 'essential' properties of
reality. ,,33 As "mental constructs," these concepts are not "des-
criptions" nor are they "hypptheses." But they can assist and
further both description and explanation.
Ideal-types are not created in and for themselves. Their utility
can be judged only in relation to a specific concrete problem. For
example, in formulating an ideal-type of a phenomenon such as
rational capitalism the "social scientist attempts to delineate,
through the empirical examination of specific forms of capitalism,
the most important respects (in relation to the concerns which he
h - 1£) - h- h - 1 - 1- - d- - · 11 34 Thhas set lmse ln W 1C rat10na caplta 1sm 1S lst1nct1ve. : - e
ideal is created and developed with empirical analysis and it, in
turn, sharpens that analysis. As Giddens has noted, "Weber con-
centrates his discussion upon the formulation of ideal types which
relate to the elucidation of specific historical configurations, since
this presents~the(clearest differentiation of descriptive and ideal-types.
But ideal-type concepts are not solely limited to this objective, and
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there are various kinds of ideal-types which, without being simple
descriptive concepts, nevertheless are generic in character. ,,35
The question arises, then: when does a descriptive classification of
phenomena become an ideal-type?
Ideal-types (the "one-sided accentuation of one or more points
of view") are to be distinguished from the descriptive -type which
involves I'the abstract synthesis of those traits which are comnlon
to num.erous concrete phenom.ena. 1136 liThe transition from. descrip-
tive to ideal-types takes place when we move from descriptive classi-
fication of phenomena towards the explanatory or theoretical analysis
37
of these phenomena. II Once again this can be illustrated in ref-
er~nce to the discussion of "exchange. If Weber holds that the notion
of "exchange" is descriptive to the extent that we observe that a large
nUnlber of human actions may be ~la·De~~d:(and;(cla:.'ss~iie·d,(as.exchange ~.
transactions. "But if we attempt to make the notion an element in
marginal utility theory in economics, we construct an ideal-type of
'exchange" whicli>l is based upon a purely rational construct. 1138
The r ole of ideal-typesand concept formation is central to
Weber's early methodological essay. Its exposition highlights his
stress on the importance of the process of their formation as an
independent (yet obviously interlinked) stage of analysis. The
elTIergent concepts (a type of tnan, authority, economy, etc.) as
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heuristic andlor expository instruments are argued to provide
increasing clarity and precision for historical causal:,analysis.
This procedure gives rise to no methodological doubts
so long as we clearly keep in mind that ideal-typical
developmental constructs and history are to be sharply
distinguished from each other, and that the construct
here is no more than the means for explicitly and
validly itnputing an historical event to its real causes
while eliminating those which on the basis of our
present knowledge seem possible. 39
As yet our discussion of "ratiorcog~oscendilll11hasillotllshown;iftobe
a separate, stage of causal analysis (although types such as "handi-
craft economy," "early Christianity," "rational capitalism, " the
"modern state" have potential explanatory power and usage)'. Weber
was to develop this initial discussion of types and c()nc~ptl-!formation
several stages further: before doing so, his whole conception of
ratio essendi was to be explicated.
Since "the meaning of history as a science of reality can only
be that it treats particular elements of reality not merely as heuristic
instruments, but as the subject of knowledge and particular causal
connections not as premises of knowledge but as real causal factors, ,,40
the question arises as to how one can establish the validity of "real
causal" factors, causal linkages.
Obviously not by the sitnple "observation" of the course
of events in any case, certainly not if one understands
by that a "presuppositionless" tnental "photograph"
of all the physical and psychic events occurring in the
space-time region in question- -even if such were
1.b...1:
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possible. Rather does the attribution of effects to
caus es take place through a proces s of thought which
includes a series of abstractions. The first and
decisive one occurs when we conceive of one or a
few of the actual causal components as modified in
a certain direction and then ask ourselves whether
under the conditions which' have been thus changed,
the same effect (the same, i. e., in "essential"
points) or some other effect "would be expected. ,,41
Here, in lfCritical Studies in the Logic of Cultural Sciences," Weber
is introducing a key notion, the notion of lfobjective possibility." The
category was derived by Weber from a study of certain theories of
criminal law • The reasons for and significance of this position are
well brought out by Andrew. :Arato:
Objective necessity has no place in criminal law,
because it does not leave room for a dimension of
subjective knowledge; foreknowledge and intention.
But a criminal case must be ultimately decided
according to evaluations of this subjective dimension.
Thus criminal case s lTIust be reinterpreted according
to an objective dynamic that allows for lTIore than one
possibility, even if we know that only one of these was
realized. In other words, a lTIan can be punished for
his subjective role in an event only if the event was
influenced by this role. But that means that without
that role other possible events could have taken place
instead of the event that did. 42 Weber adopts this
principle for historical research. The adoption means,
among other things, that the interest of law to locate a
subjective dimension in the past is replaced by the
(contemporary) interest of the historian. The stress
on a prior interest is important because Weber rejects
the possibility of (1) the synthesis of a historical totality
in itself and (2) the presuppositionless photographic
observation of facts. The a priori interest of the
historian isolates and generalizes individual components
of events to locate the possibilities within the dynamic
of' the past. 43, 44
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The .analytic technique is a means whereby one can discriminate
between factors which are relevant and those which are not, in
accounting for certain observed events and effects. 45 In his classic
example, Weber recasts Edward Meyer's treatment of the signifi-
cance of the outcome of the battle of Marathon for the consequential
development of Hellenic and Western European culture.
The historian's interest in the battle, itself a " rel a tively"
small and contained event, is precisely in its consequences for later
developments and with the thought of what might have been had the
Persians won. 46 In order to demonstrate that the battle was;
"causally significant tr in a particular way, we are asked to consider
alternative possible outcomes. Two possible courses of events are
presented (i.e., the effects of Greek versus Persian influence over
the development of the Western World). The procedure in this kind
of causal analysis is necessarily one of abstraction, involving t1imagi~
native reconstruction"; the projection of what would have occurred if
events had been qualitatively and quari.titati\ielidiffere·n~;!7
The assessment of causal significance of an historical
fact will begin with the ·posing of the following question:
in the event of the exclusion of that fact from the com-
plex of factors which are taken into account,as co-deter-
minants, or in the event of its modification in a certain
direction, could the course of events, in accordance
with general empirical rules (Erfahrungsregelen), have
taken a direction in any way different in ang features
which would be decisive for o~r interest? 4
•. 1 t
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In the case of the battle of Marathon, the consequences of Persian
victory would have been decisive for the subsequent formation and
advancement of Hellenic and, therefore, Western European culture.
One can conclude that had the battle taken a turn to the Persian
advantage, the outcome would have been "adequate fl to produce a
qualitatively different pattern in the development of the Western
49World.
This method of flimaginative reconstructionfl is the process
whereby the historian can attribute significance to causal factors and
establish "adequate causation" through "judgments of pos sibilities."
Furthermore, Yfeber argues, "we ·can ... well enough··~estimate
the relative 'degr"ee' to which the outcome is 'favoured' by the general
rule by a comparison involving the consideration of how other condi-
tions operating differently 'would' have favoured it. When we carry
through this comparison in our imagination by a sufficiently numerous
conceivable modifications of the constellation of conditions, then a
considerable degree of certainty for a judgement of the 'degree I of
objective possibility is conceivable, at least in principle. ,,50
Despite the familiar and fully justified notice which
warns against the transference of the calculus of
probabilities into other domains, it is clear that
the ... case of favourable chance or "objective
probability" determined from general empirical
propositions or from empirical frequencies, has its
analogues in the sphere of all concrete causality,
including the historical. 51
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But we cannot, Weber immediately adds, assign a numerical measure
of chance, because what is "wholly lacking" in historical analysis is
what would have to be presupposed in order to assign quantitative
measures - -lithe existence of 'absolute chance t or certain measurable
or countable aspects of phenomena. II If we ask about the possibility
of predicting an event, it is given in the historical enterprise to
attempt answers which tnay vary depending upon "the degree of know-
ledge of empirical regularities It - -ranging from the unpredictable to
various degrees of objective possibility and objective probability. 52
. These answers, however, cannot be quantified.
(It should be noted that Weber does not 11:?-ean to imply that this
"thought experiment" should take place without consideration of past
relevant studies and existing empirical knowledge. liThe simplest
historical judgement represents not only a categorically formed
intellectual construct but it also does acquire a valid content until
we bring to the 'given' reality the whole body of our 'noInological t
empirical knowledge. 11)53
UI. 1.1
(11
·(r~
116
From the early methodological essays to Economy and Society,
Weber shifts the (methodological) emphasis from ratio essendi to
ratio cognoscendi; from history to sociology. The philosophical back-
drop and underpinnings of this lTIethod remain unrelinquished. The
same basic positions are taken for granted. The concern for
sociology is also not "new." For in its fundamental conception, it
is an extension of the earlier focus on ratio cognoscendi, etc. 54
Thus Weber states bluntly:
It has continually been assumed as obvious that the
science of sociology seeks to formulate type concepts
and generalized uniformities of empirical process.
This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented
to the causal analysis and explanation of individual
actions, structures, and personalities possessing
cultural significance. 55
The full text reveals that the envisaged sociological project is both
involved and complicated. In what is by now a classic passage,
entitled "The Definitions of Sociology and Social Action," Weber
says:
Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous
word· is used here) is a science which attempts the
interpretive understanding of social action in order
thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course
and effects. 56
Sociology is, on this. conception, as Weber says, "highly ambiguous."
For it is conceived to involve (1) interpretive understanding of social
action in order, Weber suggests, to arrive at (2) a-<catisal1e-xplanation •
I _III
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However, a question arises: Does Weber mean (a) that sociology is
just concerned with (1) interpretive understanding which would pro-
vide empirical information about general principles, etc., as a basis
for (2) causal analysis, which would be the sole province of the methods
of ratio essendi (as it has been so far in our exegesis)? Or does he
tnean _. (b) that sociology itself involves a form of analysis capable of
causal explanations (of social action)? Weber IS stated position is not
transparent between these two alternative positions, although it will
be argued here that despite the fact that discussions and ana~yses-at
the level of ratio essendi always take their point of departure from
al:l:alyses :calidformulationsat the level of ratio cognoscendi, textual
analysis su~g~sts strongly that ratio cognoscendi itself embodies
position (b) above. In other words, whereas history is seen as pri-
marily involving analysis to establish causal linkages between "his-
torical individuals, 11 sociology is conceived as also embodying the
capacity to offer a causal account of social action. Weber's position
needs careful explication. We can begin by asking what Weber tneans
by social action.
"In taction t is included," he contends, "all human behaviour'
when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning
to it.· ... Action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective
meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it
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takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in
its course. 11 57
llMeaning, 11 Weber envisages, may be of two kinds:
The term may refer first to the actual existing
meaning in the given concrete case of a particular
actor, or to the average or approximate meaning
attributable to a given plurality of actors; or secondly
to the theoretically conceived pure type of subjective
meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors
in a given type of action. 58
The line between meaningful action and behavior (which is reactive
and nonreflexive) "cannot be sharply drawn. 11 Many areas of human
activity- -important for sociological investigation- -lie between the
two, e. g., traditional behavior, mystical experiences {"which cannot
be adequately communicated in words") and many psycho-physical
processes (lldiscernible l • at best "by the expert psychologist ll ). How-
ever, empathy and/ or a IIcompletell recapitulation of an experience,'
!',is:nbt .~,.,pre~~quis·ite··to]url~ers·tari.aigg~':~.~onelneed:not.lhave'been'
Caesar in order to understand Caesar. ,,59
Interpretative sociology, Weber argued, must be based on
inter -subjectively recognized methods of procedure, for verifiable,
reproducible accuracy, if it is to be counted amongst the sciences.
There was no doubt, Weber believed, that the canons of scientific
wisdom would be met. liThe basis for certainty in understanding can
be either rational, which can be further subdivided into logical or
Iii
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mathematical," or it can be of an emotionally empathic or artistically
appreciative quality. 11 60 The latter is attained when, through sym-
pathetic participation, we can adequately grasp the emotional context
in which the action took place. Rational understanding is most com-
plete when we attain an intellectual grasp of the lIaction elements in
their intended context of meaning. II It is best illustrated by reflec-
ting on an individual IS use of mathematical reasoning or formal logic.
ItWe have a perfectly clear understanding of what it means when some-
body employs the proposition 2 x 2 = 4, or the Pythagorean theorem
in' reason~ng"or "argument, or when somebody correctly carries out
a logical train of reasoning according to our accepted modes of
th"inking. 116i Likewise, we also understand what a person is doing
.lIw~en~e tries to achieve certain ends by choosing appropriate means
on the basis of the facts of the situation as experience has accustomed
us to interpret them. 11 62 An interpretation of this type of rationally
purposeful action (reminiscent of the Aristotelean idea of "practical
syllogisms ll )63 possesses the highest degree of verifiable certainty.
On the other hand, much human activity is not oriented to such
explicitly given ends or values. Furthermore, the more these ends
a1!d values d~fer from our own, the more .ctilturaldistanoe between
investigator and the subject of study, "the more difficult it is for us
to make them understandable by imaginatively participating in them. "
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Empathy, Weber tells us, is an important means of obtaining under-
standing of social action but is only one technique to help us achieve
such understanding. Understanding requires of the sociologist both
emotional sympathy (if possible empathy) and an "intellectual inter-
pretation," i. e., an intellectual "grasping" and l'catching, " of the
"subjective intelligibilitylf of action. ~:~
Given our· "basis for certainty in understanding," Weber sub-
divides further the two essential types of Verstehen he distinguished.
The first, l'direct understanding 1' (the grasping of the meaning of an
action through direct observation), may be subdivided according to
whether it involves rational or emotive actions. Both are simply
illustrated. "We understand perfectly" what it means when some-
body lIemploys the proposition 2 x 2 = 4." Likewise, we Ifunder-
stand an outbreak of anger as manifested by facial expressions,
exclamations, or irrational emotional reactions." The second type
of Verstehen, l1explanatory understanding" (erkltlrendes Verstehen)
is more complex and difficult and it is this form that occupies Weber's
~:~However, Weber briefly notes, "understanding" might fail
due to major cultural differences, etc. Then, he states, "we m.ust
simply accept them [the ends and values to which action is oriented]
as given data." If this should prove to be the case, Weber says,
"we can try to understand the action motivated by them on the basis
of whatever opportunities for approximate emotional and intellectual
i~terpretation seem to be available at different points in its course. "
(T.S.E.O., p. 91.)
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attention the most. Here a particular act is placed:
... in an understandable sequence of motivation, the
understanding of which can be treated as an explana-
tion of the actual course of behaviour. Thus for a
science which is concerned with the subjective meaning
of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex
of meaning in which an actual course of understandable
action thus interpreted belongs. 64
However, what Weber means by placing an act in a "sequence of moti-
belongs, is by no means straightforward. On Weber's account Ita
motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor:
himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in
. 65questIon. " There:ar..e ,essentially two difficulties here. The first
is that Weber's concept of flmotive" (or complex of "subjective
meaning 1') appears as a I'catch-all" category for a subject's intended
or unintended meanings, reasons, commonsense knowledge, and pro-
cedures. We briefly discuss some of those ,concepts,:_:insufficiently
distinguished by Weber, at the end of this chapter. Secondly, what
Weber means by an lIa dequate ground" for the conduct in question,
for the actor or observer, is not clear and raises a number of ques-
tions. As we will see in our discussion in this chapter,an<J.".:iJ;l-the-'dis-
cussion of hermeneutics (Chapter 5) and critical theory and psycho-
analysis (Chapter 11), the respective "weights "one grants to the
actor's account of his or her own action, against the observer IS
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account, raises very complex considerations.
For Weber if the action is rational we are able to grasp the
content without difficulty. "Thus we understand the chopping of wood
or aiming of a gun in terms of motive in addition to direct observa-
tion if we know that the woodchopper is working for a wage or is
chopping a supply ofifirewooQ,tfor his own use or possibly is doing it
for recreationr!,66 If the action is emotive we may attain a similar
"motivational understanding. II For example, we may understand an
outburst of anger if we know that it has been provoked by "jealousy,
injured pride, or an insult. ,,~:<
We can apply the term lIadequacy on the level of meaning" to
;'the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when
and insofar as, according to our habitual modes of thought and
feeling, its component parts taken in their mutual relation are
~~<Weber recognized, of course~ that "in a large number of :-
cases·' it is extremely difficult to arrive at a "satisfactory inter-
pretation of motives." He argues that "verification of subjective
interpretation by comparison with the concrete course of events is,
as in the case of all hypotheses, indispensable. II A few cases are
"susceptible to psychological experimentation!, If "For the rest
there remains only the possibility of comparing the largest pos-
sible number of historical or contemporary processes which, while
otherwise similar, differ in the one decisive point of their relation
to the particular motive or factor the role of which is being investi-
gated. This is a fundamental task of comparative sociology. Often
unfortunately. . . we are left to the 'imaginary experiment'
to arrive at a causal judgement." (T. S. E. 0., p. 97.)
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recognized to constitute a 'typical! complex of meaning. 11 67 How-
ever, such adequacy is not to be taken as having synonymity with
causal adequacy. There is, of course, in Weber's opinion no simple
and direct relationship between motivef?, "complexes of meaning, "
and action. But there is scope to explore whether or not there are
systematic interconnections between motives, etc., and action. In
order to demonstrate such interconnections and, therefore, "explana-
tory significance, II we must, Weber contends, establish "empirical
generalizations" which relate an understandable sequence of motiva-
tion to a specified class of assessible consequences. 68 An alternative
form of causal analysis to that subsumed by ratio essendi seems to
be suggested.
A correct causal analysis, Weber states, pivots on our capacity
"to determine that there is a probability, which in the rare ideal
case can be numerically stated, but is always in some sense calcu-
lable, that a given observable event (overt or subjective) will be
followed or accompanied by another event. 11 69 Therefore, a correct
causal interpretation of a concrete course of action is arrived at
when the relationship between overt action and motives has become
meaningfully comprehensible and at the same time shown to b~
typical.
A correct causal interpretation of typical action means
that the process which is claimed to b~ typical is shown
~.II
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to be both adequately grasped on the level of meaning
and at the same time the interpretation is to some
degree causally adequate. If adequacy in respect to
meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree
of uniformity and how. precisely its probability can be
numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible
statistical probability, whether dealing with overt or
subjective processes. On the other hand, even the
most perfect adequacy on the level of meaning has
causal significance from a sociological point of view
only insofar as there is some kind of proof for the
existence of a probability that action in fact normally
takes the course which has been held to be meaningful.
For this there must be some degree of determinable
frequency of approximation to an average or pure type.
Statistical uniformities constitute understandable
types of action. . . and thus constitute "sociological
generalisations" only when they can be regarded as
manifestations of the understandable subjective mean-
ing ofa course of social action. 70
In sociology, if we are applying the methods of explanatory
understanding, a correct causal analysis of social action is stipulated
to require adequacy at the level of meaning and causation. It is
crucially important here to note Weberls remarks on causality. For
what Weber seems to be suggesting is that given one adequately
grasps "the level of meaning, 11 a correct analysis also depends on
our capacity to show causal significance, i. e., that the relationship
between "motives, 11 complexes of subjective meaning, and a given
action, is empirically significant (i. e., typical). This will be the
case if there is proof "for the existence of a probability that action
in fact normally takes the course which has been held to be meaning-
full II If an Ilempirically significant" relationship can be established
..1 I
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between "motives,1I etc. ,. and overt action, we have established
adequate grounds to ascribe typical causation, i. e., "motives" can
be causes. On the basis of such an analysis of experiences in particu-
lar situations with particular outcomes, we can make Iisociological
generalizations ll about understandable, regular types of actions.
An example of such an analysis is! Paul Waltonls and Laurrie Taylor1s
study of ind~strial sabotage. The study attempts an analysis of lithe
meanings or motives which lie behind such action, 1171 (i. e., industrial
sabotage) within the context of "an imaginative reconstruction of the
contextual situation in which the actor performs. ,,72 They find
three pure types showing that individuals attempt "to destroy or
multilate objects in the work environment in order (i) to reduce
tension, or (ii) to facilitate the work process, or (iii) to assert some
. . 73form of direct control. II The types that are presented are pure in
that they. do not reflect the actual behavior of any person, but rather
reflect generalized courses of action and as such may be thought of
as II conditional generalizations. II
It is important, John Eldridge has pointed out, lito distinguish
between two kinds of probablistic statement, both of which can
prop~rly be thought of as conditional generalizations. The one we
might term an empirical tendency statement based upon statistical
knowledge - -for exalnple, the tendency of certain groups of people to
,IL II
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be located in the commanding position in a society. The other we
might term ideal typical constructions with built-in statements about
probability, :which may be utilized as a benchmark against which to
analyze the actual course of behaviour. II 74 However, these (ideal-
typical) conditional generalizations (of courses of action) may also
be thought of as providing a causal explanation of typical social
action. For example, the three constructed types of industrial
sabotage are an attempt to give a causal account in motivational
terms, .of typical sabotage action patterns. These· types do not
explain an individual IS action, but rather attempt to get at the basis
of typical andpr~b~bl~ social action, i. e., generali~ed courses of
(mass) action. Such constructed types can be best comprehended as
an attempt to advance concept formation beyond the stage of descrip-
tion and em.pirical generalization to the construction of explanatory
d . 75eVlces.
For Weber the methods of ratio cognoscendi have as an essen.-
ti~l_:task the establishm.ent of types. These methods, we have argued,
can be applied.at two levels. First, they can be used for the empiri-
cal study of social action where the sociologist attempts to explor~
and elaborate relationships between motives and actions, which may
then serve to explain typical and probabl~ courses of behavior.
Secondly, they can be used for the construction of types which can
II~
om ."
"(fJ .
127
then be employed purely for heuristic purposes in the application of
the methods of ratio es sendi. (In the following discussion we will
refer to these two levels of application as position A and B,
respectively. )
If there is to be a scientific analysis of social action--an
analysis that proceeds beyond description--it has, Weber argues, to
construct ideal types. Through the use of such types (constructed
on ideals of rational,~" or\:value~oriehted, or emotive, or traditionally
oriented action), "it is possible to compare with this the actual course
of action and to arrive at a causal explanation of the observed devia-
tions, II which can be IIattribute-di.toi the-influence c~flt'llogical'fallacies,
personal factors, and a host of other possible elements. Although
lIas in the case of every generalizing science the abstract character
of the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, compared
with actual historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullnes s
of concrete content. To compensate for this disadvantage, socio-
logical analysis can offer a greater precision of concepts . . . by
striving for the highest possible degree of adequacy on the level of
meaning.... 11 76 And if our pure action concepts are only con-:
structed on the basis of Ildirect understanding ll (or if we cannot
demonstrate causal adequacy in an attempted .explanatory-under-
standing);· lade quacyJon the 1e vel; of I'm.eaning )iSIthe :~.only'~weiy ;:w,'e)-'can
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compensate for the lack of fullness of our generalizations. These
generalizations, nevertheless, add very important precision to any
historical analysis (which might employ a whole range of types) that
we might make.
In all cases, rational or irrational, sociological analy-
sis both abstracts from reality and at the same time
helps us' to understand it, in that it shows with what
degree of approximation a concrete historical phe~­
nomenon may be in one aspect "feudal, If ·.in:another
I 'patrimonial, 'I in another I'bureaucratic, II and in
still another "charismatic." In order to give a pre-
cise meaning to these terms, it is necessary for the
sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the cor-
responding forms of action which in each case involve
the highest possible degree of logical integration, by
virtue of their complete adequacy at the .level of
meaning. But precisely because this is true, it is
probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can
be found which corresponds exactly to anyone of these
ideally constructed pure types. 77
To briefly summarize we should note that Weber's emergent
methodological. position is one that combine s and locates the two
within a single framework. Both ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi
provide us with a form .of causal analysis. Ratio cognoscendi also
generates heuristic instruments, formulations that ratio essendi
~mbraces as; a:}p,bint)_bfld~parJ:ure.It is sociology and history that
- .
provide the developed methodological position for investigation.
Weber thus distinguishes sciences oriented toward generalization
and individuation, toward sociology and history, but distinguishes
:t-
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only one methodological framework for the human sciences as
a whole.
The tensions we have discerned and discussed so far revolved
around Weber's account of the relationship between fact and value,
theory and practice, and that which he took for granted and a'ssumed.
Our present account of his method'ological procedures highlights a
further central issue: that the very logical structure of Weber's
approach to the human sciences and theory formation, predetermines
the possible applications of the knowledge generated by such sciences.
In other words, that the very structure of knowledge generated by
Weber's conception of rational method is restricted in its potential
usage, in its capacity to conceptualize historical and social action,
and that the investigatory procedures structure this bias. The sugges-
tion needs careful explication. Let us begin by looking at the applica-
tion of the methods of ratio cognoscendi: (with respect to·position--.B)
~:~andrr~atio essendi.
To begin with it can be noted that these investigatory procedures
are representative of more than is made explicit; they are a "consis-
tent expression of a quite definite attitude of man to reality. ,,78 In
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a comment that summarizes many of our themes to date, Loewith
has said:
The ideal-typical construct has as its foundation a
specific "illusionless" man who has been thrown back
upon himself alone by a world become objectively
meaningless and sober, and therefore, to that extent,
emphatically tlrealistic." He is therefore forced to
forge-,byv himself any objective meaning and a meaning-
ful relationship to things, and in particular the relation-
ship to reality, as one specifically his own: in short
lIto 'create ll a meaning, practically and theoretically.
People, state, and individual therefore can no longer
be regarded and integrated as uniform substances with
deeper backgrounds - -not merely because it would be
unscientific but because such an attitude would be marked
by transcendental prejudices and ideals, and the world
view into which "we have been placed 1l no longer justifies
such prejudices. 1179
In a world that has eaten of the tree of knowledge, that "suffers the
fate of the modern er,a, 11 it is the individual who alone is sanctified.
A pivotal presupposition, which Weber tries to justify through empiri-
cal reference is, as Loewith has written, that
since all kinds of objectivities, as a result of
their disenchantment (through rationalization) can no
longer be imputed an indepen¢lent meaning, it is only
the "individual, II the single man dependent solely
upon himself who is truly real and justified in his
existence. 80
Weber asserts the purely methodological meaning of "individualis-
tic" and'1I rational 11 definitions, types, and constructs and denies
their substantive character and value -relatedness. 81 However, his
method entails, as we have shown, an evaluation of a mode of
trl
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rationality and practice, a commitment to the production of certain
forms of knowledge, which alone are considered objective.
As such, his work is also ambiguous between an explicit
atomistic and rationalistic conception of the totality and .~~ :implicit
organicist or formalist conception. 82 In the former case, the whole
is the sum of simple elements or elementary-·'I!facts. q·.J(.>We ~can.only
know the "whole II through its elements and in Weber IS view even
these form only a partial and one-sided view. This conception of
the totality seems to be the view that Weber expli<;itly holds. In the
"rationalized" social world the If s imple elem.entslf are individuals,
only the individual is truly real. The patterns of individual acts and
attitudes are the elements occurring in social institutions and collec-
tive conceptions. It follows that for Weber, all such concepts can--
in principle--be defined in terms of individual behavior. If one wants
to understand what ,passes, for example, under "collective" concep-
tions, then according to Weber "the clear-cut sharply defined analysis
of the various possible standpoints is the only path which will lead us
83
out of verbal confusion. II "Collective 11 conceptions are important
and useful for an initial orientation to an issue, but should always be
superseded by analytical and individualistic concepts which can put
the research topic into perspective.
But if Weber maintains an individualistic theory of the totality,
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and ontology, thi~ does not necessarily imply that he believed one
could (a) in practice, define all institutional and collective concepts,
e. g" Reformation, Capitalism, in terms of individual behavior;
and that he thought (b) it was a priori inappropriate to use such
(institutional) concepts in the social sciences. Weber himself uses
such ·concepts throughout his work. But it must not be forgotten
that for Weber these "collective" conceptions are "solely the resul-
tants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual
persons, since these alone can be treated as agents who carry out
subjectively understandable action. ,,84, 85
Ho:wever, W~ber's approach also embodies an implicit refer-
ence and commitment to a formalist conception of the totality (although
he ~xplicitly rejected such an approach ~n his methodological writings).
~is work embraces interpretations of the whole of society and the
totality af'tendencies, and often, we have suggested, entails Ita more
pretentious concept of sociology. 11 Here the conception of the whole
appears to imply the view that there are properties of "whole's, II
lfemergent," as May Brodbeck has expressed it, 1'from properties
of parts, ff but which cannot be defined in terms of the parts (i. e. ,
. the i~¢lividuals') interactions. (This view is called "descriptive
emergentism" by Brodbeck. )86 In a formalist conception of the
totality, these "emergent" properties of the 1twhole" or "callective,1t
I
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are held to take on a dynamic of their own to shape and dominate the
dimensions of the parts. When Weber talks of the extension of the
process rationalization as the "absolutely inescapable condition of
our existence, II he is no longer just referring to an atomistic con-
ception of the totality, but rather to a formal or organicist-dynami-
cist conception. Rationalization, the "fate of our times,~11 appears
as the essential defining force of what we understand and can under-
stand by social reality.
It is, in fact, Weber's implicit conception of the ·nature of
totality as a formal whole which becomes the empirical basis and
hence partial justification for his individualistic ontology and.atomistic
conception of the totality. But before we can develop this point it is
necessary to direct further attention to Weber's explicit methodo-
logical commitm~nts (and then come bacl< to his implicit methodo-
logical lIinterests").
The establishment, application, and use of ideal types is cen-
tral to Weber's study of history and the working out of historical
explanations and IIreall' causal factors. The nature of the role of
ideal-types has been well summarized by Arata:
In the first instance, the concept of ideal type seems
to methodologically negate the historicity of the
spectacle it constructs. 87 However, Weber con..;.
sidered ideal typic analysis only a means toward (and
not the whole of) historical analysis. He believed
that the same problem complex can be, and must be,
'.11 I
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cut into from the points of view of several (at times
opposing) ideal types. But the aim of this procedure
is the imputation of the "adequate causation" of a
unique cultural event, or rather the reconstruction
·of the "objective possibilities" of the unique cultural
problem complex. 88 The adequate cause is com-
prised of all the elements (each formulated as ideal
types: e. g., "Puritan ethic," "rational law," "modern·
science, 11 1Ifree labor, 11 "bureaucratic state") which
made the emergence of a unique cultural complex (also
formulated as an ideal-type, e. g., II.capitalism, II "the
spirit of capitalism, 11 and ultimately Western rationality)
objectively possible. 89
The results of Weberian analysis are antaccount/ explanation of an
aspect of the historical social world, which is always partial and one-
sided, and takes place through concepts whibh capture an aspect of
this world but cannot grasp it in itself. Weber explicitly rejects the
possibility of knowing the historical totality or any of its parts in
themselves. The analysis is always external to the object of investi-
gation because this object, ultimately, cannot be known. The social
scientist imposes order on the 'Iinfinite cultural manifold, II in his /
her attempts to account for a segment of this "flux" II In other words,
the social scientist gives and imposes form and categories on the
social world and creates valid representations. But a plethora of
forms, types, and explanations are, of course, legitimate and valid
(so long as the procedures and canons of rational method are adhered
to).
Central to Weber's methodological position are the dichotomies
'(f1
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between the world that can and cannot be known, between the kn"owing
subject and the ultimately unknowable object. Weber attempts to
locate all cognition and rationality on the side of the knower. There
is an empirical basis and justification for this view and these dich9to-
mies; they reflect the diremption of man and the world in the age of
disenchantment and, consequentially, new-found autonomy. There
is also a crucial epistemological foundation. It is clearly Kantian.
For Weber ultimately reproduces the Kantian dualism between the
phenomenal and noumenal worlds; the worlds we can know and that
which exists in itself and is unknowable. We say ultimately because
Weber has his own version of this position. First, its genesis is to
be accounted for historically. It is an historical derivation and
product (the result of rationalization and disenchantment). Secondly,
the outcome of these historical processes was held to be the realiza-
tions that reality is an objectively meaningless, valueless, infinite
flux, the overcoming of which Weber saw as possible only through
individual commitment and decision which could create and impose
form and potentially tlobjective" and valid knowledge. 90 These
issues raise a number of points which are deserved of closer con:-
sideration. We can usefully begin by examining the nature of the
Kantian dualis m
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The Kantian doctrine of transcendental categories serves, it
has been argued, to bring and tie together two realms or levels of
phenomena:
... (1) the cognitions, perceptions, intuitions,
feelings, etc., of the particular individual, which
are commonly referred to through the use of terms
such as Erlebnis (lived experience) or simply Leben
(life in the sense in which German Lebensphilosophie
developed the term; as human life and experience. . .)
and (2) categories, forms, means of expression, and
symbols which are universal in some fashion, and
shared by a community of individuals, thus making
P9ssible transpersonal, inter-subjective discourse
about the contents of Erlebnis and Leben. 91
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brought these two levels together and
attempted to .bind them into an indisputable unity.
If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving
representations insofar as it is in any \vise affected,
is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind IS power of
producing representations from itself, the spontaneity
of knowledge, should be called the understanding. Our
nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be
other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode
in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on
the other hand, which enables us to think the object
of sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither
of these powers maya preference by given over the
other. Without sensibility no object would be given to
us, without understanding -no object would be thought.
Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions with-
out concepts are blind. 92
"As James Schmidt has pointed out:
With the requirements that empirical knowledge must
be viewed as consisting of both a general, inter-subjec-
tively shared power of producing representations ('.'the
spontaneity of knowledge") and a specific, intuited,
;L .
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personal experience (lithe receptivity of our mind")
Kant has given a solution to the problem of knowledge
which neither sacrifices the individual IS experience
to the dictates of a higher or more enlightened intui-
tion (such as a wisdom which can only be achieved by
a limited group within the society) nor dissolves the
general images and representations of discourse into
a babel of competing claims and descriptions. Dis-
agreements may arise between individual experience,
but there exist reasonable ways of settling them, since
both the spontaneity of knowledge and the receptivity
of mind are general species traits of all human beings.
Kant is able to win this battle, however, only at the
cost of the problematic Ding an sich. 93
Weber follows this Kantian position very closely. For, as we
have seen, he provides a solution to the problem of knowledge which
also grants central importance to the individual IS experience, and
yet also does not dissolve general forms and representations into
solipsism. In the human sciences Weber both preserves the autono-
mous constituting role of the individual and the possibility of rational,
inter -subjective discourse. We are prevented from collapsing into
a "babel of competing claims II by adherence to the canons of rational
scientific method. But Weber wins this battle oply at the cost of
reproducing Kantts dualism between t~e phenomenal and noumenal
realms and establishing trthe problematic Ding an sich." Even if the
object of investigation is another subject or oneself, there is a
noumenal realm, which we cannot know.
It is very important to realize the consequences of this view
for the hum~n science. This further dualism ensures that a critically
~JJ i
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reflexive understanding of the genesis of different values, value-
orientations, etc., which we referred to at the end of the previous
chapter, cannot become part of the human sciences program. Weber's
approach and meth.ods, with their "individualistic" and "rational"
definitions, structure the world as to make such a project anathema.
Why this is so needs careful explication.
It has already been shown that Weber's attempt to maintain the
dualisms of fact and value and theory and practice masks a commit-
lTIent to a particular schema of values aneJ. practice. It has also been
argued that Weber's methodological position embraces an evaluation
of the meaning o~ the rationalized world, as it subsumes formal
rationality as a position supposedly free of evaluations and value-
judgments (from which it criticizes all other views o~ science as
. ideological, i. e., embodying commitments to practical and value-
judgments). It can also be noted, as previously pointed out, that on
this view reality is both the object of analysis and the guiding thread
for the interpretation of this reality. This is because Weber claims
the disenchanted, rationalized world, or totality, to be of a particular
quality and kind, i. e., lTIeaningless, etc., and therefore can only be
given scientific meaning arid ·known if one pursues a particular form
of method, etc. But now we should note that we are in a circle. For
what is (claimed to be) known has become the standard of what can
(jl
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be known. It i$ like Kant's demand, as Hegel expressed it, "that
we should know the cognitive faculty before we know. If
. Even if we leave aside this last point, the consequences of the
dualism between the w~rld of appearances that we can know and the
essence that we cannot, can be seen to have further implications.
For since the world (or anapsect of it) cannot be known in itself,
there is no justification available, no privileged standpoint, etc.,
which can claim access-to it. Quite literally, in the end, one mari's
value -orientations, concepts, etc., are able to shed as much light
on this world as another 1s (so long, of course, as they employ the
rational method). For historical reasons, there now exists a philo-
sophical position that can justify the inapplicability of a critical
reflexive underst~t:lding of the lI social world. "
In Weber 1s view we can give a partial description of the pro~
cesses whereby people acquire their values, world-views, etc., but
we cannot give a critical account of these. Weber can help give an
individual an account of the ultimate meaning of his or her own con-
duct and even point out the one -sided, limited nature of this person IS
views and orientations. - 'ButiWebe-rLcanfo~lydo so~(that is, :if"he is
doin"g ;more~l than ~xp6sing.the~inte~nalJ·inconsistenciesof these views)
by pointing out the legitimacy of competing claims, explanations, and
by arguing that the totality is objectively meaningless, etc., outside
I:
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individually grounded characterizations. He cannot, in the end,
arbitrate between claims and claim the ideological nature of certain
values, standpoints, etc., i. e., that they are not only limited and
one-sided but also false .and distorted. He cannot do this because he
has no conception of· a false and distorted view of the world (given we
follow the correct methodological procedures). He only claims
ideology when value-judgments enter into the .doing of_s~ience. The
philosophical justification of this position is, of course, that sinc.e
we cannot know the object of investigation in-itself, we cannot ground
any privileged access to this world. As we have seen and see again
here, Weber's position condones a situation of theoretical relativism,
a pluralism in the human sciences and allows no objective ground for
discriminating amongst competing accounts and explanations and
voicing a preference. Weber's tnethods and concepts relnain external
to the world in":itselfand in so doing firid~7a;;~p!J.ilosophicalground and
justification for relativism.
Hence inquiry into the conditions of possible knowledge can
only be meaningfully pursued in the form of methodological inquiry
into the rules for the construction and corroboration of scientific
theories.- Weber's methodological "discussions" with his contem-
poraries should be seen in this light (for example, his critique of
Meyer). The subjects that proceed according to these. rules lose
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their significance. But this view, first, as we have already repeatedly
noted, makes a dogma of method and masks a commitment to the
values and consequences of formal rationality, which cannot be
justified within its own terms of reference, i. e., requires a prac-
tically reasoned justification which is not made. Secondly, it rests
on a philosophical argument that dirempts the world into phenomenal
and noumenal realms. The question remains: is this view and argu-
ment justified?
To answer this .question fully and adequately is beyond the
bounds of this work. It would require "nothing less fl than a· recapitu-
lation of Hegel 1s critique of Kant. Here we can only suggest a num-
ber of points and arguments that point to the inadequacy of the Kantian
dualism and Weber IS seeming~failure:-tbigrasp-tliedialectic 'of- .experi--
ence. These points and arguments highlight an alternative program
for the social sciences, a critical program that becomes plausible
when it is seen that this final dualism breaks down.
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, . 94In the Phenomenology Hegel sought to demonstrate that any
methodological procedure that concentrates exclusively on either the
subje~t or object of investigation breaks down through itnmanent
contradiction,..-likewise·.~"any,.,.epistemology that hopes to establish
and delineate the knowing process in abstract philosophical reflec-
tion. Writing of Kant's circular reasoning, Hegel points out that:
What is demanded [by Kant] is thus the following:
we should know the cognitive faculty before we
know . '." . The inve stigation of the faculty of know-
,ledge is itself knowledge, and cannot arrive at its
,goal because it is this goal already. 95
Weber's reasoning, we have already seen, embodies an analogous
circle.
We 'cannot, ~egel contends, restrict our attention to concepts,
"forms; and categories, but rather must concentrate on the explica-
tion of the 'knowil1:g process that gives rise to new conceptual forms.
Such a proce'ss Hegel finds is a continuous dialectic of subject and
object in whic·h both terms are constantly changing, developing, and
being redefined. It makes no sense to talk of an unknowable object,
a distinct noumenal realm, b~cause to posit such a realtn is to make
a::'cognitive, claim. Summarizing an important part of Hegel's argu-
rnent, Marcuse writes:
When experience begins, the object seems a stable
entity, independent of consciousness; subject and
object appear to be alien to one another. The Jpro-
ogress of knowledge, however, reveals that the two
.1I I.
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do not subsist in isolation. It becomes clear that the
object gets its objectivity from the subject. liThe
real" which consciousness actually holds in the end-
less flux of sensations and perceptions, is a univer-
sal that cannot be reduced to objective elements free
of the subject (for example, quality, thing, force,
laws). In other words, the real object is constituted
by the (intellectual) activity of the subject. The
latter discovers that it itself stands "behind" the
b · t 96o Jec s ....
We cannot obviously follow at any length Hege1 1s account, in the
Phenomenology, of a subject 's (or as Hegel puts its, a "conscious-
ness I 11) journey.;o~;discovery. We can, however, and this is crucial
for our argument, say a little about Hegel1s analysis of the dialecti-
cal nature of experience.
In the Introduction of the Phenomenology Hegel wrote:
The dialectical movement, which consciousness exer-
cises on itself--on its knowledge as well as its object--
is, insofar as the new, true object emerges to con-
sciousness as a result of it, precisely that which is
called experience.... Consciousness knows some-
thing, and this object is the essence or the in-itself.
But this object is also the in-itself for consciousness;
and hence the ambiguity of truth comes into play. We
see that consciousness now has two objects; one is
the first in-itself and the second is the being for con-
sciousness of this in-itself.
(These two objects, in the above and following passages, can be
thought of as Hege1 1s equivalent conception of what Kant had called
the noumena (the being in-itself) and phenomena (the being for con-
sciousness of this in-itself~) Hegel continues the passage by saying
that:
"f:.
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The latter seems at first to be mer~ly the reflection
of consciousness into its self, a representation, not
of an object, but only of its knowledge" of the first
object. But as already indicated, the first object
comes to be altered for consciousness in this very
process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes to
consciousness an object which is the in-itself only
for it. And therefore it follows that this, the being-
of-consciousness of this in-itself, is the true, which
is to say that this true is the essence or conscious-
ness f new object. This new object contains the
annihilation of the first; it is the experience consti-
tuted through that first object. 97
The necessity to discuss the nature of the true in-itself becomes
redundant and left to the medium of philosophical abstraction. The
result of Hegel 1 s decision to attempt to explicate the process of
knowing reveals that consciousness can come and can only come to
know the world as it appears. The knowledge we have of the world
is~ knowledge, in its being for us. As Kenley Dove wrote, "Since
the object of our inquiry is knowing, any distinction on our part
between subject and object would be playing with mere abstractions.
Our object is at once and inseparably both the object-knowing subject
and the object known-by-the-subject. Thus our object, consciousness
or Spirit, contains this subject-object distinction within itself and
requires no further distinction by us. ,,98
The "supra-phenomenal·' constructs of Kantian philos9phy are
unnecessary since the t'!exp~·riences _~f cons:ciousn_ess its<elf'~ lead too the
discovery and uncovering of a more concrete distinction.
.cf\"
145
Natural consciousness 'will show itself to be :merely
the concept (Begriff) of knowledge, or unreal know-
ledge. But since it immediately takes itself to be
real knowledge, this pathway has a negative signift-
cance for it, and what is actually the realization of
the Concept is for it [for consciousness] rather the
loss and destruction of its self. The road may thus
be viewed as the way of ".aoubt or, more properly as
the way of despair. For what happens here is not
what is usually understood by "doubt," i. e., enter-
taining a disbelief in this or that presumed truth only
to return to that same "truth" once the lfdoubt" has
been, appropriately dis sipated. . . . On the contrary,
this road is the cons cious insight into the truth of
phe~omenalknowledge, a knowledge for which that
is most real which is in truth only the unrealized
Concept. 99
Phenomenal knowledge shows its incompleteness, one-sidedness,
limitedness, and falseness at the phenomenal level. The develop-
Inent of the knowing subject is not epistemological activity per se,
for that process cannot be severed from the histor·ical struggle
between man and his world, "a struggle that is itself a constitutive
part of the way to truth and of truth itself. If 100 It is struggle along
a road of doubt and desp~ir where the subject is continually con-
tinually confronted with the inadequacy of its concepts. But the
question arises: ·do we not risk skepticism or solipsism in this
process? For what standards or criteria reveal incompleteness or
the inadequacy of ourrconcepts?
For Hegel it is, of course, of central importance to realize
that standards are always~ standards - -trcon~ciousness provides
()
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itself with its own standard, and the investigation will accordingly be
a comparison of consciousness with its own self. 11 101 Dove has
elucidated this process well:
To understand how this comparison takes place we
must observe that, just as consciousness or Spirit
was seen to be at onc~ poth~~stibjective".~and "o1?jec -'
tive, 11 this same duality holds true for the Concept:
consciousness itself distinguishes between (a) the
Concept qua knowledge and (b) the Concept qua object.
Hence there is with consciousness not only something
which is taken to be forcit; consciousness also assumes
that which is for it, is in-itself or has an independent
status as well. Accordingly, we see that the Concept
has two moments. If we take the Goncept to be know-
ledge, then the standard for this Concept qua know-
ledge will be its object or what is said to exist in-itself.
In this case the comparison will consist in seeing
whether the Concept corresponds to the object, i. e. ,
truth. But, on the other hand, if we take the Concept
to be the object as it is essentially or in-itself, then
the Concept itself will be the standard for the Concept
qua known, i. e., the Concept qua object of knowledge.
Here the comparison consists in seeing whether the
Concept qua known or qua object corresponds to the
Concept itself. 102 --
Futhermore, as Dove points out, it must be noted that (a) both these
aspects of the Concept must be taken into account in any attempt to
describe the knowing process and (b) it must be realized that both
these aspects embody, in fa-ct~ the same process. tiThe standard is
selected by consciousness itself and, since both moments of the pro-
cess fall within our object, i. e., knowledge as it appears, any selec-
103
tion of standards on~ part would be superfluous. 11 The move-
ment and development of consciousness depends then on the process
But as consciousness' knowledge changes, it follows
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whereby "consciousness not only selects its own standard but is also
the 'comparison of its knowledge with its own standard. 11 104 And if,
as happens continually in the subject's struggle in the world, con~
sciousness finds that its criteria or standard and its knowledge do
not match, it will, tr on the basis of its own assumptions, have to
change its knowledge in order to make it correspond to its stan:':'
d d ,,105ar s.
from what we have said above, that consciousness 1 standard changes,
"for the standard was based upon the object and, indeed, upon the
object qua known. ,,106
Consciousness thus discovers that the process in which
it placed its knowledge in doubt, all the while certain
that it held a firm criterion for what the object of its
knowledge was in-itself, turns out to be a movement
in which it loses its own truth; the "path of doubt ll
(Zweifel) is transforn1'ed into "the way of despair"
(Verzweiflung).... Moreover, this despair is not
something arbitrarily imposed on consciousness from
without; it is immanent in the very movement of con-
sciousness itself. Thus, in Baillie's poignant transla-
tion, consciousness "suffers this violence at its own
hands. ,,107
Experience is, therefore, a dialectical process to the extent to which
"new objects" are generated and established for itself. It is a pro-
cess in which consciousness negates the appearance of the first
object of consciousness I experience and in this process uncovers a
new object and a new standard. The negation has a content, it is a
d . · 108etermlnate negatlon.
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Hegel speaks of the Concept (Begriff), where Kant spoke of
categories, forms, intuitions, etc. And where Kant speaks of a
phenomenal and noumenal world, a given diremption between subject
and object, Hegel argues we can only speak of an interaction and
tension between subject and object in the process of knowing, out of
which the concept arises. This concept cannot be identified with the
subject or object. It is neither simply a subjective creation and
representation nor an objective structure. Rather, it is temporal
and variable and is given subjectively, but dependent for its realiza-
tion and validity on concrete human, inter -subjective, history, in
which man interacts with the world that he is conscious of. To speak
of two worlds, as Weber did, is to gloss the complexity of man's
self-formative process and his constitution of the world. How we
might further conceive these processes will be taken up again later
in the thesis. It is importan.t here, however, to note the consequences
of Hegel's critique of the Kantian dualism for Weber's own approach
to the human sciences.
First, we must note that where Weber claims discontinuity,
we can only find continuity. The dualism that Weber subsumes can-
not be maintained. Secondly, we m.ust notice that the formal ration-
ality of Weber's method structures the object of investigation in such
a way as to perpetuate this dualism. The true ~in-itself cannot be
II I
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known. We can only make valid claims about an object from our own
individual standpoints and if we utilize the rational ITlethod. Our
concepts will then capture parts of this object and render valid know-
ledge. But since the true in-itself cannot be grasped, any nUITlber of
points of view can formulate starting points of investigation. We,
therefore, have a conception of the hUITlan sciences, previously
noted, that sees relativism as 'an essential feature.
But, and in light of· ou:r above discussion of I-regel, we must
note that Weberts position is a curious one fo'r the social scientist to
accept. For the objects of the social world are~ objects. Following
Hegel, we can note that objects of investigation are always objects
for us, the being for consciousness of an in-itself. As such the
interesting question becomes how a given body of ideas, beliefs, and
knowledge comes to be established as and lin' socia,l,':reality. ~Indee4, it
is only through an account of the knowing subject (and the constitutive
presuppositions of knowledge) that the human sciences (in fact, all
science's) can render themselves comprehensible. What is required,
initially at least, is an account of the human subject, of the subjectts
knowledge, values, and interests; an analysis and account of the con-
stitutive elements that are at the base and roots of the production of
different (world- )views of social phenomena. Itt shoula, of course, be
noted that such a study is itself only free from the thrust of Weber's
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concerns .with.the role of thOe ·constituting .subject an4 :t:hat ~sub'jectl~=
value -orientations, if it can successfully ground the basis of its own
approach. The nature of this problematic is still to be explored. (It
is defined at some length in the introduction to Chapter 6. )
The process of knowing cannot, then, be severed from the his-
torical struggle between lTIan and his world. The process of knowing
{fl.
becolTIes the proces s of history in which consciousness discovers the
world as its own new and real world. lIThe subject conceives the
world as its own 1presence 1 and truth; it is certain of finding only
itself there. ,,109 To uncover this process of knowing and, therefore,
to uncover lTIan IS constitution of the world, is to necessitate an his-
torical reconstruction of the self -formative process of man and of
the social situatedness of all hUlTIan·thought.
On this account the formal rationality of Weber's lTIethodology
is seen to be inadequate to the task of conceptualizing the historicity
of the-knoWing process and the development of man. The method of
raOtio essendi, despite its important stress on the necessity of histori-
cal, interpretative analysis, ultimately emancipates itself from his-
tory. As Marleau-Ponty observed, "Historical epochs become
ordered around a questioning of human possibility, of which each has
its formula, rather than around an immanent solution, of which his-
tory would be the manifestation. 11 110 Weber's types and concepts
I~ II I
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grasp at the world and offer us a series of representations, the rela-
tionship between which can only be established through the imputation
of adequate causes, etc. But these methods cannot grasp the self-
formative process of man as process, for Weber's representations
bracket this process in a presentation of types and categories which
impose form and, therefore, order on the "cultural manifold ll in a
series of interrelated one -sided categories, which seek to analyze
unique historical configurations. This analysis, restricted to a
causal analysis of historical individuals, cannot provide us with a
sufficient method to uncover the self-formative struggles of man.
This process can only be understood in the attempt to explicate man's
reality as a self-structu·red, self-unfolding, and forming whole. The
method must be historical, but as historical also dialectical. It
must proceed:
a. through the explication of the actual constitution of ideas
in consciousness and interaction, in the dialectics of experience;
b. through the analysis of the creation, maintenance,~-and
change of man's inter -subjective, historical Concepts;
c. by lr.efusing to(ignor_e=~'and(smobth'\overcontradictions-and
contradictory claims at the phenomenal level, by appealing to an
unknowable noumenal world as the justification forpif.ferenc~s,etc.
For this view, as we have seen, embodies a false dualism and in
11.1
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Weber's justification of it a dogmatic conception of the totality.
Instead our task here is--along with Hegel in the Phenomenology--
to observe and explicate "~et.er~inat_~andhistorical acts of nega-
tionll and gr~asp·the·idynamic: m:ov_ement -of. the-~supject; and"finally
d. it must leave open the possibility of a critically:r-eflexive
understanding of history and tradition. It must not only accept the
importance of a hermeneutical understanding of the communicative
structure of tradition, but also recognize that this tradition must not
be idealized. For it might also embody interaction based on decep-
tion, distortion, i. e., ideology. As Habermas has put it, it is neces-
sary to go beyond a limited hermeneutical perspective to uncover
"what lies behind the consensus, presented as a fact, that supports
the dominant tradition of the time, and does so with a view to the
relations of power surreptitiously incorporated in the symbolic struc-
tures of the· ~ystems of speech and action. I' III
The formal method Weber defends glosses these processes and
as such reifies the social world. Despite the fact that the method of
ratio essendi is hermeneutic in intent, its tools of analysis are insuf-
ficient for hermeneutic understanding. In fact, this whole application
of Weber's methodology is ambiguous between a hermeneutic and, as
previously noted, a technical intent. For the methods of ratio cog-
noscendi when applied at the level of position B are {productive 'of
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knowledge suitable to the role Weber allots to science. Sociology on
this account .is concerned with the establishment of generalities,
empirical regularities, and with the expansion of knowledge of
behavioral uniformities that can provide a basis for conditional prog-
nosis and/or ca.usal explanation. On this level Weber's conceptual
apparatus objectifies the social world and renders it open to instru-
1 · d · 1· 112menta actlon an manlpu atlon. The idea that knowledge could be
en, .
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produced to emanc~pate people from hypostatized forces and processes
is ruled out as Weber closes off the dimension of critically reflexive
understanding. How we might reconceptualize those processes and
a method suitable to their analysis and comprehension is a topic we
will take further inIParts 3;and 4roIlhisf1?-·esis. Untili_then,' it: . ~.~.
should be remembered that certain of the criticisms we have made,
iri/.corine~tioniwith\thepossibility.: of:a~ criticallY;··ref1exiv~understanding,
Before closing our discussion of Weber with a few concluding
statements, a nUIl1ber of further points can briefly be made. These
will be br~ef since many of the points we make are in need of extended
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discussion and will·be taken up more systematically in our discussion
of hermeneutics. Many of the remarks above about Weber's concep-
tion of diachronic analysis may'also apply to the methodology of syn-
chronic analysis and its application to the empirical study of social
action (position A, see p':-.• ' -126). Iilthis context Alfred Scputz's critique
of Weber's treatment of subjectivity is apposite. 113
.-
. Schutz argues that Weber's exposition of inte.rpr~eta.tive 'sqciology
is a contribution of enormous importance to the human sciences, .but
doesn It go far eno'ugh.
Never before had the project of reducing the flworld
of objective mind" to the behaviour of individuals been
so radically carried out as it was in Max Weber's initial
statement of the goal of interpretative sociology. This
science is to study sociall.behaviour by interpreting its
subjective meaning as found in the intentions of indivi-
duals. The aim, then, is to interpret the actions of
individuals in the social world and the ways in which
individuals give meaning to social phenomena. 114
However, Schutz adds that
He [Weber] breaks off his analysis of the social world
when he arrives at what he assumes to be the basic
and irreducible elements of social phenomena. But he
is wrong in this assumption. His concept of the meaning-
ful act of the individual- -the key idea of interpretative
sociology--by no means defines a primitive, as he thinks
it does. It is, on the contrary, a lTIere label for a highly
complex and ramified area that calls for much further
study. 115
Weber's project of understanding social action falls short of its inter-
pretative intentions. For exalTIple, when Weber speaks of 'IDirect
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standing employed in everyday life" and while these methods -are
dure of 1JDirect Understanding" is equivalent to "methods of under-
his reference to meaning as simply constituted subjec-1.
Understanding," Schutz ,argues, he co~flates- i!!lportant ~6nstittitive
gloss, Schutz suggests, a series of factors and influences which
themselves have to be explored. 116 ' The two crucial sources of
elements of social action, rather than clarifying them. The proce-
satisfactory for the purposes of everyday accomplishments they
difficulty in Weber's work are, according to Schutz,
tively, rather than inter -subjectively, and
2. his consequential conflation of action as a "completed"
or "objectified ll act, and action as a series and flow of events.
Weber fails to grasp the temporality of action, the process of con-
stituting. {These remarks, it should be noted, have close affinity
to our previous criticisms of the application of Weber IS methods to
postion B.I_
Considerations of space make a lengthy analysis of Schutz IS
critique .of Weber impossible. I would, however, like to extrapolate
a few points from the issues Schutz raises (leaving aside Schutz IS
own solution to the problems of studying the social world which are
not without their own difficulties). 117
It is necessary, we can argue from Schutz's critique, to go
I .
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beyond Weber's conception of social action and to inquire into the
cOlTIlTIonsense world of everyday life. This can only be done by
exploring the processes that are taken for granted and presupposed
b b · h h · f · d . 118 d by a su Ject w 0 attempts t e executIon 0 a proJecte act an y
showing how social realities are created, constructed, sustained,
and changed by interacting subjects.
flEfficiency, efficacy, effectivene s s , intelligibility, cons is -
tency, planfulness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of activi-
ties t1 --i. e., the rational properties of practical activities--cannot
be '·'assesse-d, recqgnized, categorized, described ... outside actual
settings within which such properties are recog~ized, used, pro-
duced. . . Structurally differing organized practical activities of
everyday life, It can and must be I1 sought out and examined for the
production, origins, recognition, and representations of rational
practices. All 'logical' and 'lTIethodological' properties of action,
every feature of an activity's sense, facility, objectivity, account-
ability, comtnunality, II lTIust be treated-~~asGarfinkel put it- _lias a
contingent accomplishtnent of socially organized common prac-
tices. 11 119 Social reality can only be known fr om within social s itua-
tions constituted through the interactional use of langu~ge. Social
structures are generated by tneans of interaction, they are the
product of lIorganic self-mobilization, ,,120 in inter-subjectively
J1L jill
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constructed organizations of interaction. Weber IS conception of
It.subjective meaning~I r considered to be the irreducible element of
social phenomena, glosses the complexity of this social interaction
and as a consequence cuts short the (conceptualization of the) inquiry
· · 1 · 121
" lutO socla actIon.
What appears to be required in an" empirical analysis of social
action is:
a. an explication of the procedures· and methods used by
members of a society, i. e., their conventional practices, in consti-
tu:ting their communicative relationships;
b. an explication of the processses whereby social realities
are maintained and sustained;
c. an explication and understanding of members I reflexive
accounts of .their experience, i. e., their 11intentional descrip~ions,If
(which woul¢!. entail a study of their expressed intentions, goals,
reasons, or motives); and
(fJ:
I
d. very importantly, the :.placement 6fth~§~_ irltentional-descrip-
tions within the context of a critically reflexive understanding of
their social: situate-dn.e-ss. Such an 'understanding would attempt to
avoid idealizing such descriptions and would i(a) test :the consistency
of meaning between verbal and nonverbal expressions:.arid 'action~;
(b) check the possibility of systematically excluded meanings which
158
might inhibit self-expression and communicative interaction and,
therefore; (c) assess thepossibilify -of a'-deceptive" self-under.;. -
d e 122.stan lng, 1. e., as we have discussed it hitherto, the possibility
of ideological distortion.
This account which is suggestive of the enormous complex.ity
of issues embraced by Weber IS concept of "subjective meaning"
makes, of course, no claims to completeness. Rather, the account
is intended to show the limitedness of Weber's conception of the
analysis of social action and the multitude of questions which he does
not address. How we might systematically conceptualize these issues
and develop a method suitable to their analysis is a topic we take
further in Part 2, chapter 5.
It goes without saying that Weberls analysis of social action
was an outstanding contribution. That it did not go far enough in its
intent to provide a groundwork and method~logicalbasis for an
hermeneutic account of social action is less significant perhaps
than the long distance it did take us toward such a goal. But that
his program for the social sciences did not include the possibility
of critical reflexive understanding was not, as we have seen, because
Weber did not go far enough. His epistemolgoy and approach to the
human sciences close this dimension off.
(fjl
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In conclusion we can note that where a dichotomy and discon-
tinuity were claimed by Weber between fact and value, theory and
practice, essence and appearance (the two-world theory), we have
found certain definite relationships. Where Weber claimed a diremp-
tion between fact and value, we found an unexplicated attachment to
a mode of rationality that subsumed a schema of values that could
not be justified within its own terms of reference. Where Weber
claimed a diremption between theory and practice, we found an
immanent commitment to decisionism, the freedoms of possessive
individualism and the practice of science envisaged as a "technical
critique 'I of the choice of means (as well as the commitment to a
hermeneutic practice). Where Weber claimed a diremption between
es sence and appearance, we found a commitment to a particular con-
ception of essence, 'i. e., a conception of the unknowable.
Our discussion of Weber has served purposes other than an
assessment of the difficulties, ambiguities, and tensions in Weber's
work. For it has helped to make explicit the questions, issues, and
problems which a more adequate epistemological and methodological
framework would have to (attempt to) contend with.
In Part 2 we will examine how the positivist and hermeneutic
traditions have dealt with these issues.
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PART II
ON THE TENDENCY TO THE REDUCTION OF PRACTICE
TO THEORY, AND THEORY TO PRACTICE
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CHAPTER IV
A CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM: ON THE TENDENCY
TO THE REDUCTION OF PRACTICE TO THEORY
Introduction
There has been a seemingly endless debate over the nature of
tlpositivisIn. 11 It is a terIn that has been deeply eInbroiled in polemics.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the terIn as it has caIne to
be associated with certain positions in episteInology and and Philoso-
phy of Science. These positions are then discussed.
The theInes of this chapter are essentially as follo:",s. Starting
with certain theses of the French Enlighten:ment1 and devel~ping in
positivism, epistem'ology lost:~ sight': of'tlie-. sig~ifican~e of the role of
the episteInic subject and of the Ino:ment of reflection by the subject
on his land/or her own activities. Knowledge becanle equated with
that form. of knowledge generated by the Inethods of the natural ~
science. In the nanle of objectivity, episte:mology, reduced for the
lnost part to an elucidation of the methodology of science, faced the
danger of falling into subjectivisln and even ,solipsislTI-e As such,
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positiviSlTI lost the capacity to understand itself and, therefore,
social practice. Theory was direlTIpted froIn practice and the
for:mer becalTIe unable to cOInprehend and theIl1atize the latter.
These theInes are illustrated in a discussion of the relationship
between explanation and understanding, and in a discussion of a
position that might be called one of positivisIl1's tltheoreticaloppo-
sites. rr Z In this context the work of TholTIas Kuhn is addressed.
FraIn the point of view of traditional philosophy, the loss of
the lTIOInent of reflection entailed the loss of a critfcalp~rspe~!ive.
Phi~osophy followed science into a type of scientisIn which, in the
nalTIe of instru:mental reason, increasingly dOlTIinated :modern~ thou·ght
and activity. Today, if eInancipation from domination,in all its·multi-
faridus:forms,:-is,to·,reIl1ai~·a,:projectfor 'human~ty~ ·-it is~essent-ial to
counter this tendency. PositivislTI closes off the possibility of a
Critical Science. If such a project is to relTIain a possibility and if
a critical perspective is to be reestablished, it is necessary we
argue following HaberlTIas, to recover the mOlTIent of self-reflection
and of self-understanding.
The relationship between the structure of knowledge and struc-
ture of action is alsoexaIl1ined, as· is: positivism IS' appea·rance. of Ppass-
ive contemplative scientific reas·oii;·It~~nd:-its' underlyi~g.iune·xp~~cated
level of cOInlTIitted reason. PositivislTI 's episte:mology has certain
en
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social, political, and :moral i:mplications.
The critique developed below draws Ina~y of its ideas fro:m the
work of HaberInas and those who have associated with hi:m, specifi-
cally, Karl-Otto Apel, Albrecht Wellmer, Trent Schroyer, and
Gerard Radnitzky. 3 However, the positions developed below are
by no means restricted to the considerations of these authors.
It will be noted, finally, that our critique is itself limited in
its applicability to contelTIporary Philosophy of Science. It is recog-
nized that today Philosophy of Science cannot be equated with a form.
of s cienti sm..
Positivism, Defined and Criticized
What. is positivislTI? One of the central aim.s of positivislTI,
in its various forIns froIn Comte to the Logical Positivists, was to
construct a delTIarcation line between what it considered legitim.ate
and, illegitim.ate' knowledge claim.s. Given positivis:m
'
s location
within the empiricist tradition, this aim amounted to providing a
". . . criterion for a strict separation between science and lTIeta-
physics ... ,,,4 metaphysics being taken as speculative knowledge;
l<Tl that is, a m.ode of thought that placed itself beyond the possibility
of empirical test and decidability. In its concern to separate know-
ledge from dogma, positivism can be seen to have had an initially
progressive and liberating intent. There was, as Israel Scheffler
·cn·
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has written, an:
underlying moral impulse of positivism, the convic-
tion that our assertions impose upon us the responsi-
bility to satisfy relevant independent controls . . .
to affirIn the responsibilities of assertion no matter
what the subject Inatter, to grant no holidays froIn
such responsibilities for the humanities, politics,
or the social sciences in particular. . .115
Likewise, science, and in particular, natural science, was in the
19th century generally thought to be the Inost systeInatic source
of the type of knowledge which could be utilized to liberate humanity
from. natural :necessity:' and i dom.ination by the forces of nature. 6
Much attention was focused, therefore, on the nature and m.etho-
dology of natural science. Physics, as the Inost developed,
advanced, and prestigous natural science, increasingly took center
stage. The other sciences, both natural and social, were regarded
as poor IIseconds" and less developed. However, it was generally
assumed by the (very) late 19th century, that all these other sciences
essentially admitted of the same structure and procedures as physics.
Certainly"m the i·19th centu:ry; ~ this ~tende:ncy to.·:equatekn-owl~dge
with science in the effort to free science from dogma appeared to
have some justification. Science appeared to be progressing at
such a rapid rate and with such spectacular .results. that it seemed
o'nly to be burdened by metaphysical theories. It is particularly
with the 20th century that it became apparent that scientific knowledge,
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while a necessary condition, is certainly not sufficient for hUnlan
liberation and that epistenlology's exclusive concern with an exanli-
nation of the nlethodology of science inlpairs philosophyt s ability to
understand the "Ineaning" and "iInport lt of knowledge.
"Positivism" is a term which is used to cover a range of
philosophical positions. Hence it is often difficult to reach a clear
understanding of the term's Ineaning in a particular context. Here
I will take positivisIn to be a general philosophical orientation which
Inaintains at least the three following theses:~:~
1. All knowledge which is not analytic (i. e., where the
predicate is not contained in the subject) :must have a basis in
sensory experience.
2. The :methodology of the natural sciences provides the
only valid procedure for establishing knowledge clailTIs which extend
beyond im.m.ediate experience.
3. Norm.ative stateInents have no e:mpirical content and
therefore no cognitive validity.
The goal of positivism. is to construct an objective, em.pirical,
and systeInatic foundation for knowledge. Given the above three
t!- -.7~:~'I1his defini~ion--] of~P9sitivisrh}is" iadapted-:from' a1'paper written
jointly by Larry SiInon and myself, ,rUnderstanding Habermas, "
chap." 2, pp. 4- 5.!.~- T·he following siX pages ta.r;aw extensively froi:n~- -:-
this jointly written paper, as do pp. 186-91, 217-24.
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theses, it follows that positivists would hold that, ontologically, the
world is com.posed of t1facts,t1 or t1sense data" (or "atoInstl ). The,se
facts are given, directly or indirectly, in sensory experience, and
are the only objects of knowledge. It also follows that positivism.
is norlTIally nOIninalist, that is:
It recognizes only the particular given.. Reason
becomes extensional logic; logic turns to Inanipula-
tion of symbols and symbolic equivalents; and general
ideas, as HUIne says, can serve only to represent the
particulars from. which they have been abstracted. 7
A further point should also be noted concerning the third of the above
. thes~s. Postivists argue that it (the third thesis) follows from. the
first two theses with an adaitional claim, viz., that values are not
facts, and hence values cannot be given as such in sense-·experience.
Since all J<nowledge is based in sensory experience, value judgm.ents
cannot be accorded the status of knowledge claims. This thesis
amounts, in effect, to separating theoretical r,eason froIn practical
reason and restricting knowledge solely to the sphere of the former.
Ethics becoInes, as it was ultimately for Weber, noncognitive and
all scientific or :methodical links between theory and practice are
severed. Science can, perhaps, then guide, inform, or recom:rnend
practical measures and decisions, but it cannot be used to' confirm
or reject value judgm.ents or questions of practice as such.
The definition of "positivis1TI11 here chosen is fairly broad.
1''''·'
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"Positivism." is som.etiInes taken to have a m.ore restricted denota-
tion and the term. "em.piricisrn" then used in the wider sense here
attributed to "positivism." The m.ore lim.ited definition of the term.
is given in an essay by Robert Cohen on Carnap. There he takes
"positivism" to refer to " . . . the phenom.enalist tendency within
the em.piricist tradition: 111~o-positivismlrefers to those recent
views whose consequences :may be shown to be pheno:menalistic.,,8
I have chosen to use the less restricted definition of "positivism."
in order to better draw out and show the i:rnplications~ofthe critique
presented, for a larger range of theorists within the etnpiricist
tradition. While Habermas has discussed positivism. in its specifi-
cally phenom.enalist form, with special reference to Mach, the hope
here is to show that his critique extends beyond phenom.enalism. to
encom.pas s broader but related positions. A tnore general Inaterialist
em.piricis:m or physicalistn can avoid sOIneof the subjectivist pit-
falls of phenotnenalistn.:·Bti.t~~a~s.·-long~;a:s~it~-a'dheresto sorne version
of the above three theses, physicalisIn cannot escape the charge of
being unable to understand, within the ~erITIs it has set itself, its
own activity (e. g., as involving reflection) and the activity of science
generally. Such an eITIpiricislTI would be as susceptible to critique
as the lTIore narrow version and would prove equally insufficient as
a basis for understanding the hUITIan or cultural sciences (and for
; IT)
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establishing a critical science).
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Haber:mas begins his
critique of positivism. with a critical exalnination of the works of
Comte and Mach.9 He then attempts to show, through a discussion
of Peirce, how, by systelnatically exploring certain questions within
the philosophy of science, positivism. can be brought to the point of
transcending its li:mitations (although Peirce, it is clai~ed" failed
in the end to do so). It is worth exploring Haber:mas 1 discussion of
Com.te and Mach, specifically his critique of the objectivism. inherent
in their positions. We will then be in a position to understand sys-
tem.atically why positivism. is incapable of understanding science as
a hum.an activity.
In Comte's writings, as Habermas points out, l?positivisnl did
not appear in its purest form. Rather it was overlaid and "·burdened"
with a philosophy of history. Such a philosophy of history, which
placed the developm.ent of science within the context of the evolution
of the human species, was held to be necessary in order to " ...
interpret the m.eaning of positive knowledge...
11
If In this way,
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COlTIte was able to justify and ground his belief in science and scien-
tific progress. But as science continued to advance and develop in
the 19th century, it beca:me less of a necessity to justify its status.
Positivism. "shed" and rejected its philosophy of history and :'.
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increasingly becatne scientistic. In this context, scientistic refers
to If ••• science ' s belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we
can no longer understand science as one for:m of possible knowledge,
but rather lUust identify knowledge with science,l;l2
The rise of a scientistic orie~tation in philosophy resulted in
the deemphasis of what had been the central concern of traditional
critical philosophy; natnely, the atte:mpts to establish the conditions
for the possibility of objective knowledge. This occurrence, in turn,
resulted in the loss of the :mOnlent of reflection; that is, of the act of
reflection in which the scientist qua philosopher turns into hi:mself
in order to'· gain an understanding of the nature of the epistelTIic sub-
ject and of scientific activity.
Episte:mology, as a justificatory enterprise, beca:me increasingly
restricted to an exa:mination of questions internal to :methodology.
There developed essentially two tasks for such an epistem.ology. The
first was t~ exam.ine the :methodological procedures of science in
order to understand how knowledge was generated by science. The
second was to analyze scientific knowledge itself to dem.onstrate how
such knowledge was actually constructed out of sensory experience.
Frequently these two tasks were attetnpted together, but in neither
case was concern created t'dr~.th-e;:role;of:the;epistemic:~subj¢ct·~··.As·-
~ -- ~
Haberm.as put it:
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For an epistemology restricted to :methodology, the
subjects who proceed according to these rules [of
scientific procedure] lose their significance. Their
deeds and destinies belong at best to the psychology
of the eInpirical persons to whom the subjects of
knowledge have been reduced. 13
With the lapse of episteInology into methodology and with the
. abandon:ment of the enterprise of systetnatic self-reflection on the·
part of the epistetnic subject, the possibility of philosophy being
critical of knowledge dissolved. From an epistelTIological point of
view, there could be no atte:mpt to question the meaning or function
of sciences because there was no source of knowledge held to be
independent of science by which to criticize its results. Nor was
there a privileged standpoint froIn which one could make an evalua-
tion of scientific knowledge. Any attempt to provide an account of
the constitution of the world was blocked by the presuppositions of
positivism, which ruled out of consideration the activity of the
epistem.ic subject. As Haber:mas points out, lithe meaning of know-
ledge itself becotnes irrational- -in the name of rigorous know;" ..
14ledge. II ~ositivis:m, which began as a critique of ideology (e. g. ,
of religion, dogma, speculative metaphysics, etc.), as scientism
beca:me itself an ideology. 15 It beca:me ideological insofar as it
prevented an adequate confrontation with the nature of its own status.
Ernst Mach, in 4is writings on phenotnenalism, provided such
an episteInology; although it should be noted that in Mach I s overall
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work there is a tension between his adheren'ce to pheno:menalis:m
and a certain evolutionism. 16 However, it is his discussion of
phenoInenalis:m that most interests us here, since it was this aspect
of his thought which was so very influential on positivist thought.
Mach's phenomenalism provided an episte:mology for a science,
a~ s~ience, r ",~ener:getics.1 II For those who adhered to this "new"
science it was of considerable ilTIportance that
~;'(~. . natural phenomena :might be described as varying
appearances of energy. No need to seek the causes of
apparent 'flTIotion; and also, no need to re.strict the
entities (which undergo motions) to material particles
or rigid bodies, so long as there are observed numeri-
cal correlations between the energy manifestations. 17
Following thi~s science of correlated observation, Mach argued,
that a scientific object exists if "its sylnbol is the nam.e of a set of
particular perceptions; for it to persist as an entity, the perceptions
Inust persist as a correlated set through the observer's flux of
sensations. ,,18 Scientific entities were ordered bundles of s·.ensed
perceptions. The ordering process was held to be potentially
describable by laws of physiological psychology which were regarded
to be largely unexplored.
This phenom.enalistic foundation for scientific state:ments
served to aid both the elimination of previously cherished ITleta-
physical (unpbservable) aspects of scientific theories and to provide
a basis for the unification of various sciences into a general science
,1111111
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However, there wer,:e several otheritnpor-
Science can help us learn about the
I
en
en
(fl
en
tant, but unexplicated, consequences of this claitned p~enom.enalistic
basis for science.
Mach's phenotnenalistic positivisIn conflated appearance with
reality. It 'Essential' reality is the totality of facts as they are
immediately given; there is nothing hidden that only philosophical
fl · 20re ectlon can penetrate. It
world, but since science can ultilnately reduce all its knowledge
clailTIs to its sensory base, all knowledge is there to be had in experi-
ence. As we have seen, in Mach I s view, IIfor a scientific object to
exist lTIeant that its sytnbol is the natne of a set of particular
perceptions 11 21 Facts (Mach's term) are what is given in
sensory exper;t~nce. If science is held to :merely describe and
correlate these facts, as it was (but not continuously and consis:'"
tently) 22 by Mach, it is objectivistic; that is, 11 • • • the model
sciences, II about whose scientific character consensus was claitned
to prevail,. "adequately describes reality as what it is. This is the
basic assumption of objectivism. 1123
But the facts which constitute the world according to Mach IS
po~itivistic objectivisln have an atnbiguous status. On the one hand,
they are potentially "Subjective. They are given in sensory experience
and expressed in tertns of individual observation reports. On the
en
cn
(Jl
(n,
182
other hand, if science is to be viewed as objective, they :must be
established as inter subjectively valid. This a:mbiguity was reflected
in the fact that Mach regarded psychology and physics as com.ple-
lTIentary sciences. The ambiguity was not resolved by Mach. For
if the object~ve, inter subjective
... aspects of the basic facticity of the world is
stressed, then positivis:m falls into a circle. If
science describes facts and their relations, and if
we use this criterion to de:marcate science fro:m
:metaphysics, then we need a criterion of facticity
in order to know if a science is genuine. One way
to avoid this de:mand is to ontologize facts or sensa-
tions and, with Mach, lTIake thelTI the -given jn
experience. 24
Solipsis:m is then ruled out a priori.
It should be noted, however, that Mach did not silnply clailTI
thaf scientific objects have an independent existence, which sensa-
tions shqw. Ra~her, through his doctrine of ele:ments (facts) Mach
claim.ed that knowledge is always provisional, but is nevertheless
to be understood as
. . . constructed upon an indubitable and ele:mentary
base--indubitable, that is the sense of being unavoid-
able, not in any sense of bei!J.g unalterable. All con-
ceptions which fail to relate ideas to that base are 25
th.ereby suspect; their lTIeaning ulti:mately unclear. . .
In Mach's words, "bodies do not produce sensations, but co:mplexes
of ele:ments make up bodies . . . all bodies are but thought sy:mbols
for com.plexes of elements." And· "sensations are not signs of
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things; but, on the contrary, a thing is a thought-sym.bol for a
compound-sensation of relative fixedness. ,,26
Mach clearly wished to distinguish between a phenomenalist
confirm.ation base and any dogmatic claims to certitude about the
fundamentals of the world. But his ardent phenomenalist epistemology.
and :methodology will not permit, as Cohen put it, "even such m.inor
irresolution about ontology, ,,27 although his intent was clear.
If science is distinguished principally as a m.ethodological pro-
cedure for correlating assortments of facts, what can be the status
of our ontology? It is certainly not sOnlething that science can
provide evidence for, since science requires, on this argument, an
ontology of facts as a presuppostion. Nor is it sOnlething that we
can arrive at through lTIetaphysical reasoning, since :metaphysics
was initially rejected as being none:mpirical, that is, as being beyond
the realm of facts and ther~efore "beyond" the realm. of knowledge.
Any debate about the status of our ontology of facts, on this account,
m.ust, therefore, include nonfactual, i. e., metaphysical, i. e. ,
:meaningless statements.
Habernlas expreses the circle involved in Mach's phenom.enalisnl
as follows:
How, then, prior to all science, can the doctrine of
elements ffacts] m.ake statements about the object
dOInain of science as such, if we only obtain infornla-
tion about this dOnlain through science? 28
JJ!IJ I
! (D
(n
(n
en
(Jl
tll l
184
In order to guarantee the objectivity and intersubjectivity of science
Mach was led to as SUIne (an adInittedly alnbiguous) objectivi"stic
perspective and to posit an ontology of facts. But if we cannot
justify this assuInption (except circularly), then we cannot in the
end justify science. If our ontology is arbitrary, so is our science.
If the subjective, sensorial nature of facts is stressed, the
danger of lapsing into egocentric solipsisln emerges. If an ontology
of facts is "accepted and solipsism a priori dislnissed, the cognitive
iInpo"rt of the knowing subject is denied and the epistemic subject
falls froIn consideration. If science is essentially held to recor.~
facts, the proble:m of perception becom.es reduced to the problem.~ .,
of how one actually constructs the world out of sensory givensi{a
proc~ss ~aid to be describable by laws of physiological psychology).
The subject, on this account can be dealt with purely on the level of
irrlputed existence to which all facts are relegated.
If reality is the totality of all facts, then we m.ust
conceive the ego as a relatively constant, although
"accidental co:m.plex of sensations, which originates
in elem.ents just as :much as do all things existing
independently of us. 29
Mach hi:m.self saw that a theory of history :must supple:ment
epistelTIology in order to give a sufficient account of what is allowed
or ranked as the totality of facts or funda:mental facts. It is
interesting (but not surprising in light of our earlier r.e:m.arks on
I"
<1l 1
(n
en
en
185
the prestige of 19th-century science) that this aspect of his thought
was the least re:me:mbered alTIongst the early logical positivists in
their phenomenalist phase. 30 They stressed the wholly phenome-
nalistic~spects'of MachI s thought. The phenolTIena with which
science dealt was presumed to be the isolated sensations of single
observations ...
The relations alTIong the given phenonema were sub-
jective lTIatters of efficient but arbitrary ordering of
the data; hypothetical entities and relations were
viewed as fictions or as shorthand; and the :monadic
character of atolTIic sensations was assumed a priori:
but made empirically plausible by a progralTInle of
reductive definition of scientific concepts in ter:m.s
of individual observation reports. 31
While stressing the subjective nature of facts, it was also recog-
nized that the subject cannot be reduced merely to an accidental
bundle of sensations; all sensations, it was stressed, which are
known to exist (by lTIyself as epistilTIic subject) must be treated as
lTIy sensations. I Can perhaps wonder and speculate about other
people's sensations and lTIinds. I can utilize the argum.ent from
analogy (or the like) to try to establish their existence, but I can
only have, know, and only be said to know, :my own sensations.
But if all knowledge is founded on sensations and if all sensa-
tionsare mine,
it becomes i:mpossible to establish a world inde-
pendent of :my sensations. Objectivity and know-
ledge collapse into the pure subjectivity of solipsism..
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FurtherInore, it becoInes ilnpossible to lnake sense
of sensations as being Inine in a world in which all
sensations belong to lTIe. In such a world, sensa-
tions are, they are not owned, for to make sense of
ownersh~requires the possibility of more than one
subject.
And as we have noted, the possibility of this requirement being :met
is beyond the li:mits of our solipsistic world. The result is that
... to press the highly subjective nature of know-
ledge, conceived thus, Ineant to reinstitute ego-
centric solipsism., and indeed to deny cognitive
im.port to the knowing self as :much as to the known
object. 33
brute facticity "supported by a m.etaphysics which cannot even be
34legitiInately stated, no less proven. tr As Cohen has pointed out,
as a consequence of such a position, "both the subjective world and
. 35
objective world would disappear, and knowledge with theIne " The
world of intersubjectivity and social practice reInain unthem.atized
by theory, no less accounted for. Theory has absorbed both the
subject and object of knowledge and, as a result, can no longer
even account for itself.
Our (essentially Haberm.asian) critique of phenoInenalistic
positivism. implies, then, that the objectivistic stance of phenome-
nalistic positivislTI generates inherent difficulties which render it
incapable of understanding science. On the one hand, phenom.e-
nalistic positivislTI faces a danger of falling into a destructive
<fl
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solipsisrn.. If, on the other hand, it atteInpts to avoid solipsisIn
through an ontologizing of facts, the foundation of science cannot
be justified.
However, it is of course not suffici~nt to found a critique of
positivisIn on the charge of subjectivisIn and then to proceed to
argue this case Inerely through an exaInination of phenom.enalist
positivistn. As previously noted, not all positivist program.s are
phenolTIenalistic. While it m.ight be contended that phenom.enalists
represent the "high priests" of positivism. and that their work
crystalizes som.e of positivislTI's chief tendencies, e. g., the search
for a basis in pure experience and the quest for certainty at the
foundations of science, it m.ust be recognized that phenotnenalislTI
has been delTIonstrated to be inadequate. In fact, it has been argued
that phenolTIenalisIn, through its tendency to conflate appearance and
reality, could not possibly serve to characterize correctly the nature
of science. Phenom.enalism. stays on the level of appearance and of
im.Inediate experience. This level is not adequate for science:· IfWith
its ability to go beyond appearances, scientific explanation rejects
the allegedly ultim.ate authority of presently contingent ;fa'cts _as "we
· h 36experIence t etn."
Historically, the Logical Positivist tradition soon realized the
inadequa~ies of its early phenomenalisIn. IIAt least since 1925, an
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objectivist realislTI has been an alternative to phenolTIenalist posi-
tivism. ,,37 Although in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (written in
1922-1925). Carnap took a subjectivist and phenomenalist orienta-
38
tion, by the mid-thirties he had developed a physicalist position.
This position allowed .for observation reports to be made in terms
of physical objects and coordinates which were purportedly inter-
subjectively available. Thus it could avoid a lapse into subjectivism
and solipsism. The goal of this program was to reconstruct a lan-
guage which was adequate for science. In order to construct such
a language, a distinction was made between an observational, or
experential, language and a theoretical language. It was argued
that the C?bservational ~anguage would consist of basic :protocol
sentences (i. e., dir.~ct reports of the given and justified with refer-
ence to the given). 39 These sentences, it was held, could be used
to make statements reporting direct experiences of the physical
world. The theoretical language, in contradistinction, would con-
tain the basic postulates of the science as well as theoretical terms
(typically postulaing unobservables and functions). Correspondence
or bridge principles were argued to link the two languages, i. e. ,
cOlUlect certain theoretically assumed entities with directly obser-
vables and/or measurables. Most importantly, the tneaning of state-
ments which may possibly fall within the realm of science was taken
to be given in the flverificability theory of meaning. If Generally, it
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prescribed that Ita statement is to be taken as meaningful only if it
is capable of etnpirical verification, and its meaning is the !node of
· .f.. 40Its verI lcatlon. If
This progralTI upheld the tenets earlier identified as pivotal
to positivism. In addition, it maintained the unity of science doctrine.
Its essential thesis was the indentity of knowledge with that form. and
structure of knowledge generated by the (natural) sciences. The
:methodological procedures of physics were taken as Itparadigtnatic lt
for the procedures of all science. All other sciences' were to be
fashioned after the !TIodel of physics.
The progratn maintained the required intersubjectivity of
protocol sentences, through an objectivistic presupposition, namely,
"that there is a wo:ddof facts'which can be described unequivocally.1I 41
Through observational language,:. it was·.·~hought, we could for!TIulate
the COlTImon facts, neutral to theoretical debate.
Differing theorists . . . can step outside their theories
during the process of testing, and engage in a comInon
check of their respective observational consequences
through a shared observational language. They can
agree, furthermore, to assess their own theories
through reference to cotnrnon observational findings.
This objectivistic presupposition was gradually underInined and
43
weakened as the program was pursued. It was also realized that
there was no one unique form.al language which could be constructed
d · h h · 1 d·· 44 A S· 1 · din accor WIt t e stlPU ate crIterIa. s Ir Kar Popper pOInte
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out, such a language is ilnpossible and its very idea, within the
terms of reference of the prograln itself, absurd. If verifiable
and tautologous assertions alone are thought to be Illeanin-gful, then
any discussion ox debate about the concept of "Ineaning"~ -:musf itself
· · 1 45contaIn lneanlng ess statements.
It was soon realized that the philosopher was faced with a
choice aIllong various contending theoretical languages. The recog-
nition of this fact lead to the for:mulation of a principle of tolerance
and opened the study of the forInal syntax of scientific languages to
conventionalism. 46 However, a conventionalist turn introduced a
relativism into the foundations of science. For to regard scientific
theories and laws as justified by appeal to lnethodological or prag-
lTIatic criteria accordin.g to which they are chosen, cannot but beg
the question as to the justifiability of the choice.
The conventionalist criteria of choice are, in the:m-
selves, logically as arbitrary as the laws they legiti-
lTIate, with the result that the'-s-yst¢:m·'Qfpropositions~­
which describe' the cosmic order is lTIerely the pref~
erence of the scientific te:mperalTIent, itself deter:rnined,
we lTIay surlTIise, by personal and historical facts. 47
In order to overCOlTIe this arbitrariness, what would seelTI to be
required is for science to understand itself, its constitution, pre-
cisely in ter:rns of these personal, social, and historical "facts. tI
But positivislTI, by uncritically accepting science, by attelTIpting to
direlnpt reflection froIn society and history and by restricting itself
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to an internal analysis of methodology, is unable to even conceive
such a task. How we might conceive this task is discussed below.
Karl-Otto Apel, in his article, "The A Priori of Communica-
tion and the Foundation of the Humanities, 11 48 has attempted to
demonstrate the limits of the positivistic logic of a unified science.
His critique is worth outlining at some length since it highlights and
systematizes many of the points we have made to date. Apel's central
argument is that the "metaphysical" presuppositions and assumptions
of the Iineo -positivists" have prevented them from realizing that
they were unable, within their own terms of reference, to understand
the activity of scientists. Apel does not elaborate what he understands
by the term "neo"7positivi~m.II But he uses the term in a manner
that is not incompatible with the definition that was presented at the
outset of this chapter. This is how we will read the term here.
The fundam.ental shortcomings of neo-positivism spring, Apel
argues, from a lack of reflection "upon the fact that all cognition of
objects presupposes understanding as a means of intersubjective
communication. 11 49 Science, Apel contends, is unintelligible qua
human activity, if one cannot understand the implicit and explicit
conventions or rules, and the communication community or language
game, it presupposes. On this account, even tacit~ conventions about
the use of words--"not to mention explicit conventions about definitions,
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theoretical frameworks, or statements of facts in empirical sci-
ence" - -imply:
. an intersubjective consensus about situational
meanings and the aims of practical life which can
only be 'achieved by a lTIutual understanding of inten-
tions and motivations as the very sense of the
conventions. 50
Science, in its adoption of procedural conventions, as a communica-
tion community, goes beyond the II • • • scientific rationality of
operations on objects which could be performed in a repeatable way
by exchangeable human subjects . and passes into the realm of
a 11 ~ •• pre- and meta-scientific rationality of intersubjective dis-
course medi.~ted.by explication of concepts .and interpretation of
intentions. 11 51 . The added dimension of rationality needed by science
to understand itself requires the presupposition of what Apel calls
the Ita priori of communication, 11 that is, the pre -existence to any
scientific activity of a dimension of communication that is both a
condition of the possibility of science, and the basis and fram.e for
the understanding of science as a particular mode -of~-a·ctivity.
The principal metaphysical presupposition of positivism that
prevented the recognition of the a priori of communication was, Apel
maintains, that of m.ethodical solipsism. Any philosophy which
postulates a physicalistic-behavioristic language for objectifying
human intersubjectivity involves methodical solipsism- _lito no less
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an extent than a philosophy tl;1at starts from the assumption that
meaning and truth are matters of introspective evidence of private
experiences of consciousnes s." Methodical solipsism, according
to Apel's understanding, amou~nts to "... the tacit assumption
that· objective knowledge should be possible without intersubjective
d d · b·· b· d h52 --Thun erstan lng y communlcatlon elng presuppose . _. e ··com-
municative function of language is ignored, or rather "leapfrogged, 11
by the postulation of a language which would be a priori intersubjec-
tive by virtue of its possible universal application.
Methodological solipsism, Apel points out, amounts to the
suggestion that the idea of one pers on following a rule in isolation
from social contexts and all possible contact with others is coherent.
Given this way of stating the position, it is hardly surprising that the
argument against methodical solipsism is, as we see below, directly
influenced by Wittgenstein IS private language argument. 53
Apel"', contends" that methodical solipsism was assumed by
positivism in its phenomenalistic and in its physicalistic phases.
The formalized language which positivists were concerned to con-
struct was, in theory, to be used by scientists observing and
recording states of affairs. Any scientist was thought to be able
to observe the same states of affairs, and to be able to record
those observations in the same theoretical terms. This assumption
194
ensured the intersubjectivity of the language used and guaranteed
the objectivity of the states of affairs as observed. But,Apel
argues, the formalized languages of science cannot, in principle, be
used for intersubjective communication between persons, e. g. ,
scientists.
It is only sentences about states of affairs and logical
connections between sentences that can be formulated
in these languages, but not "utterances" or "speech
acts" because these units of ordinary language do not
get their meaning exclusively from the synatical and
semantical rules of a formal system, but only from
the context of the pragmatical use of language in
concrete'situations of life. 54
A formalized language could only be employed by one scientist to
describe the observed verbal behavior of another. Strictly speaking,
it could not be used to Ilexpress an understanding of the intentions
of the persons speaking, rt of one 'scientist by another. This follows
as a consequence of t?e us·~·~.of-'a:£.orITl.alizedJan,gua'~e.which ,makes. any-
'.
one applying it unable to ~onceptualize:a'<rnisun¢lerstaridingof--inten-
·tionality (within the terms of that language). According to the struc-
ture of such a formalized language, the intersubjectivity in use which
is assumed implies that all meaning, is revealed in observational
terms.
The language of science as conceived by the neo-positivists'
excludes, in principle, the existence of a language game common to
objects as w'ell as the subjects of science. The very point of.
~!II.
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constructing a formalized language for scientific use was to rule out
of consideration hermeneutical problems, that is, problems of
interpreting intentions and meanings. The questioning of, for
example, a scientist's meaning, of what a person meant, goes beyond
the procedures of mere observation of~a world of pure'obj~cts.-: It
implies and involves an irreducible moment of hermeneutics, the
interpretation and analysis of intentions and meanings. This moment
cannot be subsumed completely under the "categories appropriate to
. . 55 N Bthe methods of observatlon. It •• Formalized languages are,
then, ~ot suited to express the intersubjective dimension of language.
As conceived by, the neo-positivists, formalized languages were
applicable only to the observation by a subject of an object, i. e., a
mori9logic situation. They are not applicable for a dialogic situation
where two subjects interact,~ in which a counderstanding might be
disturbed and the question of the (mis)unc;lerstanding of meaning
might aris e.
Apel concedes that the logic of the positivist conception of
science would not have implied methodical solipsism if it recognized
'and reflected upon two things. First, that the use of a formalized
language of science already presupposed a language which could be
used for the communication needed for the adoption of the conven-
tions and the testihg of the formalized language. Secondly, that
f)
..
196
human beings, to the extent that they are considered as partners in
a dialogic situation, in communication and hence in interaction,
cannot be reduced to objects that can be described and/ or explained
within the terms of reference set by a formalized language. 56 The
logical "poE;·itivists,Ape~:~.admits, "would presumably not deny the
first of these two points." In fact, in the schools more recent past,
they did conceive of ordinary language as the metalanguage of scien-
tific language. On the second point, Apel argues, there were intrinsic
reasons to the logical positivist program that blocked them from
realizing the full consequences of the a priori of communication.
The essential reason was given in their program of a unified sCien~e.57
The idea of a unified science implied, as we noted earlier, that
there was a world of facts which could be described unequivocally.
~ll objects in the world, including human beings, could be explained,
it was maintained, at lea'st in theory, by reduction to one underlying
science. This idea of a unified science was originally connected with
the idea of a universal language which was necessary in order to
establish" the relation of knowledge claims to reality. But, as we
have seen, the positivists I ideal of language could only be used to
describe and account for human actions under the categories of
observational procedures. Within the terms of reference that were
set, positivism was incapable of conceptualizing human actions under
IJ:
"(11
197
the public concepts and meanings of partners engaged in a dialogue
aimed at mutual understanding and successful social action.
At this juncture and with this challenge to their program,
pO'sitivists "lhadessential~ly'two .alternatives ...: F-irstand obviously,
they could ignore the challenge to a notion of a unified science, in
which case they would riskdogmat~smand could not refute the charge
that they were incapable of understanding science within the terms of
their own program. Or they could reject the challenge on the grounds
that a dialogic situation did not involve categories which could not
be reduced to those of an empiricist, formalized language. However,
in order to make good on this latter position, they would have to
successfully complete their project; that is, they would have to
demonstrate that communicative practice could be reduced to the
categories appropriate to observation and experimentation in the
natural sciences. Such a demonstration has yet to be succus sfully
accomplished. 58
In short, we may note that the nature and structure of inter-
subjectivity cannot be adequately thematized by positivism. The
formal requirements of scientific knowledge laid down by the posi-
tivists blocked positivism's ability to understand itself as a form of
social practice. Not only is theory dirempted from practice, but the
latter made inaccessible by the former. The program with its use
WJI,
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of a formalized language and implication that all meaning and scien-
tific knowledge is revealed in observational terms, has an immanent
tendency to reduce practice, or rather what we understand by practice
and what we can understand by practice, to theory. The shortcomings
of the positivists "spring, II as Apel put it, IJfrom a lack of reflection
upon the fact that all cognition of objects presupposes understanding
as a means of intersubjective communication. 11 59 If the neo-positivists
had reflected on the need for a presupposition concerning the a priori
of communication they would have had
. . . to ackp.owl~.dge that behind the construction of
semantical frameworks there stands not just irrational
ad hoc conventions, but long chains of rational dis-
course mediated by interpretation and criticism of
the tradition of philosophy and science. And by
reflecting on this fact they would, furthermore, have
to acknowledge that there are IJs'ciences" in a broader
sense of the word which make up a continuum with
their own meta-scientific language analysis by under-
standing and interpreting the form and the context of
traditional languages. 60
A Logical Empiricist IS Acc ount of Explanation
The arguments above can be illustrated through a discussion
of a clas sical, logical empiricist I s formulation of the logical struc-
ture of explanation. The formulation to be discusssed is that of
Hempel and Oppenheim IS "covering~lawmodel. 11 61
The fundamental idea in the covering-law analysis of explanation
is that an event is explained; if, and only if, the statement asserting
1I '
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its occurences (E) can be logically deduced from two sets of
premises. Thus, the logical form of an explanation can be expli-
cated as follows:
E
The ··~~~lanClfl·!3.
.• ,; ',; • [,t',
The explanadum
where C 1 . . . en are a set of singular statements, describing
relevant initial conditions, and L 1 ... L m are a set of gen'eral
laws.~The explanaiidum.;. E, must be a logical consequence of the Cs
and the Ls. According to the dedecutive-nomological !nodel (the
name given to this variant of the covering-law model), Ita descrip-
tion of one phenom.enon can explain a d~scription of a second phenome-
~on, .only if the first rdescription entails the second. 1162
It should be noted that the structure of an explanation is held
to be identical to the logical struot~re of a prediction. If one has
the knowledge contained in the explanans prior to the occurence of
the event delineated in the explanandum, then the deduction of E is
the deduction of a statement about a future occurence, and E is,
therefore, predicted.
Laws of universal form are required in the explanans of a
deductive explanation. These are rare, especially in the social
sciences, and frequently the laws available and etnployed are of a
(':1
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statistical nature. Therefore, if statistical laws are to function as
explanations, the deductive-nomological model has to be, as its
theorists recognized, revised. The revision is presented as the
inductive -probabilis~ic;model.
A simple statistical law has the following form: "The statistical
probability (roughly, the long-run relative frequency) of the occurence
of an event of the kind G under the conditions of F is T: (briefly
L. L... 63
p (G, F) = r} where 0 == r -:: 1. " Thus, a simple probabilistic'-expla~a-
tion has the following structure:
b is an F (briefly, Fb)
p (G, F) = r
b is a G (brief~y, Gb)
. where b is some individual case. It is important to note here that
the exp~anans of a ;pr.opab~~iisf~..c e.xplariation do ,not '-entailjthe .exp,~anani~
dum. The explanans only give a certain degree of inductive support
or confirmation to the explanandum. As a consequence, the truth
of the explanans is not incompatible with the. explanandum being
false. A probabilistic explanation effects a weaker explanatory
connection than that ef~ected by a deductive explanation.
A fundamental question needs to be asked: In what sense, if
at all, could the deductive -nomological model be said to explain?
It seems that Itwhat makes a deductive -nomological explanation,
WII·
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explain, is, that it tells us why E had to be (i. e., occur), why E was
necessary once the basis is there and the laws are accepted. 1164 But
it is, of course, essential to an inductive-probabIlistic explanation
that it leave open the possibility that E might not occur. "Failing
such additional information which gives us a deductive -nomological
explanation of E, we have not explained why E occurred," but, as
von Wright has written, "only why E was to be expected. ,,65 It
se~ms:·thatall~:thetind"~_Gtive-probabilistic modell(¢lqes is .ju~tify"· ","
certain expectations and predictions. What of the original model
itself?
Hempel et ale aim to explicate the "nonpragnatic aspects of
explanation, . "the sense of explanation on which A explains B
". 1- - . d'" t' f f .. 66SImp lClter a.n no· or you or or me. Friedman points out
in his discussion· of IIExplanation and Scientific Understanding, 'I
that Hempel attempts to ignore the pragmatic dimensions of explana-
tion and such concepts as "understanding" and "intelligibilityll when
delineating his theory of the explanation relation. Hempel does this
because he fears ~enta.riglement,~with~ithecl~timedf'!!subj~·cti~is.tiblf
connotations of -these terms. 67 But as we have seen in our dis-
cussion of the a priori of communication, it is not adequate to think
of these terms as merely subjectivistic; ~they have also to be seen
as intersubjective, i. e., as public concepts and meanings of
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persons (potentially) engaged in a dialogue. To ignore their role in
explanation, or more generally, the role of communicative practice,
is to put oneself in the position of being unable to give a coherent
account of explanation. For it is to risk making unintelligible the
process of explanation itself, i. e., not being able to explain explana-
tion (or the emergence of the theory of explanation itself). It is to
close off the explanation of hermeneutical aspects of practical life;
the dimensions of which we argued were both the condition of the
possibility of science and the basis and frame for the understanding
of science as a mode of activity. Hempel closes off the thematization
of the pragmatic aspects of explanation only at the cost of being unable
to give an account of the process of explanation qua social activity.
Hempel's theory of explanation is an insufficient framework to explain
the nature of its own achievements.
However, Hempel cannot ignore the relation of his model of
explanation to a notion u:nderstanding. For to do so. would' be to
. makes the world more intelligble, that gives us understanding of the
explanandulTI. IIUnderstanding, II as Apel points out, lImust be pre-
supposed in order to describe the experienced data of the world as
so:mething, that is for answering the question what a thi'ng is. ,,68
What is it about an explanation that provides our understanding?
(f:
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In a few brief passages, Hempel does, in fact, attempt to make
the connection between explanation and a concept of understanding.
For Hempel, an explanation enables us to understand why a given
phenomenon occurred, if its occurence was to be expected.
· .. the [deductive -nomological] argument shows that,
given the particular circumstances and the laws in
question, the occurence of the phenomenon was to be
expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation
enables us to understand why the phenomenon
occurred. 69
However, this will not do as a criterion of sufficient understanding.
For understanding and justified expectation are quite distinct notions-.
We can predict without necessarily being able to understand, and
can understand without necessarily being able to predict. 70 At best,
it might be contended, the deductive -nomological lTIodel provides
only necessary conditions for the explanation of particular events.
(We will further investigate this contention. )
Friedman has tried to defend Hempel and counter this insuf-
flciency in the deductive-nomological lTIodel by attempting to pro-
vide an additional objective criterion that would warrant an explana-
tion sufficient and thereby offer an account of what kind of under-
standing scientific explanations provide. He does this within the
framework of explanation laid down essentially by the D-N theorists.
Friedman :argues that~: '
..lUll, .
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A world with fewer independent phenomena is, other
things equal, more comprehensible than one ,with
more.
. . . science increases our understanding of the
world by reducing the total number of independent
phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or
given. 71
This is in Friedman IS view lithe essence of scientific explanation. 11
If we can reduce a "multiplicity of unexplained, independent phenomena"
to even greater basic principles (i. e., more primitive laws), then,
the claim is, we have achieved a genuinely scientific understanding.
Friedman's work, however, begs a fundamental queslion as to
the justifiability of equating scientific understanding with explanation
according to laws and reduction to ever greater basic principles.
The question, therefore, arises as to whether or not the D.~N model
i$ even a necessary condition for explanation. There appear to be
1
many types of explanations in the social science, in which laws do
· 72not occur as premlses.
Friedman lists and argues for three desirable properties that
a theory of explanation should have.
a.
b.
c.
It should be sufficiently general. . . it must at least
square with the most important central cases.
It should be objective [anaJ . . . not depend on the
idiosyncracies and changing tastes of scientists and
historical periods. .
[It-;m~st have -a. .o.emo:r).,strable .-con.nectiori-with under· ...
standing]... it should tell us wha~ kind of unde'rstanding
scientific explanations provide and how they provide
-t 73 --1 •
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But Friedman's properties are compatible with a series of- views
very different from his own. For example, in Habermas' work
differing criteriadetermi~,~ng:stiificiency:of;~xplariatio;n~~re. ~x'plicated
for three domains of knowledge and are argued to be grounded in his
theory of cognitive interests. 74 In the pattern explanations of, e. g. ,
Schutz and Peter Winch criteria of sufficient explanation are argued
by the former to depend on meaning and causal adequacy and for the
latter on adequate "identificationfl of action under rules. 75 In a
pragmatist's position, e. g., in the work of Kaplan, criteria of
sufficieht explanation are held to be a function of use and purpose.
An .acceptable explanation is here, one that serves the end of inquiry
at a particular time and place - -"we have gotten hold of an idea which
we can do something with. ,,76 In Bromberger1s view, a view of an
.ordinary language philosopher, a satisfactory approach to explanation
cannot be specified .over and above possible contexts. He argues that
a satisf~ctory approach to explanation would be one that explicates
the "truth conditions" that gov~rn the-)ocGurences of "to .e?q)lairi"
when the verb functions in various statements. Criteria of sufficiency
in explanation depend on contexts. Bromberger is highly critical of
the way,:,much of the discussion of explanation is restricted to certain
functions of the t~rrri, e. g., "giving explanations of." As he
correctly points out, the term functions very different~y in where,
.®
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when, what, etc., questions. 77
Many of these positions will be taken up and discussed at length
in the following chapters. It is important to note here though that
there seem to be no transcendental criteria, or quasi-transcendental
criteria, or ground, to justify the singularity of Friedman I s views.
There are many types of explanation for which the D-N model is -"
neither a model nor provider of even necessary conditions. Types
of explanation, that is, that explicitly attempt to thematize t.he
irreducible lTIoment of hermeneutics we have discussed, e. g. ,
which could explain the social and historical nature of the theory of
explanation itself. The D-N model is not a sufficient framework of
explanation to make this possible. This is because in equating, in
its theory of explanation, scientific understanding with explanation
according to laws and reduction of laws to (eve~) more primitive
laws, it
a.
b.
cannot understand that which it presupposes, i. e. ,
the a priori of communication, and
cannot;'; the-r~fore,-~·explainits~lf q4a social phenomenon
and the process oJ explanatioli itself qua social activity.
This is not to say that the neo-Hempelian (e. g., Friedmanite)
account of explanation is indefensible as a theory of what would be
entailed in the explanation relation for the nomological sciences in
certain potentially specifiable contexts .. But it is, however, to say
that the D-N model is (1) insufficient as the theory of explanation
111111
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in these contexts and is (2) not even necessary in· certain other con-
texts. It should be stressed that the former point is made because,
as Friedman points out, the theory of explanation should be able to
tell us IIwhat kind of understanding scientific explanations provide
and how they provide it. 11 (My emphasis.) From the arguments we
have made above it follows that "how" must be understood as entailing
the requirement that the theory of explanation be reflexive, i. e., be
able to stipulate what would be entailed in accounting for itself. For
if a theory of explanation claims to be the theory,i~e.',>claims th~t "~~l·forms
of explanation can be reduced ito ._.ifs~.form (or, as we have been dis-
cussing it, to the D-N or inductive -probabilistic model), then- -among
other things - -it m':!st be able to explain itself. And this stipulation,
as we have argued, takes us beyond the considerations of the D-N
framework per see
The basis of all understanding, we argued following Apel, is
internally connected with the understanding of human language,
communication, forms of life, and traditions. Science, we argued,
could not be adequately understood, unless social practice could be
satisfactorily thematized. Likewise, the theory of explanation can-
not be adequately developed in isolation from considerations of
social contexts and modes of social practice•.~. However, as we see
below, this cannot imply that we simply reflect on traditional lTIodes
of practice - -a position taken by Thomas Kuhn.
1"111 "
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A Digression on the Work of Thomas Kulln
Arguments that parallel some of those discussed above have
provided an impetus to look beyond the philosophy of science for the
key to account for s'cience and scientific procedure. A classlcal
position 9:f this type is~taken.by.Kuhri~:We-:will·look.br·fefly'at .."~Kuhn's work
for it has the ironical consequences of making som.e of the points
of criticism. we made of positivism applicable to what one might
call its "theoretical opposite. II It is a position that emphasizes the
necessity to explicate social practice, in this case the practice of
the community of scientists, i. e., the context of discovery and con-
· · f· 78. d· f h dstltutlon 0 SClence, ln or er to glve an account 0 t e proce ures
of verification and justification in science. It is a position, we will
argue, that collapses theory into practice. The examination of
Kulmls work also raises a number of important questions, e. g.,
whether or not we can ground a criterion determining sufficiency of
explanation and understanding in science - -and whether or not we can
ground" science itself.
Kulm's work is riddled with ambiguities, tensions, and even
contradictions. His" position has also developed and changed over
. time. For reasons of brevity, I will develop the position of the
lIearly Kuhn" and in criticism of this position, highlight current
amgibuities and point to c~rtain revisions Kuhn has made.79
"f!n
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Before beginning, it is itnportant to note a distinction held to
be central to trtraditional tr philosophy.of science. This is the dis-
tinction between the logics of discovery and justification or, as some
prefer, the logics of constitution and verification. The distinction
implies that the conditions for the control of knowledge are indepen-
dent of the knowing act. Objectivity is primarily a matter, as
Scheffler wrote, of ttrational dialogue under authority of observational
credibility and logical cogency. 11 80 Objectivity is held to characterize
the evaluative or justificatory processes of science rather than the
genesis of scientific ideas. A parallel position is held by Popper
who argues that how one arrives at a theory "has no bearing on its
scientific character or logical status. It is in the rational choice of
a the ory that the rationality of science lies; and rational •.choice
depends on our systematic attempts to falsify a theory in crucial
t t 'lf81es s.
Popper'siand Scheffler's distinction between the two ttlogics"
is in Kuhn's view an ideology, rather than a logic. What these
philosophers have provided us with, Kuhn suggests, is preferred
procedural maxims, rather than methodological rules. 82 Kuhn
argues "against the necessity for prescription or therapy in natural
science and abstract theoretical reflection. In his socio-psychological
pisforical -.dis eus'sian of· science he claims that {tlin the absence of
.r-
I UI ~ _
210
an alternative mode that would serve similar functions") ...
"scientists should behave essentially as they do if their concern is
to improve scientific knowledge." For Kuhn, insights into the
sociological history of science reveal that science's practice spans
the traditional division between the two logics - -without los s of
achievement and success. The argument °runs;:-as-'Iollows:
1. There are two modes and periods of scientific
_practice, which can be called "normal" and "revolutionary"
science . respectively •
2. In normal science, the scientific community,
a language community, share a "paradig!:~~"'; that is,
~odels of research embracing shared rules, epistemological
. premises, ontological assumptions and standards of work
defining coherent research traditions, delineating a series
of "puzzles, 11 ano~alies, classes of problems yet to be
solved. Normal science, what most scientists do, most
of the time, is cumulative (because there is a relatively
high degree of internal consensus about how to apply the
cherished values of "prediction," "accuracy, II "scope,"
"simplicity," "fruitfulnes s, II etc.). But normal science
provide;s few novelties of fact or theory. However, it is,
Kuhn states, logically desirable, because science could not
continue unless it took certain key questions for granted
(e. g., questions about the nature of the world).
3. The puzzle -solving tradition is crucial to the
st.~ady., - s~t~by-s~ercl.evelopme1?-t of science; It can also
prepare the way for its own displacement ... The number of
~nomalies, puzzles unsolved by the IIparadigm" m.ay grow,
I'carrying with them their own criteria of settlement. "
4. The result may be a crisis ("the persistent
failure of the :Rl.lzzles of natural science to come out as
they should"). 83
"s. But crises don't automatically give way to critical
rationalism and change. (a) Vested interests (in departments
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and scientific journals), generation gaps and the position of
Ifmarginals," "outsiders,11 (to the dominant paradigm) block
open discourse. However people may begin to "lose faith
and consider alternatives, ,,84 possibly leading to a "prolifera-
tion of competing articulations" of the problems at hand.
(b) The discourse between dissatisfied groups, potentially
revolutionary scientists, is it&Elf inevitably marked by "incom-
pl.eteness of logical contact. If.. Languages change, language
changes, and words change meaning. Successive theories
are thus "incommensurable. ,,:8b (c) Change is largely accounted
for by factors of personality, reputation, nationality, and
extraordinary research. The process is one of conversion,
a "gestalt switch. II It is not made step by step- -it occurs
"all at once" or "not at all. ,,87: If it~is' ,"all at once," it is
revolution.
6. A new period of normal science, under a new
"paradigm" begin,~. Has progress been made? Kuhn is
thoroughly ambiguous on this issue. On the one hand he
says that the new "paradigm" does not/ should not lose
(i) previously acquired problem-solving ability, (ii) predic-
tive accuracy, and (iii) the promise to resolve some major
and generally recognized problem that cannot be met, in
the current opinion, in any other way. On the other hand,
he says, paradigms are "incommensurables" and their
advocates prone to rewrite history to "showlf cumulativity,
-88
etc. ' .
Despite the ambiguity, it would seem then that for Kuhn, .
the processes of constitution and verification are inextricably
intertwined. The development of science depends on a
variou:sly specified interplay of psycho-sociological factors
and "good reasons" (i. e., reasons which orthodox philosophy
of. science condone) for the progress it does or does not lTIake
Recent V(ork in sociology of science suggests that Kuhn's juxta-
position,of normal and revolutionary science ignores a whole range
f - d· - t 89, Th - f t-l- t-° lnterme late lns ances. . ere 15 Inore eros s - er 1 lza lon
(of ideas) across traditions than he suggests. Kuhn seems to exag-
gerate the inte.rnal integration of paradigms and also the held
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discrepancy between them. Historically, the discrepancy appears
to have been much smaller. 90
As has been documented at length by Lakatos and Scheffler,
Kuhn's epistemqlogical views can be seen to oscillate between a
radical relativism and claims that criteria of "progress" can be
delineated. 91 In Kuhn's work the tension between problems of
radical relativism and a potentially viable epistemology have not
been systematically spoken to. As such, and what is of particular
interest to us here, KulIn f s position can be seen to be intertwined
with a ,number of paradoxes. The effect of th_ese paradoxes is to
lead us back into a methodical solipsism, as the viability of a ne~
theory can~ot, within the terms set, be supported by a methodology
of justification. ·There is a strong tendency in Kuhn's work to reduce
what we might conceptualize and defend as processes of justification
to. the solitary practice of individuals, which alone is held to be
justified.
These paradoxes have been usefully elaborated by Scheffler
and include:
1. The paradox of categorization
"If my categories of thought determine what I observe,
then what I observe provides no independent control
over my thought. On the other hand, if my categories
of thought do not determine what I observe, then what
I observe must be uncategorized, that is to say,
formles sand nondescript- -hence a:ogain incapable of
providing any test of my thought. "'9'2.
cD,
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From the former position it might be concluded that observa-
tion contaminated by thought yields circular tests. From the
latter position it might be concluded that observation uncon-
taminated yields no possibility of tests.
2. The paradox of observation
11 • if perception is theory-laden. . . then proponents
of two different theories cannot observe the same things
in an effort to resolve their differences, they shar.e no
neutral observations capable of deciding between them.
To judge one theory as superior to the other by appeal
to observation is always doomed, therefore, to beg the
very question at issue. tf~Q3
The paradox has the effect of isolating each scientist within an
observed world uniquely his or her own, a world consonant
with that scientist's respective theoretical beliefs.
3. The paradox of common language
Scientists may perhaps share common sounds, but not common
meanings. If'languag~ commuriities~are incommensurable,
then
It • • there can be no real community of science in any
sense approximating that of the standard view, no com-
parison of theories with respect to their observational
content. . . no cumulative growth of knowledge, at
least in the standard sense. 1I~94
This paradox has the result of effectively isolating each
s cientist or-langua-ge-..;.;~haringcomlTIunity within the·ir respec-
tive system of meanings as well as within their own observed
world.
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Given the positions above, we cannot speak of alternative,
competing theories of the same object, for the very distinction
between the logics of constitution and justification breaks down.
The results of the position lead us back into solipsism and
skepticism. But the positions also contain the basis for their own
refutation. As Scheffler put it:
... to put forth any claim with seriousness is to
presuppose commitment to the view that evaluation
is possible, and that it favours acceptance; it is to
indicate one IS readiness to support the claim in fair
argument, as being correct or true or proper. '95
The claim that commitment to intersubjective systematic evaluation
is a myth embodies its own self -refutation. IIIf it is true, there
can be no reason to accept it; in fact, if it is true, its own truth is
unintelligible. ,,96 If the claim is held to be true, there must be
reasons to compel and accept it. Then, clearly, not all truths are
relative ..
It is important to note that Kuhn wauld, likely, regard the
above paradoxes as paradoxes and reject an association with an
epistemology that might attempt to place them at its center. How-
ever, it is our contention that there is little in his own arguments,
as we understood them above, that could provide a justified basis to
maintain a firm distance from these (admittedly IIreductio ad absur-
dum ll ) ,positio~s.
n()
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97'Further, Kuhn conflates theories of sense and reference.
There is a crucial need to distinguish between the authenticity of
paradigms /theories, their variety of sensep, and referential rules
to an external world. It is the satneness of reference that is of
interest rather than synonym. We do not need to claiITl that the
.border :between languages is constant and given to simple one -to-one
translation, nor that a neutral observation language exists, in order
to argue that there is a possibility of shared processes of decision
(i. e., as a result of dialogue) on the referential force of a term
(by reference to cases). Of course, what is decided and deemed
decidable by reference to case may change with theoretical tradi-
tions, purpose, and history. But to admit this is not to negate the
distinction between sense and reference. With a new theory, the
questions of reference may become once more thematized. "A new
theory arising within a given referenti?-l tradition cannot command
initial consensus on presumably confirming cases of its own, but
must prove itself against the background of prior judgments of
.\98
particulars." .
In all that has been said I do not mean to suggest that Kuhn's
stress on language, history, and sociology is unimportant. Rather
that his views of science at the level of sociology are inadequate
and that his views at the level of epistemology are singularly
..!.,.
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inadequate. They do not advance the considerations, co~c::ern~!?-g~t?~ nature
of science, scientific explanation, and understanding, with which we
concluded the previous section of this chapter. For Kuhn, past and
existing practices alone appear legitimate and justified. The role of
theory lapses into a descriptivism (as it often does, as we will see,
in the hermeneutic tradition). As I will argue in the following chap-
ter, if all that is demanded of the role of theory is that interpretations
of the tradition or culture taken as the object of study be purely des-
criptive and nonevaluative, nothing can be said about the truth-content
or possible deception (idology) in that traditionLs self-understanding:
all is left the same.
Kuhn fails to make the critical distinction between those stan-
dards or criteria which are internal to paradigms and those by which
we may judge the paradigm itself. On this account he conflates,
therefor e, considerations of constitution and justification in science --
unjustifiably. In his more recent work, Kuhn himself seems to
emphasize several criteria relevant to the evaluation of theories
per se, e. g. :
'n
(1
II
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
prediction,
the existence of anomalies,
the existence of crises,
the preservation of previously acquired problem-solving
ability, and
the promise of solving m.ore problems that:! qould"be
'solveid by previous theories. 99
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On these issues his work increasingly approximates that of Lakatos.
However, how we rationally justify or ground these criteria is as ret
unestablished for the nomological sciences. It is in Habermas I work
on Peirce) that we see one attempt to justify a basis, a foundation
for science. It is to this work that we now turn.
.Structures of Action and. Knowledge
In [§umlTIarizirig?u~,argume'nt itOI :date ", we :~ap..·note:th·at·pbsitivisIl1
can be criticized insofar as it attempts to reduce all knowledge to the
conceptual framework of and categories appropriate to the natural
sciences. In trying to complete this reduction, positivists lTIust
either presuppose as unproblematic the availability of an inter-
subjectively constituted language or as.sulTIe a position of methodical
solipsism. In either case, positivists are unable, within the terms
of their own philosophical understanding, to account for the possibility
and nature of this language and of intersubjective agreement in
general. While adhering to the program of a unified science, posi-
tivists could not recognize that there is a lTIode. of knowledge and
lTIethodological procedures appropriate to understanding the basis
of cOlTIlTIunicative interaction and intersubjective agreelTIent, pro-
cedures which differ from those utilized to gain knowledge of objec-
tified processes of nature. These differences, it has been argued,
arise frolTI a fundamental difference between the interaction of a
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subject with an object, which can be regarded as another subject,
and that of a subject with an object which cannot be so construed. In
the former case, we have dialogic or communicative interaction.
In the latter, we have monologic or instrumental activity.
Insofar as the employment of symbols is constitutive
for the behavioral system of instrumental action,
the use of language involved is monologic. But the
communication of investigators requires the use of
language that is not confined to the limits of technical
control over objectified natural processes. It
arises from symbolic interaction between societal
subjects who reciprocally know and recognize each
other as unmistakable individuals. This communi-
cative action is a system of reference that cannot
be redu_c~~ to the framework of instrumental
action.IOl
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas argues that
P~_i~ce was one of the first philosophers to realize the need to
systematically reflect on science and to go beyond a limited positivist
position in order to understand the logic of science, its relation to
e e d 1- hI- f - -fe 102the lOglC of actlon, an to exp lcate t e OglC 0 SClentl lC progr~ss_.
What separates Peirce from both early and modern
positivism is his understanding that the task of
methodology is not to clarify the logical structure
of scientific theories but the logic of the pro~ec1ure
with whose aid we obtain scientific theories. 103
Through persistent questioning of the meaning of science, of the
possibility of scientific progress, and of the nature of scientific
inference, Peirce, it is held, laid the groundwork for a pragm~~ic
interpretation of science. The validity of scientific results,.
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according to Peirce, was dependent on agreement among the com-
munity .'ofinvestigators. For Peirce, this meant that knowledge is
scientific: if, and only if ". . . an uncompelled and permanent con-
sensus can be obtained with regard to its validity. 11 • .104 True scien-
tific beliefs were those It. • • interpretations that have stood up to
indefinitely repeated tests and are intersubjectively recognized in
the long run. II ,105
Peirce recognized the need to conceptualize truth in terms of
the activity of scientists; that is, in terms of the community and
consensus formed through the interactions of scientists. Habermas
argues, however, that Peirce,. in ~th~~ ~nd, failed to appreciate that
inter subjective agreement could not be understood within the terms
of reference of a science that objectifies-world processes. The
details of Habermas' critique of Peirce are unimportant for our
purposes here. What should be noted is that Habermas does not rest
his discussion of Peirce at this point, nor his critique of positivism.
There is la~series+o_f'~p"Qints;":'he:~cont,ends" yet tobe made, points which
' .. - .
'ell~cidate all immap:ent~but-unexplicated'·relat~onship+~etw~en th'eory
Habermas is in fundamental agreement with the spirit of
Peirce's project to connect knowledge, inquiry, and action within a
framework of the various functio:Q.s of the species life processes,
()
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and thus to ground science in the modes of man's practical activities.
Central to. this view is the idea that science only systematizes and
formalizes the procedures required for the successful completion of
these activities. On this account, the knowledge generated by the
methods of natural science is to be understood as knowledge func-
tional and useful for the successful completion of instrumental
actions. Instrumental action is understood as activity used for the
tlcontrol of the external conditions of existence, which can be
acquired and exercised only under the conditions of a cumulative
. . . i06
learning proces s. "._~ . Inquiry, according to this interpretation,
becomes· 1:'. • . ,the reflected form (Reflexionsform) of this pre-
scientific learning process that is already posited with instrumental
· h It 107 I · · dd·· · 1 h· 1 ·actlon as suc . .' nqulry ln a ltlon 1S0 ates t 1S earnlng pro-
cess, guarantees precision and intersubjective reliability and
systematizes. the progression of scientific knowledge. Thus,
scientific inquiry can be understood as systematizing (through
rnethC?dical reflection) the conceptual framework according to which
reality is constituted or objectified in relation to a behavioral frame-
work of instrumental action. That is, science generates knowledge
that
II • • stabilizes purposive -rational, feedback-
monitored action in an ~nvironment objectified from
the point of view of possible technical ..'c 0l?-t:r 01. 108
JI '
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That the human species possesses this learning mechanism is, in
turn, to be comprehended, on Habermas 1 view, in terms of the
species 1 natural situation.. In this situation the species ". . . is
com.pelled to reproduce its life through purposive -rational action. 111 09
The pressures of natural necessity can only be diminis'hed through
the exercise of ever greater capacity to control the forces of nature.
This requirement of self-preservation, Habermas argues, is reflected
in what he calls a t1knowledge-constitutive interest in possible techni-
.110
cal control. It . This interest, Habermas claims, is inherent to
the species. It is to be distinguished from the basic instincts of the
species. However, in terms of philosophical anthropology, the
interest is to be conceptualized at a level of innateness similar to
that of our instincts.
A more complete explication of the nature and role of knowledge-
constitutive interests must await Part 4 and our direct discussion of
Habermas 1 work. The interest in technical control will be used by
Habermas to help understand, withiii~tlie t~:t:p;.s c;:>f':his IQwnjepi.stemology,
- .
the nature of human knowledge and activity. What should be noted
here is that through extending his interpretation of Peirce, Habermas
claims to have uncovered an interest in technical control which is an
a priori condition for the pos sibility of knowledge and a basis on which
to explain the structure of knowledge. Nomological knowledge is
I~ I-
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crucial to providing humanity with the capacity to control the regu-
larities and the irregularities of nature's forces. Yet, if humanity
. -
did not possess the imperatives for self-preservation, it would have
no need for such knowledge. The nature and structure of knowledge,
in Habermas' view, is to be compre.hetided ..~!1 virtueo:of ~the' spe~lesl .interests
(or as he elsewhere expresses them, "generalized motives 1'). Know-
ledge, on this account, is inextricably intertwined with human need
and the structure of action.
The Implications of Positivist Epistemological Positions
for Social, Political, and Moral Positions
It has been shown that a science cannot be fully comprehended
merely as a formal abstract system, but must be understood as a
product of concrete, historical activity. To view science in this way,
it has been argued, would force us to go beyond the limits of positivist'
presuppositions. We have also seen that this view of science cannot
imply that we simply reflect on the existing practice of scientists.
Such a descriptivism we argued closes off dimensions of reflection,
e. g., critical evaluation, which one can only close off at the risk of
failing to assess the truth-content or possible basis of systematic
deception within at.r·~dition~.(of .·s·cie~tificfactiviFy).
The critique of positivism, however, is even more extensive
when applied directly to the social sciences. Not only is the
.0
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positivisticaily oriented social scientist unable to understand his
own activity qua scientist, he is, in addition~·~. unable to fully under-
stand .his subjects qua intentionally acting subjects. That is to say,
to the extent that the people observed by the social scientist are self-
consciously motivated actors, their activities cannot be reduced to the
terms of possible observation, objectified processes, and of experi-
tnentation. To the extent, however, that actions are causally pro-
. duced as the effects of social and natural forces beyond the knowledge
and/ or control of the actors, it might be appropriate tc:> consider
social actors in obj~~tgied·te~·rl.1:s~ .Ifhuman: a~tion'is'viewed ill.
this last manner, an account can be provided of.it in causal terms,
which are open to external observation and verification. But where
human action is ".the result of conscious decision on the part of
rational agents acting within a matrix of intersubjective meaning sys-
tem's, objectivistic techniques and concepts cannot be used to pro-
vide an adequate account of social' action and reality. The dimensions
of intentionality, rules, and conventions cannot be understood in
concepts which are utilized only in procedures of observation aimed
at the e stablishm.ent of causal regularities. 111 (This position is
argued, it should be added, as an empirical, not conceptual, hypo-
thesis by some. )
The respective roles that a nohiological.socialscience can
:1,' .
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play, along with what we will call a hermeneutical-dialectical science,
will be discussed at greater length in the following chapters. Here it
should siITlply be noted that nothing in the above is ITleant to iITlply
that it is never appropriate to consider hUITlan subjects as objects
suitable for study using the methods of a causal, nOITlological science.
Rather, the claiITl is that a.social science that restricted itself to
this procedure would, according to the arguITlents above, be incapable
of understanding social reality and would itself form a type of positi-
vist ideology.
One central tenet of positivist thought has not yet been dis-
cussed, viz., its claim to be value -free. It was previously noted
in our discussion of Weber and in this chapter that positivists hold
as one of their key tenets that facts have no direct relationship to
values. Value judgments are held to have no cognitive basis or
ultimate justification. In the positivistically oriented social sciences,
this presupposition has iITlportant consequences ~.-conse.q':lences,
that is, not only for the level of epistemology, but more importantly
for social theory an~ for the planning of social life.
We'~have argued that to believe in an absolutely dichotomous
..(1
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relationship between facts (knowledge) and values is, in effect, to
attempt to dirempt theory fr om practice. A positivistic orientation
encourages social scientists to treat social life, social formations,
and history as natural processes which can be studied from a detached,
morally neutral standpoint, It is also claimed that application of
this knowledge is a wholly separate issue from its generation. This
separation of theory and practice can also lead to a decisionistic
ethics. Similar points have been noted in our discussion of Weber,
but they can here be useful~y summarized and developed.
Under the guise of a value -free science, Weber IS conception
of science masks, we have argued, i~s nature as a proponent of a
quite specific form of rationality and practice-: S:C?too·with positivi'st~
science.
Nagel's distinction between characterizing value-judgments
(affirming that Ita given characteristic is in some degree present--
or absent- -in a given instance") and appraising value -judgments
(that conclude "some envisaged or actual state of affairs is 'worthy
of approval or disapproval"), 11.2 though it may be usef~l in certain
contexts,l13 is not, as we noted in Chapter 2, an absolute one.
Although Nagel insists that certain appraisals may entail certain
characteristics and that we can characterize wi thout appraising,
a fundamental point to be made:"is that a characterizing proposition
1I '
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is not completely separable from a ethical-value judgment if,
1. what is being affirmed is "precisely the value of
those values, that is, their validity or worth lf ; .:114 -
2. an epistemology and methodology can be shown to pre-
suppose a prior commitment to a particular mode of
rationality and practice which is a matter of practical
choice, i. e., values.
The former point requires a detailed argument to sustain it, viz.,
that values have a cognitive content and as such can be treated as
facts which are open to empirical validation. This argument cannot
be made here, although it will be taken up in the following chapters. 115
The latter point, most applicable to our discussion here, maintains
that characterizing judgments presupposes a particular practical
choice as to what our standards or modes of scientific practice
should be. In this case a practical judgment enters into scientific
procedures all the way through. Following Habermas, we maintain
that this is the case for positivist thought.
In his discussion of Peirce, Habermas attempted to
demonstrate that natural science is oriented toward the production
of technically useful information; that is, while not reducing science
to a simple or crude instrumentalism, the claim is that natural
science can be understood as oriented toward the production of
knowledge which can be used for the manipulation and control of
nature. While not every study.or inquiry in~,the .natural or
I~.· ---------
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behavioral sciences need produce technically utilizable results,
nor need have as a conscious intent the production of such knowledge,
., .. Nevertheless, with the structure of proposi-
tions (restricted prognoses concerning observable
behaviour) and with the type of conditions of valida-
tion (ilnitation of the control of the results of action
. . . ) a :methodical decision has been taken in
advance on the technical utility of infor:mation. . . .
SilTIilarly the range of possible experience is pre-
judiced, precisely the range to which hypotheses
refer and upon which they can founder ..116
Although not recognized as such, the interest in technically
useful knowledge and the rationality which elTIbodies it are values
ilTIplicit in the positivist understanding of science. They are not
regarded as values which need to be defended by positivists because
of a persuasive understanding of scientific rationality which lnakes
such rationality coincide with purposive rational procedures. The
lTIethod.s which positivislTI considers scientific and therefore rational
are those which allow for the..-gathering of knowledge useful for
prediction and feedback control operations.
Theoretical knowledge and questions of scientific inquiry are
essentially Inade co-extensive with useful knowledge. Questions of
practical reason are ruled out of the range of science and beyond
rational investigation. Not being open to rational solution, practical
questions becolTIe the province of the private individual and in the
final analysis can be justified only by reference to a decision or a
- (~ - - -' -.
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cOlTIlTIitlTIent of belief or faith. By confining rational decision
procedures to those utilized by the natural sciences, positivislTI
reduces ethics to a decisionislTI and closes off ultilTIate principles
and values to the possibility of rational justification.
In the nanle of its own view of science and rationality, posi-
tivislTI launches a critique of ideology ailTIed at rooting out COlTI-
peting theories which are supposedly value-laden and hence illegiti-
lTIately used to justify scientific practice. But this form of critique
is n~t, as positivislTI lTIaintains, itself value-free. For it elTIbodies
a forlTIal (lTIeans-end) rationality and centers its interests on efficiency
and econotny of lTIeans to given ends. tlThese values are ac'corded
a privileged status since they are ilTIplied in 'rational' procedure
.117itself. " In thenatne of value-freedolTI this criticism. of ideologies
dictates the value- system. for all other m.odes of scientific practice.
Thus positivislTI's belief in the fact/value, theory I practice
dichotolTIies has paradoxical results. In the nanle of value-freedolTI,
a certain value-orientation is chalTIpioned to the exclusion of all
others. In the nalTIe of a -diremption ·petwe-ert~·theory.·~~d··pra·cti<:.e;-a particular
form. of practice is sanctioned. Positivism.ts seelTIingly passive,
contem.plative reason rrlasks an underlying level of cOlTIm.itted
reason. As a result of its own ideological position, however, posi-
tivisrrl is prevented from. recognizing these inconsistencies.
! J.....!. '
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The effect on social theory of this hidden value commitment
in positivism is a conceptualization of problems and alternative
solutions which encourages the deve·lopm.ent of a technological
rationality and mentality. Only those problems which are amenable
to scientific-technological solutions are rationally decidable. Ulti-
mate goals are supposedly not accessible to rational decision and
therefore beyond the control of science and rational dialogue.
Habermas has argued that this committed conception of
rationality ". . . ultilTIately implies an entire organization of society:
one in which a technology,~;beco~e autonomous, dica{es;a~:va:lue-
system--na!nely, its own--to the domains of praxis it has
118
usurped. .." However, it should be noted here that the word
"ilTIplies lt is highly a!nbiguous. For the "decisionistic practice"
etc. we argued to be entailed by positivism does not logically imply
Itan entire . . . technocratic organization of society." On the
contrary, as Weber understood, no single mode of living could be
justified by this "epistem.ologically sanctioned" practice. As we
noted in the discussion of Weber's adherence to formal rationality
in science and the fact/value dualism, such an epistem.ology could
f If -I d 1 f f - h d·· 11 9. -not even justi y itse and ental e a" eap 0 alt" eClSlon.·
To the .extent 'that Habermas attern'ptsto; ~:I;"guethatith~:theoryof
theory and practice in positivism. im.plies specific !nodes of social
~l.
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and political organization, we cannot agree.
The only sense of "im.plies" that can be sustained here is a
notion that has been m.otivated by historical analysis and observation.
For historically it does, indeed, seem. to be the' case--as HaberlTIas
him.self has argued elsewhere--that the contelTIporary "mystiquetr
of a positivist understanding of science helps provide the legitimating
efficacy for the spread of technocratic consciousness, attempts to
depqlitize the polity and public sphere--in the name of the trexperttr
and "impartial" decisionmaking processes. 120
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. In closing our discussion of positivism. two important points
need to be made. First, it should be em.phasized that our critical
discussion of certain traditions of positivist thought only applies, as
a whole, to those who adhere to the three central tenets with which
we defined positivism at the beginning of this chapter. It should also
be noted that several contem.porary figures in the "em.pirist" tracl.i-
tion have attempted to address and system.atically revise certain
features of positivism that have here been found wanting. For
exam.ple, Scheffler has discussed at som.e length the importance of
thematizing the role of "history" and "meaning" in developing a
;KLI
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viable Ilobjectivistic" epistexno1ogy.121 Such an epistexno1ogy
attern.pts to preserve certain aspects of positivist thought while
revising others. The scope of Scheffler's work and others like it,
goesbeyorid:~the scope of our chapter. Although it rn.ight be said
that certain aspects of our critique of positivislTI :might apply to
these works, it :must be recognized that argum.ents to this effect
have yet to be :made. The Popperians, of course, would reject the
first two tenets with which we defined positivism. For Popper all
(scientific) perception is theory i:mpregnated and the need for a
h · · 1 .. k 1 d d 122 -ermeneutlc aspect to SOCIa sCIence ac now e ge . However,
he and :many of his followers deny that practical questions admit of
truth, that values have a cognitive content. The sa:me points that
were rn.ade to the neo-Kantians and positivists, viz., decisionism,
123
etc., can, therefore, be tnade here too ..
Secondly and finally, it :must be recognized that in this chapter
we have left a large nu:mber of proble:matics and questions "unad-
dressed" and flunanswered." This chapter as a critique of posi-
tivis:m (and one of its :major critics) was intended to show only that
certain episte:mological and m.ethodological positions cannot stand
alone. How we :might develop a herm.eneutic social science, a
critical perspective, "balance" the roles of ~1._no_h-?-o16~gi~al·-a~4...
her:meneutic social science, justify criteria determining sufficiency
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of understanding and explanation and a grounding for science raises
problems and questions of enormous cOnlplexity. In the following
chapters we will return to these issues and explore how others have
.attenlpted to systetnatically address the:m. In a critical examination
of t].1eseworks we tnight discover a series of further approaches to
these questions that do not suffice. It :might well be that the central
conclusions of this thesis serve to cast strong doubt on the viability
of certain approaches to the issues above~ We tnight at least dis-
cover~.certain approaches in the philosophy of (social) science that
can be systetnatically criticized and doubted. In this case we will
have done a great deal less than answer certain fundatnental questions,
but we :might have found good reasons not to ask certain questions
in the ways they have been generated by so:me of the schools discussed.
I-I....
I
I
I
>0
i
L
I
:tf')
NOTES
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'first appears in a recognizable forIn with Comte. Cf. Andrew
Arato, tiThe Neo Idealist Defense of Subjectivity," Telos 21 (1974):
108-61.
ZIt will be argued that just as positivism tends to be unable
to comprehend social practice, so' Kuhn's work is a lTIanifestation
of its theoretical opposite, i. e., the tendency to reduce theory to
practice and is, therefore, unable to adequately cOInprehend theory.
For an elaboration of these distinctions, s~.e 'pp. 208 -17.
3
The central works of these writers are listed in the Selected
Bibliography.
4Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 74.
SIsrael Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (New York: The
Babbs-Merrill Company, 1967), p. 5. Scheffler's chap. 1 provides
an excellent discussion of this point. See also A. J. Ayer., ed.,
Logical PositivisIn (New York: The Free Press, 1959), the ed. 's
Introduction.
6For one such view d. Frederick Engels, Anti-Dlihring
.(New York: International Publishers, 1972).
7Robert S. Cohen, "Dialectical Materialism and Carnap's
Logical Empiricis:m," in The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, ed.
Paul A. Schilpp (LaSalle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Company,
1963)", p. 120.
8Ibid., p. 105. It follows from Cohen's definition that the
:me:mbers of the Vienna Circle were positivists only in their early,
phenoInena1ist phase. In their subsequent physicalist stage it
would then be :more appropriate to refer to theIn as Logical Etnpiri-
cists. By our definition, however, they can be considered as
adhering to a positivist position throughout.
233
~.I .
234
9Haberm.as, Knowledge and HUlTIan Interests, .ch~p. ,,4.
10Ibid. , p. 71.
1lIbid .
lZIbed 4.1 ., p.
l3Ibid . , p. 68.
14 bed 68-9.I 1 • ., pp.
l5For a general discussion and development of this argument,
see Haberm.as, "On Theory and Praxis in Our Scientific Civiliza-
tion," in Ju~.gen Haberma~.,:!r~~o+y~.arid:"PractiGe;,~trans-•. J'ohri,V'iertel
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1-971), pp.. 265ff.
l6This tension has been discussed at length by Robert Cohen.
Cf. his "Ernst Mach: Physics, Perception, and the Philosophy of
Science," Synthese 18 (1968): 132-70.
17Cohen, "Dialectical Materialism and Carnap's Logical
EInpiricism., tr p. 108."
18Ibid., p. 109.
19It also had a series of other implications. Cf. ibid., pp. 108-11.
20Arato, "The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity," p. 112.
21 Cohen, "Dialectical Materialism and Carnap's Logical
Ernpiricism.," p. 109.
22 I he e e e de d b 1 FIeT IS InconsIstency IS ISCUSSe e ow. or an exarnp e In
Mach's work, cf. his History and Root of the Principle of the Con-
servation of Energy, trans. P. E. B. Jourdain (Chicago: Open Court,
1898), pp. 54-7. For a system.atic treatment of the problem. in
Mach's work, once again, cf. Cohen, "Ernst Mach: Physics, Per-
ception, and the Philosophy of Science. II
23Haberm.as, Knowledge and Hum.an Interests, p. 89.
24Held and Simon, "Understanding Habermas," chap. 2, p. 9.
I .
,'411 I
235
25
Cohen, "Ernst Mach: Physics, Perception, and the
Philosophy of Science, If p. 135.
26Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, trans. T. J. :
McCorlTIack, 5th English ed. (LaSalle, Ill.: The Open Court Pub-
lishing Company, 1942), p. 580, quoted in Cohen, IfErnst Mach:
Physics, Perception, and the Philosophy of Science, '~- pp. 136- 37.
27Mach, The Science of Mechanics, p. 137.
28 .
HaberlTIas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 88.
29Ibid. , . p. 83.
30Cf., for exam.ple, the references to Mach in Logical Posi-
tivism, ed. Ayer.
31Cohen, IIDialectical Materialsm and Carnap's Logical
Empiricism., II p. 111.
32Held and Simon, IIUnderstanding Habermas, II chap. 2, p. 10.
33Cohen, "Dialectical Materialsm. and Carnap's Logical
Empiricism, p. Ill.
34Held and Simon, IIUnderstanding Habermas, II chap. 2, p. 11.
35Cohen, IIDialectical Materialsm and Carnap's Logical
Empiricism," p. ·112.
36Th-d"1 .,
37Ib-d1 .,
p. 118.
p. 143.
38Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Str.ucture of the World and
Pseudoproble:ms in Philosophy, trans. Rolf A. George (Berk"eley:
University of California Press, 1969).
39For a useful discussion of protocol sentences, d. J .. O..
UrInson, Philosophical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press,
1968), chap. 8. For a critical discussion, cf. Otto Neurath,
"Protocol Sentences," in Logical Positivism., ed. Ayer.
r-'
236
40Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for
Behaviqral Science (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing COnlpany,
1964), p. 36. Cf. C. G. HelTIpel, "ProblelTIs and Changes in the
ElTIpiricist Criterion of Meaning," Revue Internationale de Philoso-
phie 40 (1950): 41-63, for a discussion of the history of the form.u-
lation of the elTIpiricist criterion of lTIeaning.
4lKarl-Otto Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the
Geisteswissenschaften (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing
COlTIpany, 1967), p. 15.
42 Cf. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, p. 47.
43.-'7£. -be d h 3\jI 1 1 ., cap. .
44Kar1 R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth
of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), chap. 11.
_"; -~5Ibid.
:46For a sum.m.ary of the m.ain points, see John Passm.ore,
A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Harm.ondsworth, England: Penguin
Books, 1970), pp. 379-93.
"41 Cohen, "Dialectical Materialism and Carnap's Logical
ElTIpiricism.," p. 113.
4'8Karl~OttoApel, rtThe A Priori of Com.:munication and the
Foundation of the HUlTIanities, II Man and World, no. 5 (February
1972), pp. 3-37.
49"Ibid. , p. 26.
50 Ibid. , p. 7.
:51 Ibid. , p. 8.
52Ibid. , p. 10.
, 53 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans.
G. E. M. AnscolTIbe, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan COInpany,
1968), pars. 243ff.
54Apel, "The A Priori of COlTIInunication, It p. 10.
UJ j
If').
237
55.It is, of course, recognized that the claim that human action
cannot be adequately co:mprehended through the categories of an
observational language is a controversial one. The discussion of
explanation and understanding that follows in a :mo:ment, as well as
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are isolated from rational decision procedures and enter into the
process as subjectively given goals. The technical values of
efficiency and economy tend to dominate the selection of means,
The ends as such cannot beq~~estionedwithin the terms of the pro-
cedures: they admit only of compromise between competing parties.
As decision theory rationalizes choice of techniques, however, the
operative value systems also change. Habermas notes, acknow-
ledging agreement on this point with Dewey, that
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improved techniques would not remain bound solely to
the [existing] orientation of values, but als 0 would
subject the values themselves indirectly to a prag-
matic test of their :validity. [Ibid., p. 272.]
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existence so as to increase humanity's control over the conditions of its
life, the logic of scientism, taken to the culmination, ends in a situation
where decisions are removed for all practical purposes from humanity's
control and given over to fully automated systems. 11 (Quoted from Held
and Simon, "Understanding Habermas, " chap. 2, pp. 28-29.)
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CHAPTER V
A CRITIQUE OF HERMENEUTICS: ON THE TENDENCY
TO THE REDUCTION OF THEORY TO PRACTICE
Introduction
In 'the discussion of Weber's concepts of Verstehen it was
argued that he conflated a com.plexity of issues. The critique attem.pted
to highlight the limitedness of Weber's conception of the analysis of
social action~.:" In the discussion of positivislTI it was suggested that
there was a mode of knowledge and methodological procedures appro-
priate t.o understanding the basis of comlTIunicative interaction and
in~ersubjectiveagree:ment, procedures which differ from. those
'utilized to gain knowledge of objectified processes. The critique of
positivism. argued that positivism is unable to understand science,
wher~ the latter is conceived, not as a for:mal, self-enclosed system,
but as human activity, as the practice of the co:mm.unity of investi-
g~tors. Dim.ensions of social practice, e. g., intentionality, rules,
and ~onventions, cann~t be understood, it was said, in concepts
which are uttlized only in procedures of observation aim.ed at the
establish:ment of causal regularities.
In order to continue our exam.ination of the relationship between
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theory and practice as discussed in the introduction of this thesis,
as well as to lTIake good on the criticis:ms outlined above, it is
necessary to turn directly to a discussion of the hernleneutic
tradition.
It is particularly in the early work of Dilthey, working within
Geisteswissenschaften tradition, that we find a lnajor attem.pt to
uncover the basis of the ,cultural and herm.eneutic sciences and put
them. on a lTIethodological an~ epistem.ological foundation wholly
different from that of positivis:m. We begi~ this chapter with an
ex~m.ination of the early work of Dilthey. In particular, Dilthey's
stress on Verstehen (understanding) is outlined. On his account
the essential cognitive task of the hum.an sciences::is to.unde:t;stand:
its object as experienced in the di:mension of the ":meaningfulness
that it em.bodies." However, Dilthey' s elTIpathetic concept of
Verstehen is found to be singularly inadequate to -the task of under-
standing. His early work entails an intractable proble:m of evidence
and a crude objectivism. Interestingly enough, Dilthey's later work
atte:mpts to grapple with m.any of the proble:ms posed in his earlier
work. Specifically, in a discussion of the "later" Dilthey we will
see that his stress on :method changes from. one of em.pathy and
lnystical introspectionism., to a set of procedures that lays the
I
foundations for a notion of Verstehen that can be defended as a
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lnethod of verification productive of valid knowledge. However,
Dilthey' s later work fails ultilTIately to overcome the psychologisrn.
inherent in his earlier position. While Inaking a contribution to
Inove the hermeneutic tradition away from introspectionism., etc.,
his work lapses into relativisln, objectiviSln, and descriptivism..
In the discussion of the shortcom.ings of Dilthey' s work, the
central theIne of this chapter is unfolded; natnely, that throughout
the whole herm.eneutic tradition despite continuous atteInpts to
direm.pt theory from. practice, there is a strong tendency to reduce
theory to practice, to reduce the role of theory to that of explicating
practice, and to grant authority to the categories and concepts of
the subject/ object of investigation. As such within herlneneutic
epistem.ology and m.ethodology, it is~-c9nt_e~dedther~ is
'
a prop"ensity
to descriptivism.-; arid relativislTI. There is also a loss of a critical
perspective.
This discussion also draws Inany of its ideas from. the ,work of
Habermas et al; 1 specifically from Habermas' attempt to indicate
hermeneutics' :lI~~mediatelypractical relation to life. 11 2 However,
it is m.y essential aitn to extend this discussion into variants of the
herlTIeneutic tradition in contem.porary social science. There will
be a (selective) analysis of the work of Peter Winch, Alfred Schutz,
and Harold Garfinkel, representatives of the schools of ordinary
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language analysis, phenolTIenology, and ethnolTIethodology, respec-
tively.3 Although none of these schools can trace their intellectual
heritage sim.ply to the herm.eneutic tradition, their essential proble-
lTIatic is, as we shall see, that of herm.eneutics, i. e., the study of
the objectivations of hUlTIan activity, with the ailTI of interpreting
th 4 N. B., 5elTI.
It is, of course, recognized that lTIany of the intricacies of
the works of Winch, Schutz, and Garfinkel are neglected. However,
I feel that a somewhat cursory treatment of their work is justified
in light of the overall themes of this chapter, i. e., the examination
of the relationship between theory and practice in the her:meneutic
tradition. ~:~
In an exalTIination of the language interpretive sociology of
V{inch and of the phenolTIenological sociology of Schutz, it is shown
that their work is vulnerable to m.any of the criticis:ms we lTIade ·of
Dilthey. However, it is noted that there are i:mportant ambiguities
in the positions taken by Winch and Schutz on certain central issues.
These issues include:
~:~lt 'sho-uld also .~~ n(ited that in Part ··4and-iri" ~h·e ~.Gql}.~luding
Re-tnark·s--6f thls th~sis ·We 'will return tp certain aspects "of these
'Writer:s I \yorks· when;it·is· ·s"een thitt,.:Critical theor"y has not a? yet
been:-able-,td"'makegood on ce.rtain 6f ,the criticisms here made.
'f" ..
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- - -the relationship between the language of the social analyst
and that of his or her subject/ object, and
---the relationship between the interpreter and his subject/
object, and the possible effects on both of an interpretive
intervention.
. The anlbiguities of Winch on these issues are of particular interest
not o~~y because they l'expose inconsistencies in his work, but because
they bring to the fore a potentially pronlising approach to ~hese con-
cerns. A satisfactory approach to these problems is held to be of
the utmost inlportance to the development of hernleneutics. Unfor-
tunately, this potentially promising approach is not addressed sys-
tematically by Winch. As a consequence, the issues are not adequately
dealt with. They are also not adequately addressed by Schutz. Nor
are they systenlatically spoken to by Garfinkel whose work~highlights
some of the lTIost interesting applications of hermeneutics to social
science, and reaches a reductio. ad ab'surdumyiri the :conflati6n--.·of..:.
theory to practice.
In the final section of this chapter and in an analysis of the
work of the herlTIeneutician Hans-Georg GadalTIer, it is shown that
he directly and systematically addresses many of the proble:m.s and
approaches we have highlighted. However, in an examination of
the Gadam.er-Haberm.as exchange, with which we conclude this
chapter, it is argued that Gadarner ultimately maintains a direm.ption
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between science and criticism. and begs certain funda:m.ental ques-
tions. Following Haberm.as we argue that Gadam.er, in the final
analysis (along with Dilthey, Winch, Schutz, and Garfinkel), idealizes
lUeaning, accepts the m.eaning structures of herm.eneutics as a
given, and ontoligizes these structures as the lim.its of understanding,
com.rnunication, and science. Finally, it is noted that if we are to
sustain these crriticism.s and develop an alternative critical approach
to social life, it becom.es necessary to address certain theoretical
problem.s; lTIost importantly, the problem of grounding.
Empathy and Verstehen
Dilthey sought to lay the foundations for the Geisteswissen-
schaften, the cultural (or human) sciences, foundations that would
be quite distinct from. those of the natural sciences. He saw his
project as ana19gous to the Kantian project of providing an episte-
m.ological foundation for the· natural sciences.
Dilthey contended that the categories appropriate to the Geistes-
wissenschaften had to be sufficient to the understanding of lUan
through the uncovering and recoverin-g of_his c.ons.ciousl.?-ess-a·s-
objectivated in his socio-cultural institutions. The entire social
life-world was the object dom.ain of these sciences. The m.om.ents
of m.eaning or intentionality as they unfold in hum.an interaction were
held to be the im.portant lTIOInents to capture and understand. The
11.
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object domain of the Geiteswissenschaften overlapped that of the
natural sciences only insofar as nature entered into social inter-
action, but then "natural" objects would be viewed from a different
standpoint, i. e., as socially meaningful. The categories of the
natural sciences, e. g., space, time, and basic quantificational
systems of measurement, were regarded as being unable to pierce;
describe, analyze, and understand that which was socially meaningful.
According to certain positivists, the object in the natural
s·ciences is constructed froIn the fullness of immediate experience
by abstracti,ng certain properties in such a way that it can be sub-
sum.ed as a particular under a general law. The logic of explanation
in the deductive-nom.ological nlodel was to provide a causal sequence
culm.i,nating in the object or event taken as iexplanandum. ~On D~~they.'.s
account explanation was the cognitive task of the natural sciences,
the practice of which generated such questions as IIwhy? 11 and
"how?" On the other hand the concern according to Dilthey in the
human sciences is with the object as experienced in the objectivating
proces s of the subject, i. e., with the object as experienced in the
dimension of the m.eaningfulness that it embodies. The constitution
of the object as meaningful in socia-life practi"ce requires of the
cultural sciences, Dilthey argued, a different cognitive task from
that of the natural sciences. This task was that of Verstehen
JJ! -
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(understanding). Verstehen atteInpts to answer the questions:
"What? II
"What is this item. of behavior?"
"What is this object? II
as realized within the social fram.ework of any given object(s) and/ or
actor(s). (Within the herm.eneutic tradition the applicability of this
conceptual -division between explanation and understanding has been
questioned. Those whose work we discuss later in the chapter will
be seen to i~plicitly contest Dilthey' s view. )
The question arises as to how Dilthey thought one was to
answer the questions posed by the task of understanding. How can
we answer the question "what is the object? II The initial position
adopted by Dilthey, the position for which he is m.ost falTIous, was
that the object was to be understood through a method of empathy. 6
The m.ethod was individualistic and introspectionist. The task was
to reexperience psychological states of one's past self or of a
historical or foreign person. Th~"ough"the use of em.pathetic Ver-
stehen, psychic states of others were held to be relivable. From
these experiences, it was further contended, the historical world
could be reconstructed~::" Dilthey argued that there was an ongoing
unity of life experiences so that a forIner experience of oneself
could be recalled. Even if we grant that there is some initial
plausibility in the notion that a person form.s such a unity, how can
I
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the idea of reliving the former experiences of another, an idea that
Dilthey also held, be made sense of? As Arato has written:
The concept of empathetic Verstehen contains the
antinomy of individual and history. To guarantee
the possibility of the Verstehen of others Dilthey
had· to seek ahistorical solutions (by the way of
postulates that could be interpreted either anthro-
pologically or in ternlS of a Lebensphilosophie). 8
Dilthey nlaintained that human nature is, fundamentally, always the
same. He posited certain common elementary components of m.ental
life. These comInon elements of lTIental life allowed the reconstruc-
tion of the 11 saIne rr experience to be a conceivable goal.
Several points should be noted at this-:juncture;->-First,
Dilthey l s stress on empathy has certain parallels with some of
Weber l s f~rmulations of Verstehen, e. g., his conception of direct
understanding. 9 The criticism we will make of Dilthey can also
be seen to apply to aspects. of Weber l s thought. Secondly, Dilthey's
conception of Verstehen corresponds to certain formulations of the
problematic by a number of Logical Empiricists. For Nagel and
Theodor Abel, the operation of Verstehen amounts to the attempt,
by a so·cial scientist, to "project him.self by sympathetic ilTIagination
into the phenomena he is attempting to understand. 11 10 However,
Dilthey and these authors· have clear differences; particularly-
over the status of any knowledge claitns made th:ro~gh- the operation
of Verstehen. Nagel rejects the notion that Verstehen is a method
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of verification, capable of generating a :mode of knowledge of social
phenomena. For hi:m it is, at best, a useful tool which can aid the
j~.
generation of hypotheses. Nagel t s rejection of a position akin to
that of the early Dilthey is based, a:mongst other things, on the view
that such a position entails an intractable problem of evidence.
Nagel points out that the i:mputation of intentions, attitudes,
and emotions by empathetic Verstehen assum.es a twofold hypothesis
;
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that cannot be demonstrated within the term.s set. It assumes (1)
psychological states; and (2) assumes definite relations of con-
comitance between certain states, as well as between such states
study to possess lTIay, in fact, be theirs. Likewise, even if our
imputations are correct, none of the actions which allegedly derive
from those states lTIay, in fact, be their cause, basis, or foundation.
As Nagel put it,
. • . neither of such assum.ptions is self-certifying,
and evidence is required for each of them. if. . .
they. . . are to be Illore than an exercise in uncontrolled
imagination. l~
None of the psychological states we im.agine the subjects of_a 'given
d · b h· 11an certaIn overt e aVlors .
().
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Language and Action in the Work of the Later Dilthey
Dilthey hinlself caIne to realize lTIany of the problenls with
his early work on Verstehen. In the first years of this century he
began to systelTIatically address lTIany of the problem.s raised by
an em.pathetic notion of Verstehen and turned against the psychologisln
inherent in it •.. Ho·wever, as we shall see, he failed, in the last
inst~nce, to overCOlTIe th~~~.l?syc~~logism. Nevertheless, despite
this ultilnate failure, he developed the concept and rn.ethod of Ver-
stehen several irn.portant stages toward a notion of Verstehen that
can be defended as a lTIethod productive of a rn.ode of knowledge of
social phenolnena and as a lTIethod of verification.
Dilthey began by arguing that to attern.pt to recapture a former
experience ~a.s not, as he previously claitned, dependent on having
the same experience, but rather depended on our capacity to recon-
struct the saIne intentional or sylTIbolic object. The ailTI of the
cultural scientist was not to relive the actual psychological states
of his object but to recapture the meaning of the agent's actions and
social objects. Since these objects, Dilthey held, had a public,
objective structure, they presented the possibility of objective
knowledge gained through understanding. To Inake good on this
possibility, the scientist had to gain access to and fanliliarity with
the language and social context of the object. The cultural scientist
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could only enhance his knowledge of social phenomena through under-
standing and the esta?lishment of intersubjectivity.
All social communication generally presupposes this type of
inter subjective understanding.
Hermeneutic understanding is only a methodically
developed formi~of the dim reflexivity or semi-
transparency with which the life of prescientifically
communicating and socially interacting men takes
place in any case. 13
The a priori of commu.nic~tioni implies that each individual must
interpret:his or her own feelings, needs, and intentions in accordance
with the available structures of linguistic intersubjectivity, i. e., the
public meanings available in a given social context. It is, furt~er-
more, t~r6ugh this very processeof interp~etationand communication
that the socio -life .world is created, sustained, and changed.
The later Dilthey's framework of the cultural sciences is estab-
lished in his theses on the community of life unities. Habermas has
usefully explicated this notion in terms of- t~o -levels:
1. the process ·of self-formation and ego identity and
2. a dialogic relation between subjects who reciprocally
recognize each other as intentional subjects sharing
meanings.
The community of life unities involves the synthesizes between two
hermeneutical dialectics, one of which is claimed to operate at each
level.
I~"'
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The individualls life is seen as a model of a hermeneutic circle .
. The individual I s experiences taken as an ever -increasing total give
meaning to life as a whole. It is the identity of the ego which synthe-
sizes the various experiences of life relations, i. e., relations between
the ego and objects .and people in the world, and provides the ongoing
unity for the individual IS history and Bildung. The identity of the ego
is both historical and dynamic. The interactions of life relations take
on a meaning within the context of the individualls history and experi-
ence. The present is always mediated by the past and future. It is
mediated by the past insofar as the significance of the present is
determined by needs, values, and norms developed in the individual IS
past. To the .extent that present experience is interpreted according
to future ant~cipations, it is also mediated by the future. However,
the meaning of ~ particular experience, a part of the individual's
life as a whole, is always open to revision not only on the basis of
the meaning of the whole, but also on the basis of new experience.
All past experiences and future anticipations insofar as they merge
with present experiences are subject to constant reflection and
revised interpretation in light of new experiences.
The life history of an individual, held together by
ego identity, is the pattern for the categorical rela-
tion of the whole to its parts. . . . The meaning that
hermeneutic understanding takes as its object, what
Dilthey emphatically calls significance, results
exclusively from the role of elements in a structure
Itn
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whose identity includes the continual decay of identity
just as much as the persistent overcoming of this
corru~tion. It must therefore be repeatedly recreated
through continually renewed, corrected, and cumula-
ti.vely eXf,anded retrospective interpretations of life
hlstory. 4 -
Theref9re, life cannot only be understood and viewed as a seemingly
endless series of events and experiences, synthesized and given
unity by the individual ego, but 'must a~sQ be understood as a series of
-seen:~ngly.constant life interpretations •
. It is 9-:.point of agreement between hermeneuticians and Witt-
gensteinians that the meanings that the individual gives to particular
experiences and to life as a whole are argued and held to be inter-
subjectively given. As we argued in the previous chapter, viz., the
a priori of communication, these meanings are not private, despite
the fact that they may often appear so. Individuals ~ interpretations
of life experiences are dependent on a framework and stock of inter-
subjective meanings and symbols. The semantic content of an
expression owes "as much to its place in a linguistic system valid
for other subjects as it does to its place in a biographical context.
Otherwise the latter could not even be expressed symbolically. 11 15
Life experience of life relations is constructed in communica tion:
The individual viewpoint that clings to personal life
experience corrects and expands itself in common
life experience. By this I understand the sentences
that form in any group of persons related to each
other that are common to them '.' Their -dis'tin-
guishing mark is that they are creations of the
common life. 16
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Language is a continously developing and expanding system of
meanings and symbols within a framework of "commonfl life which
is- both partially defined by and define s the linguistic system. The
concept of the "common1t has a specific sense for Dilthey, referring
to the "intersubjectively valid and binding quality of the same sym-
bol for a group of subjects who communicate with each other in the
17
same language. II
Thus life histories are constituted in the cumulative experiences
of individuals over time (the vertical, diachronic dimension), and in
the intersubjectivity of communication common to different subjects
(the horizontal, synchronic dimension). The I1community of life
unities" operates in multitudes of overlapping structured connections
in which the two dimensions merge. The Ifcommunity of life unities"
can also be characterized in terms of two hermeneutical dialectics.
The first is flvertical fl and takes the form of self-formation and self-
reflection on the part of the individual ego. The second is Ilhorizon-
tal" and takes the form of a dialogue between subjects who identify
with each other while simultaneously asserting their nonidentity
against each other. It is a dialogue between subjects who reciprocally
recognize each other as intentional subjects sharing meanings.
There is also the v~rtical dimension of society itself. The system
of meanings and symbolic interactions develops and renews
·U1
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interpretations through time. The "community of life unities" is
. postulated by Dilthey as the objective framework of the Gesites-
wis s ens chaften.
Within this framework, Dilthey attempted to confront the prob-
lem of the .relation of the universal and the particular, as it manifested
itself in th.e attempt to utilize the necessary generality of ordinary
language to capture th~ specificity of the individual experience. As
·Habermas wrote: hermeneutics must account for ordinary language's
ability to II ••• make communicable, no matter how indirectly,
what is ineffably individual. II fa
As hermeneutics takes all of the socio-life world as its object
domain, it. take·s ordinary language as its object language. But
ordinary language is itself one of hermeneutics' primary topics of
study. It is both topic and resource, for ordinary language functions
as its own m.etalanguage. "Formalized languages possess meta-
linguisitic ·rules of constitution with whose aid we can reconstruct
every statement that is possible in such a language; that is, we can
reproduce it ourselves. ,,19 However, ordinary language is a practi-
cal activity, a social accomplishment, which is deeply embedded in
the pragmatic' dimensions of everyday life and cannot be dirempted
f ·· 1 20rom ltS SOCla context.
We .cannot give a formal account of the structure of ordinary
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language, as we cannot provide an exhaustive set of metalinguistic
rules for ordinary language. We cannot understand ordinary language
by simple reference to purely intralinguistic symbolic meanings; its
embeddedness in social contexts ensures, Diltheyargued, that we
have to incorporate nonverbal acts and consequently nonverbal inter-
pretations. Ordinary language must be understood as a language
game combining linguistic and behavioral components and meanings.
Dilthey cla~sified three types of elementary forms: linguistic
expressions, actions, and experiential or emotive expressions or
gestures. None of these three forms, he contended, could adequately
grasp' the particular meaning of a speech act or action. The struc-
ture of ordinary language becomes comprehensible only when we take
account of the "integration of the three classes of life e?Cperiences
in everyday life conduct. II Each class of expression is colored by
the specific context of its p!oduction. In the framework of social
life-worlds each of the forms interacts with the others and aids
mutual understanding of the whole. Language an~ action together are
mutually illuminat~ng, they interpret each other reciprocally. Further-
more, both linguistic expressions and action can be better compre-
herided if account is taken of experiential expressions, e. g., gestures
which might help indicate anger, fear, etc II
A central dilemma of the methods of the cultural sciences has
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often been called the hermeneutic circle. But the circle, far from
being vicious, is, as Habermas put it, "fruitful. ,,21 Both the
explanans and the explanandum belong to the same linguistic system,
viz., ordinary language. Therefore, they have ~'."relationship-'of
parts to whole. :.'If this relationship were {purely linguistic·;. the
circle would be vicious; that is,
... if a concept were defined by first isolating dis-
criptions of possible extensions of the concept and
then picking out further instantiations of the concept
according to this definition, . . . there would be no
way to alter the theory or interpretation in light of
erp.pirical findings. The object to be understood
could only be grasped according to the already estab-
lished interpretation scheme. But because the
- objects of hermeneutics are also objects of experi-
ence, that is, they are experienced as (historical)
facts' as well as understood as meaningful objects,
the viciousness is avoided. As facts, the objects to
be understood are experienced within a social context
of normative structures. The facts must be under-
stood in relation to rule-governed practices based
on lTIutually reciprocal expectations. It is the expec-
tation of experience in conformity with social norms,
of practice which helps to create the meaning of the
interpreted object, which breaks the purely linguistlc
circle. 22
Thus in the cultural sciences, an initial interpretation is a
conjectured interpretation. It is a provisional attempt to uncover
a system of meaning. The "interpreter himself must learn to speak
the language that he interprets. ,,23 In the "open system of ordinary
language, ,,24 our provisionally selected interpretative scheme has
the status of a-·hypothesis that does reguire cor~obor.ation.·C~njectured
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interpretations can be tested and changed in light of further informa-
tion, and linguistic acts taken as experiences within a given fralTIe
of symb~lic interaction::: . ;A"~ .,experiences, linguistic actshave-
a significance beyond their role as carriers of lTIeaning within sys-
telTIs of grammatical structures. Since ordinary language is inter-
twined with practice, the meanings and experiences that the interpre-
tation attempts to capture can be seen as part of a ll s tream" of life-
contexts; tr. • • linguisitc analysis also reveals the empirical con-
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text of indirectly communicated life experiences. ,,25 Therefore, a
provisional interpretation of an action, object, or expression only
has meaning as part of a larger interpreted scheITle.
If there is a manifest discrepancy between the posited inter-
pretation and its object, it will be uncovered as a lIgap ll between
actions anticipated by the interpretation and the actual resultant
actions. The objects 1 meaning, as it becoITles progressively mani-
fested through interactions, will indicate the success or failure of
the initial' interpretation. An interpretation fails when there is a
disappointment of expectations, when the interpretation incorrectly
anticipates certain behaviors or actions.
J,II. _.
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Structures of Action and Knowledge
There is a further conse'quence that can be drawn from this
view of hermeneutics.
If the hermeneutic circle can be resolved by demon-
strating the singular integration of language and
practice and the corresponding intermingling of
linguistic analysis and experience, then it loses its
logical doubtfulness. At the same time, however,
it becomes an indication of hermeneutics' itnmedi-
ately practical relation to life. Hermeneutics is
rooted in "the thought-generative work of life"
insofar as the survival of societal individuals is
linked to the existence of a reliable intersubjectivity
of mutual understanding. ,,26
Within a given ongoing social context, a disappointment of expec-
tations takes the form of a disturbance of a certaip. mutuality, a
consensus or agreement about reciprocal expectations. Such a
consensus as to m.utual expectations is essential to social inter-
action per se and the integration of a society. As Dilthey wrote:
Understanding first arises in the interests of practical
life. Here people are dependent on intercourse with
one another. They must make themselves under-
standable to one another. Oneimusf know;.whatithe
other wants. Thus the elementary forms of under-
standing come into being. 27
The very possibility of creating and maintaining successful mutual
(inter)action between two or more individuals depends on a "bridge-
head" of shared expectations and linguistic skills, on the pos sibility
of understanding shared int.entions and meanings. W,ithout such a
"bridgehead" and understanding, the possibility of lack of coordination,
0."
~I
tension, or conflict is greatly enhanced. Thus knowledge of language
and action, "i .. e., communication structures, is directly tied to an
interest in successful social action, what Habermas has called man's
"practical interest." We will elaborate and discuss this conception
of the relationship between knowledge and the human species' claimed
practical interest in C'h~pters 9 .and ~14.··
Dilthey, however, was ambiguous on the status of hermeneutics I
practical relation to life. Rather than seeing it as laying down the
conditions for the "possib~lity of objective knowledge, he saw in it
dangers for the scientific ch~racter of hermeneutics. In a bid to
maintain an ideal of pure objectivity and description for science, he
falls back into objectivism and a conception of Verstehen which
retained traces of his early psychologism. 28
.For Dilthey there was a tension·:~·between "life" and" science. II
Given that the scientist-interpreter and the object (who is also a
subject) of his study are immersed in life contexts of meanings,
values', conventions, etc., the question arises as to how the cultural
sciences could objectively reconstruct the life and experience of the
object? On Dilthey l s account, incorder to be objective, knowledge
in the cultural sciences had to be free of particular meanings and
normative structures of the scientist-interpreter.. Reconstructed
knowledge had to have universal validity, it had to be true and valid
;i .'
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for every hermeneutician- -irrespective of context. But in order to
guarantee that all hermeneuticians could arrive at the same recon-
struction, Dilthey had to give an account of the possibility of this
reconstruction within the community of life unities.:1(lIn the end, he
did this by revitalizing his "earlier" empathetic concept of .Verstehen
and by adopting;·:'a; philo s op4ytof vitalism (Lebensphilosophie). On this
model, one can reconstruct subject states of another and recreate
the meaningfulness of another's experience, and do so\witl,iout the
distorting influences of one's own meaning structures, predispositions,
and values.
Dilthey argued that our particular, individual experiences are
part of the~:;whole of life and share in basic tlelements of human
nature." One can capture the particular in the univeral inherent in
languagelb~causeall particulars - -objectivations of life experiences --
are seen as components in a common, ever -present and continuous
II s tream of life. "
For the interpreter, what can be experienced is what
is the case. . . . For the reproductive experience of
one who transposes himself into the original [experi-
ence] promises participation in the one omnipresent
stream of life. 29
Only insofar as the objectivations of experiences are part of an all-
embracing objective spirit, can Dilthey claim a continuity of mean-
iI?-g and fp~lTI. which allows the reexperiencing of the original
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experience. Objectivity is guaranteed through the "interchangeability
of the cognitive subje·ct. ,,30
In a dis cus sion of what he calls the historistic -positivistic
tradition of hermeneutics (Schleiermacher, Dilthey), Gerard Radnitzky
argues that this approach (one that claims subject-neutral observa-
tion, etc.) develops. a IIMus~e Irnaginairel13l stance toward past
traditions and experiences. "Methodologically this tradition tries to
distance and disengage itself from its object, to assume a contem-
plative, neiltral pose, to regard its object as a dead, museum piece,
h ·· d t··· t· ,,32unc anglng an open 0 examlna 10n.
is:
The goal of such an approach
... a hermeneutic interpretation which progressively
objectifies the meaning through abstracting from deci-
sion about the credibility of assertions and about the
acceptability of norms and value-judgments. 33
The result "is ~n' objectivism which restricts the cultural sciences to
the explication of meaning structures, to a merely descriptive func-
tion. The methodological goal is to minimize the hermeneuticianJs
subjective bias and interference. To the extent that it is claimed
that this methodological goal can be achieved because the subject is
given'and static, the link between ··science" and "life, II theory and
practice, as well as between fact and value, is claimed to have been
broken. However, the claimed diremption of these phenomena hides
a certain fundamental continuity. For the descriptive function the
JilL.: .'
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cultural sciences adopt implies a tendency to reduce theory to practice,
i. e., to reduce what is admissible in the realm of theoretical dis-
course to that which is an explication of social practice. The task of
social science becomes one of understanding, through explication,
social practice. This understanding lapses into a descriptivism, for
within the terms of reference that have been set, we cannot escape
the frames of the actor's meanings.
Once it is claimed that there are simply cleavages between fact
and value, theory and practice, a critically reflexive understanding of
a given object of study is held to be anathema. The cultural sciences
are reduced to historicism and relativism; its categories become
those of the persons it studies. As we noted in our earlier discussion
of the work of Kuhn, if all theory demands is that interpretations of
the texts, persons, cultures, or traditions be purely descriptive and
nonevaluative, nothing can be said--within the terms set--about the
truth-content or possible deception (ideology) expressed by the object
of study. Only points of internal logical inconsistency and problema-
tic areas of interpretation can be discussed.
Dilthey also claims that the process of interpreting another
tradition has no necessary effects on the self-understanding and prac-
tice of the" interpreter. As reality, it is held, is unaffected by an
interpretation and the process of "interpretative intervention, If so
(1
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too the interpreter; the claim is, that all is left as it was found.
This position depends for its viability on the possibility of a context-
free, neutral observer. But such a notion contradicts the central
realization of contemporary hermeneutics; that
Historical thinkiri.gLm"ust ".reflect upon its own his-
toricity.... There is no neutral standpoint outside
of history Jupon which the cultural scientist could base
himself. 3
1
4
Interpretations call11ot escape the language, the preconceptions
embedded in it, the background life -contexts of their authors. The
question is: what is the relationship between the meaning structures
of the herme~euticianand that of his object/subect? The question is
of central importance to the hermeneutic sciences if a concept of
Verstehen is to be defended as a viable method. But before addressing
this issue directly, it can be noted that the language-interpretative
sociology of Peter Winch, which is based on a reading of the later
Wittgenstein, both exhibits many of the same characteristics of the
work of the later Dilthey and advances and develops the issues we
have been concerned with in the pages immediately" above. It is to
this work that we now turn.
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Winch: Explanation as Identification.
As the positivist program for the social sciences closed off an
analysis of intentionality, conventions, etc., hermeneutic conceptions
of social science generally deny the validity of any attempt to estab-
lish causal regularities in social analysis. Both conceptions of social
science close off the possibility of a critical science. Winch's work
reflects an explicit rejection of the viability of causal nomological
knowledge in social investigation and an implicit rejection of the pos-
sibility of a- critically reflexive understanding of social phenomena.
His work is extremely important as an exalnple and as an attempt to
map out--albeit in programmatic form--a concept of sociology which
is essentially hermeneutic. ~~::
.For Winch understanding and explanation in the social sciences
are only possible within the learned conceptual framework of any
given "form of life. ,,35 Winch's thesis follows, he argues, from
Wittgeh~tein!s~:asserhion~thattf~what has to be accepted, the given
36
is --so one could say--forms of life. If Understanding and explana-
tion proc;::eed and, .for.1the )best__.~par~-i stpp with the identification of the
mean~ng of social practices - -by subsumption under a rule.
~::There are many important questions raised by Winch which,
given the scope of this thesis, can obviously not be pursued. Where
possible I will try to indicate some of these questions and issues,
and relevant further references.
There is a certain "openness of rules" as decisions
(;,
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On Winch's account, rules are the logical basis of social prac-
37tice and meaningful action is "ipso facto rule governed. " Such
action is action in "which it makes sense to suppose that somebody
else could in principle describe the rule I am following. 1138 The
"test of whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is not
whether he can formulate it but whether it makes sense to distinguish
a right way and wrong way of doing things in connection with what he
39does. " The concept of following a rule entails "a peculiar kind of
interpersonal agree:ment. 11 40
But social action is not simply the utilization of preexisting
rules. Rather, these "rules arise in the course of conduct and are
only intelligible in relation to the conduct out of which they arise. "
Futhermore, "the nature of the conduct out of which they arise, "
Winch contends, "can only be grasped as the embodiment of these
· · 1 ,,41prlnClp es.
have to be frequently made as to Irwhat is to count" as "going on in
the sa:m~ way. 1142
Winch's conception of the nature of rule-governed action pro-
vides the foundation for his critique of a causal-nomological model for
the social sciences. He argues that social phenomena do not have the
same logical structure as the phenomena the natural sciences make
their own. In order to establish a regularity, 'VIe have to have some
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way of determining which experiences of events are to count "as
instances of the same thing. It In the community of natural scientists
this problematic is resolved by the establishment of rules of pro-~
cedure. The natural scientist faces only one set of rules - -those the
community of investigators have established. But "what the socio-
logist is studying, as well as his study of it, is a human activity and
is therefore carried on according to rules. 1143 In social life "criteria
of identity, II of what it means lito be doing the same thing, " are inter-
nal to social activity, contexts, and participants and are therefore
!'necessarily relative to some rule; with the corollary that two events
which count as qualitatively similar from the point of view of one rule
would count as different from the point of view of another. ,,44 Social
scientific regularities exist, in Winch's view, in the "mind of the
analyst. "
Given the "openness of rules, II prediction is also highly prob-
lematic. In par~icular situations which diverge from a ~:llles 1 :'.!.para-
digm case, " the livery nature of human decisions" implies not only
the possibility of alternatives "within a rule-governed situation," but
also the possibility--over time--of modifying the rules. In very
routine circumstances action can be predicted}5 otherwise, we can-
not predict because we cannot say what is going to happen before it
happens--let alone what it might mean. 46 From Winch1s point of
;.Cf'
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view, however, although we cannot
a~ predict social phenomena; nor
b.' develop causal nomological knowledge of social
phenomena, 47
this lTIO~t definitely does not imply that social phenolTIena are con-
demned. to unintelligibility.
For Winch the problems of a theory of explanation of human
action already manifest themselves at the lev.el of observation and
description. To identify or describe an action already entails a
process of interpreting the action as
- - -being of a certain type,
- ~ -having a particular purpose or poin~,
--.-and as situated within a frame of rules, standards, and
language,
- ~ -the products of. a form of life.
As Thomas McCarthy points out in his discussion of Verstehen,
The same movements could be variously described
as "lighting a fire, 'I "giving a signal," "lighting a
.ritual fire, " and so forth.... Now the Winchean
point can be put by suggesting that the proper identi-
fication of an action depends on knowing the stock of
action descriptions available in a given language
game, as well as the criteria for their application.
. -A-n interpretative understanding of the form of life
in which it is located is thus essentially involved in
the proper identification of an action, of relevant
stimuli and of possible motives. These are not
i~dependent, but rather interconnected operations. 48
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An interpretative understanding of an action depends on the success-
ful uncovering of tiers of meaning. In short, this involves descrip- ,
tions of (a) action(s); (b) possible reasons, motives (i. e., justifica-
tions) for actions; (c) the general set of beliefs and practices which
make such actions intelligible; and (d) the ultimate points which
following a system of rules have. These latter points ca"n be
uncovered by comprehending the "limiting notions, 11 which are at
the base of a society's "very conception of human life. ,,49 The
"ethical space" of a society, i. e., its conception of "good and evil,"
is, Winch argues, given in its attitudes toward "birth, death, and
sexual relations. 11 50 The very notion of a society's conception of
human life, Winch contends, is limited by its attitudes toward these
three "moral primitives." Not only are these "limiting concepts .
. . . necessarily ... an important feature of any human society, "
but they are also a basis for our understanding of a society.
In any attempt to understand the life of another
society ... an investigation of the forms taken by
such concepts--their role in the life of the society--
must always take a central place and provide a basis
on which understanding may be built. 51
Interpretative understanding, if successful, yields on Winch's account
an explanation of an action- -an explanation by identification. Explana-
tion takes the form here, as it did for Dilthey, of answers to the
52questions IIwhat?, II "what is the item of behavior?, 11 etc.
~'j
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This account of explanation could be argued to square with the
three desirable properties, Friedman suggests, that a theory of
explanation should have. 53 For exanlple, Winch's theory is
I.
2.
3.
sufficiently general to square with the variety of social-
life contexts (the "gener:al--cases tl for social science);
objective in that criteria of a sufficient explanation are
to be found on the side of the object/ subject--not on the
side of the "idiosyncratic tastes II of scientists;
demonstrably connected to understanding. We under-
stand an item of behavior when it has been subsumed
under a rule. Winch's work, however, does not deal
adequately with the processes of how we understand,
i. e., with method. (Dilthey IS later work [see pages
253-59] is more developed on this issue. )
()
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However, there are several problems with Winchls view, none the
least of which is his own interesting, but unsystematic, attempt to
trans cend it.
In the Idea of a Social Science, Winch essentially maintains that
the fundamental criteria for the identification of actions are internal
to the activity under investigation itself. The investigator should be
neutral with respect to varying standards of intelligibility. Science
cannot, Winch contends, define the norm for intelligibility in general.
"Reality has no-key. ,,54 Ideas, "keys," and criteria of rationality
are contextually bound to "forms of life." The categories of herme-
neutics will be as relatiye as the variety of tfforms of life" them-
selves. Let us call this Winch IS position one.
On the other hand Winch suggests that a more reflective
r
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understanding of a given society, than the society's own self-
understanding, is possible. But "if it is. to :cQunt. as --a"genuine under-
standing at all," he adds, it .must"presuppose lithe participants'
unreflective understanding. 11 55 The question immediately arises as
to what is the relationship between these levels of understanding, or
as Winch (or as the later Dilthey) might put it, between the language
of the social analyst and that of this object/ subject. Are there logi-
cal issues implied by a diff~rence in language games?
In his examination of Evans -Pritchard's investigations of Azande
magic, Winch addresses the problems posed in the questions above
as the "strain inherent in the situation of an anthropologist who wishes
to make these beliefs and practices' [o~th.e.Azarid$]inteli~gible to ~hi~­
self and his readers. 11 56 Here the anthropologist is faced with
language games which he realizes are "fun'damentally different in
kind such that what may be expressed in one has no possible counter-
part in the other. ,,57 Winch rejects the view, as McCarthy put it,
. . . that the anthropologist should simply take up and
apply the standards of intelligibility current in his own
society and J?ropo.ses~,~nstead" a~ sort of, dialectical~pro-
cess in which, by somehow bringirg lthe- supje"cts 't:~con­
ception of intelligible behaviour into relation with our
own, we create a new unity for the concept of
intelligibility. 58,59
But what this amounts to is as yet unc1arified in Winch's work. 60
(We will refer to this albeit undeveloped position as Winch's position
two. )
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Several objections can be made to Winch's work which are
directly continuous with our essential theses. First, it should be
noted that his conception of interpretative sociology is inextricably
intertwined with his conception of la~gl!a'ge';games and forms of life
as monadic unities. The problems with this conception of realms
of social thought and life parallel those of Kuhn IS Itparadigms. If As
Kuhn exaggerates the internal integration of paradigms and the
claimed dis crepancy between them, so Winch can be criticized for
exaggerating the internal unity of IIforms of life lf and their Ifdemara-
·tability. II Christianity, for example, cannot be conceived as a dis-
crete system of rules~grou~dedinaqis.crete form of life.·Rath~rl'
the history of Christianity is a history of dissention as well as con-
sensus, conflict as well as peace, contradiction as well as harmony.
At frequent moments in its history it has been torn by social
61
struggle. As MacIntyre and Jarvie have argued in debate with
Winch, cultures embody differences and contradictions. 62 What
constitutes accepted standards of reasonable behavior in any given
society is often the source of militant and violent conflict. Further-
more, these .differences of standards cannot simply be conceived as
Ifincommensurables ll of language games which people choose through
leaps of faith. Rather the process of choice can be often understood
as reasoned acceptances or rejections. Much oft-claimed deviance
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in societies can be accounted for as a result of reasoned judgments
between differing modes of life out of which people have been able to
draw criteria for comparison and judgment. 63 It can also be argued
that certain actual historical transitions becotne unintelligible if one
fails to take account of both the alternative systems' of ideas etc.
with which people have been confronted, and the process whereby they
drew from these alte:natives critieria of judgment.i64
The analogy of social units to (language) gatnes is perhaps tnis-
leading. The constitutive rules of chess are rules which long tradi-
tions of dialogue have established with a relatively high degree of
consensus. As we will argue in a tnoment, the traditions that shape
societies are perhaps not best conceived a's' dialogues at all. If COtn-
gatnes analogous to chess. '·'Winch does not allow, II as Alasdair
MacIntyre has written, "for the variety of relationships in which an
agent may stand to a rule to which his behaviour conforms. 1. 65
tlpartners 1' in the 1fgatne ll are often not IIpartnersll at all. The
relationship might be one of constraint and control. (We will further
explore and develop this theme throughout the remainder of this
chapter. )
Winch1s claim that language games are 11incomtnensurables ll
also parallels Kuhn's views of IIparadigtns. II As Kuhn is at best
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ambiguous between radical relativism and a more viable epistemology,
so too is Winch. On Winch's position one interpretative sociology is
a linguistic version of Dilthey's historicism and relativism; each
society must be understood from within its own rules, its own stan''':
dards, logic, and consistency. On this account all criteria of
rationality and truth, for theory and practice, are held to be relative.
To the extent that Winch holds this view, the criticisms we made of
Kuhn's radical relativism can be here applied and need not be
repeated. 66
However, Winch's position two embodies a conception of
intelligibility w4ich cannot be understood in the terms immediately
above. Here the very process of mediating forms of life is claimed
to advance .~ understanding and found a new staJ1dard of intelligibility.
The position appe.ars potentially promising as an approach to over-
come the notion of forms of life as incommensurable, monadic unities,
and the problems of relativism. Unfortunately, how we might better
cOlTIprehend this position, as previously noted, finds few clues in
Winch's work.
To the extent that Winch holds to position one above the same
criticisms that were made of the later Dilthey can be made here.
Past and existing practices are alone considered authentic. Theory
is merged into practice as the role of theory becomes equated with
Likewise, there are many aspects of
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the explication of practice and as the processes of constitution are
merged with those of justification. The categories and concepts of
theory·are claimed to be directly reflexive and continuous with those
of the social practice under investigation. Not only is authenticity
granted tq these frames of meaning, but also--as with Kup.n--
authority. Dilthey'sandiWinch's research programs uncritically
accept th~ underlying consensus of "fonns of life." In fact, their
acceptande is dogmatic. For they close off the possibility of a
critically reflexive understanding of traditions and a priori exclude
the possibility of systematic distortion, i. e., ideology and false-
consciouJness, in a tradition's self-understanding. As such, social
. . I
actions tHat reflect power and constraint cannot be conceptualized by
I
I
Winch. It seems quite clear that the concept of ideology might find
apPlicatioL "in a society where the concept is not available to the
b f h - ,,67mem ers 0 t e soclety.
one's own individual behavior which are often not understood. It
seems cllar that a concept of, for example, neurosis might find
apPlicatiol irrespective of whether the concept is available to
- d-" -d "IIln lVl ua s. .
As le argued that Kuhn fails to make the distinction between
those staJdards or criteria which are internal to paradigms and those
by which we may judge it, so too Winch unjustifiably conflates the
0·
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problems of hermeneutic understanding with the problems of assessing
h '" 1 led'" f '"d 68t e ratlona va 1 lty 0 1 eas. The problematics are quite separate.
I
I
J'
We can accept the internal authenticity of a "form of life, 11 tradition,
without necessarily accepting it as rational or true. However, how
we rationally justify or ground the rationality of "criteria of rational-
ity" is as yet ,an open question. It is in Parts 3 and 4 of this thesis,
in the work of the critical tradition and Habermas, that we will examine
a major attetnpt to ground a view of the rationality of criteria and
develop a concept of ideology that implies "that criteria beyond
those available II in a given "society may be invoked to judge its
'" 1- ,,69ratlona lty.
In defense of Winch it can, of course, be said that to the
extent he maintains position two above, he explicitly recognizes some
of the probletns we have raised. 70 ~A,'~,more. refle.ctivec:under-.'
standing- of a given social unit is possible, Winch said, so long as
the participants' lIunreflective" self-understanding is pre~upposed.
Here Winch seems to be suggesting that tnediating language games
require translatability of terms, concepts, etc., but not necessarily
the immediate understanding and accord of the subject/ object of inves-
tigation with the terms, concepts, etc., of the social investigators.
However, besides some brief remarks (e. g., that a psychoanalyst
may explain an item of neurotic behavior in terms unknown and
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unintelligible "to the analysand- -so long as they are translatable), 71
the relationship between the language of the investigator and that of
his object/subject remains ambiguous and problematic in Winch's
. work. This position is in need of substantial development.
In a longer and more extended discussion of Winch's work it
would be important to addres s the adequacy of his definition of
meaningful behavior and his denial of the validity of the task of
developing causal generalizations in the social sciences. Neither of
these issues will be dealt with here directly. They have been use-
72fully discussed at some length elsewhere. Nevertheless, I do
intend to return to a consideration of these issues in Part 4, where
Habermas' notion of rriean~rigftil:-b~hav~or and':hisc.col:'lceptionf,o"f··the
respective rules of a causal-nomological and hermeneutic social
science will be discussed.
Schutz' Postulate of Adequacy
Although Schutz' formulation of understanding and explanation
in the social sciences does admit of the possibility of causal analysis
(with reference to an actor's "system of motives for action"), it can
be usefully noted that his phenomenological conception of social
analysis is open to many of the same criticisms that we made of
Dilthey and Winch. I shall briefly m.ention a few of the most im.por-
tant points of parallel.
Ii
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For example, where Winch talked of "forms of life" and
language games, Schutz talks of 1fmultiple realities, 11 "subuniverses
of reality, " and "finite provinces of meaning. ,,73 Schutz develops
a phenomenological ver sion of Winch I s linguistic relativism. 74 On
All facts are from the outset facts selected from~_a
universal context by the activities of our mind. They
are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts
looked at as detached from their context by artificial
abstraction, or facts considered in their specific
setting. In either case they carry along their inter-
pretational inner and outer horizon. This does not
mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable
to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that·
··we grasp certain aspects of it, namely those that are
relevant to us either for carrying on our· business of .
living or from the point of view of a body of accepted
rules of procedure called the method of science. 76
I
I
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Schutz r account there are " s trictly speaking
facts, pure and simple. ,,75
no such things as
; ·f)
i
! "
Scientific method is but one of multiple paths to construct knowledge
of the social world.
As the social world was not structureless for Winch, neither
is it for Schutz. The social scientists I observational field "has
particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings.:
livi~g, th"inking, and acting therein. ,,77 But whereas the structures
of "llforms of llfe rt are given in Jlsystems of rules, rt the structure
of rtmultiple realities, II Schutz argues, are to be located in the
Lebenswelt and in the actor's "typifying practices. If The Lebenswelt,
,0
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people's "lived-in-world,11 is the world of intersubjectivity, com-
munication, language, everyday practices, and commonsense know-
78ledge. The Lebenswelt is the foundation of society, the basis of
all meaning. It is the framework of resources (i. e., procedural
methods, rules), and topics (i. e., categorizing practics, significa-
tions, and interpretative schema). As the "founding experience" of
our world, it is held to be presupposed in all human interaction and
. · 79SClence.
The world. . . is from the outset experienced in
the pre-scientific thinking of everyday life....
The unique objects and events given to us in a unique
aspect are unique within a horizon of typical famili-
arity and pre -acquaintanceship. 80
This horizon o~ !amiliarity and pre-acquaintanceship is .acquired
through our very being in the Lebenswelt. "We are, so to speak,
b - - 1- - d d · ,,81orn lnto lt, we lve ln an en ure It.
But, whereas Winch's conception of social structure was con-
textually bound to community and society, Schutz' position, despite
this conception of the Lebenswelt, embodies a tension between the
constituting role of the individual and that of the collectivity. In
fact, in certain passages, Schutz' position appears radically indi-
vidualistic. In the second chapter of The Phenomenology of the
World, Schutz contends that the origin of meaning is ultimately to
be located in the Ego's reflections on "the stream of consciousness. "
JLU .'
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"Here and only here," he states, Ilin the deepest stratum of experi-
ence that is accessible_ to reflection, is to be found the ultimate
source of the phenomena of meaning and understanding. 1 What'is
prima:rily::,given to consciousness is, 11 as George Walsh put it,
. . . an unbroken stream of lived experiences (Erleb---
:hisset~ --heterogeneous qualities without boundaries
or 'contours which wax, wane, and pass gradually
into one another. The contents of this stream of
consciousness have no meaning in themselves. · · ·
All such lived experiences ... at the time they
are actually lived through. . . are not given to us
as seJ;arate and distinct entities. However, · · ·
once La:n experience] has been caught in the "cone
of light" [acts of identification and reflection] ema-
nating from the Ego, .' . . [the experience] is "lifted
out" of the stream of duration and becomes clear and
distinct, a discrete entity. It is at this moment and
by virtue of the Act of turning-toward (.Zuwendung)
that the experience acquires meaning (Sinn). 82
In reflecting on our experiences, ---meaning ImaY'~be:~s cr-ibed either
· I . · If' . 83 I ·thretrospectlve y, or prospectlve y,': on utur-e 'events., .il n:el er
Q ')-
case.ltheEgo·gi·yes,!s:ubjective e~~p~r~~ences jrheaning.·wh~ch~·may be
drawri'-bothfrbm·lt4elindiv.idual's lcte'ative~,irriaginary'effort s r'and
]~ I,"C .,S9-4~tzhol¢l,. then, that social reality
. . . has a specific meaning and relevance structure
for the human beings living, acting, and thinking
within it. By a series of commonsense constructs
they have preselected and preinterpreted this world
which they experience as the reality of their daily
lives. 84
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In order to grasp this social reality, Schutz contends, the "thought-
objects lf of social scientists have to be "founded upon the thought
objects constructed by the commonsense thinking of men, living their
d -1 1- .,-,85 Th S hal y Ives .. ~, .. . us, c utz states,
... the constructs of the social sciences are, so to
speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, con-
structs of the constructs made by the actors on the .
social scene. 86
Although in Schutz' view there are a number of different tasks
for the social sciences, 87 there is one essential theme for all
sciences; that is, . "to constitute an objective meaning-context either
out of subjective meaning -contexts generally or out of some particu-
lar meaning-context. ,,88 The question arises, as Schutz himself
recognized: "How is it possible to form objective concepts and an
objectively viable theory of subjective meaning-structures?"
An answer is held to be forthcoming from the basic insight that
the concepts formed by the social scientist are "constructs of con-
structs," constructs of the Ifsecond degree. II
The scientific constructs formed on the second level,
in accordance with the procedural rules valid for all
empirical sciences, are objective ideal typical con~ .
structs and, as such, of a different kind from those
developed on the first level of commonsense thinking
which they have to supersede. They are theoretical
systems embodying general hypotheses. 89
For our purposes, it is unimportant here to enter into the intricacies
of Schutz' conception of method in the social sciences. 90 However,
III
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a number of features of this method and the relationship conceived
between the social scientist and social world can be usefully noted.
First, as Dilthey maintained the possibility of a neutral
observer, so it appears that Schutz contends that the social scien-
tist can be "detached ll from the social world. The social scientist
"is not involved in the observed situation, which is to him not of
· I b 1 ... ,,91practlca ut mere y cognltlve lnterest. For Schutz the logic
o
of everyday life is seen to be predicated on practicality. Everyday
life eInbodies norms of rationality sufficient to practical accomplish-
ments. The scientist, however, IIby making up his mind to become
I
a scientist has replaced his personal biographical stiuation by
a scientific situation. ,,92·
The scientific problem, once established, alone deter-
. mines what is relevant for the scientist as well as the
conceptual frame of reference to be used by him. 93
We have already criticized Dilthey for holding a position that entailed
a simple objectivism. But the critique we made of Dilthey cannot be
simply transferred to Schutz t views. Schutz t position does not entail
a crude objectivism. His discussion of the Lebenswelt, the pre-
suppositions of science, and nature of social scientific types?4 has
served to stress some of the complex mediations between the social
analyst and the social world. Schutz certainly appreciated that know-
ledge claims of social investigators have no simple correspondence:
II:.
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to reality. However, Schutz does not speak to the complicated ques-
tion~ raised by Winch's position two, i. e., to the problematic of the
relationship between the language of the social analyst and that of his
. subject/ object. Schutz also fails to speak systematically to the rela-
tionship between the interpreter and his subject/ object and the possible
effects on both of an in~erpretativednterventiori'.9S·iILappears that with
Schutz, as well as with Dilthey and Winch (position one), all is left
the same.
The social. scientist proceeds, on Schutz' account, by observing
ffcertain fac.ts. and events within social reality which refer to human
action. II The scientist then "constructs typical behaviour or course-
of -action patte~ns from what he has observed. 1196 Each step in the
·construct·ion· of ty'pes can be "verified by empirical observation, pro-·
vided that we(:do not restrict this term to sens ory perceptions of
object~ and',events ... but include the experiential form, by which
·comm·onsense thinking in everyday life understands human actions
and their outcome iIi terms of their underlying motives and goals. 1197
The types the social scientist constructs are, in Schutz' view, any-
thing but arbit.rary. In fact, they are subject to two postulates, the
postulate of logical consistency and the postulate of adequacy. 98 N. B.
Compliance with the former postulate warrants "the objective validity
of the thought-objects constructed by the social scientist." In other
rll:
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w~rds, the ·scientist's types have to be logically coherent and pre-
cisely formulated. They have, for example, to describe the ambigui-
ties of practical activity,cl~arlY. Compliance with thepostu.;. ~ -
late of adequacy "warrants their compatibility with the constructs of
everyday life. 11
The latter means that each term in such a scientific
model of human action must be constructed in such
a way that a human act performed within the real
world by an individual actor as indicated by the
typical construct would be understandable to the
actor himself as well as to his fellow-men in terms
of commonsense interpretation of everyday life. 99
There is a crucial ambiguity here which parallels an ambi-
guity in Winch IS work. Does Schutz mean, as he has stat~d, that
"a theory which aims at explaining social reality has to agree with
the commonsense experiences of the social world? ,,100 If what he
means, as Dorothy Emmet and Alasdair MacIntyre have pointed out,
entails
... that the commonsense view of the social world
must be immune from correction and modification
by the discoveries of social science then what he
asserts is not only false but deprives the social
sciencef? of part of their genuine importance. Our
commonsense beliefs about society are not only often
false, but are also sometimes incorrigible at the
level of commonsense. 101
If the social scientist is restricted in his terms to those of the
commonsense interpretation of everyday life, then, all we have said
of Dilthey's and Winchts collapse of theory into practice, their
~.IJ:
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descriptivism. and relativism, etc., applies here and need not be
· d 102relterate . On the other hand, if Schutz m.eans that "typical
o
i
'0
constructs 11 should be understandable to actors in everyday life and
by understandable he means translatable, then all that we said, viz.
Winch's position two, can be here applied. The relationship between
the technical concepts of the sociologist and those of ordinary people
i~ not discussed but needs to be systematically addressed. For
example, the use of such .concepts like ideology' and neurosis needs
to be squared with the role of hermeneutic understanding. 103 On all
these issues, it is clear th~t Schutz' own work begs a num.ber of
fundam.ental questions and is clearly inadequate. To the extent that
.. he st:t;esses the im.portance of the translatability of the sociologists'
"language, then, it appears he is attem.pting to avoid many of the
problems that arise if the sociologists' theory is required to agree
with the commonsense experiences of the social world. However,
his attempt to avoid these problems is at best suggestive - -it is
clearly not systetnatic.
Garfinkel: Explanation as Explication
In the work of Garfinkel we find both some of the most interes-
ting applications 'of the insights of the hermeneutic tradition to social
science and some of its most self-evident litnitations. The account
of Garfinkel's work that follows is, of course, by no means exhaustive
,llH
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either of his contributions to sociology or ethnomethodology.· Nor is
it intended to be a systematic discourse on ethnomethodology, which
to use its own jargon, is a multiplicity of topic and method. 104
Rather, I intend to show how within Garfinkel's original program
and in what seems to be his present self':'understanding of his work,105
there is a strong tendency to reach a reductio ad absurdum in the
conflation of theory to practice.
At the heart of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological program for
sociology is a conceptualization of social action as constructed,
"organic self-mobilization_" The social act is understood as "the
locus where intentions come to behavioural expression, as the
fulcrum of creative self-governance where the elementary freedom
f h h b - - <--1- d ,,,106o t e uman su Ject 1S rea 1ze : Structurally differing orga-
nized practical activities· of everyday life are viewed as "contingent
107
accomplishments of socially organized common practices. It
A central tenet in the ethnomethodological account of social science
is to refuse what Garfinkel takes as
the prevailing proposal that efficiency, efficacy,
effectiveness, intelligibility, consistency, planful-
ness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of
activities - -i. e., that rational properties of practical
activities - -be assessed, recognized, categorized,
described by using a rule or standard obtained out-
side actual ~ettings within which such properties are
recognized, used, produced, ~nd talked about by
settings members. _ .. Structurally d~fering
organized practical activities of everyday life are
! .
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to be sought out and examined for the production,
origins, recognition, and representations of rational
practices. All "logical" and "methodological"
properties of action, every feature of an activity's
sense, facticity, objectivity, accountability, com-
munality is to be treated as a contingent accomplish-
ment of socially organized common practices. 108
Garfinkel, drawing on the work of the philosopher Bar -Hillel, on
the indexical properties (i. e., contextual dependencies) of utter-
ances
109 has noted, as Jeff Coulter put it, that
. . . actor's accounts, as sequences of utterances,
are reflexively and essentially tied into, or bound up
witll, the socially organized occasions of their pro-
duction. This context-specificity prohibits -generali-
zations tobther utterances with respect to sense (or
"meaning") since recognizable sense is not discernible
independently of the situated social circumstances
,wherein talking is done and transactions are located. II 0
In ethnomethodology, as Coulter goes on to argue, there is no cate-
gory of '~context-in-general."
Attempts to "remedylf the indexicality of actor's
. expressions, by substituting paraphrases or filling
out the minutiae, do not succeed in severing the
dependence of utterances on their contexts of pro-
duction. Rather than attempt to remedy the essential
indexicality of the talk of members of a society, the
alternative programme is posited in demonstrating
the ways in which parties to practical, social arrange-
ments make evident to themselves and others the
rationality of their indexical talk and indexical activities.
Thus the Jlmethods of concerted actions and methods
of common understanding lll become, If for the ethno-
methodologists, "the professional sociologist's para-
mount phenomenon. ,,112 -
On Garfinkel's account, ethnomethodology's claimed topics are
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other social sciences resources. The crucial concern of ethno-
~eth6¢lology is to.explicate and demonstrate the accountability and
inde~icality of ever.yday practices, whereby actors employ'resources,
variously formulated and reflected, for various topics of practical
interest. ~hese t~rms should be understood as following:
'f:
1.
2.
accountability- -
inde~icality - -
the capacity of qmembers P . ,to
account for their actions in terms
of culturally appropriate conven_~ .
tions, the informal logic of every-
day life.
the contextual variability of the
lTIeaning of utterances. Meaning
is held to be tied to the practical
purposes of "hearer" and "speaker."
Garfinkel often also equates indexi-
cality with the "universal contextual
dependence·
'
of utterances.
3.· resources-- the methods of practical reas oning
and stock of commonsense knowledge.
Resources are argued to be
a. variously formulated, i. e., elaborated and specified in
light of an utterance which is produced in situ;
b.
c.
variously reflected, i. e., characterized in light of past
occuren'ces and future expectations;
· lIdf·· 113varIOUS y emp oye or varIous tOpICS.
0.
if)
Every kind of member· s practices "from divination to theoretical
. 114physics, II becqme topics for ethnomethodology,
. . the sociological analysis of operative structure,
rather than the taken-for -granted backcloth of members I
procedures that produce the social structures as end-
products studied in formal orthodoxy [i. e., contem-
porary sociological practice.] 115
J.II
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The ethnomethodological progralTI, on Garfinkel's account, is
not an attempt to reconstruct sociology. In one of his most well-
kp.own- claims, Garfinkel contends that his research program is
indifferent to orthodox sociological claims to be scientific. However,
a knowledge of the "richness" of social contexts and the claimed
"sovereignty" of actors in the characterizations of their actions, is
sometimes held to lend weight and to be ~ompatiblewith certain
philosophical arguments that lead to a total rejection of a' program
f 1 l · 1 · l· 116o a causa, nomo oglca SOCla SClence.
The products of ethnomethodological inquiries are held to be
the description of methods "whereby members accomplish the inter-
pretations they do accomplish. "
T~pe transcriptions are utilized in rendering the data
upon which analyses are effected, thus allowing a-
limited replication so that the reader !night check
off the way in which the investigator listened and
analyzed the content of his data. 11 7
Ethnomethodology accounts for members' accounts by explication.
Social action is explained in terms of its construction. If we can
u~derstand actors' methods, we can give an account of how members
accomp~ish the social practices they do accomplish. Garfinkel is
not concerned to answer the questions --lIwhat? ,." "what;-is the- item-
of behavior?'1 Rather he is concerned to address the questions --
"how·? ," "how is social 'action accomplished?" He is concerned with
rU 11:
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explicating the structural properties of actions, i. e., the operative
.conditions that lTIake social practices possible accomplishments.
Explanation, on Garfinkel's account, is inextricably tied to
explication.
There are several tensions in Garfinkel's work which can
usefully be pointed out. First, it may be noted that, ·in Garfinkel's
view, ethnomethodology is itself an ongoing accomplishment of
organized ("artful") practices. The question arises as to what status
Garfinkel gives the knowledge claims of ethnomethodological inter-
pretation. Garfinkel IS views on this issue are am.biguous. There
is a tension in his work between a tacit adherence to a naturalism.
and a position that has a "family resemblance" to the relativism of
Dilthey, Winch (position one), and Schutz. On the one hand the
"discoverables" of ethnomethodology are held to be naturally occuring
properties, perhaps universally present, and "uncoverable" by the
s'ocial analyst qua objective, theory-free, observer. On the other
hand the properties revealed by ethnomethodologists are contended
to be indexical parti.culars, which ar-e "held to be objective only within
the "boundaries" of ethnom.ethodologyr--itself to be <understood as sub-
suming a particular mode of rationality, standards, and methods.
This conception of ethnomethodological practice appears to approxi-
m.ate Winch's conception of a tlform of life" or Schutz' conception of
••fl
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a 1ffinite province of meaning." There is an oscillation in Garfinkel's
work between positivist and relativist claims. Neither position (let
alone their respective problems) is addressed systematically. 118
The problems in Garfinkel's work can be illustrated by the
following line of argument. ~:< Obviously, Garfinkel recognizes that
ethnomethodological practices of constructive analysis do not and
cannot reproduce members' lived and embodied activities. The
result of such investigations, he suggests, transcend the natural
attitude to reveal it, but as reasoned discourses, are themselves
to be seen as practical activities that embody their own rationality,
standards, and particular methods. Therefore, the resources of
ethnomethodology can themselves become a topic. Ethnomethodology
can study itself and thereby reveal and explicate its own resources.
What would such a study tell us ?
~:<Garfinkel has published relatively little of his work. As a
consequence certain ambiguities in his texts have rarely been
clarified or followed up by later works. In a seminar series at
Boston ·University. ~'Summer School (Boston, Mass., 1975), I asked
him about the ambiguities pointed to above, and whether or not he
thought these might have encouraged certain of the splits in the
ethnomethodological "camp" (see note 104). Based on hjs ,answers',
I think it is fair to ascribe the views below as views he has taken
seriously and upheld. However, it must, of course, be noted that
these views have not been addressed directly in publications and
must, therefore, be given a tentative status. They might well not
be views he would systematically defend.
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In Garfinkel·s view it would not only reveal interesting accounts
of resources per se but would also uncover the basis of objectivity
per see In other words, an ethnomethodological study of ethno-
methodology is claimed to uncover the methods of what constitutes
scientific practice, i. e., practice communsurate with the production
of objective knowledge. What is the ~status of these claims?
On the one hand Garfinkel does indeed seem to be claiming that
ethnomethodology is but another ttform of life·· or "flnite province
of meaning. tt On this account the standards, criteria of rationality,
criteria of objectivity, etc., of ethnomethodology are relative to its
modus operandi and practical interests. If this is the position he is
upholding then all that was said of Dilthey·s, Winch1s, and Schutz l
relat~vism can be here repeated. But clearly this position is in
tension with certain of the above passages. Garfinkel also seems to
be making 'the_~absurd·. claim that the truth content :6£ social science
can be accounted for and justified by explicating the existing practice
of a claimed form of social science.
It is important to note the compatibility of this claim with
Garfinkel IS acc ount of the role of theory. If the central task of theory
is to transcend the ttnatural attitude lt by revealing it, i. e. ,_ by explica-
ting it, then, theory is given no foundation for reflection independent
of past and existing practices, which alone are considered legitimate,
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authoritative, and justified. Theory lapses once more into a des-
criptivism and also, in Garfinkelrs work, into a vicious circle. For
in attempting to evaluate and assess the validity of ethnomethodology,
he takes this very program for granted. This position is the reductio
ad absurdum in the conflation of theory to practice. The moments of
constitution and verification are wholly conflated. The problems of
interpretation and assessing the rational validity of ideas are once
more conflated--and once more unjustifiably conflated. As we have
argued throught the whole of Part 2 of this thesis, if theory is collapsed
into practice, nothing can be said about the truth content or possible
deception (ideology) expressed by the object of study. 119
The relationship of a social analyst to a fellow social analyst,
or between soci~l analysts and their subject/object, is also prob-
lematic in Garfinkel rs work. The central notion of indexicality is not
given sufficiently precise meaning. Frequently the term is used to
imply that the meaning of meanings is tied to the social situation of
their production. Utterances, it is often claimed, have universal
contextual dependence. There is ~ danger of a logical regression
involved in this conceptualization of indexical expressions. For if
the study of :social facts equals the study of indexical expressions
and- if (as is held) all expres sions are indexical, then, whatever one
says of social facts will itself be indexical, i. e., anything one says
fJ.lt ..
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about indexicality will itself be indexical. 120 The regression can
easily be seen to imply a tacit threat to the basis of intersubjectivity.
If all meanings can be understood only in the context of their pro-
duction, then, the whole notion of the a priori of communication,
public meanings, etc., becomes problematic. In aldiscussion of
indexicality we assume an intersubjectively shared language. The
discussion of language and meaning cannot be wholly centered, as
it tends to be in Garfinkel1s work, on indexicality. The whole concept
is in need of clarification and the relationship between indexicality
and ordinary language greatly specified. Without such a clarifi-
cation and specification, the success of Garfinkel1s formulation
of the relationship between meaning and context, context and language,
language and actors, will be in doubt.
HermeneuticsTanq..tthe .I4~a~ization of Meaning:
The Gadamer -Habermas Debate
It should be noted that none of our remarks above were intended
to suggest that the ethnomethodologicalprogram is unimportant or
without a multiplicity of insights. (The same should be said, of
course, about the programs of Winch and Schutz.) Rather the
remarks made have been intended to show how the self-understanding
of Garfinkel' s ethnomethodolog~cal social science reproduces many
of the problems we have raised throughout the whole of our discussion
of hermeneutics.
III _
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In our discussion of Winch, Schutz, and Garfinkel, it was my
hope to show how a social science based essentially on the hermeneu-
tical tradition tends to collapse theory into practice, lapse into
various forms of descriptivism and relativism, and loses the ability
t9 recognize and assess the nature of ideological distortion and the
truth content of traditions. The schools we have discussed have also
failed to deal adequately with the relationship between the language
of the social investigator and that of his or her subject/ object of
inquiry, and with the effects an interpretation might have on the self-
understanding of both the interpreter and his or her subject/ object.
The nature of these complex problematics and their discussion
can be decisively advanced by a consideration of the work of Hans-
Georg Gadamer and Habermas t response to it. But it should at the
outset be appreciated that many of the issues we have raised do not·
find resolution in the works we have yet to consider. However, our
investigations, as previously suggested, might serve to rule out
certain approaches to the questions raised and perhaps even certain
approaches to the generation of questions themselves.
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The debate between Gadamer and Habermas is far too involved
to be discussed fully in the context of this thesis. lZl Instead, I will
attetn:pt to draw from the Gadamer /Habermas exchange that which
most directly speaks to the themes we have developed thus far.
Gadamer, it can be aruged, can be seen to begin his work from
an implicit c:r;itique ·of W~ttgensteiri's '(and Winch's) ahistorical account
of language. For Gadamer, as McCarthy has pointed out,
. . . language and tradition are inextricably inter-
twined. Tradition is the medium in which language
continues and develops. From this perspective the
process of socialization into a language community,
which provides Wittgenstein and Winch with their
point of orientation, is regarded as a component of
an ongoing process in which a tradition is preserved
and ,developed. 122
o
As Winch of p'osition two raises the problem of understanding two
diffe-rent language games, the problem appears, as many of Winch's
critics have iioi~ted,bu-t,lZ,3much like oneJoftranslation.,Gadamer
begins ~is work fro~ this very view of the problem and takes as his
starting point "the situation in which the interpreter and his subject
have already mastered their respective languages. 1I 1Z4
The understanding of a language is itself not yet
really Verstehen, but an accomplishment of life
(Lebensvollzug). For one understands ·a language
in that one lives in it. . . the hermeneutic problem
is therefore not a problem of the correct ITlastery
of a.ianguage.... Such mastery ... is [rather]
a precondition for understanding in dialogue. 125
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For Gadamer the problematic of Verstehen is that of achieving
understanding between persons who already have a grasp of their
respective languages. The "paradigm" for the operation of Ver-
stehen is the attempt at "mutual understanding in dialogue. "
.Verstehen, on Gadamer's account, is inextricably tied to the
process of interpretation,
. . . with a linguistic articulation of the meaning
grasped. . . the logic of Verstehen is the analysis
of the nature of the interpretative proces s, that is,
of the articulation in the interpreter's language of
meanings constituted in another universeoi".discourse. 126
According to Gadamer the process of interpretation has both a hypo-
thetical and circ~lar dimension. The hermeneutician or social inves-
.tigator mak.es an initial interpretation, from his or her framework
of perspectives, of the meaning lias a whole" of, e. g., a text or
social institution. With further reflection, research,t:.and; :ingression
of the material under study, the conjectured interpretation can be
revised and developed. 127 The process is continuously one of under-
standing the parts in terms of a conjectured sense of the whole, and
altering the latter in light of better knowledge of the former.
This l,1ypothetico-circular process of understanding
the parts in terms of a projected sense of the whole,
and revising the latter in the light of a closer inves-
tigation of the parts, has as its goal the achieving of
a unity of sense, that is, an interpretation of the
whole in which our detailed knowled~e of the parts
can be integrated without violence. 1 8
(J-
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Interpretations, Gadamer contends, can be tested in dialogue. The
purpose of the dialogue is to recapture the meaning held by the object
or experience for the subject, to reconstruct "it within the given
tradition taken as a whole. The scientist ventures an interpretation
of the meaning of the object and the interpretation is tested in light
of the response of his dialogic partner. This process is continued
until an agreement, however tentative, is attained..
Furthermore, Gadamer ~rgues, it is through such a dialogic
interaction that the interpreter can become aware of the influence of
his own perspectives, context, and tradition on his own interpretative
understanding. What is required is .an initial recognition of the
possibility of subjective distortions, preconceptions from the inter-
preter's own cultural ~ackground, and an attempt to uncover them
within the process of dialogic interaction.
This openness cannot be a question of the interpreter's
ridding himself of all preconceptions and prejudgments.
This is a logical impossibility- -the idea of an interpre-
ter without a language. All interpretative understanding
is necessarily bound to preconceptions and prejudgments.
The problem for interpretation is not simply the having
of a structure of prejudices (Vorurteilsstruktur), but
the unselfconscious imposition of this structure and
the violence to. an adequate understanding which this
entails.... It is rather in the interpretative process
itself that one's own structure of prejudices gradually
becomes clearer. 129
In the process of reaching agreement, both parties enhance their own
understanding and self-understanding through the uncovering of
(\
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preconceptions in relation to mutually shared meaning structures.
The process contributes to their respective Bildung.
For hermeneuticians, Gadamer contends, there are no standards
of objectivity which can be recog~ized independently of the attainment
of intersubjective agreement by the partners in the dialogic process.
"The scientist"l.s interpretation must be based on understanding held
in cOD;lmon with his object/subject and expressed through the mutual
satisfaction in practice of expectations on both sides. ,,130 Thus"
the success of an interpretation can only be confirmed by continuing
successful agreement on the level of both interpretation and practic~.
The existentialistic -he rmeneutic tradition, 131 which is most
prominently represented today in the work of Gadamer, accepts as
its -starting point--in contradistinction to the work of most of those
.who.m we have discussed in this chapter to date--the necessary engage-
ment of the scie.ntist-interpreter in a social-historical context. The
necessary historicity of all persons implies the singular inadequacy
of any model of objectivity in the cultural sciences that places at its
.center the idea of "neutral," "detached, If "scientific··' observation,
or reconstruction, :!rfree" of subjective bias. Against this model of
objectivity, the existentialistic -hermeneutic tradition appreciates
and realizes that an interpretative understanding can only be estab-
lished trthrough interaction between the interpreter and his object
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132in a mutually created socio-linguistic context. " Such interaction,
as we have seen, necessarily has implications for the present and
future action of both parties. Each party enters the dialogic situa-
tion with a pregiven and established conceptual framework which.
informs and forms a pattern of present and future expectations. The
pattern may well change as a result of the interaction, but the con-
ceptual system and tradition which (in)forms it can never be completely
overcome. As Wellmer put it,
Even though his preliminary attitude may change in
the process of critical appreciation of traditions, or
of the decoding of initially alien significant links, he
[the scientist-interpreter] can neither entirely escape
from the total context of tradition, ~ -. . nor wholly
free himself from the nexus by which this tradition
relates to his own future. Consequently, his indica-
tions remain suggestions, which have to be proven
not only in regard to the material already available,
but in the future historical practice of human beings
fr om which the thread of tradition continues and will
continue to be formed. 133
The appreciation of the tradition-embeddednes s of· all interpre-
tative interventions allows the existentialistic -hermeneutic tradition
to overcome the tendencie s of the hermeneutic tradition to reduce the
role of theory to the explication of practice, to a purely descriptive
approach, etc. It also opens up for discussion and systematic reflec-
tion the dimension of history. The texts, experiences, actions, or
institutions to be understood can only be interpreted in light of the
history of the tradition and social context in which they are created,
\111
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sustained, and changed. Likewise, the interpreter is made aware
of the tradition and history of which he is a part. "The attempt to
penetrate another structure of meanings, norms, and action expecta-
tions forces him to becom.e more aware of his habitualized and
unreflective acceptance of his own tradition and thus he becom.es
:more aware of the history of his self-for:mative process. 11 134
It is of central importance to note that once an historical
. dimension is established, it becomes possible to transcend in inter-
pretative analysis the surface level of linguistic meaning.
The historical development of a tr.adition is the
medium in which meaning is created and transmitted
through time. All the actions and expressions of a
person can be understood as lTIeaningful only within
the context of this history. But if it is true that a
tradition itself lends lTIeaning and significance to
actions and expressions, then it is possible to con-
ceive of the object of interpretation as having a
meaning beyond or in conflict with that subjectively
intended by the actor. 135
Therefore, in an interpretative analysis of a given object in the
context of its embeddedness in a tradition, it becomes possible for
the scienti.st-interpreter to becolTIe aware of and uncover a discre-;;.
pancy between manifest and intended meaning. Such a discrepancy
can become apparent to the analyst even in cases where the actor
was not, or is not yet, aware of it. Gadatner has expressed this
point forcefully.
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I maintain that the hermeneutical problem is universal
.and· basic for all interhuman experience, both of history
and of the present m.oment, precisely because of the
· fact that meaning can be e£rerienced even where it
.is not.actually intended. 13
'. H:abermas is in accord with Gadamer I s account of hermeneutics
to this point. rheir positions diverge, however, over an assessment
. ". of th.·~. i~:plications .of thi~"possible.discrepancy·betweenexperienced/
l?anlfested ~e~ning," and intended meaning. One of their major
:0.. "differences be-comes apparent in their debate and discussion about
li~w "to ana1y:ze, understand, explain, and overcome this discrepancy.
"Al?-"important further divergence in their positions occurs over
disagreemt?nts about the nature of the context dependency of hermenu-
tics~ Haber"m~s agrees with Gadatner's characterization of the basic
struct:ural"ieatures of communicative interaction and interpretative
understanding: .. He agrees that interpretative understanding attained
~hrough~"a conimuni~ative interchange is always context dependent,
i. e., that an interpretation presupposes an ongoing tradition (lan-
guag"e, conventions,- etc.), the terms of which the scientist-interpre-
ter can never fully escape irl" ,his efforts to pierce another tradition.
Thus. Habeormas". argues that when someone of one tradition is inter-
preting a subject/object of another, the understanding achieved must
be made intelligible within the terms of reference and traditions of
both parties. This practice and process of merging traditions in
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order to achieve a counderstanding, becomes in hermeneutics I'the
self -conscious. . . transmission and mediation of traditions II
(T d ·· · 1 ) 137ra ltlonsvermltt ung .
Habermas, in another point of agreement with Gadamer, writes
that within a given tradition, a hermeneutical procedure is needed
when there is a breakdown of an action expectation, when an indivi-
dual expres,sion or action appears to deviate from the meaning struc-
tures of the tradition. Given such a situation, the deviant action can
only be retrieved and thereby understood if there exists as a pre-
condition a background tradition shared by both the interpreter and
his subject / object.
When a disturbance occurs in a communicative experi-
ence that is reliable according to commonfschemata
. of world-interpretation and of action, the i:p.terpreta-
tion that must be made imme4iately is directed simul-
taneously at the experiences acquired in a world con-
stituted through ordinary language arid at the very
grammatical rules that constitute this, world. Such
interpretation is linguisitic analysis and experience
at once. Correspondingly, it corrects its hermeneutic
anticipatory interpretation against a consensus amQng
partners, which is arrived at in accordance with gram-
matical rules. 138
However, how we are to conceive this background tradition--the
consensus amonst partners - -that serves as the context and pre-
condition for interpretative understanding, r·aises further complex
issues. I
To recognize the context dependency of the hermeneutic project
n'
307
is at one and the same time to recognize the need to begin a hermeneu-
tical procedure from a preunderstanding flowing from a (learned and
shared) background tradition which grounds the consensual basis for
dialogue. Gadamer expressed this recognition when he wrote, Ills
the phenomenon of understanding adequately defined when I say:
Understanding means avoiding misunderstanding? Isn 1t there rather
in truth something like a Isupporting consensus 1 which is prior to
all understanding? 11 139 Gadarn.er answers his own question by arguing
that there is, of course, such a prior underlying consensus. On this
point Habermas also agrees. However, it is in debate about the
nature of such a consensus that they expres s their second major
difference. rrWe [Habermas and Gadamer] agree on the affirmative
answer to this que'stion, but we disagree on how one is to determine
h - - 11 140t 1S pr10r consensus.
Thus there are two major points of disagr~ement between
Gadamer and Habermas. They disagree about how to analyze and
understand
1. the discrepancy between experienced/manifested meaning
and intended meaning and
2. the underlying supporting consensus of tradition.
Within the debate these ,two~·poip.t·s are',Inerge'd~int6a"-discussion
around the question of the nature of the authority of tradition. The
discussion is of central importance not only in the debate between
;1
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Gadamer and Habermas but also for the themes of this thesis. For
it brings to a head the central questions of this chapter (and thesis)
to date. Is the tradition (llform of life, II "finite province of meaning")
to be accepted as the ultimate authority which cannot be" superseded
and which must be the final arbiter in all cases of disagreement?
Or is there a critical perspective from which to question the claims
of tradition? Can we assess the criteria of rationality of a tradition
by grounding a conception of the rationality of criteria? Can we
avoid the lapse of the role of theory and hermeneutics into a descrip-
tivism ,and relativism by developing a defensible conception of cate-
gories, e. g., ideology, which are not internal and available to a
given· society, but which can be used as a justified basis to assess
the truth content of a tradition? Can we ground a critically reflexive
understanding of traditions?
For Gadamer, in the'· last analysis, there is no justified ground
for criticizing a tradition outside its terms of reference. On Gada-
mer IS account, the fact that interpretation always starts from the
basis of a supporting consensus formed in an ongoing tradition means
that there is no position, extern~l to the tradition, from which to
criticize it. 141
Any attempt to abstractly suspect this certainly con-
tingent consensus of being false consciousness is
meaningless since we cannot transcend the discussion
in which we are engaged. From this Gadalner deduces
()
.0
309
the ontological priority of linguistic tradition before
all possible critique: at any given time we can thus
carryon critique only of individual traditions, inas-
much as we ourselves belong to the comprehensive
tradition-context of a language. 142
Gadamer argues that the underlying consensus of cultural contexts
must be treated as "a genuine and legitimate agreement since "there
.is no way to step outside it, no standard from which to consider it
otherwise, no language available which can crawl out of its own
skin and allow us to see how reality is constituted within its con-
cepts and rules. ,,143 This implies that when a discrepancy is
uncovered between intended and expressed/manifested meaning, the
intended meaning must be interpreted within the given conceptual
system of the ongoing tradition. The interpreter cannot ~escape the
~uthenticityand authority of the standards set by the tradition. The
traditions' supporting consensus provide the standards from which
the :'m_anifested~me~ning., must be understood. From Gadamer's
point of view, all theoretical and practical questions only admit :0£ ,.
truth within the contexts of traditions wherein there is consensus. 144
Habermas' response to Gadamer begins with the contention
that Gadamer's work establishes fl ••• a false ontological self-
. understanding of hermeneutics. ,,145 Habermas argues that through
systematic reflection on the Enlightenment's concept of reason and
rational discourse, a basis can be uncovered to critically reject the
1~'1
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universalistic and ontological clairn.s of herrn.eneutics. 116 Central to
the consciousness of the Enlightenm~nt, he argues, was the aware-
ness of the possibility of repression and coercion, "i.e., systematic
distortion, within a tradition. The Enlightenment IS ideal of reason
w~s .opposed to the legitimation of such a tradition. Their ideal of
~' re'as on was an ideal of critical reas on. A tradition was not to be
legitimated other than through the proces.s of noncoercive rational
consensus.
Consequently, the Enlightenment principle of reason
can be interpreted as the demand for the abrogation
of all repressive conditions that could claim-nC>·legiti-
macy ot~er than their sheer existence; reason not as
a counter-concept to' authority, but as the principle
of voluntary communication in contrast to:.experienced
actuality ~f a process of communication distorted by
violence. 141
In his discussion of Gap-alTIerls work, Wellmer, a close associ-
ate of HaberlTIas, points out that for Gadamer, the Enlightenment is
. but another tradition. To Gadamer it is a tradition like all traditions,
I that is, trapped within its own presuppositions. Wellmer argues that
from. Gadamerls hermeneutical point of view, the Enlightenment can
belief in reas on.
on a structure of its own prejudices, natnely, that of a doglTIatic
be seen'as an attack on the structure of prejudices of the ecclesiasti-
But the attack itself~is an attack that is lTIounted. 1 d··· 148ca tra ltlon.
:. (1!1
311
Gadamer uses the case of Spinoza to show how, in
place of the dogmatic principles of exegesis laid
down by e.¢clesiastical tradition, the belief in reason
itself becomes the dogmatic foundation of Biblical
exegesis. In fact this belief in reason shows itself
to be dogmatic from the viewpoint of hermeneutical
criticism: subjective reason augments its force
from that very context of tradition which it opposes
abstractly in an lIanti-authoritarian guis~. "149 '
Within the existentialistic -hermeneutic school, the En~ightenment
ideal of reason is not held to provide a foundation to transcend
tradition and thereby the ultimate relativism inherent in hermeneutics.
"If one cannot' es cape a situation of context dependency, one cannot
ultimately ground reason as the final arbiter and authority. ,,150 .. To
. .
believe, that ,reason can be such an arbiter is, in Gadamer!s view, a
dogm'a of the history of our own tradition. The belief in reason is
but another normative orientation, a standard of our tradition.
Habermas takes issue with this hermeneutical position by
challenging',as' dogmatic its uncritical acceptance of the underlying
consensus of tradition. For Habermas and his school of CrItical
theory:_ .
Every consensus, in which the' understanding of meaning
terminates, stands fundamentally under suspicion of
being pseudo-communicatively induced: ... Thus the
prejudgmental structure of the understanding of meaning
does not guarantee identi~icationof an achieved con-
sensus with a true one. '15'1
Habernias t.rie's to salvage from the Enlightenment's dogmatic belief
in reason an essential principle of rational dialogue. Furthermore,
!I~H!'
I ()I '
n:
0-·
312
Habermas maintains that he can explicate, defend, and ground, i.e.,
1 · 1· if h· .. I 152u tlmate Y Just y, t 1S prlnclp e.
In -Habermas' view, this grounding requires a "depth herIneneu-
tics" which recovers the underlying history of the tradition 1s con-
sensus in such a way as to reveal sources of domination and distor-
tion; sources which by their very nature reInain concealed Jroma
surface understanding of tradition. Such a "depth hermeneutics"
requires, in turn, a nondogmatic, nonmetaphysical grounding of
reason from which it can advance a critical standard. The concepts
of a "depth hermeneutics" and a q~r:itic~!llt~eory (of ~sbc:J.e~y 'cannot
be developed at this point. They will, however, be systematically
discussed in the chapters that follow. At this point it is ilTIportant
to note the core of Habermas I disagreements with GadalTIer.
Gadamerian hermeneutics is criticized, as Wellmer put it,
for forgetting what the Enlightenment knew, "that the 'dialogue t
which (according to Gadamer) we 'are I is also a relationship of
-153
coercion and, for this very reason, ~ dialogue at all. ,,- Gadamer
fails, Habermas argues, to see t~e fundamental "opposition between
. . 154
authority and reason. 11'" Habermas contrasts his criticial stand-
point toward authority, which he considers' (in agreement with Weber)
legitimized force, with Gadamer's dogmatic acceptance of the authority
of tradition as it has historically developed.
~I
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Reason in the sense of the principle of'rational dis-
course is the rock on which hitherto factual authorities
are smashed rather than the rock on which they are
founded. 155
Wellmer develops Habermas I line of criticism by charg~ng
hermeneutics with being a form of idealism.
According to Habermas, the idealism of the hermeu-
tic position consists in the fact that it itself is the
expression of an inadmissible idealization, namely
the idealization that the linguistic organization of
. social relations and of the motivational base of social
interaction has attained a state of 1lperfection. ,,156
This idealization operates on two fundamental levels. 157 The first
level of idealization concerns the fact of hermeneutics' failure to
take account of systematically excluded meanings which, according
to Habermas, have to be allowed as a possibility which would lead to
the'inhibition of communication. The result of such inhibition (e. g. ,
in the case of neurosis or ideology), render some persons incapable
of filling in certain gaps of meaning in their linguis'tic field (e. g. ,
the expression of their true feelings, motivations, and interests).
These gaps remain 'incomprehensible if not totally unrecognizable
from a str~ctly surface, hermeneutical point of view. The second
level is the already dis cussed refusal of hermeneutics to recognize
the possibility of a deceptive consensus underlying tradition. "A
consensus within a tradition which embodies social and linguistic
inhibitions and pressures in regard to access to meaningful'
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cOlTIlTIunicative and action patterns, II cannot be considered "a genuine
consensus based on free consent, and therefore it cannot be legiti-
mately utilized to justify norms and true beliefs. 11 158
In sum, then, the critique of existentialistic -hermeneutics as
being a forIn of idealism, is that it refuses to accept the possibility
of ideological distortion as a historical reality within various socio-
historical traditions. As with the objectivistic-herIneneutic tradi-
tion of Dilthey before it, and with the interpretative sociology of
Winch, Schutz, and Garfinkel conteInporary to it, the existentialistic-
herIneneutic tradition claims to be unable to transcend the paratneters
of its s ocio -historical and 'linguistic situation and tradition. It accepts
the m.eaning structures in which it finds itself as a given and onto-
logizes these structures as the litnits of understanding, comtnunica-
tion, and science. This tradition of hertneneutics (also) does not
recognize the possibility of a critical perspective. Nor does it
accept the need to critically question the legitimacy of authority.
If we are to develop the criticistns above into a viable approach
to social theory and science, it is of central importance to go beyond
a perspective limited by the epistemological and philosophical pre-
suppositions of hermeneutics. For Habermas, as we have noted, it
is ilTIportant to do this by developing and grounding an approach that
can be a critique of ideology. Such an approach has been continually
I~
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.recommende:d' throughout this thesis as a possible and plausible
appro~ch'to overcome many of the problems we have encountered
in the discussion of theory and practice in the works of Max Weber
and certain neo-Kantians, and in the works of certain positivists and
hermeneuticians. The question, therefore, arises as to whether or
not ~ critique of ideology or critical approach to society is a viable
alternative approach.
'A critique of ideology is concerned to uncover
... what lies behind the consensus, presented as a .
fact, that supports the dominant tradition of the time,
and does so with a view to the relations of power
surreptitiously incorporated in the symbolic struc-
tures of the systems of speech and action. 1:59
In contraq,istinction to the works of the 1'schools" that we discussed
to date,. a critique of ideology is concerned to place at its center the
distinctions b·etween
systematically distorted communication and undis-
'torted communication;
false consciousness and true consciousness;
- - -. the authenticity of traditions and the authority of
tradition;
the authority of tradition and the truth content of
tradition; .
understanding and critical understanding.
In order to avoid the loss of a critical perspective, ~ critique of
ideology is also concerned to overcome the oft-claimed dualism
!ll~.
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between science and criticism.
. It should be noted that an adequate critique of ideology requires
certain. crucial theo'retical developments. It must provide a theoreti-
cal foundation which can be used to give a reconstruction of the
natural-historical development of ideological structures of communi-
cation and action. It must be able to support and defend its pre-
tensions to a critical perspective by grounding its choice of ultimate
theoretical pri1?-ciples and methodological procedure. Thus, we are
led to Part 3 of this thesis and the problematic of grounding critical
theory and various Marxist attempts to fulfill such a demand.
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NOTES
1 .
S~.~ pp~. 147-48~.for l!~lev~~t-references.
2Cf. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, chaps. 7
and 8.
3The following texts are those that we will systematically
addre s s: Winch, The Idea of .a Social Science and Its Relation to
Ph.ilosophy; Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," in
Rationality, ed. Bryan R. Wilson (Oxford: Basil Balckwell, 1974),
.pp. 78-112; ~~chutz, ~~he Phenomen-olpgy-,qf.theSocial\vWorld;' Gar-
.finkel , Studies in EthnolTIethodology. Each of these texts has~·liad
a significant influence on the for!nulation of the problematic of
social sciences in the last two decades. To the extent that these
works share a rejection of positivism they have a certain unity.
But their respective programs for the social sciences can only be
conflated at the cost of misunderstanding.
4In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas distinguishes
between lIobjectify" arid lIobjectivate." As the transla~or, Jeremy
J. Shapiro, explains:
liTo objectify (vergegenstUndlichen) means to make
into an obj ect of instrumental action or of natural
science separate from and external to the subject--
in other words, to constitute in the Kantian sense.
To objectivate (chiefly ol?jek~ivier~.n) 'Ineans togive_·..
form in a symbolic systetn, that is, to make into a
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tori s note, p. 323, fn. 23).
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PART III
ON THE UNITY OF THEORY AND PRAC TICE
;
r ' ----- -. ,- .. ------.-----.---
CHAPTER VI
ON THE REFORMULATION OF THE NOTION OF,
THEORETICAL TRUTH' IN LUKACS,
HORKHEIMER, AND MARCUSE
Introduction: The Problem of Grounding in Cr~tical Theory
We have seen·that central to the works of Max Weber and the
0-.
,
t~.
- .
neo-Kantians, positivists and the early s chool- of hermen"euticfans,
are certain claimed dualisms between fact and value, su.bject and
object, d~scription and evaluation, science and criticism, and
theory and practice. We have also seen that a claimed dualism
between science .and criticism pervades the whole of the hermeneutic
:tradition. However, where many of these writers have upheld a
du~lism:':and1 d~·sconti~u.it·y,· e. g., between fact and value, we have
fr-equently found that this claim -masks unexplicated presuppositions
and a coml1.}itment to certain definite relationships of continuity.
We have also often criticized the epistemological positions of these
writers for closing off certain approaches to social inquiry; parti-
cularly, we have criticized them for ruling out of consideration a
critical approach. We have argued and stressed the necessity for
social theory to be able to place at its center the distinctions between:
330
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---standards and criteria of rationality that are internal to
traditions, and those by which they Inay be judged;
- - -the authenticity of tradition, and authority of tradition;
- - -the authority of tradition, and the truth content of
tradition;
- - -ideology and distorted communication, and genuine self-
understanding and undistorted communication.
In criticizing the epistemological positions of those whom we
have discussed, we have as a consequence challenged their theories
of objectivity and truth. It becomes crucial, therefore, if we are
to develop a m.ore adequate epistetnological and methodological frame-
work to reconceptualize the notion of objectivity and truth. If we
reject the accounts of objectivity, etc., Jhe?~ authors have main-
tained, and if we are to avoid the fall of theory and science into a
position of skepticism and/ or relativism and/ or solipsism, then
the question and problematic as it has been developed thus far
becomes one of grounding, rationally justifying, one's choice of
ultimate theoretical principles and tnethodological procedure.
Certain authors in the Marxist and Critical tradition have
sought, with various degrees of rigor, to address this problematic •
It can be argued that for these authors, the problematic of grounding
finds its source, origin, and impetus for discussion in practice and
in theory.
I (
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The motivation to discuss the question of grounding partially
arises and derives its .force from the course of 20th-century history
and political practice. For these decades have seen the degeneration
of the Russian Revolution into Stalinism, the critique of political
economy into Diamat with its ideological mystification and justifi-
cation of centralized party politics, technocratic social management
and worse. Likewise the (to date) failure of revolution in the West;
the absence of mass revolutionary class consciousness --~h~ve.all
But the problem of grounding as a theoretical problem trans-
cends, of course, 20th-century history and finds its roots deeply
implanted in the history of philosophy. The questions for our purposes
and for Critical~~~~.o:r:Y,a~e ;~" however, most succintly raised by
Marx, although not followed through by him.
In Marx's work the relationship between
theory and practice ,
truth and ideology,
true consciousness and false consciousness
is raised. Marx it seems had two views on these relationships,
one relatively "simple,1I which I will call the instrumentalist vie~,
a~nd ~9l?-~e ~ore complex. We say "seems" because often certain
passages in Marx's work have been read (by Marxists and ~
,n
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non-Marxists alike) as sustaining the "sim.ple, " instrumentalist
view. However, it should be recognized that many of these passages
(e. g. , the famous "Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of
Political Economytr) can be read--when suitable account is taken of
Marx's use of Hegelian terminology--to be in contradistinction to
an instrumentalist position. 1
In order to avoid detailed exegetical questions we do not need
to m.ake the claim here that Marx was ambiguous between these
two positions, although there are writers who have argued this claim
at some length. 2 The claim here is that both within~:,and'withoufthe
Marxist tradition, Marx has often been ascribed one or both of these
views and that their differences provide the basis for raising the
problem of grounding as a theoretical problem.
The first Il s imple l1 and more llvul gar ll position is that which'
relates all thought/ superstructure instrumentally to (Marx's posited)
substructure. All knowledge on this account is bound to class posi-
tion's; not in the sense that 1freason appears distorted by the interests
3
of power," but because all theory is a m.ode of social practice,
and all practice is clas s bound. 4 In orthodox Marxism, for example,
this is expressed as "bourgeois ideology is the thought of the ruling
class. 11 It is the substance of a IIsuperstructure which ensures
domination. 1,5
~I
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In the second, and for our purposes more important, position
ideology is a package of ideas and norms which passes for an accurate
description of social reality but is, in fact, a false -consciousness.
Here the concept of ideology implies the dissolution of false-con-
sciousness as an emancipatory process mediated by communication
and reflection. Contrary to the first position in which all truth
claims are class relative, the second position maintains that truth
claims can be rationally adjudicated independent of class interests.
This second position comes also as an implicit critique of the first
position for conflating the processes of constitution and verification,
for reducing theory to practice and thereby obliterating any basis
for an independent moment of criticism. The second position, how-
ever, raises the .complicated question of how we can conceive of
appropriate and valid theory, true consciousness and, more generally
for certain contemporary critical theorists, theoretical truth. This
is the problem of grounding.
This second position has been developed differently by, amongst
others, George Lukacs;, the Frankfurt School, and Jiirgen Habermas.
It is to their work, and elevation of these issues, that we now turn.
In this part of the thesis I will examine the work of Lukacs and the
Frankfurt theorists. Of the latter 1 int"end to address ess.entially
the works of Horkheimer and Marcuse. 6 (1 shall further briefly
,(
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" indicate how some other contemporary Marxist figures have reflected
on, and attempted to come to terms with, the questions raised.) It
should, of course, be noted that this discussion of these three authors
is not claimed, in any way, to be a detailed or sufficient discussion
of their work. I simply hope to draw from their studies their
responses to the topic at hand.
Two objections, however, might be made to pursuing the prob-
"lem of grounding in the work of the Frankfurt School and Lukacs.
First, it .~ight be argued that the Frankfurt theorists, even if they
rai~ed these issues, 'were not primarily concerned with the questions
of grounding in the form the problematic has been raised here. It
.has been suggested by James Schmidt, for example, that a "key
discussion in Horkheimer's 'Traditional and Critical Theory' defines
critical theory as 'in its totality, the unfolding of a single existential
judgement' based on Marx's notion of the general course of the
commodity economy. ,,7 Commenting on these passages. he says:
"What is significant here is that the truths to be extracted from this
expansion are primarily negations: unfolding of the judgement does
not establish the truth of the existential judgement as a predictive
I'"
n
I
336
theory, but rather serves as a means of indicating the one-sidedness
of the other social theories which claim to have accounted for reality.IIB
Even if this is so, it can be contended that the issues we raise are
implicitly addressed. For the early theoretical formulations of
Horkheimer and Marcuse assume Marx's critique of political economy
as the center of their theory. The "general course" of the commodity
economy is taken as unproblematic and as an adequate account of the
concrete totality from which all other views can be regarded~"as
"one -sided. 11 An historical account of this assumed position might
well be offered and it is, of course, true that Horkheimer and
Marcuse were essentially concerned with extending Marx's critique
to other areas of human endeavor. But these works and remarks
nevertheless indicate a peculiar ambival~ncebetween a dogmatic
certitude and a hypothetical openness of an unconcluded, incomplete,
negative dialectic. 9 The ambiguity does not dissolve the problems;
answers to the questions of the adequacy of Marx's conceptualization
of the concretetot_~li~yand the basis on which we justify our con-
clusions call11ot be simply assumed. 10 We shall return to Hork-
heimer's and Marcuse's approach to these themes in a moment.
Secondly, it might be objected and argued that even if the
Frankfurt School raised various questions around the themes of
"reason, II "truth, It "freedom," the fact that they did not pursue
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them is of significance in itself and speaks to the incapacity to reformu-
late the relationship between theory and practice, truth and goodness,
etc., in theory. Such an argument could take a variety of forms, but
it (surely) reaches its highest development in Lukacs 1 History and
Class Consciousness. II (However, as we shall see, even this argu-
m.ent has inevitably its own theoretical presuppositions. )
It might be held that bourgeois science was and is unworthy of
lengthy~;' cons~derat~onl.because the antinomic expressions of its
thinking can only be overcome practically; theoretical disputes with
bourgeois science could be maintained only as a form of the class
struggle. The IIstructure of the historical process, 11 it might be
argued, is decisive against the IImethodological self-restriction" of
bourgeois thought in all its manifestations. On this view, which
reaches its high water mark in Lukacs, modern science is criticized
for three reasons .. Arato has summarized these as "(1) loss of
totality; (2) loss of ontological (historical) substratum; (3) freezing
of the given. ,,12
All of modern science is dominated by specialization
and organizationally, by forms of increasingly bureau-
cratic adrriinistration. On the level of scientific con-
tent, the sciences are first characterized by their
fragmentation of reality, and consequently by their
loss of totality, and their "ontological substratum.":
the more intricate a :modern science becomes and the
better it understands itself methodologically, the
more resolutely it will turn its back on the ontological
problems of its own sphere of influence • . . the
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more it will become a formally closed system of
partial laws. It will find that its own concrete under-
lying r~ality lies, methodologically and in principle
beyond its grasp. Second, the sciences are charac-
terized by their freezing of immediate factuality of
the given because the dynamic of reality is visible
only from the point of view of totality. 13
Likewise, the cu~tura1 and historical sciences disregard what is
central for Lukacs; the historical dialectic of their contents and
forms. In the famous "Reification" chapter Lukacs argues that
the efforts of the bourgeoisie to confront the problem of reification
h 1 1"·· 14reac c ass lmlts. The methodological project of German
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classical philosophy cannot be ~ulfilledwithin philosophy. The over-
co~ing of the problem of reification is a social project, which can
only be continued outside philosophy. liThe continuation and con-
cretization of lthe dialectical method as the true historical method
was reserved fora cla~s which was able to discover within itself
on the basis of its life experience (Lepen_~g~Jlnd) the identical subject-
object, the subject of action, the "we" of genesis, namely, the
proletariat,_"IS The concrete becoming of men in history, expressed
in the contemporary age as the standpoint of the proletariat, is the
only possible basis for the synthesis of the concrete totality and its
sublation (Aufhebung).
Lukacs' position is one that attempts to overcome both volun-
tarism and fatalism, the poles of the Second International and'
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neo-Kantian social science. Historical Materialism, in his view,
cannot gain an adequate understanding of the social totality and has
no meaning outside the struggle of the proletariat, the negating sub-
ject. Its claims to truth and objectivity are not those of a simple
correspondence or coherence theory. For the truth and objectivity
of any method cannot be dirempted from the social praxis of classes
and groups. All forms of thought are ro~ted 'in :aopao·rticularhistorIcal
context and are relative to the social situatedness of social structure.
But Lukacs argues the standpoint of the proletariat and consequently
Marxism transcends the "one-sidedness" and distortions of other
social theories and class ideologies. The proletariat is the class on
whose genesis capitalist society rests. The proces s of Bildung within
the society can only be successfully grasped from the pivot in its
constitution. "Since the proletariat will find that it itself has been
a key party in this constitution, it stands in a relationship to reality
which gives it the possibility of viewing the reality not as mere fact
[i. e., the freezing of the given], but as a set of relations which are
historically determined and capable of alteration. In otheOr words,
the proletariat has the capability of seeing all of the relations of
capitalist society as a stage in the process of its own Bildung which
must be overcome. 1I16 Objectivity and truth depend on knowledge of
the totality, the coherence of which is dependent on the process of
r
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history from which the standpoint of the proletariat as a potential
identical subject -object finds its foundations.
Lukacs refuses to ground the "theory of proletarian Bildung"
outside the historical proces s and portray' the role of the theorist
as neutral and detached. Theory and theoretical labor are inextri-
cably intertwined in the social process on which it cannot passively
contemplate, reflect, and describe. Rather, the theorist is seen
as a participant in an ongoing class conflict, explicating an objective
possibility immanent in the dynamic of reified class -relations and
animized things. Ther~ are numerous issues which could be raised
here but for our purposes only a number of points need be noted. 17
Lukacs I argument is predicated on the existence of a class
who~e social position is said to be unique in that, first, from its
position the historical process is claimed to be transparent and
within reach of theory. Secondly, from its standpoint the universal
interests of the species are assume¢).. to b~ uncoverable. Thirdly,
that it is necessary for the proletariat to have a correct understanding
of its position and, fourthly, that it is capable of transcending its
social (conaitions :;as· a result of the de -mythologizing of its interests.
Finally, it is argued by Lukacs that even if (mass) revolutionary
working class praxis does not exist, the dynamic of the historical
process contains within it an immanent objective possibility of this
i r>
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praxis. As such, Marxist social theory is continuous with the
imputable consciousness of the identical subject-object. Marxism
remains objective and possible. For Lukacs there is a proletarian
praxis present for class existence before it is actually known, but
such an existence is not sufficient unto itself and demands a further
critical elaboration. "The Party is the instrument in history that
does this by degrees through a dual mediation: there is a first
mediation--the Party, mediating between the proletariat and history--
and a second- .:.the Party, consulting the proletariat or in other words,
the proletariat mediating between the Party and history. tl18
Lukacs does not argue or say that the proletariat will neces-
sarily complete its Bildung process and surmount the irresolvable
tensions and contradictions in the .capitalist social order. The con-
cept of imputed class consciousness specifies what is logically
required (not what empirically exists), if the proletariat is to com-
plete its transformation into the identical subject-object., "Logically
analyzed, the situation of the proletariat is seen 'as being both within
society (as an element of the synchronic arrangement of commodities
exchanged) and outside society (as a subject which cannot come to
self-realization within the present arrangement of forms). Lukacs
sees no way of reconciling this duality theoretically. . • . Rathe r
he seeks to make the task of theorizing contingent on this very',·
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dissonance, and argues that the purpose of theory, which now becomes
equated with the activities of the party. . • 11 is to explicate, these
contradictions to a subject IIwhich at this point in history pas ses ses
the possibility of practically overcoming the separations as a part of
the very process which brings it to, consciousness of them. ,,19
Whatever its other merits, the epistemological and political
difficulties of this position are far reaching. We have to ask whether
or not in the absence of revolutionary working class praxis, Marxism,
as it is here developed, can be anything more than an abstract nega-
tion. Does the revolutionary dialectic become anything more than a
"conceptual mythology'.~'? Is the proletariat then, nothing but the
carrier of a myth, which as J. Revai argues, presents this identifi-
cation as desirable;20 i.e., is it a logical abstraction which Lukacs
imposes on the historical process? If this is the case, the Party
ceases to be a "mediation and becomes an expression of an ethical
ideal forcing itself on history.
Lukacs attempted to show that the empirical proletariat
IIsurpassed by the richness of a history which it cannot represent
to itself either as it was or it will be, retains, nevertheless,an
implicit totality and' is itself the universal subject which, because
it is self -critical and sublates itself, can become for itself only
through the indefinite development of the classless society. 11 21
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An important feature of Lukacs I thought was not to posit an identical
subject-object, to grant the meaning of history to a "world spirit. 1I
The analysis of reification attempts to derive the objective possibility
of overcoming reification in the dynamic of reification'itself. 22 As
such, .the analysis is contingent on a verifiable process and, as Arato
suggests, "one particular analysis of economic development (namely,
, . 23
Rosa Luxemburg's). II 'But Lukacs' analysis and his solution, the
identical subject -object, are far from satisfactory.
Given Stalinism and (current) technocratic social managem.~nt
in Russia, the': (as yet?) unfulfilled proletarian Bildung process in
the Western world, etc., we may well wonder (with Merleau-Ponty)
where these developments leave our original theory. Yet, in wonder-
ing within Lukacs I theoretical framework we are caught in a circle.
For the only standard of truth we have is deeply em.bedded in the
proletariat's standpoint. Yet it is precisely this standpoint that is
here problematic and questioned. To what .standards. and criteria
does one appeal in determining whether certain historical develop-
ments are falsifications of the original theory, ,signs that its premises
are dubious, that it is inadequate to comprehend the dynamics of
capitalism; or rather, developments which leave the original theory
intact but with minor modifications? IfIn ~hort, 11 as Thomas
McCarthy put it, I'if the notion of practical confirmation or
,r,
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falsification is to be used selectively, one must inquire after the
theoretic"al basis of this selection. And if the principles of selection
themselves contain theoretical moments, one must ask about the
adequacy of this background theory and its relation to the one under
investigation. ,,24 As the standard of truth, the proletariat's stand-
point does not allow us recourse to challenge it without undermining
the entire theoretical structure. If this is done, questions of
grounding cannot be taken for granted.
Yet"all of this itself assumes that it is and ever was obvious
what the standpoint of the proletariat is and that it is imputable in
its practical absence; that universal interests are uncoverable from
its actual or imputable st~~dpoint;,.,.and, therefore, what an adequate
representation of these interests by the particular, the Party, is.
Unless these questions are addressed, we risk--as Lukacs did--
subordinating class, theory, and action to the Party.25 In all these
re~pe~ts ,"_..~ukacs I resolution of the problem of grounding raises the
same questions as the first objection attempted to ignore: the answers
and the method of developing "answers,"a~e~;assuinedlas~sel~Eevident.
The connections of objectivity and truth, theory and practice
in Lukacs are closely tied to the actuality of proletarian revolu-
tionary praxis or its imputable possibility. In nonrevolutionary
periods the problem of the theory/practice relationship, etc.,
345,
becomes, to say the least, problematic•.In Lukacs I theoretical
framework, however, these relationships are dogmatically assumed.
To tie the truth claims of Marxism as a critique of society to the
standpoint of the proletariat is to leave Marxism open to Merleau-
Panty I s view that the proletariat is a waning historical force in both
socialist and capitalist. countries. Consequently, he argues, Marxism
as a critique loses its claim to truth and becomes nothing more or
1 h · ed lId · 26ess t an a cornpetlng 1 eo ogy or mora stan pOlnt. The Party,
o
.r
then, cannot claim with surety the priviledged status of histor~'cal
mediator. There are further empirical objections that can be made
to the theory. For example,' Lukacs fails to address many deter-
minants of the empirical consciousness of the working class and its
historically changing needs. Obviously, the historical conditions
of Lukacs I and our time are considerably different fr9m that of Marx
and Engels. Yet, in Lukacs, the potentiality of the identic~l subject-
object was and is assumed to be revolutionary, its standpoint trans-
parent and immanently realizable. For Lukacs it cannot be otherwise.
The standpoint is dependent on these assumptions. ,The the,ory can
only answer its critics by restatin~g its premises •
Whether or not we can go beyond Lukacs I position' in History
and Class Consciousness is, as yet, an open question. But for
Lukcics, of course, there is a way. Writing in the 1967 Preface to
1('"'
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the new edition, he suggests that the ideal of an identical subject-
object must be rejected. It was an attempt to "out-Hegel Hegel .
. . • Thus the proletariat seen as the identicalr-su1?ject-object of the
real history of mankind is no materialist consurnation that overcomes
the constructions of idealism~·,,27 With the rejection of the identical
.. c " -" _ , ,"
subject -object we may well ask wliich-'9thi~r:moments" rof Lij,ka"cs'"
theoretical edifice remain intact? "Since the identical subject-
object is the telos towards which all other moments of the Bildung
process are directed, there is'/ ~s::.·Schrriia.t"~a·:rgues,"good reason to
believe that they too will have to be altered if they are to be trans-
formed into a materialist dialectic. ,,28 In Lukacs' other three
criticisms he co~irms the need for major developments in the ground-
work and categories of historical materialisln. These include altera-
tions in his concept of nature,29 the development of a theory of
labor and, consequently, the recognition of the need to elaborate an
adequate notion of praxis (that goes..beyond an idealized imputed
class consciousness). 30 The criticisms are of crucial importance.
In Lukacs' opinion, the basic category of Marxist political economy,
"labour, as the mediator of the metabolic interaction between society
and nature, ismiss'ing. ,,31
It means that the most important real pillars of the
Marxist view of the world disappear and the attempt
to deduce the ultitnately revolutionary implications
of Marxism in as radical a fashion as possible is
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deprived of a genuinely economic foundation. It is
self-evident that this means the disappearance of
the ontological objectivity of nature upon which the
process of change is based. But it also means the
disappearance of the interaction between labour as
seen from a genuinely materialist standpoint and
the evolution of the men who labour. 32
The foundatio"n of History" and Class Consciousness has to be revised
in Lukacs I view on the basis of Marx 1s "great insight" into the labor
process. What Lukacs points to is a theory of labor and a theory of
needs •. A discussion of what this might entail must be postponed to
our discussion of Marcuse who, it can be argued- -am9ngst oth.ers --
also attempted to develop a theory of labor and human needs as a
critical foundation for Marxism. The search for such a ground
independent of (immediate) proletarian praxis became (and beco~es)
particul~rlyacute in times characterized by the loss ·of~.:r~evolutionary
praxis. Few struggled with this issue and its consequences more
than the Frankfurt School. A few general relTIarks should, first,
be made about this school.
In the early work of the Frankfurt theorists, an essential tenet
was that "even the situation of the proletariat is, in this society,
33
no guarantee of correct knowledge. If As Horkheimer wrote, "On
the identity 6f theory and praxis is not to be forgotten their differ-
34
ence. " Marcuse develops this theIne: ItTheory accompanies the
pr'actice at every moment, analyzing the changing situation and
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formulating its concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for
realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains the same and
theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the
truth even if revolutionay practice deviates from its proper path.
Practice follows the truth, not vice versa. 11 35 How, then, did the
Frankfurt School interpret the notions of truth and objectivity?
It has already been argued (against an anticipated fi~st objec-
tion) that questions of foundation and grounding are implicit in all
social theory (and science). In fact, any close reading of the Frank-
furt School suggests that these problems' and questions are not only
implicit but explicitly addressed. Obviously, a complete discussion
of Horkhei:rner's aJ?dr-Marcuse IS approaches to these issues is beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, from a reading of Marcuse's
work up to and including Reason and Revolution36 and Horkheimer IS
Zeitschrift essays, a nu:mber of i:mportant points are developed which
37
should not be overlooked.
The early for:mulations of the Frankfurt theorists presented
Critical t4~~<oJ.:)J· as part of a "dynamic unity with the oppressed
class. tI ·,;Cl~itic.~l·-theory~as considered part of the present class
struggle, as a lIpromotive factor in the development of the masses .11 38
The practical impact of the theorist was conceived in a way which
was not dissimilar to that of Lukacs: to articulate and help develop'
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a latent class consciousness. 39 There were, as Schtnidt has pointed
out, strong echoes of "the Mannheim-Lukacs group during the days
of the Free School: the tctsk of the theoretician is to attempt to pro-
vide a milieu in which a negation of the present social order can take
place. This task is carried out through an indication of alternatives
which are not analyzed by contemplative theorists who merely con-
firm . 'what is' at any given moment. 11 40 But in fascist Germany and
with exile, ~th.e·ltheoretical·ancrpraclica.!·,were ruptured; lithe political
tneaning of the Frankfurt School lost its itntnediacy. ,,41 As Marcuse
put it, "the divorce of thought from action, of theory from practice,
is itself part of the unfree world. No thought and no theory can
undo it; but theory may help to prepare the ground for their possible
reunion. ,,42 Against the objectivism of bourgeois ideology and
orthodox Marxism the task of the critical theorist became more
that of "rememberirig, If "recollecting, If capturing a past which was
in danger of be.ing forgotten. Indeed, Marcuse wrote Reason and
Revolution to "make a contribution. . . to the revival of a mental
faculty which is in danger of being obliterated: :the·"power·~o~-·negCl.·"
tive thinking. ,,43 Theirs was an attempt to preserve a residue of
Marx's original project against a theory and practice frozen into
second nature; a theory uniting, in both West and East, with pro-
duction, "a night in which all cows are black. "u44
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In examining Horkheimer's and Marcuse IS theoretical position,
we begin with Horkheimer's Zeitschrift essays. The argument here
follows closely that of McCarthy. 45 My intention, however, is to
develop this argument into a discussion of Marcuse's work. Although
both Horkheimer and Marcuse share many fundamental positions',
they diverge on the question of the centrality of labor, with the con-
sequence that Marcuse hesitated to implicate Marx in his critique of
instrumental rationality.46 A discussion of 'this theme will take us
to a conjuncture in critical theoretic development.
Horkheimer argues that critical theory, as a dialectical cri-
tique of ideology, must locate all thought in its historical context,
uncover its rootedness in human interests and yet avoid relativism
and be distinguished from skepticism. He accepts the Hegelian idea
of a critique of forms of thought, but rejects Hegel's systelTIatic
intention, in particular the telos of consciousness t journey: the
identity of subject and object in absolute knowledge.
In making these distinctions Horkheimer (and Marcuse) stress
the centrality of the 1fgoverning principle of dialectical thought, "
. Hegells concept of determinate (bestimmte) negation. "In recog-
nizing the dependence and lilTIitedness of any finite truth or isolated
perspective, that is in rejecting the claim. on its part to unlimited
truth, Hegel does not silTIply dismiss it out of hand, but rather finds
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for this limited knowledge , as limited, one -sided, isolated, etc.,
its place in the total system of truth. Thus critique in the Hegelian
sense does not result in mere negation, in the simple assurance that
all determinate ~ow~edge is transito"ry, and worthless, in a word in
skepticism or relativism. ,,47 As Horkheimer argues: "If the true
is. the whole according to Hegel, the whole is not something other
than the parts in their determinate structure, but the whole process
of thought which contains in itself all limited representations in the
consciousness of their limitedness. 1148 What distinguishes the dia-
lectical method is its recognition of what is limited as limited, as
well as its recognition of its own~~irri.itations. Dialectical logic is
critical logic for, as Marcuse put it, "it reveals modes and con-
tents of thought which transcend the codified pattern of use and
validation. ,,49
But Horkheimer cannot ground a materialist critique ..on·~egel's ..
comprehensive system. Hegel's philosophy, consqnant with the
"innermost effort" of his owh thought, is superseded, "not by sub-
stituting for Reason saine extrarational standards, but by driving
Reason itself to recognize the extent to which it is still unreasonable,
blind, the victim of" unmastered forces. 1150 Insofar as the dialectic
is embedded in Hegel as an idealist system, it must be recast :and
itself determinately negated. Horkheimer writes: ~ ..
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In the reflection on his own system Hegel forgets a
very definite part of experience. The view that this
system is the completion of truth conceals from him
the meaning of the time -bound interest which influences
the individual dialectical presentations as regards the
direction of thought, the choice of material and the
use of names and words, and which t~rn~ his:atten-
tion from the fact that his conscious and unconscious
par:tiality vis -a-vis the questions of life must neces-
sarily become operative as constitutive elements of
his philosophy. 51
In contradistinction, Horkheimer formulates the materialist dialectic
reality can never be identical with, or absorbed into, men's con-
The recognition that the prevailing socio -economic conditions are
ceivable. 1I Thus, as McCarthy has summarized it;._
Aufhebung. Horkheimer's materialism asserts that trobjective lf
Horkheimer undertakes to radicalize Hegel's already
radically historical approach by (1) giving up· the
theologically motivated belief that progress, what-
ever it might consist in, is in any way guaranteed.
The progress of history depends on the decisions
and actions of historically acting subjects; by (2)
distancing himself from the conception of a universal.
history in the strict, i. e., Hegelian, sense. Thought,
rooted as it is in actual history, can never overview
the whole of history as a pre -given totality. Rather
it owes its most general categories to actual history
itself; and by (3) accepting the consequences of this
context-boundednes s for critical theory itself. 52
cepts; Iran isolated and completable theory of reality is simply incon-
~ ..
transitory and limited is not synonymous with the conception of their
as the "unconcluded ll dialectic (the unabgeschlossene Dialektik).
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Marcuse develops a parallel position. ,Dialectical thought
invalidates the "claimed rt opposition between fact and value. Facts
can only be understood as stages of a single process; truth can be
uncovered only within the subject-object totality. The totality is the
result of the constitutive activity of'both theoretical and .practical
labor. "All facts embody the knower as well ~s the doer; they con-
tinually translate past into present." Objects "contain" subjectivity
in their very structure. Dialectical analysis becomes historical
analysis. It embraces the prevailing negativity (that -which-is in
terms of that-which-is -not; that which is real which opposes' ~nd
deriies.thepoJentialities r inherep.t,:iri-itself;the~being9ther than. i~self);
as well as its negation (the transformation of factuality into realiza-
tion;5 of subjectivity coming to itself in history, where the develop-
ment has a rational content).
The given state of affairs is negative and can be
rendered positive only by liberating the possibilities
immanent in it. This last, the negation of the nega-
tion, is accomplished by establishing a new order of
things. The negativity and its negation are two dif-
ferent phases of the same historical proces s, straddled
by Inan l s historical action. The 1tnew" state is the
truth of the old, but that truth does not steadily and
automatically grow out of the earlier state; it can
be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of
men, that will cancel the whole of the negative state .53
Against Hegel's transposition of the tension between what could be
and what exists, beween being-in-itself (essence) and appearance,
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into the very structure of Geist, Marcuse interprets this tension
materialistically. Theory attempts to grasp the contradictory
character of social processes and presents their immanent but
1funconcluded, rt incomplete possibilities (the materialistic dialectic
is 1,'Unabgeschlossen"). This framework becomes the basis of his
reading of Marx, 54 which we will say more about in a moment.
This sociological radicalism raises questions as to the logical
structure of critical theory ~ How are the relationships between
theory and praxis, fact and value, etc., conceived to avoid relativism
or skepticism.? To what concept of truth does critical theory appeal,
if not to the Hegelian? Horkheimer IS and Marcuse's responses con-
tain moments of both identity and difference. For Horkheim'er' (1937)
critical theory stood against the embeddedness of traditional theory
in the reproductive process of present day society and those very
process es themselves. Critical theory was conceived to accelerate
the subversion of structures of exploitation. The differen'ce between
traditional and critical !~eory 'was the difference between two dif-
ferent "modes of cognition" {Erkenntnisweisen);.:traditional theory
being shaped by the mode of cognition of the natural sciences.
The axioms of traditional theory define general con-
cepts within which all the facts in the field must be
conceived. • . . In between, there is a hierarchy of
genera and species, between which there are generally
appropriate relations of subordination. The facts are
individual cases, examples or embodiments of the
genera. There are no temporal differences between
1.
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the units of the system.... Individual genera may
be added to the system or other changes made,but'
this is not normally conceived in the sense that the
determinations are necessarily too rigid and must
prove inadequate where the relation to the object or
the object itself changes without thereby losing its
identity. Rather, change s are treated as omis sions
in our earlier lmowledge or as the replacement of
individual parts of the object•..• Discursive logic,
or the logic of the intellect (Verstand) , even con-
ceives living devel~pment in this way. It is unable
to conceive the fact that man changes and yet remains
identical with himself. 55
Critical.~t}l~·orYj,., on the other hand, is, as we have seen,
radically sociological. It recognizes that its content is ever
changing.
There are no general criteria for critical theory as'
a whole, for such criteria always depend on a repe-
tition of events and thus on a self-reproducing
totality. • •• Despite all its insights into individual
steps and the congruence of its elements with those
of the most advanced traditional theori.es, critical
theory has no specific instance for its elf other than
its inherent interest in the supersession of class
domination. 56 .
Nor is there, Horkheimer adds further, a social class by whose
adherence and acceptance of the theory we could be guided. lilt is
possible for the consciousness of every social stratum today to be
limited and corrupted by ideology, however much, for its circum-
stances, it may be bent on truth. It In his important early progra-
matic statement about Critical theory, 57 Horkheimer explicates
Critical theoryls concerns and preoccupations. Critical theory, in
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the formation of its categories, concepts, and in all phases of its
development makes its own Ifan interest in a rational organization
of human activity which it has set itself to elucidate and legitim.ize.
For it is not just concerned with goals as they have been prescribed
by the existing'life forms, but with men and all their possibilities.,,58
Horkheimer asserts the objectivity of this truth for the goal of a
rational society "which today, of course, only appears to arise in
the imagination, is really ~vested in every man. 1159 It is given in
men as potential. From this stan4point Critical theory can unma'sk
the ideological, one -sided, and partial character: of competing
theories. '. But '0'1~ qtlE~,!stio~s as to the logical structure of Critical
theory are not resolved. This description of Critical theory gives
rise, as McCarthy has argued, to a related question: "In what way
can the interest in the future (an interest in a rational society) that
guides Critical theo!y be distinguished from the particularistic
interesUnconcealed behind ideological theories? ..60
This question must, of course, be answered if the interest in
the future which guides Critical theory is to be distinguished from
the interest(s} guiding ideological theories and suspicion of one-
sidedness, etc. "What is there, then, about the conception of free-
dom which guide s it [Critical theory] that ensures that it too is not
just another time -bound (say post-Enlightenment), culture -bound
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(say secularized bourgeois culture), and perhaps even class ~bound
(say alienated intellectuals) standpoint?1I 61
A reading of Horkheimerls "Critical and Traditional~ Theory"
and other Zeitschrift essays suggests that he tnore or less took up
the notion of the "coincidence of reason and freedom directly or
indirectly (i. e., through Marx) from Hegel without sufficiently
attending to the reworking of philosophical foundations that a rejec-
tion of Hegel1s idealism entails. 11 62 It is, however, less plausible
to suggest that .the above is true for all Horkheitner' s colleagues.
~ere we argue that Marcuse IS greater emphasis and explication of
Marx's philosophy and theory of labor does not allow such concer-
· · f.. 63tlneermg 0 posltlons. But before attempting to discuss Marcuse,
I
()
a few more points tnight be added to our exatnination of Horkheimer.
When the issues we raised above arise in Horkheimer he
attempts to ground Critical theory either, as we have seen, in an
"interesttr in the future that is immanent in man, and/ or, as he else-
where suggests, in human work. Thus, for example, Horkheimer
writes: "The viewpoints which Critical theory draws from historical
analysis as the goals of human activity, especially the idea of the
reasonable organization of society that will m.eet the needs of the
whole comm.unity, are im.m.anent in hum.an work, but are not correctly
grasped by individuals or by the common mind. 11 64 In this paper
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Horkheimer presents this view of work almost without argument, as
if it were obvious and could be taken for granted. The question is
not which interpretation of work is correct (and there are many),
but how. does one decide which interpretation and theory is correct
and which are ideologically corrupt? 65
In various expressions of culture, in art, religion, and philo-
sophy, Horkheimer (and Marcuse, although for some different reasons
as we shall see) sought to uncover the desire for a rational organiza-
tion of life and realization of freedom. But most cultural artifacts,
as they argued, have a double character; they are differentiable as
both (and predominantly) affirmative and yet also critical, progres-
sive, and regressive. 66 But who is to interpret these criteria, and
how? The Critical theorist is required to differentiate petween pro-
gressive and regressive tendencies. This, Horkheimer suggests, he
can d~ only on the basis of his interest in the future. I1A certain
concern is also required if these tendencies are to be preserved or
67
expressed. " We have moved in a circle, "since it was precisely
the legitimacy of this interest, its universal and nonideological char-
acter' that we wished to ground. ,,68 Elsewhere, other suggestions
are to be found, 69 but there is little philosophical elucidation of
what a rejection of Hegel's idealism entails, and little clarification
of a philosophy and social theory based on materialist presuppositions.
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What then, we must ask, is the status of Marx I s critique of
political economy? What is the status of a theory that claims to be
radically historical and at the same time attaches truth and validity
claims to its analysis of the epoch. In If Zum Probleme der Wahr-
heit, If Horkheimer argues that a dialectical theory which has given
up the
. • . metaphysical character of finality, the solem-
nity of a revelation, becomes itself a transitory ele-
ment bound up with the destiny of men. The uncon.-
eluded dialectic does not however lose the stamp of
truth. In fact, the uncovering of limitedness and one-
sidedness in one IS own and in other's~thoughtconsti­
tutes an important aspect of the intellectual pro-
cesses •••• Insofar as the experi~nceswon through
perception and deduction, methodical research and
historic events, everyday work and political struggle
stand up to the available means of knowledge, they
are the truth. The abstract reservation that' one day
a justified critique of one's own epistemic situation
will be put into play, that it is open to correction
expresses itself among materialists not in a tolerance
for contradictory opinions or even in a skeptical in-
decision, but in a watchfulness against one's own
error and in the mobility o!tlio~g~t.., • • • The theory
which we see as "right may ·one day disappear because
the practical and scientific interests which played a
role in its conceptual development, and more impor-
·tantly the things and conditions to which it referred
have disappeared. . . but a later correction does not
mean that an earlier truth was an earlier untruth, .' .•
the ,~iale~t~c. freed; from the idealist illusion over-
come s"the contradiction between relativism and dog-
matism. While it does not pr~sume that the progress
of critique and determination will end with its own
..standpoint, it in no way gives up the conviction that
its knowledge - -in the total context to which its con-
cepts and judgements refer - -is valid not only for indi-
viduals or groups but simply valid, i. e., that opposed
theories are 'false. 70
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Our questions remain: what are the criteria for this nonabsolute
truth? How do we judge between competing theories?
Horkheimer summarizes his position by reference to a type
of historico-practical confirmation:
It is not history which takes care of the correction
and further determination of the truth, so that the
knowing subject. • • would only have to look and
see; rather the truth is carried forward irisofar- as
the men whp have it stand firm by it, ·~p·piy- and .-
support it, act according to it, bring it to power
against all resistance from regressive, limited,
one-sided standpoints. The process of knowledge
involves real historical willing and acting as well
as experiencing and conceiving. The latter can-
not progress without the former.
In reference to the claimed innateness of the goal of a rational society
in men, etc., Horkheimer adds that this is not a claim Itthat should
bring a sigh of relief. For the realization of possibilities depends
on historical conflicts • • . man's own will plays a part in that truth,
and he may not take his ease if the prognosis is to come true. 1172
This concept of practical confirmation raises a series of problems.
Obviously, numerous questions arise here of a type not dissimilar
to those we discussed in Lukacs. For example, what if social praxis
is oriented toward fascism or technocratism, does this confirm or
leave intact our claims about the essence of human reality? Given
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theory is indeterminate and remains necessarily so lias long as it
[the truth] is measured against the idea of unconditionally certain
knowledge. For it is fulfilled only through historical action•.•• ,,7 3
The truth claim remains--unfalsified--but the theory awaits verifica-
tion. The issues that are invoked 'can be further illustrated by Hork-
heimer's conception of the status of Marx's critique of political
economy.
On the one hand he (and Marcuse) presuppose Marx's theory
of the general course of the comm.odity economy: Critical theory
becomes the unfolding of this unique existential judgment. Marx's
critique of political economy is the truth of capitalist society.74 On
the other hand, the need for revision is frequently recognized in
light of the "courselt of capitalist society and socialism in Russia,
75
etc. Yet, this theory is still the basis for judging the one -sided-
ness and partiality of all other competing theories. It is the basis
on which all other incomplete theories can be judged. ~>If:the trutl1: is
the whole, it is here assumed to 'be grasped)py~~ar~~···.1iere,'·a·s with
Lukacs, there are epistemological difficulties and here, as with
"Lukacs, there is a similar circle. The conclusion must also be the
same: "if the. notion of practical confirmation or falsification is to
used selectively, one must inquire after the theoretical basis of the
selection l1 ; since "the principles of selection themselves contain
theoretical llloments, one must ask about the adequacy of these
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theoretical moments, 1176 the taken-for-granted background theory
and its relation to those under investigation, and the society that is
changing. Otherwise, we risk leaving everything as it was.
The critical spirit attempts to provide the milieu··for the deter-
minate negation of the present social order. Those wp.opartake of
its original tenets refuse "to speak the language of domination."??
Horkheimer's version of Critical theory is in essence negative, but
not wholly so. For Horkheimer seeks to maintain a positive ideal
of truth and virtue, while adopting a wholly negative attitude to other
theories, views, and interested standpoints. In Hegel, such a unity
of positive and negative lTIoments is not a necessary contradiction,
if we pass through Stoicism and Skepticism to the insights of the
Unhappy Consciousness. There,
• • . the "hitherto negative attitude" of self -cons cious-
ness towards reality "turns into a positive attitude.
So far it [consciousness] has been concerned merely
with its own independence and freedom; it has sought
to keep itself "for itself" at the expense of the world
as its own and real world, which in its permanence
possesses 'an interest for it. 'I The subject conceives
the world as its own "presence" and truth; it is cer-
tain of finding only itself there. ?8
This process is the movement of history itself. The question, none-
theless, arises: how is this process and presence ;of ·the. ~ubject and
its truth to be conceived? HorkheilTIer clearly rejects Hegel's own
view and in doing so risks contradiction unless he adequately grounds,
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historically and! or philosophically, his priviledged standpoint. For
Horkheimer the truths to be drawn out are primarily negations. He
is unable to accept, as foundational, the claims to rigor of the model
of the natural sciences; the standpoint of the proletariat; the position
of the party or its leadership; or, for example, the social practice
of groups and classes of his day. He says little, if anything, positive
about the telos of his work. IfIn regard to the essential kind of change
at which Critical theory aims, there can be no ••. concrete per-
ception of it until it actually comes about. If the proof of the pudding
is in the eating, the eating here is still in the future. 1179 The dialec-
tic is necessarily negative .for lIin a historical period like the present,
true theory is more critical than affirmative. II This view finds its
full development and justification in The Dialectics of the Enlighten-
ment. However, the negative judgments of Horkheimer' s Critical
theory always, as we have tried to point out, assume a social theory
to which it grants a privileged status and/ or an interest in a rational
society according to which it demarcates itself from other ideological
theories. _'His view of the privileged status of this theory is, as we
have seen, circular and insufficiently founded. Further, this
"interest" was, we argued, neither philosophically grounded nor
identifiable with a particular cl~ss standpoint. The (possible) con-
verge~ce of reason and freedom was said, by Horkheimer, to be
'(1
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immanent in man and work. But who is justified in interpreting
this criterion? A few intellectuals? How can we interpret it, let
alone elaborate and justify its immanence? Horkheimer had a strong
tendency to treat the answers to these questions as: self -evident ..
There is little attempt to systematically address ',.these questions.
Without it his attempt to ground Critical theory is dogmatic. What
is required and what is lacking is an elaboration and elucidation of
the notions of lIreason, II Ittruth, " and ltfreedom" upon which his
theory relied, but which are taken over from Hegel, via Marx, with-
out adequate reflection ... W!~a~~otild have to be demonstrated, amongst
other things, is:
1. why the interest in a rational society is universal and
2. why Marxism is the correct theoretical expression of
this interest.
Neither point receives sufficient attention in Horkheimer's work.
The rejection of Hegel's idealism requires the development of alter-
native philosophical and social foundations which find too brief an
extension here.
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CHAPTER VII
THE THEORY OF LABOR AS THE FOUNDATION
OF THE UNITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
The views of Lukacs' 1967 Preface suggest that a theory of
labor and needs could provide a material consumation that over-
comes the construction of idealism and provides an elucidation of ')
thought on materialist presuppositions. Some of the arguments of
Lukacs' most sympathetic critics would suggest the same direction.!
The argument is also found in Marcuse. 2 We attempt, below, to
explicate such a theoretical position, although the position is not
claimed to be that which is found in Lukacs 1 later work, or through-
3
out Marcuse. Howeyer, it seems worthwhile to reconstruct and
develop a theory of labor, etc., given the stress both theorists have
placed on it and given its cont.emporary vitality (e.g., in the work of
Alfred Schmidt). 4 The emphasis is on reconstruction and develop-"
ment because a theory of labor has not been systematically worked
through by the authors in the works to which we will be directly
refer"ring. Their works are often at best suggestive, and frequently
contain ambiguities and unexplicated presuppositions. As a conse-
quence I will attempt to take up the suggestions made and develop
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them through considerations of a variety of texts, especially the
early works of Marx.
It should be emphasized that what is o~tlined here is only the
briefest development of a series of arguments that could take various
complex forms. I only hope to sketch an approach which is claimed
to go beyond the positions of the early Lukacs and Horkheimer. (A
more complete exploration of these points would, of course, have to
involve a detailed consideration of Lukacs' last labor in the Ontology,S
an exam.ination of Marcuse's Heidegerrian Marxism, the various
developm.ents of his later work,~and a detailed consideration of con-
temporary positions.) Here we merely hope to indicate the direction
of the program and say a little about its limitations.
It was in Lukacs t later writing, as we noted earlier, that he
suggested that Marx's "great insight" into the labor process was
passed by (3.nd over in History and Class Consciousness.
Marx's great insight that H even production for the
sake 'of production means nothing more than the
developm~nt of the productive energies of man, and
hence the -development of the wealth of human nature
as an end in itself" lies outside the terrain which
History and Class Consciousness is able to explore.6
For Lukacs t"his meant that (1) capitalist exploitation loses its
"objectively revolutionary aspect," i. e., its objectively progres-
sive qualities and revolutionary implications. He felt that, in his
earlier work, he had not yet comprehended the material foundation
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of capitalist exploitation. In Lukacs I view this was because he had
not grasped the ontological objectivity of nature, the labor process,
upon which all social processes are based and therefore, in his view,
to be understood. Secondly, he felt that he had previously failed to
grasp and comprehend the fact that "although this evolution of the
species Man is accomplished at first at the expense of the majority
of individual human beings and of certain human clas ses, it finally
overcomes this antagonism and coincides with the evolution of the
particular individual. Thus the higher development of individuality
is only purchased by a historical process in which individuals are
sacrificed. ,,7
What Lukacs is suggesting in these quotations is that the under-
standing of the development of history, the species, and the individual
has to be closely tied to an adequate conceptualization of the process
of labor, the "dialectics of labour. 11 Further, the telos of social
formation is, no longe r, the elusive and abstract notion of the identity
of subject and object, but rather "a notion of a harmonious, total
appropriation of objective reality by an objective, embodied subject.8
The fulfillment of what Marx called manls "species nature" (a notion
that will be elaborated below) becomes the goal of a future rational
social order, the Itparadigm1f of which might be conceived in, for
example, the terms of the following passage:
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The immediate, natural and necessary relation of
person to person is the relation of man to woman.
In this natural species relationship man's relation-
ship to nature is immediately his relation to man,
just as his relation to man is immediately his rela-
tion to nature - -his own natural destination. In this
relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested,
reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which
the human essence has become the human essence
of man. From this relationship one can therefore
judge man's whole level of development. 9
Commenting on this 'passage from Marx's Economic and Philosophi-
cal Manuscripts, Paul Walton and Andrew Gamble note that "the
humanised relation of two reproducing animals is precisely its nature
as a reciprocal activity, entered into freely and consciously, with
10the aim of .satisfying the other as oneself. If This constitutes full,
undistorted sociality which, as we sheill see, is a key element con-
stitutive of species nature. 11 These ideas need closer examination.
We begin by addressing the concept of labor.
,
In an interview, published posthumously, Lukacs suggests that
his new work centers on the question of the relationship betweeen
necessity and freedom, causality and teleology. "Traditionally,"
Lukacs sa~d{: ','philosophers have always built systems founded on
one or the other of these two poles. They have either denied neces - .
sity or denied human freedom. My aim is. to show the ontological
interrelation of the two, and to reject the 'either -or t standpoints
with which philosop4yhas presented man. The concept of labour is
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the hinge of my analysis • • . The notion of alternatives is basic to
the meaning of human labour, which is thus always teleological- -it
sets an aim which is the result of a choice. It thus expresses human
12 ' ,freedom. " What is this conc ept of labor or, as Lukacs puts it
elsewhere, "the dialectics of labour," the "Marxian Ontology"?
How can we conceptualize this new direction?
For Marx, nature becomes objective for us through the laboring
process, in which both nature and the laboring subjects are them-
selves transformed. We may speak, in a limited sense, about a
"dialectics of nature 1t in that the synthesis of material labor unites
the historical subject (which is of nature) and the process of nature.
Through Man, and by virtue of men's theoretical-practical activity,
Itnature attains self-consi::iousness tf and Itamalgamates with itself." 13
Human activity, labor, production, and creation also, therefore,
mediates between men and society. For Marx the world was the
Itworld of man. II He rejects the metaphysical idea of a "final uni-
versa1 goal II given and unfolding in history; 14 a goal that predeter-
mines the meaning of the world; a Spirit or Logos that guides m.an's
praxis from an organic, sense -certain, undifferentiated unity between
man and nature to a rational, reasoned differentiated unity between
man and nature (which preserves individuality in a context of self-
conscious collectivity). 15 . Goals and purposes, in the strict sense,
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are always a category of human practice and here, as Alfred Schmidt
has pointed out, Marx IIlimited himself, as a materialist, to what
Hegel called the ·:'finite -teleological standpoint.'.". ·.,H.egel J?ut·.i~ this
way:
In practice man relates to nature as to somethi~~g
immediate and external. He himself is in this rela-
tion an immediately ext~rnal and hence sensuousal1cl
individual, who has however the right to conduct him-
self towards natural objects as t~eir purpose. 16
In Capital,· Marx discussed at length the way in which the "purposive
will" 17 of man "triumphs over nature":
We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as
exclusively human. A spider conducts operations
that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to
shame many an architect in the construction of her
cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect
from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises
his structure in imagination before he erects it in
reality. At the end of the labour proces s, we get a
result that already existed in the imagination of the
labourer at its commencement, that was therefore
already ideally present. He not only effects a change
of the form of the natural basis; in it he also realizes
his purpose, which he lmows, which determines the
mode of his activity, and to which he must subordinate
his will. 18
According to both Hegel and Marx, labor's purposes are sub-
.ject to necessary limitations'; they are limited objectively "by the
material at men's disposal •.. and, subjectively, by the structure
of men's needs and drives. ,,19 Marx, of course, went beyond Hegel
in attempting to work out the socio -historical roots of human
i
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purposes. In doing so, he includes (although in sketchy form) an
analysis of the complex further lTIediations that arise w.hen labor
casts off its "first, instinctual form" in which man (simply) utilized
nature through the natural organs of his body. In a higher unity of
man and nature, conscious production directed to a" purpose, is
mediated through the role of tools 20 or artifacts. 21
Marx conceives man·s "finite-telological activity," his "pur-
poseful creations," his 1fconsciousactivitylt as critical for the ade-
quate differentiation of manls species characteristics from those of
animals. Man externalizes and objectifies his nature, history is the
creation and record of his ·praxis. Labor is the defining, natural,
and historical condition of lTIan. But lTIore than this can be said. In
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx argued that
It
• • an animal only produces what it imlTIediately needs for itself
n
or its young. It.produces one -sidedly, whilst man produces univer-
sally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical
need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need
and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. tr 22 Here and else-
where in these early writings23 Marx distinguishes human nature
from the nature of animals by reference to four characteristics of
manls productive activity. It is, as we have seen, (1) conscious,
purposive (solTIetimes he uses the word "self-conscious"). It is also
n·,
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(2) universal, there are no limits to man's capacity to extend him-
self and, therefore, history. Man produces in order to live, to
satisfy his material needs. He also, according to Marx, produces
free of physical need and men "only truly produce in freedom there-
from. II There are, we suggested above, necessary limitations on
human production. But these are operative in qualitatively different
ways in each historical epoch. What man will make or is capable of
making admits of no formal answer. (3) Man's productive activity
can be ,planned, and (4) it is flsocial. II In the Manuscripts Marx
suggests that man is a social being because "he exists in reality as
the representation and the real mind of social existence, and as the
sum of human manifestations of social existence. ,,24 Eac'h man is
both unique and a communal being. He is the "supjective existence
of society as thought and experienced. ,,25 In the German Ideology
the concept of social being receives important further alteration. 26
It can be argued27 that Marx saw language as intrinsic to and, there-
fore, further defining of human production. Although Marx's state-
ments about tanguage are underdeveloped, they provide us with
further insight into the social nature of man's species being. He
wrote:
Language is as old as [human] consciousness, lan-
guage is practical consciousness that exists also
for other Inen,:,~nd··for,·thatreason alone it really
exists personally as well; language, like conscious-
ness, only arises from the need, the necessity·, o~ ,
1,1
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intercourse, with other men. 28
As Michael Gordy has pointed out, "the necessity he [Marx] speaks
of is empirical necessity because language is practical conscious-
ness and practice is empirical. Since practical consciousness, i.e.,
purposive consciousness, is what makes production human, then
language, or the possibility of language, is coextensive with human
production." For Marx, "language is im.possible without human
beings living together and talking to each other, so the pos sibility
of language implies human society. Since the possibility of language
is coextensive with human production, human production is "social. rr29
The form of man's labor, its quality and quantity vary, Marx
of course reasoned, with natural and historical circumstances. In
Capital, however, he says why it is essential to begin with a study
of man, man's essence, the nature of labor:
To know what is useful forLa=.dog, one must study dog-
nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from
the principle of utility. Applying this to tnan, he that
would criticize all human acts, movements, relations,
etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with
human nature in general, and then with human nature
as modified in each historical epoch. 30
Therefore, it is claimed; in order to know what is central and use-
ful for m.ankind, we must begin from analysis of m.an, of labor in
general and then labor as developed, changed, and constrained in
each social formation. The unity that informs Marx's project is,
l.
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Paul Walton and Andrew Gamble s~ggest·, "his 'constant insistence on basic
premises which reveal the dialectics of labour. "
The labour process, which antedates value, and serves
as its starting point, thus again makes its appearance
within capital, as a process which occurs inside its
substance and forms its content. The labour proces s,
because of its apstractnes s, and its material nature,
is equally 'char~c~eristic of all forms of production.31
From an understanding of the "natural unitylf of what is "exclusively
human ll Marx 'proceeds to explore (from the early writings on
alienation to the concrete measure of exploitation of labor power in
Captial) how man's development is constrained by the history of
In tear.ing away from man the object of his produc-
tion' [this] tears from him his species -life, his real
objectivity as a member of the species, and trans-
forms his advantage over animals into the disadvan-
tage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away
from him. 32
The analysis is directed to uncover "~the tensions between the "natural
unity" of labor and its historical unfreedom, in order to explore the
conditions for the possibility of overcoming structures of alienation;'
conditions that might reveal developing "needs If and ttpurposes" that
cannot be met under, for example, capitalism I s rigid preoccupation
with profit and distribution of scarce values.
Commenting on a similar reading of Marx, Walton and Gamble
declare that the problem now becomes that of deriving operational
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concepts from lithe dialectic ll that will both account for and help
reveal the dynamics and direction of social change. "What we have
to show, If they add, lIis how alienation is linked to the labour theory
of value in Marx's work and in so doing highlight their dependence
upon his view of man... 33
Yet, within the terms of reference of the theory, several ques-
tions remain. How; given a claimed human essence of the type dis-
cussed above,~canwe explain structures of unfreedom? Does the
quality of man's species characteristics change over time? If so,
does his essence change? If so, how can we claim a concept of
essence that is/trans-historical or a-historical or how can we ana-
lyze its changing social form over tirrle? What is the relation of
es sence and appearance over time? How is alienation, if conceived
as embracing the four dimensions Marx discusses in the Economic
and Philosophical Manuscri:ets , 34 to be linked to a critique of capi-
talist society that includes the concept of human essence, species
characteristics, as its foundational premise? If man is alienated
from his species being, how can we still justify our premises, i.e.,
can we still claim man has species characteristics if, as OIlman
suggests, "alienated man. . • has lost touch with all human
35
specificity':I?". -.
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The argument can be taken several stages further by an ana-
lysis of Marcuse's work. In developing this second argumentation
we use the above discussion as a backdrop and attempt to advance
the argument beyond the problematics raised by the questions above.
Marcuse shares Horkheirner's position on sociological radical-
ism, the unconcluded nature of the dialectic and the stress on an
immanent, ~ssential potential in man that is yet to be realized. But
in place oia relatively static epistemological relationship of essence
to appearance and fact, Marcuse develops a critic-al and dynamic
relationship of essence to appearance seen as parts of a historical
process. With Horkheimer he stresses the embeddedness of all
theory in social struggle; its ultimately necessary confirmation in
practice but also its ultimate (as yet) irr~ducibilityto any given
form of social practice. "The truth of the Illodel of essence, II he
argues, "is preserved better in human misery and suffering and the
st!uggl~ to overcome them than in the forms and concepts of pure
thought. ,,36 This truth is 1findeterminatetr and remains necessarily
so. It is fulfilled "only through historical action, and its connection
can thus result only,~p6-st\feptum~ll~1 The trti.thl..~claim ren:ains~ ,a"s .we
philosophy with"social ~the'or'y, ~Marcu'se-expli<;ated -this,·theor~tical
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intention at greater length. In Reason and Revolution, "The Concept
of Essence," and in other places, Marcuse explained that "if there
was to be any progress beyond this philosophy [Hegel's], it had to
advance beyond philosophy itself and, at the same time, beyond the
social and political order to which-philosophy had tied its fate. 11 37
In a critique of Sartre' s existentialism, he wrote:
One step more toward concretization [away from-
Hegel's philosophy] would have meant a transgression
beyond philosophy itself. Such a transgression
occurred in opposition to Hegel's philosophy. •
When they [Kierkegaard and Marx] came to grips
with the concrete existence, they abandoned and
repudiated ···pllil6s ophy~- F'or lMarx, .th"e·'i concep.- ~
tion of "realite humaine" is the critique of political
economy and the theory of socialist revolution. The
opposition against Hegel pronounces the essential
inadequacy of philosophy in the face of the concrete
human existence. 38
Marcuse argues that one criterion for the objective validity of
dialectical theory's separation of essence and appearance is the
"suitability of its concepts for service as the organizing principle
in the explanation of a given group of"appearances (e. g., constella-
tions of political power among states of a specific era, their alliances
and conflicts). If the historical structure (e. g., 'imperialism ')
postulated as 'essential' for the explanation of such a grouping makes
it possible to comprehend causally thesitu.ation both in its individual
phases as well as in terms of the tendencies effective within it, then
it is really the essential in that manifold of appearances. This
It
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determination of essence is true: it has held good within the theory.,,39
Yet, Marcuse goes on to argue, the theory of which it is a part is
itself at the same time a factor in the historical struggles that it
aims to grasp and catch: lIonly in them can the essential theoretical
truths be ultimately verified. And from this very historicity of
dialectical concepts grows a new kind of 'universal validity' and
objectivity.1I40 The question is: how are we to conceive the dynamic
and historical relationship of essence and appearance from which a
new kind 'of "universal validity" and "objectivity" derive? The re
is a strong tendency, in Marcusets earlier work, to answer this
question, explicitly, through a theory of alienation, grounded in the
concept of labor and a dialectic of needs. This is how we shall read
his work here.
For Marcuse the distinctions between appearance and essence,
form/content, immediacy/potentiality, have significance at more
than one level. First, they have import for the analysis and explana-
tion of social formations and realities. The appearance and form of
a social reality is not to be taken to be synonymous with illusion.
To uncover the essence and content (to explain appearance and form)
requires an analysis that is itself a "process of elucidating one
reality by disclosing its Ioundation in and determination by another.,,4l
(Cf. the example of imperialism above.) Marcuse argues that all the
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concepts that Marx and Critical theory employ make -possible a know-
ledge of reality in opposition to the freezing of the given, the false
facticity and evidences of immediate reality. In doing this they
refer us to a sec ond level of significance. For in examining, for
example, capitalist society they refer us to 1fs tandards entirely
"foreign to commodity production, It they are also 'critical concepts.
Concern for man moves into the center of the theory and to a con-
ceptualization of man's potentiality within a particular historical
situation. 1fAt this level the tension between essence and appearance,
between authentic potentiality and immediate existence, is reflected
anew in the concrete notions with which the theory attempts to grasp
the social process of life in its antagonistic character. 11 42 These
concrete notions belong to two levels: (1) Some deal with phenomena
in their reified form, as they appear immediately, and others aitn
at their real content, as it presents itself to theory once its immediate
and taken-far-granted phenomenal form has been transcended.
Both groups of concepts are equally necessary to an
understanding of the antagonistic reality; neverthe-
less, they are not on the same level. In terms of
dialectical theory, the second group of concepts,
which has been derived from the totality of the social
dynamic, is intended to grasp the essence and the
true content of the manifestations which the first
group describes as they appear. 43
The dialectical concepts transcend the given social reality in the
direction of another historical structure which is present as a
Ii 1_._._._
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tendency in the given reality. trThe positive concept of essence.
, (~
j ~ .
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is rooted in this potential structure. "
In attempting to demarcate progressive and regressive moments,
the potential from the given, Marcuse often has the propensity to
make similar arguments to those that Horkheimer used. This was
indicated in the discussion of Horkheimer above. Marcuse often
includes references to "the inte rest of freedom," "historical goals, "
which have the potentiality to be fulfilled in a real lIuniversality. rr 44
The arguments that underlie these phrases and similar ones45 can
easily be read as following Horkheimer's pattern of argutnentation,
viz., Itthe interest in a future rational society" or as treating as
self-evident what a lIprogressive and truly universal" view is, etc.
To the extent that this is true, the criticisms we made of Horkheitner's
position obviously apply and will not be repeated here. However,
there is an alternative reading, which is the one that principally con-
cerns us. Marcuse can be read as subsutning a theory of labor and
·needs, from which a particular type of social theory is said to follow.
He can be seen, consequently, as recasting and grounding theory and
thoug~t on materialist presuppositions. The theory needs further
explication. In Marcuse's work it finds extended developtnent in
Reason and Revolution (although we shal1!'refei-back to"othe~ earlier
works).
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Marcuse argues that Marx focused his theory on the labor pro-
cess and "by doing so held to and consumated the principle of the
Hegelian dialectic that the structure of the content (reality) deter-
mines the structure of the theory. 1146
He made the foundations of civil society the founda-
tions of the theory of civil society. This society
operates on the principle of universal labour, with
the labour process decisive for the totality of human
existence; labour determines the value of all things.
Since the society is perpetuated by the continued
universal exchange of the products of labour, the
totality of human re~ations is governed by the imma-
nent laws of the economy. The development of the
individual and the range of his freedom depend on
the extent to which his labour satisfies a social need.
All men are free, but the mechanisms of the labour
process govern the freedom of them all. The study
of the labour proces s is, in the last analysis, abso-
lutely necessary in order to discover the conditions
for realizing reason and freedom in the real sense.
A critical analysis of that ,f.rocess thus yields the
final theme of philosophy. 7
Marx, Marcuse argues in an ea!lier essay, takes up the Hegelian
concept of labor with all its essential characteristics: "'Labour is
the becoming-for-itself of man within externalization (Entausserung)
or as externalized man.' ,,48 In contrast to the concrete analysis of
the "labour processes tr in Capital this is, of course, an "abstract"
determination of labor (that is insufficient for economic theory). But,
Marcuse also points out, "it remains the foundation for all concrete
concepts of labour in Marx and is explicitly operative in Capital:
As the creator of use -values, as useful labour, labour is therefore
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a condition of. human existence independent of all social forms; it is
external natural necessIty that mediates the material e xc4ange
between man and nature, and thus human life ...49 The essential
tenets of the concept of labor, which were developed on pages 375 ff.,
are here explicit and/ or implicit. Labor as "mediation, 11 "objec-
tification, l' etc., finds its place, but with one major change in
emphasis: the process of history as man's becoming, development
and potential real.ization, finds greater expression and thematization.
Being and becoming are constituted through the being and
becoming of historical, human existence. Within the totality of
being, the meaning of labor is the key constitutive element for all
human praxis. In the ItFoundations of the Concept of Labour, II
Marcuse stresses that the very structure of being human, embraces
the lInecessity for life" ("the remedy of wants always leaves some-
thing to imagine and that some unfulfilled want always remains
b h - d • 1t)50e ln .••
The necessity for life underlines an "ontological"
condition: it is grounded in the very structure of
being human that simply can never reduce to a pas-
sive process, but must constantly be a process of
Itself-creation" as Itself-making. II Even praxis of
human existence which is self -mediated in the pro-
cess of coming to know itself, requires "labour"
as the mode of its becoming. 51
Being human is always lTIore than its present existence: "a discre-
pancy that demands constant labour. "
II
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This essential excess of being over existence con-
stitutes the primordial.and ineliminaple-humsn~
"necessity for life ll (GattI). Man's very structure
of need is grounded in it and its fulfilling is the final
meaning of labour: the need for an enduring and
lasting self-fulfillment of the existence in the
actuality of all its possibilities - -a task in whose
service the economy ultimately is also engaged. 52
In the labor process m'an develops both his inner and outer nature
in a continuous ever -transforming process. It is a process in which
he develops, struggling to fulfill anticipated needs. It is a process
of becoming, a process with a final meaning. Any analysis of social
life has to capture this dynamic process in its categories.
Marcuse stresses that far from being a mere economic activity
(Erwerbstatikeit), labor is and was conceived by Marx, as the "exis-
tential activitytr of man, his "free conscious activity"- -"not a means
for maintaining his life (Lebensmittel) but for developing his 'univer-
53
sal nature I • It
The new categories [of political economy] will evalu-
ate the economic reality with a'view to .what it has
made of man, of his faculties, powers, and needs.
Marx summarizes these human qualities when he
speaks of the "universal essence ll of man; his exami-
nation of the economy is specifically carried on witp. ..,.
the question in mind whether that economy realizes
man's Geltungwesen (universelles Wesen). 54
Marcuse does not specify at any length what he considers Marx meant
by "universal essence." Nor does he specify at length what he con-
siders the "universal essence" of man to be. We will, following
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textual suggestions take this to be the fulfillment of man IS species
nature through labor (hitherto discussed) which can be characterized
as self-conscious, universal, social, planned, and free. 55 (Man is
f,ree if 11 Inature is his work and his reality, I so that he 'recognizes
himself in a world he has himself made , .,,)56
The "final theme of philosophy" opens problems and possibilities
which are no longer philosophical. The self-realization of man now
requires the explanation, understanding, and abolition of certa~nmodes
of labor. The critique begins in philosophical terms because the
"enslavement of labour" and its emancipation are both conditions
that affect the very foundation of human existence and go beyond the
framework of tr~ditional political economy. 57 Marx, of course,
departs from philosophical terminology in the elaboration of his own
theory. However, Marcuse points out: "The critical, transcendental
character of economic categories, hitherto expressed by pl1ilosophical
concepts, later, in Capital, is demonstrated by the economic cate-
gories themselves. ,,58 A few further points need to be made.
Marcuse elaborates Mar~'s notion of alienated labor in its com-
plex social forms. We cannot, for obvious reasons of space, develop
this specific discussion. 59 It is important to note, however, the
different levels of analysis. On the one hand, Marx's discussion of
manls alienation from his product, process, fellowman, and species
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being is developed. Under the capitalist mode of production, it is
concluded, "the worker does not affirm but contradicts' his essence."
The concept of second nature summarizes this state of alienation. 60
History is nature I s coming to be in self -consciousness. Yet a dis-
tinction persists. Man is of nature and makes history, but nature
is not made by man.
The distinction is vital: if it is lost then the laws of
history are simply equated ·with the laws of nature;
they are made timeless and unchangeable. Rather
the laws in history exist, are natural, blind, and
fateful, but are ultimately grounded in human insti-
tutions. The! are specifically historical; they can.
be changed. 6
In an essay on Karl Popper, Marcuse writes that: "The less a
society is rationally organized and directed by the collective efforts
of free men, the more it will appear as an individual governed by
'inexorable' laws. . . . ,,62
The dialectical analysis of social reality. • . shows
this reality to be overpowered by objective mechanism
that operates with the necessity of "natural1f (physical)
laws. . . • The movement is dialectical in its elf inas-
much as it is not yet piloted by the self-conscious
activity of freely associating individuals. 63
The analysis of economic, objective facts becomes necessary in
order to grasp the complex cycle of the reproductive processes of
. civil society. But in such an analysis itself, objective facts are not
simply facts: they come "alive and enter an indictment of society. "
An economic. theory cannot but in turn be a critical theory. "Economic
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realities exhibit their own inherent negativity. 11
In Marx; as for Hegel, dialectical analysis moves from
appearance to es s ence, from immediacy to potentiality. Critical
theory follows and explicates ·the existential dialectic by taking cog-
I?-izance of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is "the
moving and creating principle," the labor process.
The dialectic is the "dialectic of negativity"--every
fact is Illore than a fact; it is a negation and restric-
tion of real possibilities. Wage labour is a fact, but
at the same time it is a restraint on free work that
might satisfy human needs. Private property is a
fact, but at the same time it is a negation of man 1s
collective appropriation of nature.... ManIs social
practice embodies the negativity as well as its over-
coming. 64
From an understanding of labor in general, the dialectics of labor,
we can make explicit what is imIllanently possible, potential,:~~nd
available to determinate negation. But, Marcuse stresses, this can
only be done in historical analysis. It is a central tenet of Marcuse 's
analysis that man's capacity to realize his essence evolves and changes
over time. So, on the other hand, the analysis of alienated labor
must be supplemented with an analysis of its continually. changi!1g
social form, and, also, of the positive concept of essence rooted
in it.
Here again the development from Hegel is essential. Hegel's
philosophy,. Marcuse argues, revolves around the universality of
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reason; it was a rational system with ee:tch moment, its every part
(the subjective and objective, of for-itselfness and in-itselfness) inte-
grated into a comprehensive, structured, self-unfolding whole.
Marx shows, and this is the crucial development, in Marcuse 's
view, that capitalist society first put such a universality lnto
practice.
Capitalism developed the productive forces for the
totality of a uniform social system. Universal com-
merce, universal competition and the universal inter-
dependence of labour were made to prevail and trans-
formed men into "world-historical, empirically
universal individuals. 1165
This universality is, of course, a negative one for the productive
forces,. man's products, impinge on him as uncontrolled alien power,
second nature. But in concrete, social theoretic analysis, Marx
uncovers in the dynamic of this social formation and mode of pro-
duction (under the laws of capitalist accumulation and value, etc .)66
the objective possibility of this negativity being negated. One class
in capitalist society makes this possible and points in the direction
of another historical structure which is present as a tendency.
The proletariat is distinguished by the fact that, as
a class it signifies the negation of all classes. The
interests of all other classes are essentially one-
sided; the Eroletariat1s interest is essentially
universal. 7
How can we conceive, ground, and justify the claimed "universal
interests"? Marcuse's answer is worth quoting at length:
(;1
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The universality of the proletariat is, again, a nega-
tive universality, indicating that the alienation of
labour has intensified. . . . The labour of the prole-
tarian prevents any self-fulfillment; his work negates
his entire existence. This utmost negativity, how-
ever, takes a positive turn. The very fact that he is
deprived of all assets of the prevailing system sets
him beyond this system. He is a member of the class
Ilwhich is really rid 6f the old world and at the same
time stands pitted against it." The "universal char-
acterll of the proletariat is the final basis for the
universal character of the communist revolution. .
The proletariat is the negation not only of certain
particular human potentialities, but also of man as
such. All specific distinguishing marks by which men
are differentiated lose their validity...• (Property,
culture, religion, nationality).... His concern to
exist is not the concern of a given group, .class or
nation, but is truly universal and "woi"ld historical. u68
Capitalism puts universality into practice and creates the possibility
of "universal reason. II It creates a subject that re,presents the
universality of man, for its structural and historical determinants
create the conditions for the realization of man's species nature.
Capitalism fulfills the condition of necessary universality; it
revolutionizes the productive forces and creates the possibility of
production free from the immediacy, of physiological needs; it
socializes produ.ction; "allH that is required and left is that men
recognize and repudiate fetishism, the appearance and form of capital,
and with their (ever -present) tlpurposive -will," will history their own.
Few other than Marcuse have appreciated the immense diffi-
culties involved in this last step and the blocks to its realization. 69
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It "is he~e, however, that Critical theory--as we have expounded it--
finds its role. And it is the immanent possibility of the confluence
of historical developments and hum.an essence, the becoming of
manls species characteristics, that directs this theoretical labor.
We asked earlier how we could interpret the concept of truth in
the following passage of Marcuse:
Theory accompanies the practice at every moment,
analyzing the changing situation and formulating its
concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for
realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains
the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian.
Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary
practice deviates from its proper pat4. 70
We are now in a situation to offer a reading and interpretation. It
was argued that the labor process is pivotal in the constitution of
being; that the dialectics of labor disclose the unfolding of man and
his powers in history. In the Frankfurt School reading, however,
the dialectic is, as ·we have seen, unconcluded and open. Read in
this way the theory of labor and needs attempts to surmount the
difficulties raised by our questions to the first argumentation. The
potential for man to realize his ·~es senceiis -:.conceive"d>as being··his-
torical and dynamic. Marx was read as resting his theory on the
assumption that the labor process determines the totality of human
existence and thus gives to society its basic patterns. As manifest
in capit.alisrn, the "productive activity" of man was said to have
~I
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created the possibility of realizing species nature. The truth of this
process and its immanent potentiality is the world constitutive activity
of labor. The key constitutive element in the overcoming of capi-
talism and authoritarianism emerges as dependent on the historical
and pivotal role of the proletariat. The truth claims of Critical
theory are intertwined with man's historico ~practical activity and
rest, consequently, on a philosophy of m.aterialism., an analysis of
labor, and, therefore, on the species characteristics of man. The
analysis of modes of labor and production can, as a consequence, be
empirical, analytic, and critical. The interest in freedom and a
rational social order is grounded in every act of labor. Every
mom.ent of labor anticipates the fulfillment of the specie s charac-
teristics of man, an enduring and lasting self-fulfill~ent of existence
in the actuality of all its possibilities. The "universal validity"
and "objectivitytl of this IIreconstructedll school--:,of.(3r;itical theory
finds its foundation in an analysis of labor itself.
Therefore, for Marcuse, the parameters of theory are set by
the nature of man's social practice, his labor. In an analysis of
labor, the claim is made, we find the foundation of the unity of
theory and practice. But this unity is not to be understood as a
simple identity. In an analysis of the essence of labor, theory finds
a basis that is both internal to practice and independent of its given
:(1
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form. Critical theory is grounded in a notion of theoretical truth
that is both of practice, i. e., an expression of its essence, and
irreducible to its historical manifestation at any given moment.
Marcuse emphasizes that Marx's conception of reality as
dialectical was "originally motivated by the same datum as Hegells,
namely, by the negative character of reality. "
IIi the social world this negativity carried forward
the contradictions of class society and"thus remained
the motor of the social process. Every single fact
and condition was drawn into this process so that its
significance could be grasped only when seen in this
totality to which it belonged. For Marx, as for Hegel,
"the truth ll lies only in the whole, the IInegative
t~tality. 1171
Social reality, however, can only be conceived as a negative totality
in the process of ,abstraction, "a 'process which is· iirp.posed on Critical
theory by the very structure of its subject matter. The analysis of
the·labor process continually reveals the necessity to move through
two fundamental levels .of analysis. We must first grasp in its
immediacy, the f~tishizedworld of appearances, the "pseudo-
concrete, 11 and in so doing we must follow the abstractions that
make up this world. The second step is then lithe abstraction from
the abstraction" (Marcuse) to the true concrete world, to essence.
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Accordingly, the Marxian and Critical theory of capitalism elabo-
rates first, the abstract relations such as commodity, exchange
value, money, wages, and ;returns-from:to.,the' concrete ·totality,
, - - . ,
the structural tendencies that lead to its self-generated collapse
and to immanent and potentially successful emergence of a socialist
totality.
The negativity of reality is an historical and social condition,
the analysis of it,;:always historical. The study of any moment of
the "world of m.en l1 is, Marcuse argues, inescapably enlbedded in
the structure of the socio -historical process. But what the relation-
ship of part to whole is, is little developed. Bertell OIlman, devel-
oping Karl Kosik's notion of the concrete totality, provides an impor-
taut elucidation of the dialectical relation of whole to parts which
can be employed here with consistency to the theoretical position.
OIlman argues that the dialectical and materialist conception of
totality in Marx views the whole as "the structured interdependence
of its relational parts, the interacting events, processes, and con-
ditions of the 'real' world. ,,72 Through the constant interaction
and development of these parts, the whole also changes, realizing
(s orne of) the pos sibilities given in prior stages.
Flux and interaction, projected back into the origins
of the present and forward into its possible future',
are the chief distinguishing characteri sties of the
world in this view. . . . Since this interdependence
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is structured- -:that' i~, rootecl in relatively, stable
connections - -the same interaction accords the
whole a relative autonomy, enabling it to have rela-
tion as a whole with the parts whose order and unity
it represents. 73
These relations are of four types:
(I)! The whole shapes the parts to make them more
functional within this particular whole (so it is that
capitalism, for example, gets the laws it requires);
(2) the whole gives meaning and relative importance
to each part in terms of this function (laws in capita-
1ism are only comprehensible as elements in a struc-
ture that maintains capitalist society, and are as
important as the contribution they make); (3) the
whole expresses itself through the part, so that the
part can be seen as a form of the whole ••• (a study
of any major capitalist law which includes its neces-
sary conditions and results will be a study of capita-
lism); and (4) the relations of the parts with each
other, as suggested above, forge the contours and
meaning of the whole, transform it into an ongoing
system with a history, a goal, and an impact. 74
The analysis of any part of the socio-historical process can-
not and must not avoid the analytic process of totalization. Nor can
the part simply be -subsumed under the whole. The development of
man;in";h"istOT,¥", the changing formscf human practice, can only be
grasped if each moment is conceived as embedded in the whole, the
~nabgeschlossene~Dialektik of labor. Likewise, the totality cannot
!
b~ understooq without reference to its constituents, the conscious-
I
n~ss and self-consciousness of men.
!
Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please; they do not make it under
r{r
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circumstances chosen by themselves, but under cir-
cumstances directly encountered, given and trans-
mitted from the past. 75
The theoretical position we developed above grounds Marxism
as a materialist critique in an analys is of the labor proces s. The
foundations of this proces s, it was argued, embody and anticipate
the "universal interests" of the species, the fulfillment of man's
species nat~re, in a rational social order that conforms to the "good,1I
the "just," and the "true." It attempts to uncover an immanent
relationship between truth and freedom in history and, at one and
the same time, avoid relativism (being class, culture, and time
bound) and, yet, be inextricably intertwined with historical process
and social struggle. There are several directions one could take in
commenting on this reconstructed position. For example, much
needs to be said about the relationship betwe'en'.-causality and teleol,?~y
or for what passes under the concept "dialectic. 1t However, we
must restrict ourselves to the essential themes of this chapter.
The IIphilosophical anthropology" of our theory of labor
attempts to avoid the pitfalls and epistemological circles of Lukacs'
theory of the standpoint of the proletariat and that of Horkheimer's
•• 1
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static epistemology•. The question is, whether the difficulties of the
previous positions we addressed are resolved, recast, or deter-
minately negated (preserved and superseded). A number of major
points need to be made •
.The theory of labor as it was developed in the first and second
argumentation says very little about man's suggested lIuniversal
essence. II The notion of unalienated labor is ill developed. Yet its
"unpacking," concretization and expansion seems of central impor-
tance if it is to become something more than an abstract, meta-
physical standard recognizable only by lfisol~ted'l theorists. How
can we or might we recognize this essence, know its content, let
alone deduce institutional structures compatible with its. principles?
How are we to differentiate what is argued to be immanent and poten-
tial from tho~e that claim to represent such a standpoint, e. g., the
party, intellectuals, critical theorists? Are there criteria that
make such distinctions possible and are there uniqu~ principles of
social and political organ~zation that fol~ow from the premises of
the theory? Or are there a multitude of competing moral and politi-
cal standpoints compatible with "labor IS 11 uncovered telos? Herbert
Marcuse has said that in a rationally organized society, he believes,
labor can win back its "originally libidinous II character. 76 Marx,
on the other hand, attacked the (Fourier) thesis that labor could
{:'
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become play in a free society. In the Grundrisse, he chastized and
ridiculed Fourier's romantic, If 'naive, dreaming shop-girls' view·:'
,
that labour must become fun: Really free labour, e.g., composing,
is at the same time grim~y serious, the most intensive effort. • 11 77
If. the~h'otiono~.;speciesilatur·eis fo·have empirical ,i:mpbrt·,th~e issues
raised by the questions. above cannot b~ glossed over. 78
A further objection emerges from those above. The (possible)
convergence of reason, freedom, species nature, was said to be
immanent in labor. As we asked of Horkheimer earlier, we must
ask here: who is justified in interpreting this criterion? A group
of critical theorists, intellectuals? Although certainly not conceived
as such, the theory is, in fact, potentially lJ e litist." Without a con-
scious theoretical defense of the possible political need for a 1'party,"
IIleadership, II etc., the theory faces the danger of lapsing into an
unconscious, dogmatic, elitism which becomes even more serious
given the lack of explicated principles for political and social organi-
zation and action.
Furthermore, if the theory of labor is to have analytic, empiri-
cal and critical import, it becomes important to be able to recognize
true from false needs, ideologically distorted from reflected/true
interests and to explore their relationship to social development.
~he theoretic~lposition"' that we developed above, argues that despite
!ill'
~
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and given alienation, labor still em.bodies I'human specificity ll (the
pos s ibility of fulfilling species nature, etc.); that the development of
man in labor, is the unfolding of man and his powers in history; that
the dialectic is unconcluded but potentially lIconcluded" (i. e., that
man can break through the current structures of unfreedom toward
ever greater realization). Yet given the continuance of domination
in Eastern Europe, with oft-expressed political suspicion of free
thought (rationalized by use of Marxist terminology); the absence of·
a universal proletariat; the developments of 20th-century capitalism
(and the emergence of revolutions in the Third World, etc. )-,79 .the
theoretical position is faced with "discrepancies" which unless it
can (begin to) account for has no recourse but to lapse, for example,
into the static, epistemological position of a Horkheimer andlor fall
open to the charge of investing groups and classes in the life world
with a (conceptual mythology.' 80 What seems required is a theory of
labor that embodies a more developed theory of human needs and
their relationship to historical developments and social evolution.
In this light, Habermas I suggestion that the dynamics of human
practice embody two essential moments (that are interdependent but
irreducible) speaks of.an alternative view of the interconnection
between labor, needs, and social evolution (and, therefore, the
motor of history) that is deserving of close consideration. 81
~J.
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The problem of grounding is unresolved in the works of those
we discussed in the last two chapters. The theoretical cores of
these writers I works are (as yet?) quite insufficient to provide a
foundation for an epistemology and methodology that supersedes
the series of problems posed in our concluding remarks to Chapter 5 J
and in our Introduction to Chapter 6. There is little doubt in my
view that the works we have discussed here have made a significant
contribution in providing, alTIongst other things, a critique of ~any
of the aspects of the thought of the previous schools discussed. As
such their work is true to the central ta"skCritical theory was and
has set. But t.o the extent that Critical theory does not maintain a
wholly critical and negative attitude to other theories, views, and
interested standpoints and, as we have argued, maintains a positive
ideal of ultimate theoretical and lTIethodological principles, it is
found to be inadequate. The basis for the distinction between the
contexts of constitution and justification within the works discussed
appears deficient. The moment of independence the authors sought
to give theory is on very fragile ground. Whether or not Habermas I
as yet, an open question. This question is a ce~tral topic of the
remainder of our work.
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PART IV
JURGEN HABERMAS' THEORY OF THE RELATION'
OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
. i.
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INTRODUCTION
Habermas I project is a breathtaking attempt to develop the
idea of a theory of ?ociety conceived with a practical intention: "the
self-emancipation of men from the constraints of unnecessary domi-
nation in all its forms. ,,1 Habermas' work can also be seen as a
sweep!rig.attempt to fulfill this project through a reexamination of
the relationship between theory and practice. Critical theory, it
is argued, cannot treat as self-evident the relationship of theory
and practice. It has, in Habermas I view, to continually demonstrate
and reaffirm th~s relationship in practice and in theory. The pro-
ject is conceived as a " ••• struggle for the critical soul of science"
and "the scientific so~l -oficritidslTI. ~,2 Critique, or critical social
science, finds its place, Habermas argues, between,:.philosophyand
science. Habermas rej~cts an attempt to return to the ontological
and epistemological views of classical philosophy but Pseeks to
reformulate and defend some of its central theses: the inseparability
of truth and goodness, of facts and values, of theory and practice.
With these theses stands or falls the attempt to provide philosophical
foundations for a critical theory of society, for a social theory
with a practical intention. ,,3
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The imperative.to reformulate the relations between theory
and practice derives its force, for Habermas, from the "course of
history." Twentieth-century h~story is seen to be characterized by
the degeneration of the Russian Revolution into ,Stalinism and techno-
cratic social management. Likewise, the (as yet) failure of mass
revolution in the West, the absence of mass proletarian revolutionary
class consciousness and a Marxist theory which was and is fr~quently
either a deterministic, objectivistic science (consequentially legiti-
mating the diremption of "revolutionary practice" from the forma-
tion of class consciousness)4 or a pessimistic cultural critique
(which did less to integrate Marxist political economy and socio-
cultural, psychological dimensions than replace the former with
the latter), 5 are all seen to be dominant features of recent decades.
Above all, capitalist society is argued to have changed both its
appearance:l'and perhaps its essence. State intervention grows; the
market place is suppo·rted and replaced; capitalism is increasingly
"organized~r; education, science, and technology contribute signifi-
cantly to the productivity of labor and also become ideological;
instrumental reason and bureaucracy seemingly ever expand and
depoliticize the public sphere, etc. 6
These events and others, Habermas contends, not only call
into question interpretations of Marx, but the adequacy of his work
,LI
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to account, for example, for class, clas s consciousnes s, the possi-
bility of a revolutionary subject, and the relationship between theory
and practice in theory and in practice. Habermas, therefore, finds
it necessary to go back to Marx's social theory, epistemology, and
self-understanding in order to locate sources of possible misunder-
standing. He further attempts to explore the epistemological and
~ethodologicaladequacy of the human sciences in order to check
the sufficiency of Marx's work itself. Before turning to Habermas'
analysis of Marx's writings, a brief summary of the overall structure
of this project can ·usefti~ly be noted.
Habermas begins his work by dividing Marx's category of
IIsensuous human activity 11 into two aspects. These are the self-
generative and self-formative moments or as he calls them else~
where - -purposive -rational action and communicative action. From
the second moment he derives a third--the emancipatory moment--
in his discussion of the possibility of systematically distorted
communication. 7
The result of Habermas I analysis of these three moments i:s
a tricotomous model of the human species I interests (generalized
motives), mediums (structured activities) and sciences. The
interests are:
415
1. the practical
2. the technical
3. the emancipatory
1 . inte raction
2. work
3.. authority
which unfold
in three
mediums;
which give rise
to the conditions
for the possibility
of three sciences;
1. the hermeneutic
2. the empirical-analytic
3. the critical
In Chapters 4 and 5 (in the sections entitled "Structures of Action
. and Knowledge"), we have already seen how Habermas attempts to
ground the empirical-analytic and hermeneutic sciences in the species I
activities constituted by the technical and practical interests respec-
tiy~..ly;' rjlt~i!3.one of Habermas' central claims that the respective
sciences only systematize a+ld formalize the procedures required
for successful completion of the human species I three structured
activities.
Pivotal to the grounding of the three sciences:is the theory of
interests. It is in this theory that we find Habermas I initial attempt
to ground criteria of objectivity and truth specific to each science
and object domain. However, Habermas has recently recognized
,0
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the ,need to develop further in his work the distinctions between pro-
cesses 'of'-coristitution arid jtistificatio'n :(which he now, :regards as
inadequately specified in his theory of interests). This he attempts
to do in his theory of communicative competence. In this theory he
seeks to ground the respective sciences within the problematic of
Critical theory and science. This project, we argue, despite its
systematicnes s, is ~ -in the last analysis - -not much more succes sful
than the attempts to ground critical theory that we have already
discussed.
The development of this part of the thesis will have a some-
what different structure to those hitherto. In the next six chapters
our ta~s.k will be primarily exegetical, although I hope to highlight
certain difficulties and questions throughout. The stress on exegesis
is made because Habermas 1 work is extremely difficult if not obscure
in many places. As a consequence, a step-by-step construction of
his various positions seems not only worthwhile but necessary. 8
Furthermore, this exegesis of Habermas' work will draw whenever
and wherever helpful on the work of his colleagues and those who
share with him certai:n 'commonlPosition's. These authors often help
to elucidate and interpret Habermas I work. 9 It will not be until the
last chapter of this part that I will try and develop a critique of
Habermas' work as ~ whole.
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1McCarthy, from his Introduction to Habermas' Legitimation
C-risis, p. xf.
2WelllTIer, Critical Theory of Society, p. 53.
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p. xv.
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on pp. 536 -37 •
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"The LilTIits of Integration," in The-·Critical Spirit: Essays in
Honor of Herbert Marcuse, ed. Kurt:' H. Wolff and Barrington
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6For an elaboration of these arguments, see Habermas,
Theory and Praxis, pp. 3-6, 195-99.
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Theory and Practice.
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"On Systematically Distorted Com.m.unication," Inquiry,
vol. 13 (1 970) .
"Towards a Theory of Communicative COnlpetence, "
Inquiry 13 (1970). (These last two articles are reprinted in Recent
Sociology, ed. Dreitzel, vol. 2 (New York: 1972).
"A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," Philo-
sophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 2 (1973).
Of less imtnediacy are HaberITlas,
liOn Social Identity, II Telos 19 (1974).
"What Does a Crisis Mean Today? LegitilTIation Problems
in Late Capitalism, fI' Social Research, vol. 40, no. 4 (1973).
"Rationalism Divided in Two: A Reply to Albert, It trans
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Anthony Giddens (London: Heinetnan, 1974).
liThe Public Sphere, II trans Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox,
New Gerlnan Critique, no. 3 (1974).
"Summation and Response. II
9For a concise statement of a position close to Habermas,
see Apel, "The A Priori of Comtnunications and the Foundations
of the Humanities. II
Other works that parallel, to a significant extent, Haberlnas 1
work are:
Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society.
Radnitzky, Conte:mporary Schools of Metascience.
Schroyer, The Critique of Domination.
Schroyer 1 s work is also a helpful introductory stateInent;
further useful introductions are included in Fred Dallyrnar, "Reason
and Emancipation: Notes on Haberrnas, II Man and World, vol. 5,
no. 1 (1972).
An excellent summary of the (as yet developed) theory of
com.m.unicative com.petence, with som.e useful criticism, is Thomas
A. McCarthy, flA Theory of Communicative Competence," Philo-
sophy of Social Science, vol. 3, no. 2 (1973).
Papers that aid the historical location of HaberlTIas r project
are: JerelTIY J. Shapiro, liThe Dialectic of Th~ory and Practice in
the Age of Technological Rationality: .. Herbert Marcuse and Jiirgen
Habermas, II in The Unknown Dimension, ed. Dick Howard and
K. Klare (New York, 1972); Albrecht Welltner, "CoIl1Inunication
and Etnancipation: Reflections on the 'Linguistic Turn' in Critical
Theory, II Stony Brook Studies in Philosophy; McCarthy, liOn the
Proplems' of Truth and Objectivity in the Early Writings of Max
Horkheitner." McCarthy's Introdl1;ction to L-egitimation Crisis-is~.,
also extreITIely useful in providing both historical and clarificatory
rem.arks.
The critical literature on HaberlTIas is extensive. A lengthy
bibliography of relevant references is found in Habermas, "A Post-
script to Knowledge and Hu:man Interests," and Theory and Practice,
pp. 283-86. See also o. Blanchette, !.!-Language, The Prim.ordial
.Labor of History: A Critique of Critical Social Theory in HaberInas,"
Cultural Herlneneutics, vol. 1 (1974); Fred Dal1ylTIar, ftCritiqal ~
Theory Criticized, " Philosophy of Social Sciences, vol. 2, no. 3
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(1972). This issue of the journal also includes critical articles by
C. Lenhardt, M. Hill, C. Nichols, and N. Lobkowicz; see also
Gadam.er, "On the Scope and Function of Herm.eneutical Reflection":
Dick Howard, IfA Politics in Search of the Political, If Theory and
Society, vol. 1, no. 3 (1973); P. Laska, "A Note on Haberm.as and
the Labor Theory of Value," New Germ.an Critique, no. 3 (1974);
F. Lawrence, "Dialectic and Herm.eneutic: Foundation Perspectives
on the Relationship Between Hum.an Studies and the Project of
Hum.an Self-Constitution, If Stony Brook Studies in Philosophy; M.
Jay, "SoIne Recent Developm.ents in Critical Theory, II Berkeley
Journal of Sociology, vol. 18 (1973-74); JaInes Schm.idt, trReply to
Martin Jay, If Telos, no. 21 (1974); Goran Therborn, "Haberm.as:
A New Eclectic, II New Left Review, no. 67 (1971); and Walton and
GaInble, FroIn Alienation to Surplus Value, pp. 43-50.
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CHAPTER VIII
AN INTERPRETATION AND CRITIQUE OF MARX
Habermas is concerned to uncover a fundamental ambiguity
that he sees in Marx's writings. Habermas contends that in his
philosophy of materialism, Marx is ambiguous between two motnents.
As we shall see, Habermas refers to these motnents as the Kantian
and Fichtean strains in Marx's thought. The focus of Habermas'
concern is with an analysis of "sensuous human activity" or ttsocial
labour, II which he.takes to be the central category of Marx's
materialism.
Marx is, of course, no vulgar materialist. On Marx's account,
nature becomes objective for us only through the lab.our process in
which both nature and the laboring subjects are themselves trans ~
formed. It is in this sense, that we previously noted one may talk
of the dialectics of nature in Marx. Men and women are both of
nature and through them, IIn~ture attains self-consciousness and
amalgam.ates with itself by virtue of their theoretical-practical
1
activity. 11 This activity constitutes nature's self -movement and the
basis for its se~_f--·c·onsciousnes s •
Through labor we both evolve qua human species and alter the
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framework of experience. Labor becomes the "dialectic of negativity,
as the tnoving and creating principle. ,,2 The basis of experience,
the conditions and grounds of possible knowledge, can be conceived
in the notion of tnaterial synthesis. The synthesis of material labor
unites the historical subject and the process of nature. But synthesis
through social labor neither generates a logical structure nor creates
an absolute unity of men and nature. "Like Kant's original apper-
ception, the materialist concept of sy~thesis preserves the difference
between form and matter. 113 The categories are, of course, not
those of the Understanding but of the form~;g'~ving character of human
production. As Marx put it, IfIn his production man can only pro-
ceed like nature herself, that is only by changing the forms of the
substances. ,,4
Habermas argues that there are certain Kantian residues in
Marxls thought. In his view what is Kantian about Marxls conception
of knowledge is the "invariant relation of the species to its natural
environment, II which is established through the labour processes
which are lithe perpetual natural necessity of human life." (Marx.)
The arguments are worth exploring at greater length for there is,
Habermas contends, an am.biguity in Marx t s epistemological category.
In the last section of the Economic and Philosophical Manu-
scripts, Marx argues that we find the clues for a materialist
___1 ....
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interpretation of history in Hegel's grasping of the self-creation of
man as process. In Marx's view, Hegel's work lays the foundation
for a philosophy of labor. However, in these early writings, Marx
opposes his philosophy of .labor ("naturalism" or "humanism") to
both the philosophies of labor of the traditions of idealism and
materialism; "only naturalism is able to comprehend the process of
world history. 11 5 In his first Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx sum-
marizes his sublation of idealism and materialism:
The chief defect of all materialism up to now (inclu-
ding Feuerbach's) is, that the object, reality, what
we apprehend through our senses, is understood
only;in the .Ifoi'm of- tl].e .. object/·'or 'contemplation
(Anschauung); but not as sensuous human activity,
as practice; not subjectively. Hence in opposition
to materialism the active side was developed
abstractly by idealism--which of course does not
know real sensuous activity as such. 6
Marx interprets this "sensuous human activity" in juxtaposition to
the abstract "active side" of idealism, which in turn was developed
(in:part,) to counteract the objectivism of materialism. As such,
Marx 1s concept of human activity has, Wellmer argues, "the pecu-
liar status of a category which is fundamental both as an anthro-
pological [which refers to the philosophical theory of man] and as an
epistemological category. ,,7 Marx points to the epistemological
import of the category in the second Thesis where he states that
"the dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is
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isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question." The question
8is a practical one: "Man must prove the truth. If· But what does
Marx mean by "sensuous activity" or "practice" or by "proving
the truth"? As Wellmer points out, "as far as he specifies what
he means • . . [he] does not speak of labour, as he does in the
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts; .•. rather of "practic'al-
critical activity' or of 'revolutionary activity'. ,,9 However, although
the theses on Feuerbach directly contain an injunction to learn from
idealism insofar as it grasps the tractive side" of the cognitive
process (i. e., the form or faculty or knowing), Habermas argues
that Marx, who is at best ambiguous, essentially develops the
philosophy of praxis as a philosophy of labor. In the Manuscripts
the difference is rather one of emphasis. In Capital it is at the
level of episte~ology implicitly reductionist. That is to say, Haber-
mas contends, that '''practical activity ll becomes synonymous with
labor which becomes synonymous with the category of productive
labor, instrumental action. The latter takes :on a paradigmatic role
as the philosophy of practice. In so doing, it is claimed, Marx
reduces the self-~ormativeact of th~ human species to labor. This
is not,' as yet, to make any claims about MarxLs social theory, but
to address his ~~ philosophical frame of reference. What does Haber-
mas mean?
II
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Habermas begins by attempting to extrapolate the way in which
social labor is to be conceived as the synthesis of man and nature in
order to understand how "all the elements of a critique of knowledge
radicalized by Hegel's critique~~6f'~ant-are···pres~iifin Marx and yet
. are not combined to construct a'materialist epistemology. It We
have already briefly pointed to the Kantian moment of m.aterial syn-
thesis. But there is a second non-Kantian component of the concept
of synthesis through social labor. There is a twofold relation between
man and nature •
On the one hand, the Kantian moment, man is posited as having
an invariant relation to nature; a relation in which lTIan struggles to
satisfy his needs and reproduce himself in the reallTI of necessity.
Both nature and man are transformed in the process. The unity of
the objectivity of possible objects of experience is historically
embedded in the "universal structure of mediation constituted by
labouring subjects. II The Kantian moment reveals that man is
engaged in a trial-and-error encounter with nature in his everyday
life, acquiring, inquiring, and learning in the realm of feedback-
...
controlled action. The r~sultant (pragmatic) knowledge increases
the range of his control over nature. The knowledge is technically
exploitable and belongs to the same category as that which is pro-
duced and tested in the natural sciences. Man's relation to nature
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is instrumental and is invariant, for the natural processes over which
he must secure control to reproduce life cannot be abolished. In a
letter to Kugelmann, Marx wrote: "Natural laws can absolutely not
be abolished. What can change in different historical states is only
the form in which these laws take effect. ,,10 IfOnly because," Haber-
mas argues, lithe conditions of the objectivity of possible natural-
scientific knowledge are rooted in a deep-seated structure of human
action can statements of laws at all claim universal validity. In con-
trast, the historically changeable form is grounded in the level of
development of the forces of production. ,,1 ~ The behavioral systetn
of instrumental action is constituted historically by the unique con-
figuration of existing productive apparatus and the labor of man.
On the other hand, the subject attains consciousness of itself
in the strict sense only if it becomes aware of itself in its production
or labor as -the self -generative act of the species. Labor is often
referred to by Marx as social labor. The instrumental activity of
man takes place in a symbolically mediated institutional setting
(i. e., a framework of norms). The human subject, while produced
by the "labour of the entire previous course of world history"
achieves identity of self on!y through the comprehension of the self-
formative processes of past generations which are constituted
through his own self-positing struggles. ,,12 This is the Fichtean
II
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moment which is for Marx, of course, a self-conscious positing in
historical struggle, not a logical relation between ego and nonego.
Self-consciousness is not an lJultimate representation" but an action
that 1fgoes back inside itself and thus in its own accomplishment
simultaneously makes itself transparent. 1f13 The mechanisms-for
transparency and self-understanding are not those determined by
the extension of technical control, but involve;'·:a -constifti.tive struggle.
of reflection and understanding to recover identity.
The Kantian moment of self-generative activity is held to be
logically irreducible to the Fichtean moment of s elf -formative activity.
~hese two generalized modes of activity are, as we shall see, further
analyzed by Habermas in his theory of interests. In this theory, the
two moments of activity are held to be expressions~ofthe species r
generalized motives or "interests," the technical and the practical
respectively. Self -generative activity, motivated by man r S technical
interest, takes place through "productive labor. II Self -formative
activity, motivated by manls practical interest, takes place through
"critical-revolutionary," "practical activity. II The I1proces ses of
natural history are mediated by the productive activity of individuals
and the organization of their interrelations. 11 The species repro-
duces its life both through learning processes of socially organized
labor and processes of mutual understanding in interactions in
II:.
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ordinary language. Consequentially, the "dialectics of emancipa-
,tion tl involve freeing man from the forces of both outer and',. --inner
nature.
In his empirical investigations and the fragments on historical
materialism, Marx, in Habermas' view, always takes account of
social practice as encompassing both productive labor and practical
activity or, as he puts it elsewhere, both work and interaction. Marx
incorporates an analysis of the material, i. e., economic, basis of
society with an analysis of the institutional framework, the struc-
ture of symbolic interaction and the role of cultural tradition. He
draws on analytic distinctions between two, dialectically related,
"dimensions tr of the reproductive process of society. "On the one
hand, there is the realm of scientific -technical progress which is
characterized by 11 epochal innovations through which functional
elements of the behavioural system of instrumental action are repro-
duced step by step at the level of machines" (forces of production).
On theothet hand,'{ hedistinguishes~-the'tilJ..stitutional<:re~l1? (the relations'
of: proq.uctibn)'l!'.These ~relations ~!e .~subject to nOJ;1ps',~which with the
force} 6f institution,s, ~ d~stribJlte.~rewards~,. obligatiohS ," al1C! cJ.:1arges. The
latter /comprises ::forms. of,: so.cial finteg:ration '(domination) ;and- social
,character of surpassed forms of domination and ideologies are
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dispelled, the pressure of the institutional framework sublimated,
and communicative action is set free as communicative action. If 14
On the level of epistemology and anthropology:the ab~ve dis-
tinction made by Marx, interpreted by Habermas, would require a
conc~mitant distinction between man as a tool-making and as a
language -using, llsymbolizing ll animal. In contrast, however, at
both levels Marx has a strong tendency to incorporate the latter in
the former. This is the basis of Habermas I central objection to
Marx. Marx is read as granting primacy (at the level of epistemology
and anthropology) to man as a tool-making animal. "Sensuous,"
"practical, II activity is absorbed by the "paradigm fl of productive
labor. IlMarx deludes himself about the nature of reflection, It
critical activity, and the dialectic when he reduces self -reflection
to labor. "He identifies It transformative abolition (Aufheben), as
objective movement which reabsorbs externalization, _. "with the
appropriation of ess ..ential powers that have been externalized in
working on material. 11 15 Fichte's concept of the independence of
the s elf -constituting act of reflection is reduced, Habermas argues,
to a feedback relation to the productive process; even though "Marx,
himself, retain.s the framework of the philosophy of reflection. "
_Marx correctly criticized Hegel, in tr~nsforming the construction
of the manifestation of consciousness into an encoded representation
'0
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of the self-production 'of the species, but in so doing (and probably
as a consequence) fails to recognize the epistemological and metho-
dological status of his own work. In the materialist synthesis Marx
relegates the Fichtean moment to an area bounded by the Kantian,
on the one hand, and Darwin's theory of evolution on the other.
Habermas is aware, of course, that Marx did not obliterate
the distinction between productive or instrumental activity and prac-
tical and critical activity in his scien~ific practice. But nowhere,
Habermas poihts out, did he distinguish between the logical status
.of the instrumental meaning of the natural sciences and sciences of
man as critique. We have already briefly discussed Habermas' con-
ception of the technical (instrumental) and practical basis of the
natural and social sciences respectively (in the sections "Structures
of Action and Knowledge'~" in", 'C4ai?ters~4 .arid~,.5.). We have also seen
(at the end of Chapter 5) how Habermas, in his debate with Gadamer,
stresses the importance of developing a conception of social science
that can also be a critical theory or critique of society and ideology.
In the following three chapters Habermas I conceptions of both these
concerns and themes will be greatly elaborated. In an absence of
a knowledge of the next three chapters, I am well aware that at this
stage of my exegesis, certain distinctions which I made immediately
above and will make immediately below, are not yet fully developed
0-
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and clear. At this point, however, it is most important to capture
the general structure of Habermas' critique of Marx. We will return
to a detailed examination of tnost of the terms and issues involved
throughout the following chapters.
It is central to Habe rmas I critique of Marx that as a conse-
quence of his tendency to reduce his epistemological categories to
the "paradigtn" of productive labor, he (Marx) misunderstood the
epistemological and tnethodblogical status of his own work. On
Habermas' account, altho~ghMarx himself lIestablished the science
of man in the form of critique arid not as a- natural science, he con-
tinually tended to classify it with the natural sciences. 1116 Marx
makes frequent analogies between the status of his work and that of
the natural sciences. -The Russian reviewer of Capital is quoted (in
an Mterword to the second edition of Capital) with absolute approval.
Habermas regards this demand for a natural science of man, with its
positivist overtones, as Itastonishing. II
For the natural sciences are subject to the transcen-
dental conditions of the system of social labour,
whose structural change is supposed to be what the
critique of political economy as the science of man
reflects on. Science in the rigorous sense lacks pre-
cisely the element of reflection that characterizes a
critique investigating the natural-historical process
of the self-generation of the social subject and also
making the subject conscious of this process. 19
Since, for Marx, self -reflection is tied to the framework of a feedback
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relation to production, and instrumental activity determines the
scope of human action, the logically distinct moment of comprehen-
sion can be expounded within the explanatory method of the natural
sciences. It is a logical consequence of a framework restricted to
instrumental action. If we take as our basis a materialist concept
of synthesis through social labor, in which the Fichtean moment is
bounded by the Kantian, etc., then "both the technically exploitable
knowledge of natural science, the knowledge of natural laws, as well
as the theory of society, the knowledge of laws of human natural
history, belong to the same objective context of the self-constitution
of the species. 11 If our knowledge of ,society is viewed as dependent
on the pragmatic self-understanding of social groups which in turn
is tied to the development of production, then, the sciences of man
also appear under the categories of knowledge for control. So far
as production establishes the only framework in which the genesis
and function of knowledge can be interpreted, the second Thesis on
Feuerbach, as Wellmer suggests, "assumes a purely instrumentalist
meaning; natural science becomes the basic paradigm for what
theoretical knowledge can be, and the relation between science and
industry provides the normative model for the relation between
theory and practice and their possible unity. ,,18
Having said this, Habermas makes it clear that this lack of
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epistemological clarification is not found in Marx's social theory, i. e. ,
his theory of capitalism, his critique. of political economy. His
theory is essentially "critical" theory. It is at one and the same
time an" analysis of the crisis -ridden dynamics of capitalism and a
critique of ideology, i. e., it is both an analysis of political economy
(qua political-economic.activity) and a critique of political economy
{qua an incorrect theory of such activity, and an inadequate view of
·the nature .of theor.y/ins·ociallscience)~~.~.It:·is ..an.empirical theory
and a theory of the transformative abolition of exploitation and aliena-
tion. It is both science and· criticism, a theory of exploitation, etc.,
which also conceives of its~lf as the critical consciousness of revolu-
tionary practice. It becomes practical only by awake~ing class con-
sciousness through initiating self-reflection and a process of self-
understanding. The transcendence of the causality of fate and second
nature depends on a practice that is the emancipatory activity of a
class, not a technical, manipulative practice. On Habermas t
reading, there is a basic unresolved tension in Marx between the
quasi-reductionism of his anthropological and epistemological cate-
gorial framework and the critical, dialectical character of his con-
crete social investigations. 19, 20
It is in Habermas' theory of interests that the two interdependent
but irreducible moments of social practice are elaborated at the
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levels of epistemology and philosophical anthropology. Habermas
holds that such an elaboration is crucial to the adequate developlTIent
of a science of man as a critical science.
"n
NOTES
1Cf. Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, p. 79.
2Marx, Early Writings (Bottomore ed.), p. 202.
3
HaberlTIas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 34.
4Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 47; quoted in Habermas, Know-
ledge and Human Interests, pp. 34-35.
5Marx, Early Writings (Bottomore ed.), pp. 202-6.
6
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Appendix, p. 197
7Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation," p. 74. Cf.
also his Critical Theory of Society, chap. 2.
8 Marx and Engels, The GerlTIan Ideology, p. 197.
9Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation," p. 75.
10 . .Quoted in HaberlTIas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p.36.
11 Ibid .
12Schroyer, The Critique of DOITlination, p. 139.
13HaberlTIas, Knowledge and Hum.an Interests, p. 38.
14 bed 55I I ., p. .
1\bid., p. 44.
16 bed 47
.I I ., p. .
17IbedI ., p. 46.
18 11 e e dEe e 7 6 hWe lTIer, "CommunIcatIon an manclpatlon, 'I p. . T e
view is discussed at greater length in HaberlTIas, Knowledge and
Human Interests, chaps. 2, 3, 6.
19There are, however, passages in Marx's writings where his
m.ethodological s~lf-reflections clearly could and have been read as
"encouraging" the positivist atrophy of his social theory itself. For
example, the fa:mous ":preface to a Contribution to a Critique of
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Political Econom.y." (See Iny COInments on this work, pp.333-36.
20 Th -t- f h- - d b- - -de recognl Ion 0 t IS tensIon an aln IgUlty proVl es an
opening to understanding the development of MarxisITl. It also pro-
vides us, as Wellm.er suggests, llwith a key for an evaluation"
(but not, of course, for a historical explanation) of the way these
issues were resolved in "official, If orthodox MarxisITl into an
alm.ost exclusive collapse into the reductionist, determinist side
of Marx's thought. It gives us a basis on which to explore MarxisIn
since the tiITle of the Second International and to reconstruct why
and how "Western" Marxism. attem.pted to surm.ount the petrifica-
tion of Marx in DialTIat. Obviously, such a reconstruction cannot
be made here. For an interesting beginning, cf. Wellm.er, "Com.-
m.unication and Emancipation, ft pp. 76-86, although I do not agree
with his -interpretation of Lukacs or the Frankfurt School. Also,
Jacoby, IITowards a Critique of Autom.atic Marxism.: The Politics,
of Philosophy froIn Lukacs to the Frankfurt School. II
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CHAPTER IX
OBJECT DOMAINS AND HUMAN INTERESTS:
THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE INTERESTS
. Habermas, as we have seen, divides Marxts category of
"sensuous human activity," "social labour, It into two distinct cate-
gories: the self-generative lTIoment, involving the developlTIent of
technological power (forces of production), and the self -formative
moment, which encompasses the organi~ation of social, normative
structures (social relations of production) and is the mediulTI of the
self-understanding (identity formation) of the human species. These
distinctions are further explicated by Habermas in terms of the
differences between "instrumental, II or "purposive -r~tio;q.al;lt acfiol?-
"and "communicative" action (social interaction). To reformulate
the two moments of labor in terms of two distinct types of action is
to split, as Wellmer put it, "Marx's concept of ·sensuous activity'
into two components which are not reducible to each other - -man as
a tool-making animal and a speaking animal. III
As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, in the sect~ons" rrStructures of
Action and Knowledge," this distinction between two types of action
basic to the species is, Habermas contends, reflected epistemologi-
cally in the difference between natural (or ffempirical-analytic ll ) and
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hermeneutical ("cultural") sciences. Each type of science generates
'a '-different 'for!ll- of :k:q.(i\yledg~,' a:q.9-.~utilize~.a ",diff~r,eilt~,form of.'
metho·dology'. .The 'dis~~nctiori.s·are reflect, iIi turn, '<:.on the level of.·
sophical anthropology in Habermas 1 theory of cognitive interests.
The theory of interests underlies his overall work in epistemology.
It is to an explication of this theor'y that we must now turn.
The theory of cognitive interests:.is concerned to uncover the
basic conditions for the possibility of knowledge. While accepting
the need to understand knowledge as the result of the constituting
activity of the cognizing subject, Habermas rejects the Kantian
approach of locating such activity in an ahistorical, transcendental
subject. Rather, starting with an essential tenet of historical
mat~rialism', viz., that history, social reality, and nature (as
known)2 are all a product of the constituting labor of the human
species, Habermas understands knowledge in light of the~ p.r0plems
man encounters in his efforts to 11produce his existence and repro-
dlice his species -being,_ If
To speak in this context of a basis of interests is justi-
fied precisely because the cognitive strategies serving
the creation of technical, practical and emancipatory
(true) knowledge are related to general classes of
problems pertaining to the rep~oduction of human
life, problems which are rooted in the constituent
elements of social systems. 3
It is Habermas' contention that human existence and interaction with
nature is structured in terms of certain fundamental and invariant
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needs (the reproduction of social existence) which force man, as
long as he maintains a species identity, to organize his experience
in terms of ~ priori interests. That there is such a structure of
basic needs, Habermas argues, follows from an understanding of
man as essentially both a tool-making and language-using animal.
As a tool-using animal, man must produce from nature what is
needed for his material existence through the manipulation and con-
trol of objects. As a language user, that is, as a fundamentally
social animal, man must communicate with his fellow men through
the use of intersubjectively understood symbols and within the con-
text of rule -governed institutions. Thus, with regard to the respec-
tive needs, the human species has an interest in knowledge which
allows it to better control objectified processes and to better com-
municate with other men. That is, the interests
••• result from the imperatives of a socia-cultural
life -form dependent on labor and language. • • •
They are the conditions which are necessary in order
that subjects capable of speech and action may have
experience which can lay a claim to objectivity. 4
The interests which serve these needs can be recovered by an
examination of the types of knowledge required for the development
of these activities and an analysis of the conditions under which such
knowledge is possible. Thus for Habermas, It ••• the functions
knowledge has in universal contexts of practical1ife can only be
n,n
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successfully analyzed in the framework of a reformulated trans-
cendental philosophy. 11 5 Epistemologically, such an analysis would
be concerned to deve~.op ". . • a theory which is intended to be
capable of grasping systematically the constitutive conditions of
science and thos e of its applications. ,,6
The argument, in Knowledge and Human Interests, for the
distinction between the natural (empirical-analytical).:,sciences and
the hermeneutic sciences, proceeds on the level of an investigation
of methodology. In this work Habermas 1 strategy was to
"enco~rite'r'" theseJdeep'~se~ted:'ant~.rop·ological
interests in the attempt to clarify the "constitut~o:n:"
of the facts about which the theoretical:::statements
are possible. 7
Through an examination of Peirce's and Dilthey's reflections on the
nature of the natural and cultural sciences respectively, Habermas,
as we have already seen, has attempted to Glarify the logical struc-
ture of the methodology in the different sciences. The methodology
of the natural sciences is structured to generate knowledge in the
form of laws and theories which can account for regularities in
observable phenomena. Particular phenomena are characteristically
conceived only in terms which allow abstraction from their particu-
larity and subsumption under general concepts. Through the use of
such general concepts, knowledge in the natural sciences allows for
the duplication of conditions and verification via the reproductivity
11 .
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of results. The methodology of the cultural sciences, as we saw in
the chapter on hermeneutics, is structured to allow the recovery of
a particularized meaning of an action or expression which is neces-
sarily lost in the generalized terms of langu~ge. Verification becomes
a matter of consensus concerning an interpretation which can only be
attained through the process of a dialogue.
From his investigation of Peirce and Dilthey, Habermas further
concludes that II. • • each came up with different pre scientific
domains of objects of possible experience. 11 8 These domains' are
prescientific insofar as they originate in the activities of everyday
life, namely instrumental activity involving objects and communica-
tive activity involving subjects. The respective sciences only
systematize and formalize the procedures required for successful
completion of these activities. That is,
••• the object domains of the empirical-analytic
and of the hermeneutic sciences are based on these
objectifications of reality, which we undertake daily
always from the viewpoint either of technical con-
trol or intersubjective communication. 9
Thus taking as an initial fact the existence of the two distinct realms
of knowledge as found in the natural and cultural sciences, Haber-
mas argues for the existence of two distinct object domains of know-
ledge. This fact, he 'claims,
n .. · · is revealed by a methodological comparison of
the fundamental theoretical concepts, the logical
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construction of the theorems, the relationship of
theory to the object domain, the criteria of verifica-
tion, the te sting procedures, and so forth. 10
More specifically, knowledge claims of the empirical-analytic
sciences 11. • • grasp reality with regard to technical control that,
under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all times .,,11
Correspondingly, knowledge claims in the hermeneutic sciences
tI ••• grasp interpretations of reality with regard to possible inter-
subjectivity of action-orienting mutual understanding specific to a
~iven hermeneutic starting point. \tIl
These object domains, that is, those portions of reality dis-
closed and constituted from the standpoint of the cognitive interests
underlying the natural and empirical sciences, can be differentiated
on the levels of language, action, and experience. 13 In the natural
sciences, under ideally conceived conditions of instrumental action,
sentences would ". • • belong to an either formalized or at least
formalizable language. 1114 Theory in the rigorous empirical sciences
is connected to action by means of certain operations and activities,
in particular, systematic observation, experimentation, and opera-
tions of measurement. These actions and the monologic langu~ge
required to express them objectify reality under the conditions of a
firestricted mode of experience. 11 15 For instance, within the trans-
cendental framework of the empirical-analytic sciences, objects
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constituted as observable are at the same time objects whose
behavior can, potentially, be described in causal.laws and conse-
quently, objects which are instrumentally manipulable. It must be
remembered that when describing the object domain of the empirical-
analytic sciences, Habermas is not discussing an ontologically dis-
tinct realm of objects. Rather he is trying to delineate a general
orientation which yields a viewpoint from which reality is objectified.
That is to say, a knowledge-constitutive interest is to be understood
as a basic, underlying mode through which reality is ~isclosed,
. constituted, and acted upon. Each interest defines a functional
sphere of action as well as a conceptual framework, the latter being
a system of concepts and categories which help structure facts about
reality as confronted from a particular action-related point of view.
Thus Habermas wants to hold that knowledge claims, i. e., statements
.which we take to be true about the world, must be understood in
terms of the types of actions to which they are systelTIatically related
and that these forms of action can only be comprehended in light of
the basic intexests of the species. In other words, there is a sys-
temat~c relationship between the form of knowledge claims and the
uses to which such knowledge can be put. Thus to raise the issue
of the object domain constituted by the empirical-analytic sciences
is not to que~tion what there is as lnuch as to talk about how reality
I
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can be meaningfully constituted from the point of view of possible
experience and a related form of knowledge.
The discussion of the object domain of the empirical-analytical
sciences and its relation to instrumental action involves an abstrac-
tion from everyday experience. The orientation given by the techni-
cal interest is a part of everyday life in the sense that an interest
in manipulation and control of objects in our environment is a basic
element of normal experience. To formalize the empirical-analytic
sciences in terms of theoretical structure and 1?-1._ethodolbgy, however,
is to attempt to isolate within the flux of experience an orientation
and type of action. For these sciences, operations of measur'ement
playa mediating role between langu~ge (theory) and experience.
That is,
• • • operations of measurement permit the reversibly
univocal correlation of operatively determined events
and systematically connected signs. • • • Only a theory
of measurement, therefore, can elucidate the condi-
tions of the objectivity of possible knowledge for the
nomological sciences. 16
In the hermeneutical sciences, the rules of ordinary language
constitute the framework in which communicative action occurs.
Communicative action necessarily involves the experiencing of others
as subjects of a possible dialogue. Hence objects constituted frotTI
the point of view of communicative action lTIust either be language-
users or incorporate a dilTIension of lTIeaningfulness (e. g., texts,
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cultural objects, etc.). But to be constituted from the standpoint of
p~ssible communication does not mean that the object cannot also
be regarded from the point of view of potential manipulation and
technical control. Quite the contrary.
• • . "understandable persons" are simultaneously
IIparticipants in linguistically mediated interaction, II
hence something which can be both an object of instru-
mental action and a rival in inte ractions. 17
Thus Habermas claims to have uncovered a link between the
invariant needs of the human species (structures of action) and the
conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Furthermore, he main-
tains that there is a connection between action which constitutes the
objects of experience and allows for the accmnulation of knowledge,
the uses to which possible knowledge can be put, and the logic of
inquiry of the existing sciences. "There is," he argues,
• . . a systematic relationship between the logical
structures of a science and the pragmatic structure
of the possible applications of the information gen-
erated within its framework. 18
These connections, then, must ultimately be located by reference to
the fundamental problems of existence and preservation within the
framework of the cultural form of life of the human species. The
successful solution to these problems is to be understood, Habermas
argues, in terms of basic interests of the species in maintaining its
existence and identity.
f1
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I term interests the basic orientations rooted in
specific fundamental conditions of the possible repro-
duction and self -constitution of the human species,
namely work and interaction. 19
The interest ultimately reflected in the empirical-analytic sciences
Habermas calls the technical interest. That reflected in the
hermeneutical sciences he calls the practical interest.
Besides the technical interest man has in controlling objects
in his environment and the practical interest in furthering mutual,
inter subjective .understanding, Habermas argues that there is a
third cognitive interest, an emancipatory interest man has in freeing
hiInself froIn hypostatized forces and conditions of distorted communi-
cation. As we saw in the section on hermeneutics, as soon as it is
admitted that the history of mankind embodies repressio'n and dis-
tortion, then one cannot assume an uncritical attitude toward any
historically realizable consensus. That history is the history of
domination and struggle is what Habermas attempts to demonstrate
in his reformulation of historical materialism within the context of
a theory of social evolution. This theory will be discussed later.
For our purposes here, the point is that once we acknowledge the
possibility 'of domination and hence of a forced and therefore false
consensus, we have already ac~nowledged,the need :for:a~cri~lcalper-
spective. This need for a critical perspective follows from the need
to establish the actuality of. a genuine consensus.
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The theory of interests, Habermas contends, is rooted in the
human species 1 nature as a tool-maker and language -user. As such,
the species can be seen to constitute its world and history. But the
- human animal, on Habermas 1 account, is also a self-conscious
animal capable of consciously guiding its activities according to
principles of knowledge and norms of action that it establishes. It
is this capacity as a rational being, i. e., the capacity to self-
consciously reason and make dec~sions in light of available know-
le.dge, rule s, and needs, a capacity dependent on the ability to -use
language, which allows the human species to rise above the level of
.mere animal instinctual existence. Thus the self-formative process
of man is, in potential, a process whereby he consciously and
rationally makes his history. But the history_ of man is not one of
fully-- self .;.conscious-1deliberate-.activity·~FRather; social~'structures- of
repression and ideological distortion have prevented him from fully
actualizing his rational capabilities. Thus he has an interest in know-
ledge which will enable him to overcome those barriers which retard
the creation of a world that is rationally organized around self-
conscious steering controls. The form of knowledge which allows
one to overcome and dissolve distorting and repressive influences is
self-knowledge through self -reflection.
Self-reflection brings to consciousness those deter-
minates of a self -formative proces s of cultivation
~.t ;.
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and spiritual formation (Bildung) which ideologically
determine a contemporary praxis of action and the
conception of the world. 20
By bringing to consciousness the determinates of the self-formative
process, on both the level of the individual and the species, the
structures of distortion can be revealed, isolated, and under the
properobje¢tiveconaitions ,nestr(~yeQ.
The impetus to overcome conditions of ideologfcal distortion
and repressive power is identified with the emancipatory interest in
knowledge. Historically, this interest is found as a prominent theme
in German Idealism, particularly in Fichte IS concept of interested
self-reflection.ahd Hegel's description of the self-formative develop-
ment of con~ciousness in the Phenomenology. 21 It is in man's poten-
tial ability to be a self -conscious, rational, and therefore free being
that Habermas finds the basis of the emancipatory interest. The
interest is an interest in reason, in man's capacity to be self-
reflective and self-determining, to act rationally.
In self -reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge
comes to coincide with the interest in ,al.1t9:~omy·:and..
. responsibility (Mundigkeit). For the pursuit of reflec-
tion knows itself as a moment of em.ancipation. ~Reason
is at the same time subject to the interest in reason.
We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive
interest, which aim.s at the pursuit of reflection. 22
The relationship between knowledge and interest is different
for the emancipatory interest than it is for the technical and practical
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interests. With the latter, the act of knowing is separable from the
act of satisfying the interest. Knowledge in the natural and cultural"
sciences is not immediately or automatically utilized in such a way
as to satisfy the need which gave rise to the interest in such know-
ledge. Theory can be engaged in independently of practical activity,
i. e., of the utilization of the knowledge. There is, however, an
immanent link between these lTIoments which can be comprehended
only through reflection on the conditions of possible knowledge.
Habermas has attempted in his theory of cognitive interests to
uncov~r this underlying connection. As concerns the emancipatory
interest, the gap between theory and practice is of a different form.
The need which gives rise to the interest in freedom is conceived
lTIaterialistic~llyas the experiencing of suffering and exploitation
due to structures of power and patterns of distorted communication.
The act of knowing associated with the emancipatory interest is that
of self-reflection which reconstructs the history of an individual (or
species) in such a way as to destroy the ideological distortions which
had prevented complete self-knowledge. Through self-reflection,
the individual can become aware of the compulsion, of the causality
of fate, which these forces have exerted over him. He is, in this
manner, able to gain self -transparency concerning his needs and
lTIotivations. Thus this same act of knowing frrees' the pe~son"~rom
u"
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the systematically distorted meaning structures. In this way, the
act of knowing, i. e., the moment of theory, coincides with the act
which achieves the goal of the interest, viz., emancipation from
hypostatized forces. Furthermore, it is only through the act of
reflection on the self-formative process of the species that man can
become aware of the connection between knowledge and interest.
Thus the true unity of knowledge and interest is only achieved in the
emancipatory interest. "It is in accomplishing self -reflection that
reason grasps itself as interested. ,,23
[It should be noted that Habermas does not intend to fall into
an idealism which implies that the achievement of a rational conscious-
ness freed from domination by ideological forces is the total concern
of the process of emancipation. The practice of self -reflection is
not co-extensive with the praxis of freedom. Rather, for Habermas,
the practice of self-reflection is a necessary but by no means sufficient
condition for the achievement of real, material freedom. Complete
emancipation cannot be achieved until the social structures which
create conditions of exploitation, domination, and distorted:communi-
cation are eradicated. Therefore there is a gap between theory and
practice for the emancipatory interest, precisely that which must be
fill~d by a conscious, revolutionary politics. The interrelation
between these two moments of the praxis of freedom lTIust be '-. _
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understood historically and dialectically. This interrelation Haber-
mas has attempted to elaborate in his later work, especially in his
theory of social evolution which will be discussed below.]
Interpreted materialistically, the interest in reason (emancipa-
tory interest) follows from the exigencies of man's struggle for self-
preservation. Seen in this manner, we can say that reason inheres
in interest. Given the nature of the human species, it is Habermas'
contention, as we have seen, that self -preservation requires success-
ful performances on the levels of both instrumental and communica-
tive actions. These actions are historically embedded in evolving
structures of the forces of production and of normative institutions
(social relations). These structures, in turn, are fashioned in light
of the contingent conditions of objective and subjective nature. Thus
far in history, these conditions have involved the establishment of
structures embracing, to varying degrees, domination and repression.
This is to say, as Habermas observes in accord with Marx, that
. for the species as a whole, the boundaries of
reality are in fact movable. The degree of socially
necessary repression can be measured by the techni-
cal control over natural processes. With the develop-
ment of technology, the institutional framework,
which regulates the distribution of obligations and
rewards and stabilizes a power structure that main-
tai~s cultural renunciation, can be loosened. 24
At any given point in history, the institutional framework and
level of technology of a society embody the accmnulated knowledge
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of the species. The achieved level of knowledge forms the precon-
dition in terms of which the species I notion of self -preservation is
formulated, the latter being dependent at any given time on the needs,
expectations~ and objective possibilities of a society at a certain
stage of development.
The interest of self -preservation cannot aim at the
reproduction of the life of the species automatically
and without thought, because under the conditions of
the existence of culture this species must first inter-
pret what it counts as life. 25 .
The end or goal of self~preservation, then, is an evolving and dyna-
mic one, an expression of the cumulative developments in the dimen-
sions of both instrumental and communicative action. But as we
.have seen, the dialectic between the "forces of production" and the
"structures of normative interaction" embody historically changing
levels of repression and domination. This repression creates a
potential for the perception of suffering and the frustration of needs .26
The need to overcome this suffering can be expressed as " ••• the
interest in that measure of emancipation that historically is objec-
tively possible under given and manipulable conditions. 11.27 But what
is objectively possible at a given historical moment is embodied in
society's conception of its self-preservation. Habermas wants to
maintain, however; that what is required for self-preservation at
any given historical point is itself a product of cultural self-"
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interpretation. The concept of self-preservation itself embodies a
normative element. Not only is it a description of those components
necessary to life, it also includes a concept of what life should be •
• .• • the cognitive processes to which social life is
indissolubly linked function not only as means to the
reproduction of life; for in equal measure they them-
selves determine the definition of this life. What
may appear as naked survival is always in its roots
a historical phenomenon. For- it is subject to the
criterion of what a society intends for itself as the
good life. 28
The need for self-preservation, then, is also an expression of
the need for the good life, a need which is especially acute when
there is a high level of consciousness of felt repression. But this
interest in the good life, the interest in achieving conditions' of
emancipation, oriented in terms of the prevalent interpretation of
self-preservation, is conditioned by the level of growth in the forces
of production and normative structures. Thus the interest man has
in emancipation is historically conditioned by the developments in
the dimensions of his two primary interests, the technical and the
practical. The emancipatory interest can be interpreted as the impera-
tive for fnan to free himself from forces (of both inner and outer
nature) which control him but which he would be able to control in
practice under the proper, specifiable conditions. The actual
historical form the imperative takes at any given time is a function
of the social reality created by manls activities in the practical and
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technical spheres of action and of the consciousness of suffering to
which conditions of that social reality have given rise.
the concept of the interest of reason, introduced
by idealism, needs to be reinterpreted materialis-
tically: the emancipatory interest itself is dependent
on the interests in possible intersubjective action-
orientation and in possible technical control. 29
One might well object at this point that Habermas 1 conception
of a society having Ita conception of its self-preservation'," or of
having a conception of "what it • . • intends for itself as the good
life," etc., implies ~a reified conception of that society. Given the
stress Habermas himself places on the capacity of any given asym-
metrical dist~ibution of power to distort communication, it is clear
that he himself attempts constantly to avoid suchan hypostatization
of any given society's apparent social identity. However, in his
theory of interests, there is a tension between a stress on the neces-
.sity for a hermeneutic analysis of social life, with its emphasis on
the understanding and explication·of contextually bound activities
.and self-images (of, e.g., individuals, groups, and classes), and
a stres's on the necessity to understand society qua system, about
which very general and broad claims are made. Whether or not
Habermas surmounts this tension we will continue to investigate
below. But is is clear that if the general claims about a society are
to be sustainable, Habermas will have to demonstrate methods
·n
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adequate to make and place them. These will have to extend socio-
logical and historical modes of .analysis and place at their center
considerations of social evolution. Otherwise notions like 11 ••• the
interest in that measure of emancipation that historically is objec-
tively possible under given and manipulable conditions, 11 will be
suspect of being nothing other than a vague generality which cannot
be empirically grounded.
There are three categories of knowledge, then, each of which
can bOe regarded as the cognitive expression of a basic knowledge-
constitutive interest of man. Each interest forms a structure of
activity which is basic to the survival and development of the species,
that is, the It. • • knowledge -constitutive interests take form in the
medium of work, l~nguage, and power. ,,30 Each of these interests
is reflected on the level of the logic of inquiry in a distinct methodo-
logical approach to the generation of knowledge. We have seen how
Habermas uncovers the technical and practical interests through an
examination, respectively, of Peirce's and Dilthey's analysis of the
nature of the natural and cultural sciences. In an analogous manner,
the ernancipatory interest gives impetus to a third type of science,
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critical- science. Before examining the nature of this science, how-
ever, there are a number of points and distinctions which must be
made.
The three cognitive interests were said to be conceivable as
generalized motives in terms of which systems of knowledge -consti-
tuting. action could be understood. These systems of action determine
the rules of inquiry according to which objectivity is constituted and
knowledge systematically generated. Seen in this sense, the interests
appear to function as transcendental conditions for the possibility of
knowledge. It is only in light of the interest structure, the claim is
made, that knowledge as we find it can be comprehended. Indeed,
Habermas writes that:
As long as these interests of knowledge are identified
and analyzed by way of reflection on the logic of inquiry
that structures the natural and the human sciences, they
can claim a IItranscendental fl status. 31
But, as we hav.e seen, Habermas· epistemology is not transcendental
in the Kantian sense, or even in the sense in which neo -Kantian or
phenomenological epistemology can be said to be transcendental. 32
There is, for Habermas, "no ahistorical transcendental subject who
provides the preconditions for the constitution of possible experience.
Rather, the subject of the constituting activity is the human species.
The conditions of the constitution of knowledge are the historical,
material conditions in which the self-formative process of the species
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has occurred. Habermas I epistemology starts from the fact of man
as a natural animal who is both a product of and located in nature.
Thus the cognitive interests are transcendental from the point of
view of the generation of human knowledge, but are themselves
naturalistically grounded. That is, the rule systems governing the
activities of the species
• .• have a transcendental function but arise from
actual structures of human life: from structures of
a species that reproduces its life both through
learning processes of socia1~y organized labor and
processes of mutual understanding in interactions
mediated in ordinary language. These basic con-
ditions of life have an interest structure. 33
Se'en from this perspective, the cognitive interests If •••
assume an 'empirical' status as soon as they are being analyzed as
the result of natural history- -analyzed, that is, in terms of a cogni-
tive anthropology, as it were. ,,34 "Empirica111 is placed in quotation'
marks in the last quote because the recovery of these interests as
emergent properties of the natural pre-history of man would be
provided by a theory of evolution. But such a theory of evolution
would itself have to be understood within the cognitive framework of
the constituting interests. This being the case, it could not 11 •••
wholly divest itself of the form of a reflection on the pre -history of
culture that is dependent on a prior understanding of the socio-cultural
life form. 11 35 Habermas is aware of the circularity which thus
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appears at this point in the interpretation of his theory of interests.
Concerning this circularity,he writes in a footnote to the Introduc-
tion to Theory and Practice that:
The unavoidable circularity, in which we become
involved as soon as we approach problems which .m~y
be equivalent to the traditional one of ultimate founda-
tions - -although this can ve ry well be explained --
may be a sign.that;· among other things, the concept-
pair, "contingent-necessity" is no longer to be
sharply separated on this level of argumentation.
Presumably, assertions concerning contingency or
necessity of interests of knowledge are meaningless,
just like those about the contingency or necessity of
the human race or the world as a whole. 36
transcendental one nor simply empirical. Human knowledge can be
conceived of as neither wholly instrumental in regard to an organism IS
adaption strategies toward its environment nor as rt. • • the act of
a pure rational being removed from the context of life in contempla-
37
tion. It Likewise, the category of "cognitive interests" expresses
the fact that tnap. is both a product of his natural environment and the
creator of his social reality. The cognitive interests exemplify, at
the same :time, both man IS continuity with nature a;nd his power over
nature, in the sense that nature (qua nature as known) is the product
of the constituting activity of man. History is natural and nature
historical. "Thus 'interest' can be neither classed with those mecha-
nisms of steering animal behavior that we can call instincts nor
n·
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entirely severed from the objective context of a life process. 1138 In
recognition of this dialectical tension, which epistemologically is
located in the theory of interests, Habermas accords to the cate-
gory of "cognitive :1ntere~tF'i the somewhat problematic status of
IIquasi-trans cendental. It
As a result of the conceptualt connection in his theory between
the status of knowledge and the satisfaction of basic needs of the
human species, Habermas has been accused of both naturalism and
pragmatism. In light of the above discussion, it can easily be
appreciated that the charge of naturalism on the part of certain
philosophers with a theological or Hegelian orientation (Gunter
Rohrmoser, Michale The~n~sse"h' Riidigner Bubner) misunderstands
Habermas' position. Likewise, the charge of antinaturalism (e. g.,
by Hans Alber.t):"is equally misdirected. As concerns pragmatism,
Habermas rejects the view that If. • • the success of instrumental
action is a sufficient criterion of the truth of propositions. 1139 liThe
truth of a proposition," he maintains, Ilis not established by means
of interest gratification, but only by means of an argumentative
redemption of the truth claim itself. ,,40 (It should, however, be
noted that questions concerning the status of truth claims remain
open ill Knowledge and Human Interests and were unsatisfactorily
dealt with. This, as we shall see, Habermas readily admits. )
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It this were not the case, that is, if the conditions for objec-
tivity were not distinguished from the conditions for the truth of a
statement, then it would be impossible to distinguish true from false
needs, legitimate from illegitimate practice, and ultimately to ground
theeman~ipatoryinterest. The conditions for objectivity are linked,
as we have seen, to the knowledge -constitutive interests. If truth
is not distinguished from objectivity, then truth also mUE?t be -linked
to basic interests as together expressed in the interests of self-
preservation. Under these conditions, the notions of truth and
validity would be tainted with a pragmatic bias which would rob them
of their traditional claims to being objective and disinterested. The
danger, Habermas acknowledges in his discussion of Nietzsche in
Knowledge and Human Interests is that:
The basis of knowledge in interest affects the possi-
bility of knowledge as such. Since the gratification
of all needs is congruent with the interest in self-
preservation, any illusion at random can put forth
the same claim to validity, as long as s orne need
interprets the world through it. 41
In order to maintain a critical perspective and the possibility of a
critical science, to establish the claims of reflection and the poten-
tial for emancipation, Habermas must distinguish his theory of objec-
tivity· and the problem of meaning-constitution as being separate frotTI
that of truth and the recognition of validity.
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nCHAPTER X
GROUNDING THE EMANCIPATORY INTEREST:
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE
It was argued, earlier, that the dualisms between fact and
value,:science-ana.(criticism, Ee'tc~. -, are clearly incompatible with the
idea of a critical theory of society. One of the defining characteris-
tics of the work of Lukacs, Horkheimer, Marcuse, etc.~, was seen
to be precisely the attempt to overcome the empirical/normative
dualism and the diremption of theory from practice which follows
from it. But it was argued that in the work of these authors there
was too little elaboration of how, in a materialist theory of history,
in a materialist critique, the notions of "reason, II ""truth, II "opjec-
tivity, II and IIfre'edam, II upon which their theory relied, might be
grounded. If Habermas is to advance beyond their positions it becomes
crucially important for him to address himself to these "problematics. 1f
If critique, moving beyond the understanding interpre-
tation of a context of meaning, accepts as its task the
explanation of a systematically distorted communica-
tion' then it must have the mastery of the idea of undis-
torted communication. 1
The question becomes: how is the emancipa~oryinterest rationally
justified?
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Habermas' recent philosophic work has been an attempt to
develop systematically the philosophical underpinnings of a critical
theory of society, 2 in a reformulation and defense of some of the
central theses of classical philosophy: the inseparability of truth
and goodness, of theory and practice, of fact and value. By pro-
viding a language theoretic reformulation of the epistemological
presuppositions of historical materialism ·heat,tempts, as McCarthy
put it, trto walk the fine line between naturalistic and transcendental
philosophy. ,,3 The starting point for this project is the claimed
normative foundation of ordinary language communication:
••• for in every act of speaking the telos of under-
standing is inherent. • • . Understanding is a norma-
tive concept; everyone who speaks a natural language
is intuitively familiar with it and trusts himself to
distinguish a true from a false consensus. 4
The issues raised are worth exploring at some length.
Habermas stresses that language is a universal medium (along
with work and domination) in which the social life of the human species
unfolds. The stress, as we have seen, is not new in this work. 5
Habermas views the history of the species as determined simul-
taneously by the reproduction of the material conditions of life (labor)
and by the system of symbolic interaction that mediate all socio-
cultural life. It is in explicating how the species unfolds through
these mediums that reveals the emancipatory interest. We must
i
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return for a moment to Habermas I earlier distinction between objec-
tivity and truth.
Man is both a producer and a communicator, a tool-making and
symbol-using animal. His
. • • production processes extract natural resources
and transform the energies set free into use values.
Socialization processes educate the members of the
system to subjects capable of speaking and acting.
The embryo enters this formative process and the
individual is not released from it until his death (if
we disregard limit cases of desocialization). 6
Outer nature (i. e., the· resources of the nonhuman environment) is
appropr.iated in production and "inner nature" in socialization pro-
cesses. For the specific form in which socia-cultural life repro-
duces itself the exchange with outer and inner nature is de·cisive-;·~ ...
Habermas argues that social systems socialize outer nature
with the help. of the forces of production. They organize and train
labor power, develop technologies and strategies through instrumental
~:ction (according to technical rules) mediated by utterances capable
of truth. Social systems also maintain themselves vis -'a-vis saciali-
zing inner. nature (in which needs are interpreted and actions licensed
or made obligatory) through communicative actions (according to
valid rules) mediated by norms in need of justification. There exists,
Habermas contends, an evolutionary disjuncture}:betw~.en'm~n' and
animal because at the socio-cultural stage of development (human)
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animal behavior is reorganized under imperatives of validity claims.
This reorganization is effected in the structure of
linguistically produced intersubjectivity. Linguistic
communication has a double structure; communica-
tion of propositional content may take place only
with simultaneous metacommunication of interpersonal
relations. 7
We cannot achieve a consensus about experience and propositional
contents without at the same time a metacommunicative discourse
about the choice of one among a variety of pos sible patterns of inte r-
personal relations. This, Habermas suggests, is an expression of
the specifically human interpenetration of cognitive abilities and
action motives with linguistic intersubjectivity. In this process
language functions as a kind of transformer; "since psychic processes
such as sensation, needs, and feelings are fit into the structures of
linguistic intersubjectivity, inner episodes of experiences are trans-
formed into intentional contents, that is cognitions into statements,
This transformation produces a distinction "rich in consequences"
between the "subjectivity of opinion, of wanting, of pleasure and
pain on the one hand, and the utterances and norms which appear
with a claim to generality (Allgemeinheitsanspruch) on the other. ,r
Generality here means objectivity of knowledge and legitimacy of
valid.norms. More specifically, the objectivity of knowledge, e. g.,
of perception, "is guaranteed by the intersubjectively shared
("I
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structure of objects of possible experience," whereas the objectivity
of valid norms, e. g., of prescriptions and evaluations is guaranteed
by the universal intersubjective acceptance of norms of action and
standards of evaluation." Both create, sustain, and ensure the
community (Gemeinsamkeit) which is constitutive for the socio-
cultural-life -world. 9
In social practice, action-rel~~e~~experienceis acquired and
shared. Statements serving to convey experience are themselves
action. The Ifobjectivity of experience consists precisely in its
being intersubjectively shared lt ; the possibility of which, we have
seen, is ensured by the generality of language (whether for percep-
tive, descriptive, Qr evaluative statements). Yet, this objectivity
of experience as stated in language is not to be conflated with the
truth of statements about experience. "Objectivity of experiences
means that everybody can count on the success or failure of certain
actions; the truth of ~.:·propositiori~state'd:,i~:~dis,cqur:ses'means 'that
everybo,dy can be persuaded by reasons to recognize the truth claim
of the statement as being justified. 1110 What is required is an analy-
sis of the difference 'between problems of object constitution and
problems of truth, which, in Habermas I opinion, were llinsufficiently
worked out" in Knowledge and~i~uman Interests. In his theory of
CO~Il.'?-u~i~,ativeCompetenc~_, Habermas seeks to demonstrate that
The first important element of the theory
(':,
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this can only be done in a systematic investigation of the general
structures, the universal pragmatics, which appear in every pas-
sible speech situation and which are themselves produced through
the performance of specific types of linguistic expes sion. .An ..~dequate
conception, Habermas argues, can be developed only in terms of a
universal pragmatics "which exhibits the normative basis of all
communication and explains the possibility of systematic~llydis-
d ·· tt lltorte communlcatlon.
rests on the distinction between everyday and theoretic attitudes,
communicative action or interaction and discourse. 12
A smooth functioning langauge game, in which speech acts are
exchanged, are based, Habermas argues, on an underlying, back-
ground con.sensus. This is formed from the mutual recognition of
at least four different types of validity claims (Geltungsanspruche):
.•. the claims that the utterance is understandable
and that its propositional content is true, and the
claims that the speaker is sincere in uttering it and
that it is right or appropriate for him to be perform-
ing the speech act which he performs. 13
In everyday interaction these four types of'validity claims, implicitly
raised, are naively accepted. But people can step into situations
that have not yet been routinized or where routinized, taken-for-
. granted. realitie~ a:re disturbed. It becomes possible for situations
to arise in which one or more of the implicitly- raised validity claims
~I '
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becomes problematic and where the background consensus might be
disturbed in a fundamental way. When this occurs, specific forms
of problem'resolution, different for each type of claim, are needed
14to restore the original, or a new, background consensus. But
the validity of questioned and problematic truth claims or norms can
only be redeemed and established Ildiscursively and only discursively."
The meaning of the truth or untruth of a statement
does not consist in the conditions guaranteeing the
objectivity of our experience but in the possibility
of argumentative corroboration of a truth claim
which is falsifiable in principle. 15
Discourses help test the truth claims of opinions, and norms, which
the speakers no longer presuppose. In the first case we have a
"theoretic discourse lf (which has the single purpose of justifying
and judging the truth of the problematic opinion), in the second case,
a "practi~al discourse" ~(where~:~he"s\lita-bil~tyrof the_;questioned norm
is debated) •
As opposed to other language games the speech situation of dis-
.
course "represents a certain break with the normal context"6f inter-
action in that, ideally, it requires a ','suspension of the constraints
of action, t/ Ita putting out of play of all motives except that of a willing-
ness to come to an understanding;('and a ;'bracketing of validity claims,'
that is, "a willingnes s to suspend judgment as to the existence of
certain states of affairs (they mayor may not be the case) and as to
j()
I
I,
I
I
470
the 'rightness of certain norms (they mayor may not be correct). tt 16
There is only one form of compulsion permissible in a discourse:
"the force of the argument. 11 The cooperative search for truth is
the only permissible motive. The communicative structures of dis-
do 't~eyaccomm6date-pro-ce~sse~s·\wh~ereby information can be acquired.
They are purged of action and experience. 1f~:~ 0n the other hand,
everyday attitudes, opinions, and evaluations, etc., of the normal
, context of interaction contains - -Habermas argues --an implicit
reference to discourse.
Inasmuch as interaction involves regarding the other
as subject, it involves supposing that he knows what
he is doing and why he is doing it, that is, that he
intentionally holds the beliefs he does and inten-
tionally follows the norms he does, and he is capable
of discursively justifying them if the question should
arise. 17 .
This "model of pure communicative action" points implicitly to dis-
course as an immanent ap.d possible form of communication. It
~:~It can be noted in passing that this series of points is vul-
nerable to the criticism that what is being presented is nothing more
'or less than an idealized account of discourse which has little, if
any, basis in everyday social reality. (As we shall se"e, the same
charge can be made about Habermas 1 whole analysis of speech. )
Post-Kuhnian sociology of science could certainly show that this
model of discourse has no counterpart in everyday scientific dis-
course.:18 "However, the charge, if it is to be made, must realize
that Habermas by no means ends his analysis here.
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involves the assumption that interacting subjects could, if the back-
ground consensus is brought into disrepute, discursively justify
their beliefs and norms. What is the ·status of this assumption?
In Habermas I view it is, of course, obvious that "institu-
tionalized actions do not as a rule fit this model of pure communi-
cative action although, If he goes on to ar'gue that,
• • • we cannot avoid counterfactually proceeding as
if the models were really the case --on this unavoid-
able fiction rests the humanity of intercourse among
men who are still men. 19
Habermas suggests that this supposition of accountability, this
expectation "that the other could account for his behavior in the
same way that (we are convinced) we could account for ours is a
normal feature of functioning language games. ,,20 The assumption
of acco~ntability is, however, usually counterfactual to institu-
tionalized everyday communicative interaction. But, Habermas
wants to contend, the actualization of the factual in the counterfactual,
"the exception, is the rule in human history•.•. That the assump-
tion is counterfactual and that nevertheless persists as an expecta-
tion can. • • be explained in a theory of systematically distorted
21
communication. 11·-· The question is, if the argument is to develop,
how can the counterfactual expectation be stablized, i. e., how can
"the rule" remain and persist qua counterfactual?
.f)
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This can be achieved only through legitimation of the
ruling systems of norms and through the anchoring of
the belief in legitimacy in systematic barriers to will-
forming .colTImunication. . The ·clai~ that bur norms
can be grounded is redeemed through legitimizing
world-views. The validity of these world-views is
in turn secured in a communication structure which
excludes discursive will-formation. . • the barriers
to communication which make a fiction precisely of
the reciprocal imputation of accountability, support
at the same time the belief in legitimacy that sustains
the fiction and prevents its being found out. That is
the paradoxical achievement of ideologies, whose
i:qdividual prototype is the neurotic disturbance .,22
Before talking about the individual prototype and the claimed
import of the analysis for social theory, a number of further points
need to be made. For if it is recognized that a claimed rule of inter-
action is a counterfactual or an ideality, the question arises: how
can we exempt discourse itself from distortion? Consequentially,
can a distinction between a true and a false consensus be made? Ar·e
there criteria for such a distinction? In light of our discussion of
. earlier· attempts to sustain a foundation for critical theory, these
questions become of particular importance. Habermas believes that
a basis for answers to these questions lies in the explication of a
consensus' theory of truth.
In an earlier paper Habermas argued that philosophy must
remain true to the central insight of its classical tradition that "the
truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of
the good and true life. ,,::23 In his discussion of theories of truth
o
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(particularly those prevalent in the analytic tr~4ition, e.g.._, the
semantic and correspondence theories)24 he attempts to develop the
claimed classical "connection." Leaving aside his critique -of indi-
vidual theories which would take us beyond the scope of this work,
we can draw out the direction of his own analysis ..As was mentioned
above, a functioning language game rests, according to Habermas,
on a background consensus about the truth of certain beliefs and the
correctness of certain norms. If called into question, these validity
claims can only be justified through discursive verification.
Experiences support the tr.uth claims of assertions •
• • • But a truth claim can be redeemed only through
r
argumentation. A claim founded (fundient) on experi-
ence is by no means a jU$tified (begrundet) claim. 25
In the context of everyday communicative action our assertions are
about the objects of our experience. It is only when their truth claims
are no longer presupposed, and are suspended and tested, do facts
as facts become the theme of discourse. "Facts are not constituted,
since they are not entities in the world but correlates of propositions
on the level of argumentative reasoning. 11,26 . What is constituted are
the objects of possible action-related experience. But if and when
statements are found to be in need of corroboration they break their
link to the practical life ,in~ respect only: their sentences and
presupposed validity claims become sentences, etc., in a discourse.
To uncover the notion of truth, it is argued, therefore requires an
I, _
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analysis of the argumentative corroboration of a validity claim (i. e. ,
of the elements of a discourse) •.
Discursive justification is a normative concept. Were
ev~ry c_ontinge~tlY5~once~v~ed~agreemento be·under~tood
as a "consensus, If then the latter obviously could not
serve as the criterion of truth. Truth is not the fact
that a consensus is realized, but rather that at all
times and in any place, if we enter into a discourse
a consensus can be realized under conditions which
identify it as a justified consensus. Truth means
"warranted assertibility. u;Z-7 ...
What is a founded consensus and are there criteria to distinguish
it from any contingently achieved agreement? As McCarthy put it,
"if the criterion which serves to distinguish a true from a false
consensus itself requires discursive justification we are moving in
a circle; if not, we have transcended the consensus framework in
establishing it. 11/28
Habermas argues that there is only one way out of this di~emma
and that is through a characterization of the "force of the better
argument" expressed in terms of I1the formal properties of discourse. 1f
What is "required, he maintains, is an analysis of the logic of dis-
course which is in turn dependent on an explication of the notion of
"providing rational grounds 11 or tlrational motivationl1 in terms of
"the formal (not in usual syntatical or semantical sense, but in the
pragmatic sense) properties of argumentation." Against the oft-
claimed c~ntrali.ty of the modality of formal logical necessity or
"I
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impossibility, Habermas contends that the fundamental modality is
the pragmatic modality of cogency or soundness: the argument should
rationally motivate us to accept, suspend, or reject ·the validity
claim 'unde r dispute.
In an analysis that follows the work of Stephen Toulmin,
Habermas analyzes the
.' • • structure of an argument into the conclusion that
is to be grounded, the data that is put forward as
relevant, the warrant which establish'es the connec-
tion between the data and the conclusion (e. g., a
·general law of physics, a universal moral rule) 'and
the backing for the moment, that which establishes
it as plausible (e. g., the obse~vationaland experi-
mental backing for a !lypothesis, the consequences
of follow~g a given n~rm for the satisfaction of
a~cepted needs).-·;..29 ..
Having made this analysis he attempts to characterize the conditions
which would "rationally motivate" or justify and ground a consensus.
The central preoccupation is that the context of argument must "per-
mit a progressive radicalization of the argument, there must be
freedom to move from a .given level of discourse to increasingly
reflected levels, I"~O ·i. e.:
---there must be freedom to enter a discourse;
-- -to discursively check questioned claims;
- - -to seek discursive evaluation of methods '. explana-
tions, etc.; and
- - -to modify or throw out a given conceptual framework
(metatheoretical discourse).
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In attempting to "rationally motive" and justify a line of argumenta-
tive reasoning we must, Habermas insists., presuppose that the out-
come of the debate will rest simply on the force of the better argu-
ment and not be the result of lIaccid~ntaltt or "systematic constraints. ft
J.'Ifwe··didnot suppose that a justified consensus were possible and
could in some way be distinguished from a false consensus, then the
very meaning of discourse, indeed of speech, would be called into
question. 11:31
j
The condition for a grounded consensus, th.e. context
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of discourse free of constraint or systematically distorted communi-
cation, can--Habermas further argues--be specified formally in
terms of the pragmatic structure of communication itself. Habermas t
thesis is that the structure is free from systematic distortion and
constraint ..
• • • only when for all participants there is a sym-
metrical distribution of chances to select and employ
speech acts, when there is an effective equality of
chances to as sume dialogue roles. In particular, all
participants must·have the same chance to initiate
and perpetuate discourse, to put forward, call into
question and give reasons for or against statements,
explanations, interpretations and justifications.
Furthermore, they must have the same chance to
express their attitudes, feelings, intentions and th'e
like, and to command, to oppose, to permit and to
forbid, etc. 32 ~ -
These last requirements refer to the organizational context of cOlJ:?-
munication, since unconstrained discourse is only possible in a
speaking-situation we name ideal. Such a situation is not only not
..
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hindered by the forces which result from the structure of communica-
tion itself, but also not hindered by external contingent influences. 33'
In other words, the conditions of the ideal speech situation must
ensure equal opportunity for dis cussion, which is itself free from all
domination, the sources of which can be conscious strategic behavior
and! or the impediments of systematically distorted communication,
i. e., ideology and/ or neurosis. "Thus, the conditions for ideal
discourse are connected with conditions for an ideal form of life;
they include linguistic conceptualizations of the traditional ideas of
freedom a:od justice. JTruth' cannot~e analyzed.,iildependently of .
Jfreedom I .and Jjustice I ~ 1.1 3:4
It goes without saying that the conditions of the ideal speech
situation are ideal. But this fact does not of itself bring the ideal
into disrepute. It is Habermas' view, then, that
. the ideal speech situation is neither. an empirical
phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a reciprocal
supposition (Unterstellung) unavoidable in discourse.
This supposition can, but need not be, counterfactual;
but even when counterfactual it is a fiction which is
operatively effective in communication. I would there-
fore prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal
speech situation. . •• This anticipation alone is the
warrant which permits us to join to an actually attained
consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the
same time it is a critical standard <:tgainst which every
actually realized consensus can be called into question
and tested. ,35
The conclusion of Habermas 1 analysis of the structure of communica-
tion is that it rests on a normative foundation. uIn discussing we
i0
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assume the reality of an ideal speech situation. It is tanticipated, I
but as anticipated also 'effective'. 11.36 'This anticipated situation of
an ideal speech situat~on, of an anticipated life, which presupposes
an ideal of:~reason, is, of course, rarely, if ever, approximated in
speech situations. But the ideal as an ideal can serve as a standard
for the critique of syst<e?TIatiGa~lydistorted communication and as a
guide for the institutionalization of discourse (i. e., on how social
interaction should be institutionalized). Whether or not the empirical
conditions for the approximate realization of this ideal of life and
reason can be practically accomplished does not, in Habermas t
opinion, "admit of an a priori answer. If liThe fundamental norms of
rational.speech which are built into universal pragmatics contain,
f h - - f - · 1 h h·""3'7rom t 1S pOlnt 0 Vlew, a pract1ca ypot eSlS. ."
The endpoint of the analysis is that the very structure of speech
involves an anticipated form of life in which autonomy and responsi-
bility are pos sible. Critical theory is, therefore, grounded on a
normative standard, which is not arbitrary, but inherent in the very
structure of social action. The theory is an attempt to reconceptualize
the philosophical foundations of the relationship between theory and
practice. In it Habermas seeks to defend the inseparability of truth
and practice, of facts and value s, of theory and practice. With this
thesis stands his attempt (to date):
(;, .
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• • • to provide philos ophical foundations for a criti-
cal theory of society, for a social theory design~
with a practical intention: the self-emancipation of
men from the constraints of unnecessary domination
in all its forms. His argument is, simply, that the
emancipated form of life which is the goal of critical
theory is inherent in the notion of truth: it is antici.;.
pated in every act of communication.~~'.39
In summary, we can say that it is Habermas' intention to
demonstrate that the a priori of experience (which lays down the
objects and structure of possible action-related experience) is
independent of the a priori of argumentative reasoning (which lays
down the conditions of possible discourse). Both of these combine
to define lithe limits of empirical theories (which are built up from
., .
accummulated evidence). II
Theories can only be constructed, and progressively
reconstructed, in the context of conditions pertaining
to the nature of argum.entation and within the limits
of prior objectivation of experienceable occurences ~~40
Therefore, Habermas argues that the "unity of reasoning is compa-
tible with a differential m~aning-constitutionof object domains. In
all sciences, argumentation is subject to the same conditions govern-
ing the discursive redemption of truth claims. 1141 However, the
argument for the "unity of argumentation, II which is suggestive of
~ alternative conception of a unified science, must not be conflated
with the program for the unity of theories themselves. The program
for the unity of theories is obviously rejected in light of the attempt
],
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to reconstruct (1) the link between theory formation and the log"ic of
inquiry and (2) the IIquasi-transcendental" conditions of how know-
ledge comes into being and is used.
There is, however, a unity between the a priori of experience
and the a priori of argumentative reasoning, between action and
experience with dis course. It is the ~owledge-constitutive interests
themselves which maintain this unity.
They preserve the latent n.exus between action and theore-
tical knowledge. They are r'esponsible for the trans-
formation of opinions into theorems and of the retrans-
formation of theorems into action-oriented knowl~·dge.
But they do not by any means obviate the difference
between experience stated in a context of action and
propositions about facts which have been corroborated
in a discourse. Similarly, knowledge-constitutive
interests do not obviate the difference between truth
claims based on merely factual recognition and those
that have been tested by argumentative reasoning. 42 '..:. -
It was my view that the systematicness of Habermas I response
to the proble'm of grounding is not (as yet?) sufficient to show that
his response to the is sues is, in the last instance, adequate. The
status of the analysis of universal ,pragmatics, central to Habermas I
prog'ram, is ambiguous between philospphical anthropology and
empirical sociology. Particularly, the status of the ideal speech
situation as an ongoing feature of interaction is extremely proble-
matic. But b'efore making these points in detail there are several
other central aspects of his thought which should be developed and
I·
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discussed, especially his conception of psychoanalysis as the "only
tangible exatnple of a critical science." It is in his discussion of
Freud and psychoanalysis that we see how the theory of cognitive
interests and the theory of cotnlTIunicative cOlTIpetence infortn a con-
ception of social sc~ence_a~ a critical science.
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CHAPTER XI
CRITICAL THEORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
For Habermas, the theory of communicative competence pro-
vides a foundation for Critical theory. On Habermas I account, the
normative model of ideal-language use is not abstractly metaphysical
(or excessively formal) insofar as it is founded in an analysis of the
conditions of concrete speech situations. Furthermore, within the
terms of theory, we saw that Habermas attempts to conceptualize
the notions of truth, freedom, and justice. Thus he seeks to ground
Critical theory while attempting to avoid the circularity in previous
attempts.
In Chapter 9 we also saw that on the level of epistemology,
Habermas seeks to uncover an intere,st in emancipation which arises
out of the conditions of the human species' struggle for self-preserva-
tion. _ His emp~asis on the unfolding of this interest from the actuality
of human struggles makes plausible the contention that the attainment
of the concretized conditions of truth, freedom, and justice are not
beyond the immanent possibilities of human history. Whether these
conditions will be achieved, however, is --Habermas stresses --an
empirical and practical hypothesis. In his most recent book,
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Legitimation Crisis, he seeks to investigate this hypothesis at con-
siderably greater length. We will discuss some aspects of this work
in the following chapter. In this chapter we will concentrate our
exegesis on a central aspect of Habermas I work which has not yet
been dis cussed, namely, his model of Critical theory (as critical
science). We have already seen how the empirical-analytic and
hermeneutic sciences are held to be constituted by the technical and
practical interests respectively. We will now analyze the science
which Habermas claims is directly related to the species interest
in emancipation. It is this science, iJ? Hab~~mas I view, which is
with the knowledge, knowledge immanently and closely tied to practice,
which opens the path to freedom and truth.
In the theory of communicative competence there is an implicit
claim that true human eITlancipation requires, initially at least,
the attainment of a situation of undistorted communication. The
increasing lIapproximation to such communication will necessarily
lead to the practice required for the destruction of the material strite-
tures which create conditions of distorted communication" and will
likely furthermore "be a safeguard against the emergence of ideological
1
structures. " It is the central aim of critical science to generate
the knowledge necessary to this task. The goal of critical science is
!('
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to facilitate the process of methodical self-reflection and thus dissolve
barriers to undistorted communication'and the development of a fully
self-conscious self-formative process. In the practice and develop-
ment of critical science, the material conditions which create the
possibility of ideological domination are also disclosed, opening up
the possibility of practical-action to overcome them.
The theory serves primarily to enlighten those to
whom it is addressed about the position they occupy
in an antagonistic social system and about the interests
of which they could become conscious as objectively
their own in this situation. Only to the degree that
organized enlightenment and consultation leads those
groups, toward which this is directed, to actually
recognizing themselves in the interpretation offered,
do the analytically proposed interpretations actually
become consciousness, and does the objectively
attributed situation of interests actually become the
real interest of a group capable of action. 2
If, according to the theory of communicative competence, the
conditions of truth (and freedom) are realized only in the ideal speech
situations, and if it is recognized that all human history so far has
witnessed the presence of domination andd.i~tortedcommunication,
then, the validation. of all scientific knowledge of the world is inex-
tricably intertwined with the conditions for the realization of the good,
the just, and the true life. The refore , the validation of scientific
knowledge ultimately rests on a science which has a practical intent,
which realizes the need to chaJl1·g~.the w~rl?-,~i.e. , on critical science.
According to Habermas, the developments of the natural and cultural
(~
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sciences are to be understood as interrelated aspects of the historical
constitution of the world through the self-generative and self-formative
processes of the species. These processes, he maintairis, cannot be
completely comprehended and the sciences established on a firm
basis without first grasping and retrieving in theory and overcoming
in practice the moments of historical domination and repression.
Thus, in the end, the true understanding of the meaning of knowledge
in the natural and cultural sciences depends on a critical science.
Such a science
tr~es. to illuminate both human history and. the
pr?tctice of science as historical s elf -forming pro-
cesses' and thereby restores to men an awareness
of their position as the active, yet historically
limited, subject of history. To recognize the pro-
cesses of historical self-formation of human history
is to become aware of the mechanisms of historical
negativity and therefore to be able to generate a cri-
tique of existing structures by objectifying the objec-
tive possibilities of a social reality. 3
Habermas contends that the only satisfactory example of a
!4
critical science is that of psychoanalysis as first developed by Freud.
It is from this conception of psychoanalysis that he thinks many of
the features of a critical science can be drawn. Psychoanalysis,
Habermas argues., is fl ••• the only tangible example of a science
incorporating methodical self-reflection. ,,5 It is through methodical
self-reflection.that the "deformations of distorted communication'1
can be overcome. As a consequence the subject can be freed frotTI
II 1
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the Ifcausality of fate, If from hypostatized forces and poten~:Lal1y
from the underpinning structures of trsecond nature. "
While taking.psychoanalysis as the prototype of a critical
science, Habermas transposes the model to the realm of social
analysis and political practice. On Habermas' account, historical
materialism can and must be (re)formulated as a critical theory of
society which incorporates the insights of the psychoanalytic model
with its erriphasis on the role of critical self -reflection. Seen in this
context, hist'orical materialism becomes a critique of ideology with
a practical intent. According to Habermas' interpretation:
• • • the critiques which Marx developed as a theory
of society and Freud as ~~.t~psycho~<?gy;ar,eldt.sti~g.uished
precisely by incorporating in their cons ciousnes s an
interest which directs -lmowledge, an interest in emanci-
pation going beyond the ~~chnical and the practical interest
of lmowledge. 6
Freud, on Habermas' account, developed an interpretive
framework for the examination of the self-formative processes of
individuals disturbed and in need of "the rapeutically guided self-
reflection.' 1 At first sight, psychoanalysis appears to be a process
of methodical inte rpretation (of the analysand 1s behavior, drealns,
etc.) and therefore a hermeneutical science. Psychoanalysis,
Habermas P9ints out, IJprovides theoretical perspectives and techni-
cal rules for the interpretation of symbolic structures. If
I ;
I,
490
Freud always patterned the interpretation of dreams'
after the hermeneutic lTIodel of philological [i. e. ,
traditional hermeneutical] research. Occasionally
he compares it to the translation of a foreign author:
of a text by Levy, for example. 7
However, by recognizing the presence of neurotic symptoms, i. e. ,
repressed, Qmmitted and distorted symbols and meanings and inter-
nal disturbances which result in the disruption of language games of
ordinary speech on the level of both speech and behavior, psycho-
analysis requires lla specifically expanded hermeneutics. II As such
the methods of psychoanalysis have togo beyond the usual procedures
of traditional interpretation, in an attempt to take into account an
additional dimension of meaning structures.
Psychoanalytic interpretation, in contrast to traditional herme-
neutics, is directed at meaning structures that are not neces sarily
consciously intended. Freud appreciated and sought to demonstrate
that gaps
••• in.the me.aning texture of behavior and speech of
the patient, gaps which are eithe.rl·~unobserYable_·or
incomprehensible to the patient, are due to the repres-
sion and exclusion of undesirable symbols and meanings
fr'om the acting subject's consciousness. 8
By aiding the analysand to reconstruct his or her life history, the
analyst attempts to bring to.the analysand IS consciousness, me~nings. ,
that have 1?een lost. Psychoanalysis attempts to bring to conscious-
ness~ that lTIeasure of life history that has been systematically repressed.
I
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The need for psychoanalysis to go beyond the world of appearances
and surface meanings to recover unconscious feelings and motive:s
". . . distinguishes the peculiar task of a hermeneutics that cannot
be confined to the procedures or philology but rather unites linguistic
analysis with the psychological investigation of causal connections. 119
The methods and procedures of interpretation which Freud used to
analyze the distorted meanings with which the analysand deceives
himself or herself is called by Habermas depth hermeneutics. 10
In the process of depth hermeneutics the analyst seeks to inter-
pret obs erved speech and behavior not only on the level of the sub-
jectls conscious intentions but also on the level of the subject's
repressed intentions. The meaning of observed actions, symbols,
etc., can only be adequately understood in terms of the underlying
unconscious factors which caused the actor to act as (s)he did. If
the compulsive nature of neuroses is accepted, then the action or
expressions being studied must be regarded as caused by a motive
or force which remains on the level of the analysand IS llnconscious.
A correct interpretation of the action or expression can be supplied
by the analyst only with the successful uncovering of the unconscious
"factors. 1I IJ;l other words, when an attempt is being made to under-
stand on the level of meaning what is recognizably a neurotic or
distorted symbolic structure, whether in the dimens ion of speech,
.0
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action, or bodily expression, the assumption is made that the patient
does not act with full self-transparency. The action or expression to
be interpreted cannot be adequately understood in terms of the self-
understanding of the analysand. Systematic reference must also be
m.ade to factors which are initially opaque to}the.'~patient.
It is not enough, however, for the analyst merely to present a
correct interpretation to the analysand in order to have the latter
accept it in such a way that (s)he can overcome his or her own dis-
torted self -interpretation. The analysand, rather, must come to
. accept the reconstruction of his or her past, offered by the therapist,
at a time when (5 )he is reliving the emotions or experiences which
"lie at the base of his or her pathological attitude. This reexperien-
cing is awakened in the analysand during the course of the thera-
peutic process. Repression mechanislTIs are weakened through
techniques which induce relaxation, free association, and suspension
of the pressures of everyday life within the confines of the artificial
environment of the therapeutic interaction. In this situation, the
patient is aided to relive experiences in such a way that the emotions
involved are felt as immediately present and real. Freud calls this
process transference. Under the conditions of a IItransference
neurosis ll at a point when the patient is reliving repressed emotions,
{s )he is confronted by the analyst with an interpretation of his or her
y.'
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past experiences. An attempt is made to compel the patient to reflect
upon and accept the interpretation"in such a way that (s)he realizes
the true nature and source of the emotions.
• • • the physician t s constructions can be changed
into actual recollections of the patient only to the
degree that the latter, confronted with the results
of his action in transference with its suspension of
the pressure of life, seesrhimself through the eyes
of another and learns to reflect on his symptons as
offshoots of his own behavior. 11
The phenomenon of transference, then, is a crucial element in the
process of emancipation in psychoanalysis.
Thus, for Habermas, Freudts psychoana~ysis is seen to be
essentially concerned with the construction of interpretations.
But psychoanalysis is not conceived in any straightforward sense as
a hermeneutic science. As with other hermeneutical sciences, psy-
. choanalysis deals with the interpretation ~f meaningful symbols
within a communicative fraITlework. Like hermeneutical sciences,
psychoanalysis begins with a subject/ object the meaning of which is
in question. If the interpretation is successful it ends with an inter-
pretation of the subject/ object. As in Gadamerian hermeneutics,
the methodological procedures in psychoanalysis utilize a "dialogue"
as the medium to gain access to data and test conjectured interpre-
tations. However, unlike the hermeneutic sciences, psychoanalysis,
as we have seen, employs interpretations whibh--cannot",." in ·tOhe'-first
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instance, be continuous and reflexive of the analysand's self-
understanding. Thus psychoanalysis ultilizes teclmiques which go
beyond hermeneutics. The analyst is required to systematically
investigate connections which are not apparent to the patient. Ade-
quate interpretations can only be developed with the aid of explana-
tions involving causal connections. Such explanations can only be
developed, in turn, with reference to~ it general theory of hysteria,
neurosis, the uncons cious, etc., such as that constructed by Freud. 12
In order to see this general point more clear~y, it is useful to
delineate the three levels into which Habermas analyzes the theoreti-
cal structure of psychoanalysis. 13 The first level is that of meta-
psychology or metahermeneutics. lfMetapsychology unfolds the
logic of interpretation of the analytic situation of dialogue. ,,14 It is
on this level that we find, according to Habermas, Freud 1s theory of
neurosis in terms of distorted communications, that is, an explica-
tion of lithe connection between language deformation and behavioral
pathology. fl15 Here we also find the ego -id-superego model and the
theory of instincts. As to the grounding of this theory Habermas
writes:
• • • basic metahermeneutical assumptions about
com.municative action, language deformations, and
behavioral pathology derive from subsequent reflec-
tion on the conditions of possible psychoanalytic know-
ledge. They can be confirmed or rejected only indirectly,
with regard to the outcome of, so to speak, an entire
category of processes of inquiry. 16
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The metapsychological level is to be distinguished from that of
general interpr~tation. On this latter level, ". • . empirically sub-
stantive interpretations of self -formative processes can be developed'.' 17
within the theoretical framework supplied by metapsychology. The
general int.erpretations are drawn from data collected from clinical
experience and operate like theories in the empirical sciences. Thus
a general ~nterpretation If ••• is 'fixed I and, like a general theory,
must prove itself through predictions deduced from it. 1I18 In psycho-
analysis, a general interpretation provides a narrative, in terms of
the theory, of infant and childhood development (the lTIost formative
stages for Freud). This level is concerned with problems of patterns
of interaction between child and parent, identification, development
of lTIotivational patterns and learning mechanisms (e. g., object choice),
elTIergence of personality structures, etc. "This level then comprises
an empirical theory in the form of a systematically generalized narra-
tive depicting the psychodynamic development of the child. ,,19 The
general interpretation of childhood development thus allows a particu-
lar case history to be understood in ~erms of causal connections of
the developmental sequence, modified, of course, in light of initial
'conditions and particularity of the cas e •
The third level is that of the interpretation of the individual or
rather, tI. • • reconstructions of individual life histories with a
th t e e 11 20erapeu lC lntent.
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The actual events of the patient's life are
pieced together using the facts that can be ascertained in accord
with the logic of development of the general interpretation. Gaps
and inconsistencies in the patient's memory are filled in and
rearranged by the analyst in the process of therapeutic dialogue.
In order to be able to make sense of the fragmentary and distorted
information, the analyst must be able to rely on a theoretical struc-
ture which guides his insights into possible reconstruction. Each
reconstructed individual.life history can be viewed as a hypothesis
generated by the theory. Verification, however, is not, as in the
empirical-analytic sciences, merely a matter of establishing ~gree-
ment concerning the results of an observation in light of a prediction.
In psychoanalys.is, verification of a reconstruction means the accept-
~ by the analysand of this account of his or her life's development.
And it must be acceptance on a level of self -reflection such that the
blockages, repressions, etc., are apprehended and dissolved by the
patient, i. e., his or her neurotic symptoms are overcome. If this
is successfully .acco~plished, the patient can gain a conscious under-
standing of his or her process of self -formation.
In the final instance, the meaning of the process itself
must be capable of becoming part of our [the patient's]
consciousness in a critical manner, entangled as we
are in the drama of life history. The subject must be
able to relate his own history and have comprehended
the inhibitions that blocked the path of self-reflection.
I1°
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For the final state of a self-formative process is
attained only if the subject remembers itsidentifica-
tions and alienations, the objectivations forced upon
it and the reflections it arrived at, as the path upon
which it constituted itself. 21 '
Thus the ultimate verification of an interpretation/ reconstruction in
psychoanalysis depends on its acceptance and corroboration by the
. analysand. Through the psychoanalytic encounter and th~rapeutically.
guided self -reflection, the analysand can come to understand the
unconsio\1s ,factors which had been;.affecting his or her behavior. By
.systematically understanding and reexperiencing the history of the
conditions that produced these motives and forces, the analysand
can ov'ercome ,their past unsuspected control of ;his ro'r-fher life.
The unconscious motives, forces, etc., that dominate past
behavior do so, Freud argued, precisely because the analysand is
unaware of them and their true nature. Systematic repression and-
distortion in communicative and self-reflective capacities a·re held
to. prevent access to interpretations and meanings necessary'to self-
understanding. If the therapeutic interaction is successful, access
is established to self-understanding; the analysand can have a true
understanding of his or her motives, needs, intentions, the conditions
of his or her life, etc. As a result the analysand can self-consciously
reach an understanding, and potentially complete control, 6f his or
her self-formative process. If this is the case,. the adequacy of the
()
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psychoanalytic encounter and interpretation will be reflected on the
level of action and expression in the disappearance of neurotic symp-
toms. Thus in the end, verification is achieved only in and through
practice.
At this point it is useful to note how Habermas conceives the
respective roles of Verstehen and explanation in psychoanalysis. As
we have seen, the initial appearance of psychoa:p.alysis is that of a
hermeneutic science. But there are important differences between
hermeneutics and the currently presented conception of depth herme-
neutic s • First, in psychoanalys is (taken by Habe rmas as the model
,of depth hermeneutics), the interpretation to be achieved is of most
immediate concern to object of investigation (the analysand) and not
to the scientist-interpreter (the analyst). This is the opposite situa-
tion of concerns to that of the standard hermeneutical sciences. In
the latter, the concern and interest of the scientist is in achieving an
interpretation of a meaningful action or object. The consequences of
achieving such an interpretation may have repercussions, previously
noted, on the self-understanding of the object being studied. But the
fact of such repercussions are only of secondary i'!l1-port'to,the ·interest
guiding the 'scientist and science. On the other hand, for psychoanaly-
sis, the interest guiding the science is the emancipatory interest.
. ~.
'The-imp()rtance of the interpretation proffered is primarily for the
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analysand (the object of study). That the interpretation developed
must be understood by the scientist-interpreter is a methodological
necessity. But it is of secondary concern, Habermas contends, when
seen from the point of view of the "interest structure of the science."
In psychoanalysis a simple hermeneutic procedure is i~s'4'fficient
givel). the fact the object/patient does not have full self-understanding,
as manifested by his or her neurotic symptoms. The theory of psycho-
analysis pres,ent~ a~ay 'of understanding neuroses of various types as
the consequence of sequences of causal, lawlike developments which
act, prior to therapy as a form of "second nature" and are bey?~d
the immediate control of the patient. These developments, which
ar'e the result of unconscious "factors, II act upon the analysand as
seemingly natural forces, i. e., as forces which are external to the
patient's consciousness and which operate in a nomological, causal
ma1U1er.
Within the terms of the psychoanalytic theory, when
the action of these forces is described by the analyst,
the patient is objectified and an explanation, similar
in form to those of the natural sciences, given for his
action. The speech of the patient is not taken, in the
first instance as a dialogue to be interpreted with tJ::1e
intent of understanding the patient's consciously,
intended meaning. 22
Instead, verbal behavior is veiwed and treated as the result of motives
and fo!ces beyond the patient's immediate control, and therefore as
lTIaterial to be explained.
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In the psychoanalytic situation the analyst takes the
analysand's utterances not as a discourse but as verbal
behavior--i. e., as symptoms of objective conditions,
which he, the analyst, tries to explain "from outside"
in terms of a special sublanguage which the other (the
. former interlocutor) does not possess. 23
The level of "naturalistic," causal explanation in psycho-
analysis (and other critical sciences) is called by RaCinitzky a "quasi-
24
naturalist approach. " This term is employed in order to indicate
that the technical interest in explanatio:n is subordinated to the prac-
tical interest in understanding. Although the two moments of analysis
are ttstrongly interacting, 11 the role of explanation' is to mediate
.between the initial distorted self-understanding of the patient, and
the final,(~.s.sum~gthe therapy is successful) fully self -conscious
self-understanding achieved. "Explanation, in the form of a recon-
structed life history, is used to both understand, and overcome the
objectifications of the unconscious forces of second nature. ,,25
Psychoanalytic therapy is not based, like somatic
medicine, which is "causal" in the narrower sense,
on making use of known causal connections. Rather,
it owes its efficacy to overcoming causal connections
themselves. 26
The causal connections which control and dominate the behavior of
the analysand are posited, in terms of the general interpretation of
psychological development, as a potentially understandable intentional
structure. The respective "meaning structures" are uncovered
through the process of a Ifdepth hermeneutics" which functions on
501
the methodological levels of understanding and explanation.
The role of the analyst is obviously central in this process.
The scientist ~interpreter'i_s required both for the development of
possible explanations of apparent symptoms, and in the employment
of those in the therapeutic dialogue to encourage critical self-
reflection on the part of the analysand. Th.e complementary utiliza-
tion of explanation and understanding is necessary only while there
is a gap between the expressed needs and self-understanding of the
object/patient and his or her behavior, as manifest for instance in
neurotic symptoms. IITheoretically, once the therapy has been suc-
cessfully concluded and the patient is emancipated from domination
1?y forces beyond his knowledge and control, explanation of his actions
will coincide with his own understanding and the former ·r:ti~thodwill
be superfluous (to the recovery of an understanding of an individual
action or expression on the level of meaning and intention) ... 27
The question arises as to what the analogue of this process is
at the level of social theory. Can the model be translated for use
in social theory? Given our earlier questions about the usefulness
of discussions of society qua systems which have identities or
deformed identities, 28 we need to explore carefully how Habermas
tra.nslates considerations at the level of individual development to
the level of group and community development. Taking psychoanalysis
1_
o
. i
I
I
i
I
!.0
I
i
i.
!
.0
o
502
as the theoretical prototype of critical science, Habermas attempts
to translate this model into social theory. His conception of social
theory can be usefully elaborated within the terms of the above dis-
cussed three levels of psychoanalysis.
For Habermas, the level of metatheory is inclusive of his
theory of communicative competence and his reformulated notion of
historical materialism, including his basic philosophical anthropology
and the theory of interests. This level supplies the basic fraITlework
and categories within which the theory develops. As with the meta-
psychology of Freud, the metatheory of the critical social theory is
only indirectly empirical. Thus it can be argued against directly
on the level of theory but can only be empirically falsified indirectly
through falsification on a lower level. That is to say, that on the
level of metatheory, empirical data cannot be brought to bear to
falsify the theoretical claims. The theory can be opposed on philo-
sophical grounds but empirical evidence can be used to reject it only
insofar as the theory leads to false predictions on a lower level of
theoretical application.
The middle level, corresponding to Freud IS general interpre-
tation, consists of a theory of social evolution constructed within
the terms provided by the metatheory. On this level, Habermas
talks of the development of the human species through the three
nn
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mediums of work, language, and domination. As we shall see, he
speaks of the logic of development of both the forces of production
and of nor,mative structures (roughly, relations of production) within
evolving social formations. This level obviously relies heavily on"'
empirical data and must constantly be checked against the available
kn'owl~dge in history, sociology, ;anthropology, archeology, etc.
The th~r.¢llevel involves the application of the general theory of
social evolution to the development of a specific society or social
. formation, in particular that of capitalism. Here the task is to
.reconstruct ."~ .• the life history of a given society in an attempt
to. reveal and dis solve i9-eological distortions of communication as
a part of a process of self-em.ancipation. ,,29 The attem.pt is m.ade
on this level to reveal the dynamic of social development of a society
in such a way that the knowledge developed can uncover the sources
of ideology and ultimately be used to overcome them. Part of this
project involves the identification of potential crisis points in the
social structure and thereby identification of social groups poten-
tially amenable to the proces s of enlightenment. As with psycho-
analysis, falsification on the level of individual reconstruction, and
hence in the last instance, falsification of the entire theoretical
construct, is judged ultimately only in terms of the presence or lack
of emancipato;ry praxis which overcomes structures of domination.
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Apel sums up the use which he, in accord with Habermas, sees
in· the psychoanalytic model.
I. think" that this methodological pattern of dialec-
tically mediating communicative understanding by
causal explanation is, in fact, the model for a
philosophical understanding of all those types of
critical social science which have their relation to
the practice of life, not in the realm of social
engineering, but in provoking public self-reflection
and in emancipation of Il1en as subjects. 30
In Knowledge and Human Interests, the notion of "reflection"
is anibiguous. In a late"r work, Habermas himself notes that:
It occurred to me only after completing the book that
the traditional use of the term "reflexion," which
goes back to German IdealisIl1, covers (and con-
fuses) two things: on the one hand, it denotes the
reflexion upon the conditions of potential a~~lities of
a knowing, speaking and acting subject as such; on
the other hand, it denotes the reflexion upon uncon:-
sciously produced constraints to which a determinate
subject (or a determinate group of subjects, or a
determinate species subject) succumbs in its process
of self-reflexion. 31
Habermas readily admits that these two modes of reflection, which
he calls rational reconstruction and self -reflectioij., respectively,
were not adequately distinguished in his earlier work.32
A rational reconstruction explicates general rules of human
competency in a given area or context, e. g., logic, linguistics, or
: i
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psychological and cognitive de'velopment. Habermas cites Chomsky
and ~Piag.et as key figures who have helped to bring about the syste-
matic reconstruction of individual competences. In his own work,
Habermas relies on rational reconstructions in at least two areas,
i. e., in communication with his theory of communicative competence,
and in epistemology with ihis" theory of cognitive interes~s. While
reconstructions depend on reflection, this reflection is not limited
to a particular subject.
Rational reconstructions ••• deal with anonymous
rule systems, which any subjects whatsoever can
comply with insofar as they have acquired the corres-
ponding competence with respect to these rules. Recon-
structions thus do not encompass subjectivity, within
the horizon of which alone the experience of reflec.-
tion [in the sense of self-criticism] is possible. 33
Self-knowledge is enhanced by rational reconstructions in the sense
that one ,'rbecomes familiar with the range of inevitable subjective
,conditions II which both make human action pos sible fland place limits
on it." Such reconstructions can tell us t what is entailed in success-
ful participation in a functioning rule -governed context; that is, flit
renders explicit the intuitive knowledge that is given with competence
with respect to the rules in the form of 'knoW-how'. ,,34
On Habermas I account the impetus to develop a rational recon-
struction of a particular area of competence emerges only in the
context of a theoretical discourse. That is, it is only when we
·~0,
I:, 506
bracket or suspend the imperatives of everyday action and reflect
on "the conditions normally assumed in ordinary interaction" that
we can engage in this type of theoretical activity. This type of
reflection, as Habermas points out, "first took the form of a
search for the transcendental ground of possible theoretical know-
·ledge (and moral conduct)~,,35 But while this form of reflection is
related to what has traditionally been considered transcendental
thought, Habermas stresses that in the context of his usage, it is
better termed "quasi-transcendental." By the term "quasi-
transcendental," Habermas seeks to stress that while this type of
reconstruction has a "transcendental" function, i. e., highlights a
priori co.nditions for the possibility of ordinary interaction, it (the
reconstruction) remains empirical insofar as it explains the develop-
ment and acquisition of empirical cOnlpetences by empirical subjects.36
Self-criticism, on the other hand, is a mode of reflection
which
••• brings to consciousness those determinants of
a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual
formation (Bildung) which ideologically determine a
contemporary: praxis of action and the conception
of the world. 37
Thus self-criticism is the lnode of reflection which the analysand
is encouraged to engage in during psychoanalysis. Unlike rational
reconstruction, self-"criticism is directly tied to practice insofar
Wi.
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as it is:
a. brought to bear on objects of experience whose psetido-
objectivity is to be revealed; • • •
b.
c.
brought to bear on something particular- -concretely
speaking--on the particular self-formative process
of an ego, or group, identity; ••.
characterized by its ability to make unconscious
elements conscious in a way ~hich has practical
consequences. Criticism changes the determinants
of false consciousness, whereas reconstructions
explicate correct know-how, i. e., the intuitive know-
ledge we acquire when we possess rule-competence,
without involving practical conseque~ces.38
In a therapeutic dialogue, .as we have seen, a rational reconstruction
is required in order to be able to isolate the potential causes of the
neurosis. Such a reconstruction is needed to facilitate the process
of systematic enlightenment through dialogue and self-criticism.
Likewise within the context of a cr\itical social science, the self-
criticism which becomes a critique of ideology requires a theory of
normal communication as well as a reconstructed history which
locates the potential sources of ideology.
Habermas points out that the situations in which self -criticism
can occ~r, e. g., in a therapeutic dial~gue,::are ,lI ••...• both more
'd e 0 39and less than a lscourse. Given that the analysand and analyst
iIn
are not symmetric::ally related, i.e., that the analyst has access to
lTIore information and a greater range of speech acts than the analy-
sand engaged i? critical reflection, the therapeutic dialogue is less
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than a genuine discourse. The therapeutic dialogue can only become
a discourse through successful therapy. The psychoanalytic dialogue,
on the other hand, "is more than a discourse because, as a result of
the relation of critical reflection to action, claims to authenticity as
well as claims to validity can be settled. ,,40 Only validity (truth)
claims can be agreed upon under the conditions of a normal discourse.
Claims to authenticity can only be decided in light of expectations of
future courses of action. However, in a therapeutic dialogue, the
validity of an interpretation can be established only through the pro-
cess of critical reflection. This process of testing conjectured
interpretations only corne s to an end in and through practi~e, i. e. ,
with the disappearance of neurotic symptoms. Thus validity claims
concerning the systematic distortions in the analysand I s life history
and Bildung, can only be redeemed in discourses if at one and the
same time the analysand can overcome his or her false consciousness
and act with authenticity.
It should be noted that Habermas 1 interest in psychoanalysis is
not restricted merely to the theoretical and methodological structures
of the science. In addition he stresses that certain elements of
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Freud's substantive theory can be usefully employed to supplement
Marx's conception of power and ideology and his reformulation of
historical materialism~4l_SpeCifically,Habermas argues that in
Freud's later work--in his contributions to social theory and social
psychology - -there are systematic ins ights into the origins and func-
tions of social institutions which "aid the elucidation of the concepts' 6f
social power and ideology.
Freud understood institutions as the manifestation of '~(his-
toric~lly required repression of instinctual drives"·,which-reslilt.
from "... the conflict between surplus impulses and the conditions
of collective self -preservation. ,,42 In order to fulfill its primary
need for self-preservation, the species, faced with conditions of
scarcity, is forced to adapt to its environment in ways which prevent
"complete gratification of instinctual desires. II The process of
adaption is the central principle, Habermas maintains, behind Freud IS
conception of social organization~ On Habermas' interpretation,
Freud ·held that there was a similarity in the process of the socializa-
tion of the species and the socialization of the individual.
As long as the pressure of reality is overpowering
and ego organization is weak, so that instinctual
renunciation can only be brought about by forces of
affect, the species finds collective solutions for the
problem of defense, which resemble neurotic solu-
tions at the individual level. The same configura-
tions that drive the individual to neurosis move
society to establish institutions. 43
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The effectiveness of social institutions in facilitating survival must
be understood, according to this theory, as occurring only at the
cost of a repression of needs ahd motives. This repression is
operationalized through the development of patterns of distorted
communication on a social scale.
Freud, Habermas claims, distinguished, in a way similar to
Marx, the fo~ces of production 'from the relations of production.
He understood that the level· of necessary social repression was a
function of the level of development of productive forces; that is,
as the technical power of a society to control the forces of outer
nature increases, the constraints of scarcity are progressively
undermined,.. thus ~-decre·a'si.gg the degree of socially necessary
repression. Thus as the level of necessary repression lessens,
the institutional framework of a society can be changed to accommo-
date a higher level of needs gratification. The impetus for such a
change arises out of the experience of members of a given society
who suffer as a result of the repression of needs.
Beyond the level of general repressions which are imposed on
all members alike, there are, of course, in class societies, Haber-
mas points out, class specific privations and denials. Hence the
most oppressed classes, who experience the most suffering and
deprivation, are potentially the least integrated into society and the
!~ JJ : .
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most likely source of change.
There is a difference, significant from Habermas' point of
view, in the way Freud and Marx viewed social institutions.
Marx conceives the institution.framework as an
ordering of interests that are immediate functions
of the system of social labor according to the rela-
tion of social rewards and imposed obligations ••••
Freud, on the contrary, conceives the institutional
framework in cOIll1ection with the repression of
instinctual impulses. 44
It-is Habermas' contention that by conceiving of social institutions
as the result of repressed needs and therefore as the source of
distorted and limiting communication, Freud is able to give a better
account of ideology than Marx. Marx, Habermas maintains, was
unable, given his focus on production and lab·or, to view ideology
and power as distorted communication. This is reflected in tendencies
in the later Marx, sanctioned by some orthodox Marxist interpreta-
tions, to attempt to reduce the development of social organization to
developments in the forces of production. Freud, on the other hand,
by focusing on the development 6f socially expressible needs and
motivational patterns, was able to perceive that the power of· social
norms " ••• is based on a defense which enforces substitute-
gratifications and produces symptoms as long as it is a result of
· h· d f· 1 45unconSClOUS mec anlsms an not 0 conSClOUS contro • As Schroyer
points out, although this view recognizes that a precondition of
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emancipation is fl ••• the extension of objective possibilities by the
productive forces, there is no certainty that emancipation will follow
automatically from greater technical progress. 114 6
In Habermas I view, historical materialism must be supple-
mented by a theory of ideology understood in terms of distorted
communication. In this context, "ideology" can be defined, as
Schroyer put it, as .
• • . the compuls ory suspension of doubt about its
claim to validity. Ideologies are those belief sys-
terns which: can maintain their legitimacy despite
the fact that they could not be validated if subjected
to rational discourse. 47
The process of emancipation, then, entails the overcoming of such
systems of distorted communication. This process, in turn, requires
engaging in critical reflection and criticism. It is only through reflec-
tion, as conducted socially through a discourse organized around the
interest of emancipation, that repressive domination in all its forms
can be unmasked. The power of ideology can then be destroyed in
practice. The imperative for this practice follows from the process
of reflection, enlightenment, and the successful uncovering of the
sources of distortion and domination. In this way we can understand
critical theory as, in the end, the critique of ideology.
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As the critique of ideology, critical theory stands between
philosophy and science. Like science it makes truth claims which
are derived from a theory about the nature of the world and are
verified in light of empirical results. But unlike traditional science,
critical theory comprehends its own historical situations and realizes
that its validity is dependent on its ability to understand itself and its
gene'sis; that is, it is a reflexive the~ry which has the aim of
achieving an explanation of social evolution which
is so comprehensive that it embraces the interrela-
tionships of [its] own origins and application. 48
This ,reflexivity also distinguishes critical theory from traditional
philosophy. While critical theory is concerned with the traditional
philosophical que'stions concerning the conditions of possible know-
ledge, the nature of freedom and justice, etc., it realizes that these
questions cannot be answered in abstraction from the interests and
activities of life practice. Critical theory understands the inadequacy
of a purely conte'mplative philosophical stance and the need to go
beyoI?-d (but not reject) reflection. Critical theory realizes, that is,
that the resolution of philosophical issues can only take place in his-
tO,ry under the achievement of certain concrete conditions and as the
result of the conscious activity of the species •
.': - :~. sum:r:p.ary..we see~that.~·Habe~masf1TIakes~the idistinction between
t~e ,diffe'rent,\khowledge -.constitutive interestsl and "their 'correlated
domains of human action ·at~~a!,.ritimber .0£ levels.
r0.
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. These include:
1. The " quas i-transcendentallevel": the theory of cognitive
interests distinguishes the technical interest in prediction and con-
trol of objectified processes from the practical interest in extending
intersubjective understanding and the emancipatory interest in the
maintenance of distorted free communication.
2. The methodological level: the argument is made for a
logical distinction between empirical-analytic sciences which yield
nomological knowledge that is technically exploitable, the historical-
hermeneu;tic science which -yields interpretative knowledge to expand
and preserve understanding capable of orienting action, and the
critical sciences --such as psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology--
which yields knowledge that creates the possibility of action against
the blocks to human emancipation.
3. The sociological level: where realms of purposive-
rational actions are distinguished from the institutional framework
in which they are embedded.
4. The level of social evolution: where .the growth in pro-
ductive forces and technical control of outer nature is distinguished
from the extension of communication free from domination of inner
nature.
In making these ~istinctions, Habermas hopes a~d intends to over-
~ome the ambiguity of Marx's epistemological framework, its
515
tendency to reductionism, and orthodox Marxism IS IIreduction."
, -
The o"ft-proclaiD;led "dialectical1t interdependence of the economic
base and the socio-cultural supeJ;structure IImust be reflected at
"
the categorical and methodological levels if critical theory is to
avoid the extremes of economism and neo-idealism. ,,49 This is
not to imply that in certa,in social formations, in certain epochs,
there cannot be a predominantly "one -wayll relationship from base
to, superstructure. But it is only theoretically informed empirical
work that can uncover the respective relationships 6f concepts at
the. sociological and evolutionary levels.
Thus, .for example, the .theor~esof int~rests and:-com:tritinicati~ve
competence are not formal, abstract models to replace historical
to be in marked contrast to the concrete, dialectical chara'cter 'of
his discussion of the human species' characteristics and in his
vincingly with the precisely rendered fundamental assumptions Jof
This link Habermas began to develop in
epistemological framework and self -understanding (which was held
attempt to overcome the ambiguity he argued was present in Marx's
categorical framework for understanding history and social evolution.
the critiqu~ of political economy). It is to Habermas I discussion of
h - - 1 - 1- 11 50lstorlca materla 1sm.
If they are to'do this they must, in Habermas' view, be I'linked con-
,materialism. Rather they are intended to provide a satisfactory
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levels three and four that we must turn in order to uncover whether
or not he makes good on his claim to be reorienting and systema-
tizing social theory.
I!.
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1He1d and Simon, "Understanding Habermas, " chap. 7, p. 1.
In reality, of course, there is a dialectical relationship between the
efforts to attain the conditions of an ideal speech situation and the
destruction of the material causes of ideology, exploitation, and
domination. The comprehension, to say nothing of the completion,
of each task presupposes a necessary reference to·the other. The
process of achieving human freedom, if it is to take place in history,
will necessarily involve the uniting of these two projects. For the
purposes of Habermas I approach, it is useful, in the interests of
theoretical clarity, to make the analytic distinction between condi-
tions for linguistic rationality and freedom from ideological distor-
tion and those for material freedom from exploitation and domination.
It should be stressed, however, that an adequate understanding of
either aspect necessitates an understanding of the interrelations of
both•
2Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 32; also quoted in
McCarthy, itA Theory of Communicative Competence, p. 148.
3Schroyer, "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced Industrial
Society," in Recent Sociology, ed. Dreitzel, pp. 224-25.
4 Cf. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, chaps. 10,
.11, 12.
5Ibid ., p. 214.
6Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 9.
7 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 214-15.
8Held and Simon, "Understanding Habermas, " chap. 7, p. 4.
9Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 217.
10Ibid., p. 218.
11Ibid., p. 232.
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l2It should be noted here that Habermas criticizes Freud for
failing in the end to understand the status of psychoanalysis as a
critical science. Habermas suggests that Freud, because of his
scientistic understanding of science, lapsed into a positivistic mis-
understanding of- his own"work. This positivist tendency is indicated,
according to Habermas, in Freud's attempt to interpret psychoanaly-
sis in terms of an energy distribution model, thus eliminating the
hermeneutic dimension. For the development of the critique of
Freud, cf. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 284-86.
l3The .discussion of Habermas I interpretation of the levels of
psychoanalysis presented here relies heavily ona discussion by
McCarthy, "Philosophy and Social Theory," Stoney Brook" Studies in
Philosophy, pp. 108-10. Also cf. Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests, pp. 253-73.
14Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 254.
l5Ibid., p. 255.
l6Ibid .
17Ibid., p.258.
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22Held and Simon, lIUnderstanding Habermas, 11 chap. 7, pp. 9-
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23Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, p. 237.
24Ibid., p. 236. Radnitzky provides an interesting and wide-
ranging discussion of the psychoanalytic model and the role of explana-
tion and understanding in a critical science (as developed by Habermas
and Apel). In particular, Radnitzky develops Apel's notion of a tacking'
procedure back and forth between the quasi -naturalistic level of
explanation -and the hermeneutical level of interpretive understanding
in a dialogic form. Cf. ibid., pp. 233 -351 •
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Habermas, irA Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, "
p. 182.
32Cf• ibid, pp. 182-85; Theory and Practice, pp. 22-24;
. "Summation and Response, If pp. 99-101. In the latter two refe.rences,
"self-reflection" is used instead of "self-criticism. If . I shall follow
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to be the more accurate translation.
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Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 22.
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CHAPTER XII
SOCIAL THEORY AND THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION
Habermas has argued that an essential characteristic of the
human species is the organization of its behavior under imperatives
of validity claims. As such, Habermas contends, man- -who is both
producer' and communicator--learns and develops over time. This
learning and development takes place in two dimensions: ,'1?-amely,' ~in
work and interaction. Manis automony was said to be dependent on
t1?-e developments in these two dimensions, on: the development of
productive forces and on the alteration of normative structures.
These developments, Habermas further claims, "follow rationally
reconstructible patterns which are logically..iridep~ndent.'ofone
1another. II
According to Habermas the history of productive forces, tech-
no!ogy, a.nd secular knowledge is a history of I1truth-monitored
successes in coming to terms with outer nature." It consists of
••• discontinuous but, in the long run, cumulative
processes. For the explanation of the'world-
hi~st6rical cumulative character of scientific and
technical progress, the knowledge of empirical
mechanisms is necessary but not sufficient. For the
development of science and technology we must rather
conjecture an inner logic through which a hierarchy
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of non-reversible sequences lis fixed from the outset.2
Cognitive breakthroughs cannot simply be forgotten, so long as the
continuity of tradition does not come to an end. Likewise, the
development of cultural life, the alteration of normative structures
works through discursive validity claims. Just as .with the history
of science, it is a directed process. The socialization and integra-
tion of inrier~nattire_-hasa cognitive component (l.r e eo .0 the 'way from
myth to religion to philosophy and ideology is a directed process in
which the demand for discursive redemption of validity claims more
and more prevails U ). 3 As with knowledge of nature and technologies,
so with world-views, the pattern of their development, Habermas
argues,. makes it possible to reconstruct the following des criptively
enumerated regularities: 0
-~-expansion of the secular domain vis.:a-vis the sphere
of the sacred;
-- -a tendency from far -reaching heteronomy to increasing
autonomy;
-- -the draining of cognitive contents from world-views
(from cosmqlogy to the pure system of morals);
- - -from tribal particularism to universalistic and at
the same time individu:alistic orientations;
-- -increasing reflexivity of the mode of belief, which can
by seen in the sequence: myth as immediately lived
system of orientation, teachings, revealed religion,
rational religion', ideology~~
,0
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The elements of world-views which sustain and secure social identity
and social integration, that is, moral systems and interpretations of
moral systems, follow with "increasing complexity a pattern which
has a parallel at the ontogenetic level in the logic of the development
of moral cons ciousnes s . A collectively attained stage of moral
consciousness can, as long as the continuity of the tradition endures,
just as little be forgotten as collectively gained knowledge - -which
does not exclude regression. ,,5
The fact that evolution takes place in both dimensions in the
form of directed learning processes which work through discursively
'redeemable validity claims does not imply that history follows or is
to 'be explained by the logically necessary sequence of possible
developments (which are rationally reconstructible). For example,
Habe rmas notes, the history of science cannot be explained adequately
by regulators internal to the scientific system. The "actual develop-
ment~, innovations and stagnations, the occurence of crises, the
productive or unproductive working out of crises, etc., can be
explained only with the aid of empirical mechanisms. ,,6 Limits of
a rationally reconstructible pattern of development "are reflected
in the trivial experience that cognitive thrusts cannot be simply
forgotten so long as the continuity of tradition is unb~oken, and that
every deviation from the irreversible development path is experienced
as a regression which exacts its price. ,,7
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. Before discussing the empirical mechanisms Habermas thinks
are pivotal and the methods through which we can conceive them, a
number of points that follow from the above should be noted. Haber-
mas suggests that there seems to be a "conspicuous asymmetry for
the form of reproduction and the logic of s ocio -cultural life world. .
While the development of productive forces always extends the range
of contingency of the social system, II evolutionary changes in the
structure of norms and interpretating systems by no means offer a
social system any number of selection advantages. 8 Since the
mechanisms which cause developmental thrusts in the nor'mative
structures'- are t~independent of the logic of their development, there
exists a fortiori, 11 Habermas contends, .: I'no guarantee that a develop-
ment of the forces of production and an increase in steering capactiy
will release exactly those normative alterations which correspond
to the steering imperatives of the social system. 1I9 They might well
be in contradictionlO (the possibility of which we will discuss in a
moment).
In order to explore how Habermas arrives at a conception of
the empirical mechanisms requisite to an analysis of social evolution
and the development of social formations, we must return for a
moment to considerations of his levels of analyses J approaches, and
methods. In Legitimation Crisis Habermas is concerned with both
moments of self -reflection: systematic reconstruction and criticism.
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The first one -third of the book sketches in programmatic form the
outlines of a theory of social evolution in which, in the second one-
third, the developmental tendencies of la~e capitalism can be and are
located. In the last one-third of the book Habermas engages in a
critique of some contemporary social theoretic positions. It is the
first one -third of the work which is the most re~evant here.
In order to explore the developmental tendencies of any social
formation, Habermas suggests that it is insufficient to look just tc?
the proceeding social formations. Given t~at" evolutionary develop-
ment is dependent on cognitive thrusts, we must, he argues, recon-
struct the necessary and sufficient conditions of development and
trace the immanent possibilities of evolution within the boundaries
set by past and present conditions. The necessary conditions to be
analyzed are the sequences of empirical events - -the sufficient c ondi-
tions, the sequences and direction of the inner logic of cognitive
processes. The approach Habermas advocates for systematic recon-
struction is articulated in terms of the question of social crises.
In a brief history of the concept of crises Habermas suggests
that 'we associate the idea with an objective force which deprives a
subject of a part of his~s.overeignty,:and the resolution of which
effects a liberation of the subject caught in it. Habe'rmas aims to
systematically introduce a s ocial-'scientifically ·useful concept of
~.
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crises and argues that such a concept must grasp the connection
between social integration and system integration, between the
approaches of a hermeneutic, Verstehen, action theory and a
naturalistic, objectivistic, behavioral-oriented systems theory. 11
We speak of social integration in relation to the sys-
terns of institutions in which speaking and acting sub-
jects:'are(socially;-relat~d[verg~sellschaften].,., Sys-
tems are seen here "as :life-worlds that are symbolically
structured. We speak of system integration with a
view to the specific steering performances of a· self-
regulated system. Social systems are considered
here from the point of view of their capacity to main-
tain their boundaries and their continued existence
by mastering the complexity of an inconstant environ-
ment. Both paradigms, life -world and system, are
. important. 12
Under the former we thematize the normative structure, values, and
institutions (i~. e., framework of social norms) of a society. "We
analyze events and states from the point of view of their dependency
on functions of social integration (in Parsons r vocabulary: integration
and pattern maintainence), while the non-normative components of
the system count as limiting conditions." Under the latter we the-
matize a society1s steering or control mechanisms and the extension
of the range of contingency. 11 We analyze events and states from the
point of view of their dependency on functions of system integration
(in Parsons' vocabulary: adaptation and goal-attainm.ent), while the
goal values ['the value of the state variables characteristic of the
13
goal state of a system I] count as data. 11, If we reduce the latter to
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the former (i. e., the paradigm of systems to the life -world) then
issues of contr.ol are screened out; investigations and studies stay
at the level of commonsense cultural knowledge and procedures
(within r .situatic>llS' immedi?Ltely constituted through interaction"> and
deny that social phenomena are construable as determinate or bounded
in their parameters. At best we are left with an idealistic conc~pt
of crises that rests on 'mem.bers I (:definitions of identity. But, as
Habermas says, Ita society does not plunge into crises only when
and wherever its m.embers say so. 1t14 Furthermore, even if we
suppleITlent the ane:t1ysis of norITlative structures ~with,an~ana~y~is7.
of liITliting material conditions, it is at the expense of creating a weak
dichotomy which does not ITlake the connection palpable (i. e., we
cannot explain the· origin of the limiting conditions).
~, on the other hand we reduce the former to the latter (i. e. ,
theparadigITl of the life-world to systems) and understand society as
a system, tlie'n "the fact ~hat social reality consists in the facticity of
r~cognized, often counterfactual validity claims lt constituted by
subjects is not taken into consideration. Here we are left with a
systemic or structural concept of crises, e. g., environmental
disturbances which overload system ITlaintenance capacities and!or
inherent contradictory system imperatives which are inc·ompatible
and cannot be hierarchically integrated. But structural contradictions
~JiJ '.
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~an only be designated as leading to crises if we are able to specify
structures central to stability. Structures may fundalnentally change
without the system losing its identity. tiThe range of tolerance within
which the goal values of a social system can vary without critically
endangering its contiriued existence or losing its identity obviously
15
cannot be grasped from the objectivistic viewpoint of systetns theory."
Habermas argues that both types of analyses and approaches
have their point. The problem is to present their integration. This
Habermas finds in a historically oriented analysis of social systems.
'The range of tolerance within which goal values may vary wlthout a
given systetn losing its stability depends primarily not on the flexi-
bility and consistency requirements of normative structures, but on
both components of goal values, the cultural values of the constitu-
tive tradition and the non-normative requirements of system inte-
gration (i. e.', survival imperatives). Until now, Habermas states,
there have been insufficient tools and methods available to grasp
this connection. Variation ranges for structural c.hanges, he argues,
can only be grasped in terms of a theory of evolution of social forma-
tions, which are themselves determined and defined by a fundamental
principle of organiza~ion 1twhich fixes an abstract space of poss~bilities
of alteration in social states II (and which arises in evolutionary
thrusts) .
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Therefore, organization principles can be seen to
ltlimit the capacity of a society to learn without losing
its identity. 11 According to this definition steering
can have' crisis effects if (and only if) they cannot
be resolved within the range of possibility that is
circumscribed by the organizational principle of
the society. Principles of organization of this type
determine, firstly, the learni!1g mechanism on which
the development of productive forces depends; they
determine, secondly, the range of variation for the
interpretive systems that secure identity; and, finally,
they fix the institutional boundaries for the pas sible
expansion of steering capacity. 16
For Habermas -the concept of an organization principle points to
. the ~unda'Q1.ental empirical mechanism of any given social formation,
the uncovering of which can determine the learning capacity, and
thus the potential level of development of a society.
It is my conjecture that the fundamental mechanism
. for' social evolution in general is to be found in:"".an
automatic inability not to learn. Not learning, but
not-learning is the phenomenon that calls for explana-
tion at the socia-cultural stage of development. Therein
lies, if you will, the rationality of man. Only against
this background does the overpowering irrationality
of the history of the species become visible. 17,18
In determining the possibility spaces for evolution in three develop-
m.ental. dimensions (wo rk/production, interaction Iso cialization,
steering / control), the principle of organization determines whether
"and if so (a) how system and social integration can be functionally
differentiated; (b) when dangers to systetn integration must result
in dangers to social integration, that is, crises; and (c) in what
way steering problems are transformed into dangers to identity,
530
that is, what type of crisis predominates. ,,19 These crises can
manifest themselves in four dimensions:<as syste:m crises in the
economic and! or rationality of administration and State, and/ or as
identity crises in the form of legitimation or motivational problems.
There are three potential sources of crises: the economic, the
political, the socio-cultural. 20
Habermas proceeds by illustrating "Social Principles of
Organization" in the social formations of precivilization (primitive
communities) and traditional societies. In each case he shows how
from the determining principle (respectively, kinship systems and
class domination in a political form) one can derive the possibility
spaces which it opens to social evolution and how definite types of
crises can be derived from them. The first two exatnples are
important, to ground an historical perspective. His :main interest
is, however, in exploring the organization principles of liberal and
organized capitalist societies, examining their crises tendencies
in order to locate the "possibilities of a 'post-modern l society, by
which is :meant a historically new principle of organizati"on and not
a new name for the surprising vigor of an aged capitalism. ,,21
Habermas I study of organized capitalism cannot be discussed
at any length here. 22 Such a discussion' would take us too far beyond
the :major themes of this work. An important point, however, should
.1' __
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be noted, viz., the claim of critical theory to be reflexive. 2~ In
Legitimation Crisis, Habermas attempts to demonstrate the theory's
reflexivity by arguing first, that capitalism is creating the potential
for a. new organizational principle which itself embodies a level of
consciousness ·co'mpatible with the emergence of the highest stage of
man's "inner cognitive logic." And by arguing secondly, that as
such, what was. held ~o be itn~manent and effective in the species I
communicative interaction--the ideal of truth, freedom, and justice--
is potentially realizable. And by arguing thirdly, that the potential
of this new emerging principle of organization itself becomes the
basis for the explanation of the historicity of critical theory. In
short, developments internal to the progress of contemporary social
practice form the historical preconditions for the possibility of a
corr~ct explanation and understanding of the history of the species.
For these developments themselves reveal the immanent potential
in the human species and the:t;eby expose the full capacity of the species
for the program and process of critical self-reflection and the fulfill-
~24'
ment "of the ideal of truth, freedom and justice. 11'
Critical theory, on Habermas t account, is the emancipatory
interest become self-conscious and the new organizational principle
is the embodiment of this interest. The theory of social evolution
attempts to provide an explanation of how and why this interest is
IIi
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thematized and concretized at a particular moment in history. In
Chapter 14 we will attempt to assess these claims together with the
other major theses of Habermas I work. But before we examine these
issues further, it is first necessary, for purposes of completeness,
to see one further area of implication of Habermas I views. We turn
now to an exegesis of his theory of Political Organization, the theory
of the relationship of theory and practice in practice.
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1
HaberInas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 11 (Iny elnphasis).
2Ibid .
3Ibid., p. 12.
4Ibid. For an elaboration of this argument see Jurgen
HaberlTIas, "On Social Identity," Telos 19 (Spring 1974).
5Ibid.
6Ibid., pp. 14-15.
7Ibid., p. 11.
8
For exanlple, he suggests tha.t tfwe cannot exclude the case
in which a strengthening of productive forces, which heightens the
power of the system., leads to changes in the normative structures
which sinlultaneously restrict the autonom.y of the system because
they bring forth new legitiInacy claim.s and thereby constrict the
range of variation of the preferred values (ibid., p. 13).
lOlt is important to note that Habermas employs the concept
of contradiction in two different theoretical languages corresponding
to the differences between the logic of self-regulated system.s and
the logic of ordinary language co:m.lTIunication. In the latter case,
he argues, that t1we !nay speak of the fundam.ental contradiction of
a social for:m.ation:-,when,.. and only when, its org?-nizational principle
necessitates that individuals and groups repeatedly confront one
a~other with clairn.s and intentions that are, in the long run, iricoln-
patible~ In class societies this is the case. rr (Ibid., p. 27.) Syste-
m.atically distorted ,co!nrnunication :which·:"f.orces·_'in~¢gration,-
and represses needs no longer enables tis to identify a contradiction
. between declared interests but assurn.es the ideological form. of a
contradiction between the intentions. which the subjects believe thetn-
selves to be following and their, as we say, unconscious !notives
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and fundaIl1ental interests. At the systemic level, Itcontradictions"
are introduced with reference to problems of system maintenance
(e. g., when lnore problems are posed in a given environment than
the steering capacity of a system can solve, logically derivable
contradictions appear which require, on pain of ruin, an alteration
of system. structures: a change of elernents which up to that point
belonged to its flstructural continuitylt). See ibid., pp. 25-28.
lIlt is worth saying at the outset that Habermas' partial
adoption of system.s theory and system.s theoretic language is not
an uncritical adaptation to his purposes. See LegitiIl1ation Crisis,
translator's note, fn. 9, chap. 1.
12 bed 4.1 1 ., p.
13 bed 5.1 1 ., p.
14Ibid. , p. 3.
15Ibid.
16 bOd 7-8.I 1 ., pp.
17Ib o d 15.1 ., p.
19Ib e d .. ° 23° °241 ." r:.pp'~ r '~ ".
20See Habermas, Legitirnation Crisis, chaps. 2, 3, 4.
17.21 Ibed1 ., p.
18Habermas differentiates fiifferent levels of learning: these
follow from. the fact that Itwe learn in two dim.ensions (theoretical!
practical) and that these learning processes are connected with
validity claitns that~ be discursively redeetned. It "The level of
learning which a social formation tnakes possible could depend
upon whether the organization principle of the society permits
differentiation between theoretical and practical questions and
transition from nonreflexive Iprescientific) to reflexive learning. II
For illustrations, see Legitimation Crisis, pp. 15-16.
,n
22Habermas' analytic theory of advanced! organized capitalism
is outlined and criticized at some length in the joint work_ by Larry
SilTIon and rnyself, "Understanding Habermas, If chaps. 9, 11. 'For
a useful exegesis of Haberrnas 1 work on organized capitalisrn, see
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Schroyer, trThe Re-politicization of the Relations of Production:
An Interpretation of Jiirgen HaberlTIas
'
Analytic Theory of Late
Capitalist De;veloplTIent, If in New GerlTIan Critique, no. 7 (1975).
23The concept of theoretical reflexivity was discusssed on
pp.512-13 .
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CHAPTER XIII
THEORY OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Our discussion of critical science has thus far concentrated
on the relationship between theory and practice in theory. As we
have seen, critical theory is designed to help create the conditions
for the possibility of a political practice directed toward emancipati0l'l:.
from distorted communication in all its forms. Critical theory under ~ _
stands that its ultimate verification can only be demonstrated in
practice, i. e. , through the establishment of conditions of freedom
and truth. However, critical theory, Habermas also contends, is
reflexive. It comprehends itself as the historical result of emerging
emancipatory practice. In other words, critical theory understands
itself as both the result of the struggle for social fulfillment and as
an es sential catalyst in this process. The question now arises, how,
in light of the the ory, is this practice, i. e., the political struggle
for emancipation, to be organized and carried out? How can self-
reflection, as an essential moment of liberation, be made a part of
the political task? What is Hab~rmasI conception of the theory of
the relationship between theory and practice in practice?
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In order to answer these questions, we need to turn again to
the model of psychoanalysis as a critical science. 1 On Habermas'
conception, psychoanalysis links theory with practice through ~
methodically incorporating self-reflection. But how can the psycho-
analytic model be transferred to the level of social and political
interaction? Are there safeguards that can be applied to guide its
application and sanctions that would help avoid its abuse?
Habermas points out that the practice of psychoanalysis itself
is governed by several such safeguards and sanctions. 2 For example,
the basic theorems of the theory which claim to be valid and true
must be defensible in scientific discourse. Further, the sufficiency
of a particular interpretation is dependent on a critical test, i. e. ,
successful self -reflection on the part of the analysand. There are
also various types of professional and social standards and ethics
which legally or morally check possible abuses in the patient-
therapist relation. Above all, in psychoanalysis there is (ideally)
the voluntary submission of the patient to the the~apy.
What are the analogous safeguards and sanctions at the level
of social and political interaction? In political struggles, there does
not seem to be any overriding authority who can impose sanctions.
Nor does it appear that we can easily speak, when reflecting on
conflict and revolutionary conflict between classes, of the voluntary
Wi
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submission of one class to a group, party, etc., for the' purpose of
systematic enlightenment.
In recognition of these questions and problems, Habermas
was led to make distinctions in the function and organization of the
political process of enlightenment. Three levels are differentiated.
The first is 'I ... the formation and extension of critical theorems,
which can stand up to scientific discourse. ,,3 On this level theory
is established via rational scientific procedures, the aim of which
is the generation of true claims about the socio-historical world.
The validity of these truth claims rests ultimately on their redeem-
ability in a discursively generated consensus. The 'second level is
" ••• the organization of processes of enlightenment. ,,4 This is
the level on which the theory generated is therapeutically applied.
The aim here is to enlighten those to whom the theory is addressed
about the actual nature of socio-historical reality. The aim of this
process is to eradicate the repressive str.ucture of communication
which blocks individuals I / groups t / classes r capacities to locate
themselves in society and history and to articulate their interests.
Through the systematic application of the theory developed by theoreti-
cal discourse, and self-reflection on the part of the subject/ object
of investigation, the theorems can be tested in the' only way which
can lead to their genuine confirmation.
.0,
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The third and final level is concerned with " ••• the selection
of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the
5
conduct of the political struggle. " This level must be clearly
differentiated, Habermas emphasizes, from the second level. While
the theory ~hich is developed on the first level ca~ be used to legiti-
mize' the organization of the process of enlightenment, it cannot in
a like manner be used to justify particular political actions.
Decisions for the political struggle cannot at the out-
set be justified theoretically and then be carried out
organizat~onally. The sole pos sible justification at
this level is consensus, aimed at in practical discourse,
among the participants, who, in the consciousness of
their common interests and their knowledge of the
circumstances, of the predictable consequences and
secondary consequences, are the only ones who can
know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with
what expectations. 6
That, is, theory cannot dictate and justify action. Theory can be used
to create agents capable of full participation in decisions concerning
action and it can be us~d to support a:rguments in favor of certain
courses of action. But it cannot be used, in any alltomatic or
mechanistic way, to generate and justify strategy. Nor can a theory
in any way ensure success of any strategic action. Therefore,
Habermas maintains, that in the theory of the relationship between
theory and practice in practice, there is, in the last instance, a
"dualism. 1I Theory is not reducible to the contingencies of- practice.
This "dualism II Habermas would vigorously defend.
1lI:
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Habermas here wants to differentiate clearly the process of
enlightenment from the process of political action and the process of
confronting a political opponent with whom any constructive dialogue
(and therefore a therapeutic dialogue) is impossible. Critical
theory directly emqodies a form of practice, i. e., the organization
of enlightenment, as part of its theoretical and 'methodological struc-
ture. This practice involves a special type of interrelationship
between participating groups, as determined by reference to the
psychoanalytic model. The limits of this practice are also the limits
of practice which can be directly derived from theory. As the
result of the process of enlighten~ent, if it is successful, self-
conscious agents free of ideological distortions will be "forth-
coming." These agents, as persons capable of participating in a
political struggle to create the material conditions of freedom,
must be included in any process of strategy formation. The pro-
cedure for deciding 0!1 questions of strategy is the practical dis-
couse. As we have seen, such a discourse has as a condition that
the consensus arrived at, if it is a genuine consensus, must result
from a dialogue involving all self-conscious, ema~cipated agents.
Since the ultimate rational authority is the discursively generated
consensus, theory calUlot dictate a particular strategic practice.
Insofar as a consensus of all self-conscious and participating agents
i1'_~ •
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is attained concerning a course of action~ the strategy decided upon
can be informed by theoretical argumentation. But the theory, in
and of itself, has no authority aside from the agreement of the part-
ners to accept it in the attained consensus of the practical discourse.
While a practical discourse can and must interpret the theory, the
theory cannot be used to question the authority of the discourse.
Habermas recognizes, of course, that under the pressures
of actual immediate events, it may well prove to be impractical, if
not impossible, to implement a practical discourse in order to
formulate strategy. In such cases, actions must be taken as the
situation demarids.
There are situations in the face of which ~'such con-
siderations are either scurrilous or simply ridiculous;
in such situations we must act as best we can- -but
then without appealing to a theory:whof?e -capacity
. for justification does not extend that far. 7
The theory of political organization is meant to provide a model to
which actual practice should attempt to conform. The virtue of
such a model, Habermas suggests, is in clearly demarcating the
various functions involved so that political organization can avoid
elitist or mechanistic practice.
Habermas stresses this point by distinguishing different, pre-
conditions which he argues must be present on the three levels. On
the first level, that of theory, it must be accepted as a precondition
i.
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that " ••• those engaged in scientific work have the)freedom to
conduct theoretical discourse. ,,8 Only under this condition can a
scientific theory be developed in the most rational way. On the
second level, that of the process of enlightenment, practice must
be organized so that " ••• those who carry out the active work of
enlightenment commit themselves wholly to the proper precautions
and assure scope for communications on the model of therapeutic
'discourses'. ,,9 This condition must be met if deception and exploi-
tation are to be avoided. On the third level, that of political struggle,
there is yet a different precondition if it is to be legitimate, viz.,
II ••• that all decisions of consequence will depend on th~ practical
discourse of the participants --here too, and especially here, there
is no privileged access to truth. ,,10 It is Habermas· contention that
a political organization or party must adhere to these differentiated
functions and preconditions if it is to achieve its goals. Not to recog-
nize that strategy must be decided upon under conditions different
from those of the practice of enlightenment or theory is to run the
risk of conceiving of practice instrumentally and to fall into a
IIscience of apologetics. II As Habermas says: "The autonomy of
theory and enlightenment •.• • is required for the sake of the inde-
pendence of political action. 1111
None of that said above is intended to minimize the importance
.f)
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of the level of strategy. Rather, Habermas intends to maximize one's
appreciation of the risks involved in day-to-day political practice,
risks which 1J no theory can dissipate. II Nor can political participants
avoid or escape these risks. Likewise, nothing said above was
intende.d to imply that we should not engag~ in strategic action. It
is rather that Habermas seeks to stress that if and when we engage
in such activity, we do so with no illusions as to the nature of its
status.
The moment of ema~cipation looks to the future, to the Bildung
and freedom of the subject. The moment of enlightenment looks to
the past, to the self-formative process of the subject. The moment
.of political struggle takes place between these two moments. And
here there are no guarantees. But if the struggle is successful,
we can overcome the a'!,ymmetry between the enlightened and
unenlightened and unite and equalize all subjects in the same process.
NOTES
('1
lef. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 25-40.pp.
2Ibid• , p. 29.
3Ibid . , p. 32.
4Ibid .
5Ibid .
(1 6Ibid• l p. 33.
7Ibid. , p. 37.
~8
. L, Ibid.
(1
9Ibid . , p. 33.
IOIbid. , p. 34.
0 llIbid. l p. 36.
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CHAPTER XIV
A CRITIQUE OF HABERMAS
Habermas' work is a major and extensive attempt to reformu-
late the philosophical foundations for a critical theory of society;
a social theory designed with a practical intent, the self-emancipation
of men from the constraints of unnecessary domination in its multi-
farious forms. Central to the project is the argued connection
between truth, freedom, and the good life. Is this argument defen-
sible? The argument for the connection is crucial to Habermas'
overall program; with it stands or falls his attempt to overcome the
separation of fact and value, description and evaluation,' science and
'\
criticism, and theory and practice.
The analysis of speech reveals Habermas I claims that speech
is oriented toward the idea of truth. The analysis of truth, the
argument suggests, leads to the conGept of a discursively achieved
consensus. The analysis of the IIconsensus, 11 it is contended, shows
this notion to involve a normative dimension.
The analysis of the notion of a grounded consensus
ties it to a speech situation which is free from all
external and internal constraints, that is, in which
the resulting consensus is due simply to the force
of the better argument. Finally, the analysis of the
545
U:
·0
!
o
546
ideal speech situation shows it to involve assumptions
about the context of interaction in which speech is
located. 1
The end result of this argument is, as we have seen, that the very
structure of speech is contended to involve the anticipation of a form
of life in which freedom and autonomy are possible. On Habermas'
account, the critical theory of society makes this its starting point.
No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual under-
standing may be deformed, the design of an ideal
speech situation is necessarily implied in the struc-
ture of potential speech, since all speech, even of
intentional deception, is oriented toward the idea of
truth. This idea can only be analyzed with regard to
a consensus achieved in unrestrained and universal
discourse. Insofar as we master the means for the
construction of the ideal speech situation, we can
conceive the ideas of truth, freedom, and justice,
which interpret each other - -although of course
only as ideas. On the strength of communicative
.competence alone, however, and independent of the
empirical structures of the social system to which
we belong, we are quite unable to realize the ideal
speech situation; we can only anticipate it. 2
The theory of Communicative Competence, of 1'pragmatic
universals, 11 is both ingenious and extremely controversial. This
theory is, as Well1TIer has pointed out, at one and the same time,
lIan attempt to explicate the universally valid pragmatic rules which
every 'competent' speaker,-actor has learnt to master; no less is it
an attem.pt to provide a linguistic explication of the traditional ideas
of truth, freedom, and justice, an explication which tries to show
that these ideas are operative--and how they are operative--in any
~ll i .
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symbolic interaction. Correspondingly, the theory of pragmatic
universals also provides an explication of the idea of 'systematically
distorted comlnunication, ' an idea which is of fundamental impor-
tance for Habermas' re -interpretation of historical materialism." 3
The very basis of this idea and of Habermas' critical theory rest on
an analysis of the structure of communication and its claimed norma-
tive basis. The question is, is the analysis of the structure of
communicative interaction adequate? The supposition of the ideal
speech situation and, therefore, the presence of the ideas of truth
and freedom as anticipations in speech, are argued to be operative
in any symbolic interaction. The question is, how are they? Is
this analysis, of vital importance to Habermas' argument, satisfactory?
It was suggested earlier that in Habermas 1 view we assume,
in discussing, "the reality of the ideal speech situation. It is
'anticipated, ' but as anticipated also 'effective '. ,,4 The question
remains: how can we lnake this claim about human interaction? How
. is the notion of the ideal speech situation generated in social inter-
action? On Habermas' definition, universal pragmatics deals with
speech acts in abstraction "from the variable components of the
speech situation. 11 It examines only "the general structures of
speech situations in general. ,,5 This characterization does not
apply, however, to the specification of the ideal speech situation.
o\
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This specification is "formal" in the sense that it
abstracts from the different methods and strategies
proper to the resolution of different types of prob-
lems. It is also ""formal1t in that it employs the con-
cepts of universal pragmatics. But in requiring
symmetry of chances to exercise the different speech
acts it clearly involves the dimension proper to
empirical pragmatics, that is, the empirical condi-
tions which vary from speech situation to speech
situation. 6
But what is Habermas abstracting from when he labels the conditions
of the ideal speech situation as 1tformal"? When one normally speaks
of formal properties of arguments or statements (e. g., in the context
of logic), the bases of abstraction are usually quite clearly determined.
This clarity is absent in Habermas 1 analysis.
On the one hand, Habermas argues that the theory of communi-
cative competence is a metatheory, the elements of which are indirectly
empirical. At this level of theory, Habermas contends, empirical
data cannot be brought to bear to falsify the theoretical claim.s. The
theory or the ele"ments of the theory can only be directly opposed and
challenged on philos ophical grounds. (Empirical evidence can be
used to reject the theory only insofar as the theory leads to false
predictions on a lower level of theoretical application.)7 Thus
Habermas appears to attempt to immunize the theory of c.ommuni-
cative competence from a direct empirical critique. But the argu-
ment and demonstration that the ideal speech situation, for example,
is a presupposed or anticipated property of communicative interaction,
lit
:0
I
I
o
549
caIUlot be made simply by philosophical reflection. This Habermas
clearly recognizes when he argues, on the other hand, that the
normative model of ideal language use is not abstractly metaphysical
(or excessively formal) insofar as it is founded in an analysis of the
conditions of concrete speech situations. In walking "the fine line
between naturalisti~ and transcendental philosophy," Habermas
seeks to ground critical theory in such a way as to avoid the circu-
larity in previous attempts. Thus Habermas appears to be claiming
that the ideal speech situation is an empirical property of communica-
tive interaction per se.
-W.hus Habermas is, ~nib~guous 'concerriiItg the :status of the claims
of the theory of communicative competence. However, despite this
ambiguity, it does appear that when Habermas discusses the theory
. directly he does make strong e~pirical claims about the nature of
communicative interaction. He contends that certain arenas of social
interaction are governed by certain: rules or conventions constitutive
of dialogue. The ideal speech situation, he claims, is operative in
any symbolic interaction. But the question arises: From what
empirical data are these claims derived? Habermas offers us no
empirical analysis of practical social communication that might
uncover and, therefore, ground in social life this ideal speech situa-
tion~- From the school of ethnomethodology, Coulter has charged that
I.
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this ideal speech situation, as a model of human competence, "seems
more inspired by its exemplification of cherished ideals,,8 than by
empirical analysis. The charge, -that Habermas I version of critical
theory imports abstract, formal standards and ideals into analyses
of social life and history, ,-Jcan only be avoided if Habermas shows
how, and at greater length and detail than previously, the ideal
speech situation can be uncovered in communicative interaction.
Otherwise, Habermas appears to be making the absurd claim (which
he clearly is not) that communicative interaction can be understood
context -free. If the ideal speech situation is not to be regarded as
an imported, outside standard to social interaction, Habermas will
have to show how it is p.resent as a convention in the ongoing accom'- :
plishment of everyday life. Habermas would do well to bear in mind
one of the central tenets of the ethnomethodologists - -namely, that
the rational properties of practical activities be recognized, assessed,
categorized, and described within social situations of organized
common pr~ctices.9
Whether or not the ideal speech situation embodies only
abstract, formal, decontextualized rules (or methods) of action,
that are consequentially "imposed on" (and hence irrelevant to)
human interaction in some or all of its manifestations is as yet an
open question. To know whether or not the standard of an ideal
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speech situation is immanent in human interaction and, therefore,
whether or not it might be attainable, we need an account of compe-
tent rule usage in communicative interaction and an analysis of what
counts as competent rule usage in various social settings. What
seems to be required here is an analysis' of the socially organized
nature of cognition, of the indexicality of all types of interaction.
It --:should--be"noted, ·howeve,r.,· that such an analysis must explore these
areas with a broader, historical conception of social context than
that used by Garfinkel's ethnomethodolog~¢al-program,i.·e~, it·:
must avoid the problems associated with Garfinkel1s conception of
indexicality. 10 . This type of investigation would not onlys eek to
analyze the rules and conventions constitutive of social action in the
immediate situati~n of the action's production, but would also seek
to account for the historical genesis of these rules, etc., within the
movement of larger 'historical contexts. ~~~ Such an enterprise, which
is perhaps akin to Habermas J intention in developing a theory of
social evoiution, might or might not reveal that certain rules are
primary and common to the orientation of all human action and
interaction.
~r~It is recognized that the precise nature of such an analysis has
yet to be worked out. Likewise, a precise and operational concept of
indexicality has yet ·to be developed. In the absence of these specifica-
tions and developments, the above suggested program for further inves-
tigation into Habermas J theory of communicative competence must, of
course, be given a tentative status.
" ~
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The satisfactory discussion of these issues is crucial to Haber-
mas I program. For if the ideal speech situation is inadequately
"grounded, 11 not rationally or empirically justified, the critical
base of Habermas I program falls away. The whole conceptual schema
that allows Habermas to talk of distorted communication, "deforma-
tions of pure intersubjectivity," ideology, etc., is, as, yet, on very
"fragile grounds. Without development many of the problems associ-
ated with other attempts to ground critical theory will be "reproduced
here. For example, parallel charges such as those Merleau-Ponty
brought against Lukacs 11 could here be made; it could be said that
Habermas bestows on human life an abstract ideal--unconnected
with what is immanent or immanently possible in interaction. His
analysis of speech might be regarded as being charged with a "con-
ceptual mythology." Habermas I claim to have advanced beyond
.'
previous s cho~ls of critical theory will be in doubt if he fails to
develop what is, as yet, a speculative metatheory. Likewise, Alfred
Schmidt's claim that Marx's critical theory has been l'ransacked
again and again ll in search of an ultimate epistemological "founda-
tion" that can only be abstract and formal, will, with Habermas,
beget of yet another example. 12 If the Habermas program fails,
none of these remarks should suggest to the reader that we are thrown
back on, for example, the classical positions of a positivism or a
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hermeneutics. But it is to suggest that the questions we have begged
of these schools have not yet received adequate answers and that they
might well not if taken in the direction of Habermas' work.
A further difficulty can be highlighted with the theoryo! com-
·municative competence and Habermas' conception of the ideal speech
.situation. Even if we accept for a moment the analysis Habermas
makes, the question arises as to whether or not the symmetry of the
ideal speech situation is a necessary or sufficient condition of rational
discourse. McCarthy has cast doubt as to whether it is.
On the one hand, the argument for its necessity can
be Ina-de plausible only if "rational" is taken in the
very strong sense of perfect rationality proper to
the philosophical tradition. At the level of theoretic
explanation--for example in the natural sciences or
in mathematics--what counts as rational discourse
does not seem to require this symmetry, does not
seem to be inc~mpatiblewith any number of psycho-
logical, moral, political, etc. peculiarities of the
participants so long as these do not --occasion" a· -d~pa'r­
ture from the standards accepted within their disci':"
pline. It is only if this level of discourse is regarded
as resting on presuppositions which themselves must
be discussed (foundations of science) and ultimately
upon assumptions about the nature and limits of human
knowledge that rational discourse as such may plausibly
be argued to imp!y complete freedom from the con-
straints of ideology, neurosis or any form of domina-
tion. But to make this case for even the more reflected
forms of knowledge would clearly require a much more
detailed analysis than Habermas has yet offered. 13
On the other hand, as McCarthy points out, it is extremely difficult
to see how Habermas' notion of "formal" symmetry is a sufficient
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condition for what he argues and describes as the structure of
rational argumentation. How does this symmetry requirement
ensure the capacity and freedom to move from level to level of dis-
cour'se?
The freedom, for example, to consider alternative
conceptual schemata or to reflect upon the conditions
of knowledge seems to require presuppositions about
the reflective capacities of the participants and about
the cultural traditions to which they belong. It is,
to say the least, rather unclear how these are already
covered by the symmetry requirement. 14
The necessity or sufficiency, as well as the importance of the sym-
metry requirement is extremely problematic.
This point raises another difficulty internal to the te.rms of
Habermas f theory of objectivity and truth. The validation of all
scientific knowledge of the world, in Habermas t view, is inextricably
intertwined with the conditions for the realization of the good, the
just, and the true life. In absence of the realization of these condi-
tions there can be no ultimate verification or falsification of any, it
would seem, knowle"dge claims. As a consequence, the 'theory of
communicative competence is itself, given we are clearly well short
of the ideal speech situation, unproven. On the other hand, it is
ultimately unverifiable until the conditions of the ideal speech situa-
tion are realized. It cannot on this account be proven or falsified
until the ideal speech situation is achieved. Therefore, all knowledge
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claims are ultimately grounded on a ground that cannot be ultimately
tested until the specified conditions are realized. The claims for
the centrality of the ideal speech situation cannot, within Habermas I
own terms of reference, be settled or ultimately justified at this time!
.Habermas, therefore, cannot claim to have grounded critical theory.
At .best, he can claim that the truth claims of the theory remain
unfalsified; but the theory awaits verification.
There are, then, major pr.oblems with :tlie Habermas I theory
of truth. But having said this, it must of course be remembered
that Habermas attempts to historize the concepts of communicative
·interactio.n, communicative competence, discourse, etc. In the out-
line of a theory of social evolution he dis cusses the consequences of
the "evolutionary disjuncture," the fact that man is oriented to
validity c~aims. In his view, as we have seen, t~~~e ",is .a ,different
logic of development in the realms of work and interaction. This
claim raises another series of questions which are also, in fact,
questions to Marx.
Habe rmas I claim that the re are:~l~gics i_ofc:'devel()pD;lent ·.~.n;,liist6ry
(which do not discount regression) seems to tread the fine line between
,th~ stronger claims of Hegelian teleology and historical relativism.
His work, in arguing the centrality of cognitive functions and develop~
me:pt., is enormously suggestive, but as suggestive--as he hinlself
:-.c'
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readily admits --highly programmatic. The questions that are raised
speak to the enormously complex issues as to whether or not we can
talk of progress in history;and', if so, in what sense and generated by
what mechanisms. Marx, it would appear (or might be argued)
wants to hold on to a theory of progress. His view might be that
man's powers, needs, and consciousness unfold in history with the
development of his capacity to master outer nature. In the last
analysis, Marx might argue, the logic of development of conscious-
ness:- cari bel~un-derstood~interms of the logic of development of pro-
-, ~ ... ..
duction, the logic of development of social labor. In other .words,
human progress is dependent on the unfolding through labor of man's
powers and needs in history.
Habermas is, as we have seen, unconvinced that we can discuss
the logic of development of social life in this way. Neither he nor
Marx, however, have (obviously) adequately clarified the relation-
ships between realms of human interaction. For Habermas t argu-
ment, it is crucial that the irreducibilities and interdependencies
'of productive forces, world-views (or moral systems) and steering
(control) capacities be clarified. This I take to be his task in attemp-
,.
ting to develop a theory of social evolution. Leaving aside, for a
moment, the important questions as to whether such a general theory
is at all viable, the need for further development and clarification
1i
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.is crucial if this aspect of his work is to be !nore than of hypothetical
import. Without an elaboration of the theory, and detailed historical
arid anthropological inquiry, the "theory" of social evolution and
progress will remain speculative. A clarification of the two realms
of action is also important to the theory of interests. The exact
nature of the irreducibilities and interdependencies of the two realms
needs to be' clarified and specified. Without such a specification we
:might discover that there are good reasons why Marx could only
speak generally about social labor. (I will return to a discussion
of the theo·ry of interests in a moment.)
The discussion of a logic (or logics) of development in history
carries with it its own dange~s. In an entirely different context
Adorno pointed-·"ouf.:·;that:
To suppose, if only methodologically, anything.li~e·
an independent logic of culture is to collaborate in
the hypostasis of culture, .the ideological proton
ps eudos. The substance of culture, according to
this argument, resides not in culture alone but in
its relation to something external, to the material
life -proces s. Culture, as Marx obse rved of.~juridical
and political systems, cannot be fully "understood
either~ in- terms of itself . • • or in terms of the so-
called universal development of the mind. If To
ignore this, the argument concludes, is to make
ideology the basic matter and thus to establish it
firmly. 15
The position that Adorno is attacking is a view that Habermas would
also have no sympathy for. In his view, culture cannot be under-
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stood outside the development of the totality of hUlTIan practice. But
. Habermas does want to talk of a logic of development of communica-
tive .interaction and world-views that cannot be reduced to the logic
of the development of work, etc. In so doing, his argument carries
with it·a certain te:n.dency to legitimate certain forms of ideology,
and hence social repression, in history as being necessary at various
stages. (I believe that this view was also a tendency in Marx.) It
becomes extremelyitnportant for Habermas to elaborate when in
any given ·society he considers it to be legitimate and when surpassed,
i. e., what is the relationship between necessary and unnecessary
social repression in changing social epochs? 16 Otherwise, we risk,
as Adorno put r it, IImaking ideology the basic matter" ..and thus con-
tributing to establishing it firmly.
There are several other problems that carryover into Haber-
mas' discussion of "logics of development fl in history. One of the
most important of these problems arises with his claim that immanent
to the crises development of capitalism, is the emergence of a new
organizational principle which elTIbodies a level of consciousness
compatible with the highest stage of man's "inner cognitive logic. If
This claim we noted at the end of Chapter 12 is closely tied to Haber-
mas' contention that critical theory is reflexive. Both claims are
controversial. In order to understand Habermas' position better, it
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is worthwhile noting some of the major points he makes about the
changing nature of consciousness in organized capitalism.
In Habermas 1 view, the ideology of liberal capitalism is being
undermined and ever more replaced by "Science and Technology as
Ideology, If the instrumentalism of capitalism, etc. This view was
first expressed in Towards a Rational Society and is given central
importance in Legitimation Crisis. The argument for the under-
mining of the ideology of liberal capitalism is central to Habermas 1
contention that in the changing structure of consciousness the grounds
for a new "organization principle" might be located, i. e., a principle
that creates the pos sibility of discursive willfQrination: a democratized
society. This is the principle of organization of a "post-modern"
society and not one'that could support capitalism (or as some prefer,
a "post -industrial" society). Habermas seeks to demonstrate that,
just as Marx thought that in the wOlTIb of an old mode of production
a new one was born and developing, so a new and more developed
form of consciousness is emerging that will not support capitalist
value relations.
The argument Habermas develops to support this position is,
in essence, that the general development of organized/advanced
capitalism, and in particular, the increasing expansion of the state
into formerly private realms of determination, has<signi~ic'antlY-
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altered patterns of consciousness and motivation formation. The
con.tinuation of this tendency will lead, he maintains, to a motiva-
tion crisis. Habermas speaks of such a crisis when "the socio-
. cultural system changes in such a way that its output becomes dys-
functional for -the state and for the system of social labor [i. e. ,
the organization principle of society]. ,,17
The discussion of the motivation crisis is enormously complex. ~8
-J will only- briefly indicate its main points and directions. The major
motivational "dimension" of capitalist societies is characterized by
Habermas as bourgeois privatism (specifically, civil and familial-
vocational privatism). By privatism is to be understood a high
interest in the social system IS output (e. g., money, social status,
leisure, social stability) and a low interest in the inputs into the
decision and legitimizing processes (e. g., participation and control).
It is this motivational orientation, Habermas contends, which is
being systematically eroded.
The argument which supports this thesis has two parts: (1)
that the traditions which produce these motivational patterns are
being eroded and (2) that no normative structures are developing
which can serve as functionally equivalent replacements of the eroded
structures. As regards the first part, Habermas identifies the
chief components of bourgeois ideology and tradition as the achievement
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ideology, possessive individualism, and the orientation toward
exchange value. In Habermas I view the market mechanism is
weakening. As a result of this, the state is seen to be increasingly
socializing the costs and goals of the accumulation and legitimation
processes. As a consequence, Habermas argues, there is a steady
undermining of the persuasiveness of bourgeois beliefs. Additionally,
as the s ector of the population which no longer reproduces its life
through labor for exchange value (e. g., welfare clients, students,
the criminal, and the sick, the unemployable, etc.) grows, the
socialization effects directly dependent on the market are reduced
and lessened.
As regards part (2), that no equivalent replacement structures
are emerging which will generate privatism, H~bermas analyzes and
discusses three elements of the contemporary cultural formation:
scientism, modern (post-representational) art, and universalistic
morality (equality, democracy, etc.). He takes these elements to
be "indicative of the l~gical development of modernrc:ultural values .",
The contention is that in each of these areas, the logic of develop-
ment is such that the normative structures no longer promote the .
reproduction .of privatism and that they could only do so again at the
cost of a regression ~ social development (i. e., increas'e.~ ~uthori-
tarianism). In each of these areas, he argues, the normative
llJ I
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structures embody tendencies towa~d universality and critique which
. are potentially threatening to the inequalities of the economic and
1_.. 1 19po ltlca systems.
Habermas does not want to commit himself to the view that the
current motivation crisis will lead to a crisis productive of a post-
modern society. Rather he sees in the systematic erosion of bourgeois
ideology "signs'," "strong tendencies" to indicate its possibility.
But it is also clear that to the extent that he regards these develop-
ments as r~velator.~ of the immanent potential of the human species
~or the program and process of critical self -reflection, he must
regard them as both important and significant. The claim of critical
theory to be reflexive is, after all, closely tied to the claimed pro-
gressive changes internal to contemporary social practice.
Habermas I position rests - -as he himself recognizes - -on
complex empirical questions. These questions cannot be taken up
here at any length. However, I would like to indicate briefly a
tendency in his views to (1) overestimate the degree to which liberal
capitalist ideology has been eroded, and (2) be too quick to gloss
complex empirical phenomena. Both these points can be taken up
in reference to contemporary dis·cussions amongst sociologistf?
about the nature of consciousness that pervades contemporary life.
In separate surveys of a substantial number of studies debatip.g
!Ie
()
.0
Q
\(f)
,
563
the nature of the social cohesion of capitalist societies, Mann and
Giddens have both concluded that there is clearly a great deal of
evidence of dissensus and various degrees of class consciousness
and conflict at political, industrial, and cultural levels. 20 However,
they warn against the tendency, prevalent in much contemporary
social science, to make too simple gene ralizations about the similarity
of experiences between anyone country or tradition and another.
They stres s both the importance of eros s -cultural empirical data
and the absence of much reliable data of this kind. They highlight
that to the extent that reliable studies exist on the changing nature
of consciousness, they reveal a picture of complexity and ambiguity
that does not lend itself to easy generalizations. Patterns of con-
sciousness change significantly across countries and cultures. A
multitude of different types and levels of class consciousness are
found in different countries and within countries.
At the empirical level there is no ready evidence to support
Habermas I contention of the potentially imminent realization of a
communicative ethics, of the highest stage of tnan1s "inner cognitive
logic. If There appears to be very little evidence to suggest a general
change in normative structures that embodies tendencies to univer-
sality and critique. To the extent that any general characterization
of contemporary social consciousness can be made it should suggest,
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as Mann argues, that a dual consciousness is often found in many
working-class communities and work places. 21 This implies a
relatively radical qua populist interpretation of concrete everyday
events but a relatively conservative, privatistic interest in dominant
political parties and processes. Many dominant institutions and
processes are perceived and hypostatized as "natural," "the way
things have been and always will be," in which existing social struc-
tures are taken to be Ifin the order of things. "Z2 In other words,
much knowledge of abstract general issues is the result of interpre-
tation through categories and language not held and felt to be appli-
cable to the characterization of more immediate needs.
In short, given the available empirical data in contemporary
sociology (and the absence of empirical evidence inTHabermas I ~own
work), there does not seem to be a sufficient basis to locate the
emergence of an organizational principle of a "post-modern society."
C;;ontemporary changes in normative structures have, at best it seems,
a very ambiguous relationship to discursive will formation, univer-
sality, and critique. This is not to 'say that some of Habermas'- sug-
gestions are not powerful and useful, but it is to say that I consider
his views both an overestimation of the degree to which capitalist
ideology has been eroded, and too "quick" and "sweeping" in their
assessment of immediately past and contemporary developments.
()
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As a consequence, the status of notions like the "inner logic of
development of 'practical consciousness, It the lIpotential realization
of the highest stage of development of man's inner logic, II and the
lfreflexivity of critical theory, II are all problematic. First, given
the enormous differences between levels of critical reflection found
in contemporary society, 23 the general claim about there being an
"inner logic of development of practical consciousness ll (at the
phylogenetic level) needs to be much more carefully specified if it
is to be sustained as a useful concept. Second, given the significant
differences in degrees of "critical," emancipated consciousness
across cultures and within cultures, 24 and the general unavailability
of empirical evidence to trace the claimed imminent formation of
the "highest stage of developm~nt of man's inner logic, II the conten-
tion that such an evolutionary stage is potentially realizable is
extremely weak and unsupported. Third, as an inevitable conse-
quence of what we have said above, the claiin of Habermas ' version
of critical theory to be reflexive is tenuous. Developments internal
to the progress of contemporary social practice do not seem, in
any obvious sense, related to the categories .and concepts of his
version of .critical;theory.
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One of the central tenets of Habermas I philosophical position
is ·thc~.t the empirical-analytic 'sciences are to be sharply distinguished
from the cultural-hermeneutic sciences, both on the level of episte-
mology and on that of methodology. His views, as we have seen,
are based on his reflections on philo~ophicalanthropology and his
theory of cognitive interests. A criticism critics have made of this
position is that Habermas, in attempting to differentiate the various
sciences, has accepted a positivist model of the natural sciences.
For exalTIple, in a recent review of Kp.owledge .and Human Interests,
Richard Miller wrote:
• .. • Habermas I effort to create an unbridgeable gap
between natural science and other kinds of science
inc!easingly relies on an unintentional parody of the
natural sciences in which questions of whether given
particular events confirm or disconfirm given
natural-scientific theories is regarded as essentially
unproblematic. 25
A second and oft-made criticism is that the technical interest, which
Habermas claims informs the empirical-a~alyticsciences, is too
narrow a basis on which to found the variety of disciplines which
are normally considered natural sciences. The criticism suggests
that if Habermas is to convincingly· argue that there is an u~derlying
cOIUlection between all knowledge in the natural sciences and a basic
interest in control and manipulation of all natural objects, then he
lTIust provide an account of such a link with respect to certain problem
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cases, e. g., astronomy and the theory of biological evolution.
These criticisms misunderstand the intent of Habermas I
writings on the natural sciences. 26 Habermas is not concerned to
explicate t,he internal logic of the natural sciences and to des cribe
this logic in such a way that it can be used to give an account of the
history of the natural sciences. In fact, as we previously noted in
Chapter 12, Habermas explicitly denies·thatthe·is lTIakigg s-u-ch:a
claim. "I am 'not claiming that the history of science can be ade-
quately explained by regulators internal to the scientifi9:~system.,,27
Nor is Habermas recommending a model of how natural science
should ideally proceed. Rather, Habermas I intent is to demonstrate
(cf. Chapter 9), through an analysis of the logic of scientific inquiry,
that there is an inherent connection between certain types of knowledge
claims and certain forms of human activity. Further, he wishes to
claim that certain forms of human activity, in particular, the lTIanipu-
lation and control of ol:?~ec~s,and communication b-etween men and
women, are necessary to the survival of the species, given the
natural and:defipi~gneeds of the species and the nature of the world
in which it finds itself. This being the case, Habermas ar'gues that
certain forms and structures of inquiry and knowledge claims , for
instance, the form of nomonological, causal explanation in the
natural sciences, are a result of, and ultimately are to be understood
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as, a natural and inherent consequence of the situation of man in the
world.
Thus, that science does not function and operate according to
a model of science which Habermas (supposedly) discusses is not to
the point, for he is not attempting in his epistemological writings to
give a descriptive account of science. Rather, he is attempting a
metatheoretical examination of the underlying structure and logic
of knowledge and its systematic relation to action. He is seeking
to ·uncover the "a priorill (i. e., quasi-transcendental) conditions
for the pos sibility of knowledge. All he needs in order, for exatnple,
to begin his argument as it concerns the ~atural sciences, 'are two
things. First, that the inherent and fundamental "needs structure"
of the species is of the form he claims it is; and secondly that the
structure of knowledge and explanatory claitns in the natural sciences
are of a certain type, namely, ~aw-like generalizations concerning
externally observable and measurable objects, generalizations
which characteristically record the results of interactions between
objects in terms of such concepts as causation, etc. Given this
understanding of Habermas 1 project, two areas of questions and
criticisms can be posed.
First, can Habermas establish that there are three and only
three basic cognitive interests, the technical, the practical, and the
emancipatory?
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Or, to express this question differently, can
l'
Habermas demonstrate that certain rules are primary and invariant
to the orientation of all human action and interaction? And, secondly
and more generally, has he adequately established that there is the
type of linkage that he claims between human interest and structured
activity, and knowledge? Has Habermas adequately demonstrated
that the re is a If systematic relationship between the logical struc-
tures of a science and the pragmatic structure of the:rpossible applica-
tions of the information generated within its framework"?28 It is-my
view that concerning all of the above questions, Habermas I work
needs to be more explicit, developed, and detailed if his epistemology
is to be convincing.
A number of points can be made in cOllllection with the first
area of questions. In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas
attempted to uncover ,the three ,im.erests by systematic reflection on
the work of Peirce, Dilthey, and Fre'ud. But this strategy of inves-
tigation, although enormously fruitful and suggestive, cannot estab-
lish the claim that man historically is oriented to three b~sic interests.
For one cannot uncover and establish these interests by systematic
philosophical reflection alone. The the'ory of interests, like the
theory of 'communicative competence',. does in fact make strong
empirical·:~claimsabout the essential ori~ptations of the human species I
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activities. To establish and justify the thesis, viz., three interests,
one needs to investigate, as Habermas now emphasizes ,the evolution
of the species. Such a project is only in the earliest stages of develop-
mente Therefore, the claim that manls history is essentially struc-
tured along the dimensions Habermas suggests must at this stage
be regarded as conjectured knowledge. A theory of evolution might
or might not reveal that certain rules are primary and invariant to
the species f development.
Having said this, we must note another difficulty. A critical
objection can be raised by the (Winchian position two and Gadamerian)
hermeneutic tradition to the claim that one might or eQuId ever
uncover invariant needs of the species, e. g., a generalized interest;·~ .
in emancipation. For the ITleaning of emancipation, Gadamer, for
example, might well point out, is contextually bound to traditions.
When comparing the meaning of emancipation across traditions
across time, Gadamer might argue, we are lTIore than likely not
comparing similar phenomena'e~ As we saw in Chapter 5, the pro-
blematic of what is to be counted "as doing the salTIe thing" is
enormously complex. For Gadamer we can mediate traditions, but
the mediation is always a lTIediation for ·us.. Therefo~e, the meaning
of the claim that there is an invariant emancipatory interest is
inextricably ·bound to Hour" tradition. Rational reconstruction is
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alway~ for GadalTIer, reconstruction within the presuppositions of
our own tradition, which is to say, in short, that there is no basis,
no transcendental viewpoint, from which to construct the history of
the species. Given the weaknesses of the theory of communicative
competence, it is not clear how Habermas would or could respond to
these objections. However .he 1?ightr~spond, systematic attention
to these issues is a necessity if his program is to develop.
, The second area of questions has two parts. The first concerns
the viability of the link between action and knowledge, i. e., do action
structures provide the conditions for the possibility of knowledge,
etc. r? The second concerns the relationship between knowledge and
use, i. e., does the claimed pragmatic structure of knowledge imply
use for control and manipulation?
First, it seems important to note that, with respect to the
linkage between action and knowledge, Habermas I position on the
elTIpirical-analytic and hermeneutic sciences is both insightful and
at a certain general level correct (I note criticisms and questions in
the next paragraph). It does appear that if man did not need to control
and manipulate the objects in his ilTImediate natural environment he
would not need knowledge of regularities, etc. Likewise, it does
appear til~t the hermeneutic project is ini'~-xtricably'lip-Ked,to the -:.particu-
larities of human practical activity. 29 On these basic points I am
o·. I
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.sympathetic to Habermas I position. However, the link between know-
ledge and the emancipatory interest seems much lTIore problematic.
T~e problems here were reflected in our earlier criticism of the
theory of communicative competence (vital to the grounding of the
interest) and the claim of critical theory to be reflex'ive. If there
are systema~ic problems with both of these positions then the claim
that psychoanalysis, for example, as a mode of knowledge is linked
to an invariant emancipatory interest·~is. extremely dubious. On this
point Habermas 1 work needs considerable development if it is to be
satisfying.
The two major points that were made to the first set of questions,
however, obviously apply here. If the three interests have not been
shown to be invariant, then, the link between knowledge and interest
might well not be transhistorical. The following kinds iofiquestions
arise. Is there a link between, for example, a technical interest
and nomological knowledge throughout history? Can "primitive"
communities be said to manifest this link? Presumably, these
communities share a technical interest, but do they share knowledge
of the form Habermas contends, i. e., nomological knowledge?
Habermas I theory of evolution will have to address these questions
if his epistemology is to be found adequate. Likewise, the question
also arises here as to the meaning of these claimed links. In the
:)1.: ! .
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absence of a viable theory of communicative competence it is not
clear how Habermas could respond to the hermeneutic point that,
for example, the meaning of this link' is always, in the last instance,
tr'adition bound. If members of a primitive community have a tech-
nical interest and have a mode of knowledge that approximates' -the
nomological form, then, the relationship between interest and know-
ledge will have a connotation that is contextually tied to their tradi-
tion. A rational reconstruction of interests, a hermeneutician
would contend, is- always "a reconstruction for us. As such, a theory
of interests cannot have the stat~s Habermas claims for a rational
reconstruction.
Similar problems carryover into Habermas' discussion of the
relation between knowledge and use. But before addressing these
problems' a number of points can be made concerning the charge
~~nti.oned above (by some of Habermas' critics) that the technical
interest provides too narrow a base on which to found the empirical-
analytic sciences. Natural science, these critics would argue., does
more than provide information which is technically utilizable. For
example, the knowledge generated by the natural sciences, it might
be contended, allows man to feel more lIa t home" in a universe
filled with "chaos, contingency, and danger. 11 . This charge, as
usually made, (again) misunderstands the level on which Habermas I
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epistemological argument is developed. His theory (of a technical
interest) is not narrowly instrumentalist. He is not claiming that
all knowledge produced by the natural sciences must have a direct,
immediate, or obvious application for the manipulation and control
of the environment, and only such an application. Nor does the
expressed intention of the scientific community or of anY~lparticular
scientist have to include a concern for the technical usefulness of
kllowledg.e. His theory of cognitive interests is clearly not,; ,as some
of "his critics have maintained, psychologistic. Rather, Habermas
is concerned, as we have argued, with the form and structure of
knowledge" in the empirical-analytic sciences and the underlying
connection with basic human interests.
However, having said this, certain problems clearly remain.
For if certain forms of empirical-analytic knowledge do not have any
obvious direct "technical application," could it:";~dt .. be argued that,
given that the link between knowledge and use is not "immediate, 11
weak for certain sciences, e. g., astronomy? For if an empirical-
analytic science has no obvious application to technical c0!1trol, etc.,
the question arises as to how we can contend that a technical interest
is the constitutive basis of that science. Could not a case be made
that knowledge of the stars fulfills an interest, for example, in
o(i:'
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"making man more at home in the world'l? Habermas needs (again)
to be much"more explicit on the nature 6f the links between knowledge
~nd use, and knowledge and action.
,'..
' .....
A series of different questions and criticisms can be raised
in connection with Habermas 1 theory of the relationship between
theory and practice in practice. How, in any concrete situation, can
the psychoanalytic .model, in its differentiated functions as discussed
above (Chapters 11 and 13), be applied to political activity? Can we
derive a proposal for concrete ,political organization from Habermas I
writings?
In order to operationalize Habermas 1 theory of the practice of
enlightenment, it is necessary to be able to identify those social
classes or groups who can and will participate in the proc"ess of an
emancipatory political-therapeutic dialogue. That is, it is essential
that the theory be able to identify those groups to whom it can be
fruitfully and effectively addres sed. If the theory fails to do this,
the charge can be made that Habermas t notion of the feasibility of
. a program of social emancipation is utopian.
Marx was able to avoid the charge of utopianism in his day by
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being able to identify both the subject of enlightenment and the sub-
ject of revolutionary activity with a class, he argued, had
the potential power to ultimately transcend conditions of domination.
Marx's theory of capitalist development soug~t to account for the
conditions that made an emancipatory practice objectively possible.
Habermas als a recognizes the need for a theory, such as his, to
be able to ident~fy the subject of emancipation, the revolutionary
subject. Does Habermas' theory indicate classes or groups which
might fulfill this function?
In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas argues that the objective
conditions of capitalist organization may have altered sufficiently in
the last one hundred years to make it les s likely that the proletariat
will assume the role traditionally assigned to it by Marxist theory.
Habermas does not,6f course, rule out the possibility of the prole-
tariat assuming the role of revolutionary subject. Rather, he argues,
it is a matter which cannot be settled by theoretical reflection alone.
The issues involve a number of empirical hypotheses. These hypo-
theses are delineated by Habermas in his presentation of a typology
of possible crisis tendencies in late capitalism. 30
In his discussion of contemporary crisis tendencies, Habermas
is hesitant to commit himself to predictions about future social
development. However, he does indicate that certain developments
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in late capitalism may be producing various disaffected gr oups who
could be receptive to the process of enlightenment and the development
of a radical or socialist consciousness. These groups include women,
students, racial minorities, welfare constituents, etc. While these
groups are marginal to the production process, their disaffection,
Habermas contends, is evidence of emerging patterns of motivation
which are dysfunctional to the capitalist system of social labor. But
the question ar~ses as to whether or not Habermas would want to argue
that these groups, even if the tendencies he outlines are exacerbated,
are situated in a way sufficient to be able to provide the basis for
fundamental social change. If they are not (and if capitalism can only
be overthrown by the power of the working class as many Marxists
argue), the~ the disaffected groups :he mentions cannot, even if they
act together, perform the role of revolutionary subject. As a con-
sequence, an organized pro·cess of enlightenment aimed primarily
at these groups would not produce the hoped-for results.
It could.be argued by Habermas, however, that changes and
developments in the above -mentioned disaffected groups could be
sufficiently disruptive to "the system, II thus impeding the reproduc-
tion of capital. These developments would intensify structural
problems and as a consequence systemic crises. These crises, in
turn, perhaps might help to create the conditions whereby working-
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class consciousness would radically change. The result might be a
situation in which the working class would have an increasingly
radical consciousness and a will to act. If this last possibility proves
to be the case, then, a concrete and realistic political program might
be devised in line with Habermas' work. Habermas, however, needs
to be more exact and explicit in his social theory, not only as to the
possibility of major social change and crises, but also as to which
groups m.ight be affected by the various crises and therefore which
m.ight be susceptible to political organizing, and generally, what
political possibilities might be present ~r imminent.
A further question arises as to how Habermas conceives the
role of "psych"oanalystll at the social level. Who is to be the insti-
gator or promoter of the process of enlightenment? Is there to be
a revolutionary party and, if so, of what organizational form? Once
again it needs to -be said that Habermas I position on these issues is
not clear and needs to be made more explicit. In a recent interview
he indicated that a whole series of tactical possibilities cannot be
closed off at the present moment. 31 Tactics and strategies which
he mentioned include most things from organizing at the work place
to efforts at radical reform within existing political institutions.
Although, as we have seen, Habermas does provide a model of
political organizations, which emphasizes certain If safeguards ~ "
0·
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restrictions , etc., it would seem to follow that actual organizational
structures would, at least in part, have to depend on the nature of
the activity engaged in. 32
Finally it may be noted that there are problems with Habermas'
conception of the >organization of enlightenment as it is envisaged on
the lTIodel o.f the psychoanalytic dialogue. In Chapter 11 we noted
that central to Freud's theory of lfenlightenment" (on Haberm.as'
interpretation) was a process of transference. That is, it was held
to be necessary for the analysand to re-experience that which lay
-at the root,of:;his·orherjn~.u~9.S~S~. It is not enough for the therapist
to merely present a correct interpretation; only if a re -experience
occurs (of the experiences that caused the neurosis), can the analysand
successfully transcend his or her distorted self-understanding and
neurotic behavior. The crucial question here is: what political or
social experience can be taken as analogous on the level of social
enlightenment to transference within the psychoanalytic situation?
Habermas does not addres s this question directly. It is clear,
however, that a discussion of it is important if Habermas is to
successfully argue that the organization of enlightenment at the social
level can be fashioned after that at the psychoanalytic level. In
defense of Habermas' f position, it might be contended, as Simon and
I have pointed Qut:
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••• that a social crisis, if severe enough, causes
conditions in which people are forced to confront their
needs in a way that is more immediate and stark than
is normally the case. At such times, mechanisms
of distorted communication might be sufficiently
weakened so as to allow people to recognize the nature
and form of their social repression and exploitation.
If so, then they might be more generally receptive at
these moments to a theoretical account of their self-
formative process which corrected for experienced
distortions. 33
This sketch of an argument might be suggestive of what Habermas
has in mind by transference at the social level. But as it stands, it
is obviously an insufficient answer to the question. The usefulness
of the psychoanalytic model as a model for political emancipation
must be questioned if Habermas cannot more adequately address
this problem.
Habermas takes as central to his work the reexamining of
theory and practice,=in "both,"theory:"aridl"practic~.As we have seen,
however, Habermas' positions are open to a variety of criticisms.
Although he has succes sfully raised a plethora of key questions,
he has not (as yet?) developed convincing answers. Habermas seeks
both to unite and differentiate theory and practice. In his theory of
communicative competence he attempts to ground theory and theory's
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standards in constituent elements of practice, and yet maintain a
critical distance from the contingencies and immediacies of practice.
This theory we have found wanting. As a consequence, the founda-
tion of his conception of critical science is in doubt.
In his theory of interests· he attempts to link knowledge and
human interests, but these claimed invariant links have also been
criticized and questioned. The theory of systematic enlightenment
and emancipation was modeled after the pyschoanalytic dialogue.
But this Inodel, as currently employed by Habermas, leaves open
several unaddressed questions. We have also found that the theory
of evolution and progress, which might sustain many of Habermas t
theoretical reflections, is promising but s.till ~peculative. Likewise,
Habermas I work on the contemporary epoch and the potentiality of
emancipatory political practice is both insightful and insufficently
developed·. On Habermas t account, thel"ultimate verification of his
theory can only come, as we have noted, in practice. However, with-
out adequate stipulation of the ways in which we are to proceed toward
the eventual practice which might vindicate his theory, the program.
appears incomplete if not simply inadequate.
In the absence of satisfactory answers by Habermas to the above
questions and criticisms, the success of his program remains in doubt.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: REFORMULATING
THE QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
In our discussion of the Critical tradition we have seen how
the search for ultimate foundations, a grounding for Critical theory,
is a quest ridden with problerns arid am.biguities. The tensions we
uncovered in Weber l s thought, and the multiplicity of problems we
foun.d in the respective traditions of Positivism and Herrneneutics,
have not found resolution in the Critical tradition. Its atternpt to
sustain a theory of unity of theory and practice has been shown to
be inadequately developed.
Frorn our arguments in the first two parts of this thesis it
is clear that the oft-thought cleavage or dualisrn between theory
and practice masks certain relationships of continuity. However,
I have argued and stressed that these relationships of continuity do
not entail that the unity of theory and practice be regarded as a
simple reduction of either practice to theory, or theory to practice.
Rather the relationship, I have contended, rnust be conceived as
one of difference within unity. Positivisrn fails to recognize the
dirnension of unity in the relationship between theory and practice.
As a consequence, positivislTI is unable to account for itself and,
therefore, is unable to justify itself. If we regard the sciences,
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for exa:rnple, as formal, self-enclosed syste:rns, then it becomes
i:rnpossible to com.prehend them as hum.an activities. Theory is both
of practice and imlTIanently related to practice in a variety of ways.
Yet, if the need for differentiation is not recognized, as is often
the case in .the hermeneutic tradition, then the terms and categories
of theory are reduced to that of practice. As a result, theory falls
into a relativis:rn and descriptivis:rn and is unable to·justify its
understanding and explanation of events in the world as so:rnething
m.ore than a la.y:man's everyd~y·~account.
We have seen, however, that serious difficulties arise in
certain atte:rnpts to elaborate a ground froIn which the theory of
the unity and distinctness ~of theqrY· and~1pra-ctice~:can1bedefended.
- ~ . . - ..- .. - ... " ,'" ". '" .. ' " ~
But the failure of the critical school to have uncovered an ultilTIate
ground that is both of practice and independent of its i:rn:rnediacies,
etc., does not im.ply that we are forced back on a position of, for
exaInple, a positivism or a hermeneutics. It does not i:rnply, tha1 the
-- I
proble:rnatic of ideology, or m.ore generally the proble:rnatic of using
."._-.
ter:rns that are not part of an ongoing everyday life or tradition,
raises false/pseudo issues and proble:rns. Nor does it i:rnply that
that the distinctions between:
---syste:rnatical1y distorted com.:rnunication and undis-
torted com.Inunication;
---false consciousness and true consciousness;
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- - -the auth~nticity of tradition and the authority of
tradition;
- - -the authority of tradition and the truth content of
tradition; and
-- -understanding and critical understanding.
were pseudo distinctions.
At the outset of this thesis we said that a critique of ideology
lnust be able to:
1. give an account of the concept of ideology.
2. support its pretensions to a critical perspective by
I
o
grounding its vision of ideology-free inter subjectivity, i. e. ,
clarify and justify in the notion of ideology, a necessarily
ilTIplied conception of a ttself-conscious tt and "self-transparent"
actor. In short, it lTIust be able to elucidate the difference
between false-consciousness and true-consciousness.
3. give a reconstruction of the natural-historical.develop-
lnent of ideological structures of intersubjectivity.
What can we make of these delTIands in light of our discussion so
far and, in particular, in lieu of the criticisIns of critical theory
in Parts 3 and 4?
Let us begin by examining the issues raised by the second
deITland. We have argued that the problematic of grounding a
critical perspective is still a proble:m. An iITlportant question, how-
ever, retnain"s: Might it be that the series of philosophical questions
,JIll I
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that arise when the proble:ms of "ulti:mate foundations" e:merge in
Critical theory are the:mselves a lTIisplaced series of questions?
We have seen that atte:mpts to ground critical theory, for exa:mple,
on the claim.(s) that the human species hasr~n interest or need
structure that is invariant and ilTImanent", can be objected to on
several levels. These included criticis:ms and questions as to the
internal consistency of the theories, the insufficiency of elTIpirical
evidence to sustain clailTIs lTIade, and the potentially variable status
and lTIeaning of these clailTIs thelTIselves" (an objection m.otivated by
the hermeneutic tradition).
Given all the problems that weigh on attempts to find absolute
standards for the foundation of a critique of ideology, it can clearly
not be :ruled out that the problelTI of grounding adlTIits of no ultilTIate
solution. Furthermore, given the objections we have :made from.
the perspectives of the herlTIeneutic tradition, it appears that the
search for absolute foundations im.plies a task that is theoretically
irn.plausible. But that a series of criticisms can b"e :made of the
Critical tradition IS attelTIpts to ground critical theory does not
i:mply that a critique of ideology is necessarily illegiti:mate and an
unfounded i:mposition on social life. That there are no ulti:mate
grounds does not ilTIply that there are no critical standards that
can be defended in argument, dialogue, and theoretical discourse.
:jJli I
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The question arises, however, what basis lTIight we have for these
standards? What is their status?
In HaberInas
'
discussion of psychoanalysis he continually
eIllphasized the need to elaborate and justify a presupposed concept
of norlTIality. Likewise he stressed the necessity for critical theory
to ground its .conception of undistorted cOInInunication. As a conse-
quence of the argum.ents he gave that underpinned {the.se-views,
Habermas was led, like some of his predecessors in the critical
tradition, to search for an absolute foundation--a pOEition which
would give the criti~al theoretician justified and ultim.ate authority
to unveil the ideological content of all thought. We ·have already
criticized this position. It is clear, however, that if a critical
science is to rem.ain a justified project in the human sciences, a
basis or bases for criticism. must be established. While psychoanaly-
sis and a critique of ideology do entail and require a conception of
"undistorted communication," or "true consciousness," etc., I
see few sound reasons why this conception requires the status of
ultim.ate foundations. In:my view we do not need to follow the
theoretical path of Haberm.as et al. in order for there to be justifi-
able standards for critique, standards of criticism. which might be
syste:matically applied by social theory.
The fact that we have no llgroundtr does not :mean that we
li~; :
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cannot present evidenc~ and develop argulTIents for a certain theory
of what might be ilTIlTIanent or potential in the human species (e. g. ,
a capacity of a given kind for self-knowledge, self-fuifilllllent,
dialogue, etc.), or of what is im:minent and potential in social
developments (e. g., in struggles or crises). Proposed theories
Inust, of course, be systematically placed at risk, i. e., in circuIn-
stances where they can be tested. The given theory of properties,
or potential properties, of the species and life-circulTIstances should
be clearly delineated and open to the criticisIn of those engaged in
theoretical discourse .. If a certain theory can sustain criticism and
systematic attelllpts at falsification, as mapped out in a research
pro graIn, then, this theory can become a basis for criticisIn in
social theory. For this to be the case, the properties which such
a theory interprets lllUSt be shown to be
a. natural-historical properties of the species (for exalllple,
qualities of species-being, or species needs); and/ or
b.
c.
historically developing (for exa:mple, new needs which
cannot be satisfied under the present system of labor);
and/or
objectively possible, c9~c;:rete':alte'rnatives :(fg·r/~exaInple,·.
a new principle of organization for a given specified
social unit); and! or
d. historically necessary (for exaInple, to the survival of
:man, or as the Inost rational' way to overCOIne syste-
lTIatical1y. r~prdduced3socia~:")prbbleIn's).
,UI! I
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Thus the unification of science and criticism. in a critique of
ideology will be the unification of the empirical and norrn.ative.
Empirical in that the elements interpreted and explained by the
theory. werecshbwn~tob"e p;.r,op~rties,::ofithel,~'social~world.. _.Normative
in that these properties could naturally become part of standards to
uncover and expose ideological conceptions of reality. (1 shall
define the concept ofideolC?gy -in~.a jlTIorn.eht·~ )
However, it should be noted that these critical standards will
not be ultilTIate justifications, or grounds. Rather, they will have
the status of what one rn.ight call quasi-reconstructions. They can
be thought of as reconstructions because they provide knowledge of,
e. g., species characteristics and! or irn.lTIanent properties: of-the
species and! or irn.minentlY realizable social developments, given
conditions x, w, etc. The claim here is that the critical standards
are ern.pirically grounded and reflexive of the corn.petency (or poten-
tial competency) of the species in certain specifiable circumstances.
These reconstructions cannot have the status which- Haberrn.as, for
.exam.ple, bestows on the theory of cOlTIrn.unicative cotnpetence.
They a:re better thought of as quasi-reconstructions because such
reconstructions will always etnbody interpretations that are histori-
cally and culturally intertwined and bound to traditions, and thereby
limited by the stock of knowledge, conce:R~s, rules, tnethods, and
i,
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procedures of flour" titne.
If we cannot uncover such standards the dualism. between
science and criticism will be justified. Systetnatic criticism. will
be flreturned" and bound to the realm of ethical theory. Without
such standards the role of theory becom.es much lUore like that
which Weber lTIaintained. But that we should continually and syste-
matically investigate_lpotential bases for critical standards is
crucial if we are to justifiably avoid the relativism. with regard to
value that is entailed in Max Weber and the neo-Kantians, Hertne-
neutics, and PositivislU; or the skepticism~ entailed in the self-
understanding of certain critical theorists (who seek to systematically
criticize the existing order but reject the quest for some positive
basis for critique). Such a skepticislU, we sawiin Chapter 6, alw~ys
entails (variously explicated) presuppositions in need of justification.
The critical skeptic m.ight well be able to point out "alternatives, rr
closed-off "possibilities, fI etc~ However, if these are to be any-
thing other than utopian suggestions, they need a justified basis,
an empirical foundation.
Such standards, if or when they are uncovered, can take on
the function of Habermas I flInetatheorytl without the entailed absolu-
tist com:mitments. This does not im.ply radical relativism. Rather
it implies the recognition that justified value positions, those values
JI~; ,
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that have been eInpirically grounded, will not be justified flfor all
time, If will not have the saIne connotation "for all tiIne. If Such
standards and values are relative to certain historical and cultural
contexts but, nevertheless, can, within those terlTIs, be objective.
In short, value-judglTIents have a cognitive content and adInit of
truth in specified contexts. Values can "theInselves be facts about
actual or potential hu:man satisfaction'} 1 and develop:ment.
Our given quasi-reconstructions Inust, of course, be subject
to·~:the given and appropriate' scientific procedures for testing pro-
posed "theories, It hypotheses, etc. But this type of test, as Haber-
lTIas has well argued, is insufficient for a critique of ideology.
Ultitnate verification is achieved only in and through practice with
the erradication of plockages' to···self:.urider~tariding. -..tJh~ analytic
dialogue between theorist and his/her subject/ object, whether
lTIobilized in a university or through political parties, is the basis
for the critical test of critical theory. As Habertnas wrote:
The theory serves pritnarily to enlighten its addressees
about the position which they occupy in an antagonistic
social syste:m, and about the interests of which they
could becolTIe conscious as objectively their own in
the situation. Only to the extent that organized enlight-
enm.ent and counsel lead to the target groups recog-
nizing itself in the proferred interpretations does
the analytically proposed interpretation becolTIe an
actual consciousness, and the opjectively attribut.e;d
interest situation the real interest of a group capable
of action. 2
illlJi 1
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As in psychoanalysis, so too in the critique of ideology, ultim.ate
confirm.ation is dependent on ttunconstrained acceptance by the
'addressees and the successful form.ative processes resulting
from. this. ,,3
The true interpretation :makes possible the truthful-
ness of the subject in the experiences with which he
had previously deceived him.self and others. 4
Ultirnate verification is successful em.ancipatory reflection because
the critique of ideology is concerned to uncover and dem.onstrate
a reality unrepresented, unknown and unthematized in the pre-
interpreted world of everyd?-y'life where actors l fralTIes of lTIeaning
the theorists 1 account of reality be set free as reality, can the
'0
I .
are distorted by ideology. Only through the dialogic, pr.bc'ess can
. .
I
I
:r\
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theorists I interpretations and theses become part of lived life, and
beco~e a dOlTIinant the:me in the actual consciousness of a group
and! or a class. The Critique of ideology is also, then, the process
of dialogic interaction between theorist and his/her subject! object,
whereby the theorist atte:mpts to :make the theory count in the meaning
structures of everyday life. Therefore, and paradoxically, the
critique of ideology is committed to interpreting, describing,
analyzing "what is, tr and changing the world as a consequence.
Thus the theorist concerned with the Critique of ideology
lTIust be both engaged in theoretical reflection and discourse, and
engaged in the dialogic process of enlightenm.ent. Only through
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active involvement in both processes can the theorist trdiscover rr
the world and "verify" or Ifcorroborate" his/her findings. Only
in this manner can the seemingly formal and abstract character
of the theories, concepts, and categories of theoretical discourse
become part of the constitutive practice of the preinterpreted world
of everyday life.
The concept of ideology, com:rnensurate with this revised and
modified account of critical theory, lTIust not entail an absolutist
..
conception Of'it:t;u~ consiousne~s~ Rather, the notion of ideology
that might be defended would be one that implies an empirically
grounded account of actual and/ or potential consciousness, i. e., a
concrete and historically r'ealizable concept of reason. The definition
of ideology could be that which:was ours at the outset. In Chapter 2
I stated that Ita body of beliefs is ideological insofar as it prevents
an adequate confrontation with the nature of its own status." By
"prevents tt is i:rnplied either that a body of beliefs contains pre-
suppositions which prevent it from understanding its own origin
and status (as we saw was the case, e. g., with certain strains of
positivism) or that a body of beliefs is systematically distorted in
situations of domination. Therefore, certain beliefs can be ideologi-
cal as a result of the force of their presuppositions and/ or as a result
of the force of :might and power. Beliefs that are ideological can
be seen to obscure reality in, at least, one of five ways: the'se include;-;,
claims to:
lIJIl,
1.
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represent a totality when, in fact, the set of views are-
"partial an~."on~ ... sid"ed. .
2. em.ploy pertinent categories, concepts! and term.s,
which are, in som.e sense, in~pprop~~~~e•.
3.
4.
have an adequate and substantive theory of a given set
of phenom.ena, which can be dem.onstrated to be false.
have a certain epistem.ological or lTIethodological status,
which is, in perhaps a variety of ways, incorrect.
5. have a theory which justifies actions,when these can be
shown to be pseudo or false~justi~ications;~5
Ideologies, then, could not be validated if system.atically tested in
theoretical or practical discourses. However, the possibility of
particular discourses occuring is itself dependent on historical
and cultural circum.stances. As a consequence, a given position
which is found to be ideological at point tl' m.ight not be thought
to be falsifiable at to (due to the [thenJ current stock of knowledge,
concepts, :methodological techniques, etc.). Having said this, it
can be noted, that the views expressed above are clearly not
incom.patible with Haber:mas
'
claim. that the concept of ideology
im.plies the eventual dissolution "2J·J~·.false'-c6rfsc.~.Qtis~_es·s·'(wh~th.er
process :mediated by comlTIunication and reflection.
On this account critical theory :might well proceed by exatnining:
a.
b.
597
the consistency of m.eaning between verbal and nonverbal
expressions and actions;
the possibility of system.atically excluded Ineanings
which lTIight inhibit self-expression and cOInmunicative
interaction; and therefore,
c. assess the possibility of a deceptive self-understanding,
the possibility of ideological distortion. 7
An exam.ple of a study in line with such a procedure is contained in
Claus Offe I s suggestion to exam.ine the ideological legiti:mation
mechanism.s of a political syste:m by
o
1
l
1.
2.
proceeding i:mInanently by putting un~ctualizedclaims
against the [sic (their)] systeInatic avoidance in
practice;
identifying system.atic rules of exclusion practiced by
a political system.;
3. showing how administrative processes have unintended,
[and intended] systematically arising 'imisunderstandings ll ;
,\
4~ or. by. cOInparative procedure that reveal rules of exclu-
sion in one system. in relation/to another. 8
We saw that a given conception of Critical theory was often
argued to im.ply a particular conception of (critical) m.ethod. What
approach, or series of :methods, would be appropriate to pursue the
types of analysis suggested above? HaberInas I account of the rela-
tion between the causal~nolTIologicalsciences and the herrn.eneutic
sciences in his ldealized account of psychoanalysis (which is further
concretized in his approach to the investigation of social crises) is,
in :my view, an excellent discussion of the respective roles of these
1 1:. c:
I~Ij •
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approaches for a critical social science. His attem.pt, however,
to ground these approaches in the hum.an species' interests has
been questioned and criticized.' But in absence of an ultim.ate
ground for these enterprises, it (again) ,does not follow ,that there
are no sound argum.ents for each approach. Without an absolute
ground in ~hesubject's needs or interest structure, the argum.ents
, for the justification of respective approache~ perhaps falls back on
a position that we originally started with and criticized, i. e., on
an argum.ent from. m.ethod. Weber m.ade this position his own,
although as we have seen, he provided few argum.ents to support
his views. Certain of the writers we discussed in Chapters 4 and 5
alsolTIade such a position their own. With each of these authors
I atte:mpted to highliglit the lim.itations and inadequacies of the
argument froIn :method. However, we have also seen the lim.ita-
tions and inadequacies of certain of the objections we m.ade against
their positions;'· particularly with respect to the 'lcriticism.1I of
their seem.ing failure to ground their choice of ultim.ate theoretical
principles and m.ethodological procedure.
In light of the developm.ent of this work it is clear that I have
no system.atic response to these issues. Nevertheless, I would like
to stress m.y accC?rd with an underlying com.mon im.pulse to the works
of Lakatos, Gadam.er, 'and Haberm.as that defends 'the necessity of
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testability, sophisticated falsificationism., criticism., and discourse
in all theoretical work. Assertions of all kinds :must be open to
relevant intersubjectively established controls, if they are to be
established as som.ething lnore than assertions. Furthermore,
within thi s ,rcriti9ist" fralne' :it:~ s~em.s_~clear:1that";the~question as: to
the applicability -bf any series of ITIethods, standards, controls, etc.,
is dependent on the theoretical and practical context of investigation.
As w.e saw in our discussion of the e:mpirical-analytic, the herm.e-
neutic, and the critical sciences, the question as to viability of a
given approach is contextually bound to the questions we ask (or
can ask) of social life. The probleIn of the systematic adjudication
between assertions is not a proble:m that can, in the last instance,
be settled over and above the context of inquiry. T"he warrantability
of assertions is dependent on the context of our questions and pur-
poses. The nature of the responsibility of finding a justified response
to a question, or series of questions, cannot be explicated indepen-
dently of the context of the types of questions we pose. Different
types of questions i:mply different types of :methods which, in turn,
entail different conceptions of what counts as explanation and under-
standing. Within the context of the the:mes of this thesis it appears
i:mportant to stress that within social science, no single approach
has ulti:mate authority. In where, when, what, why, how questions,
:,0
(~
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addres sed to different characterizations of social action, the
applicability of various lTIethods changes. Likewise, the criteria
of sufficiency in under standing and explanation change with'. the .context
, of questions generated. Within the fram.ework of the investigation
of the theory of theory and practice in theory, the questions as to
the applicability, correctness, and limitations of various approaches,
m.ethods (and th,eir implied conceptions of understanding and explana-
tion) m.ight usefully be further explored.
Thus, in the end, while this thesis has clearly not established
the viability of anym.ode of procedure or approach, it might have
served to highlight the respective li:mitations of certain approaches
to social science. The li:mitations of lTIy own concluding rem.arks
are also only too apparent. The relTIarks clearly have a tentative
status. They are intended to be suggestive of a direction for further
thought and work. It is, of course, recognized that if a useful
direction has been indicated, its clear' articulation has yet to be
made.
()
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-7
These points are drawn (and are adapted for :my purposes)
from. Haber:mas' and Wellm.er's critique of Gadam.er. See Wellrner,
Critical Theory of Society, pp. 31-41, and his ttCom.rnunication
and Ernancipation, If- p. 92.
8Schroyer, . sum.m.arizing the position of Claus Offe, in
ffThe Re-politicization of the Relations of Production: An Interpre-
tation of Jurgen Haberm.as' Analytic Theory of Late Capitalist
Developm.ent," p. 128.
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